Airports Authority of India v. W. Morris Romel Roy & Ors.

8. The learned Single Judge after relying upon above cited decision allowed the writ petition and observed as under:- “8. A reference to the aforesaid para of the judgment of the Supreme Court shows that the State does not have a licence to act in an arbitrary manner and the decision not to fill up the vacancies has to be taken for bonafide and appropriate reasons. Therefore one will have to examine in facts of the present case whether germane reasons are given and so argued before me for scrapping of the selection process and in not finalizing the select list although the entire selection process is complete by conduct of the interviews and also otherwise a merit list has been prepared which has not been published.

9. The argument which is argued before this Court of selection process requiring to be scrapped on account, of change of rules of the game midway by allowing probationers as valid candidates and also that all eligible probationers in whatever posts employed with the respondent ought to have been considered, is an argument which in my opinion does not give valid and germane reasons for scrapping of the selection process and not finalizing the merit list/select list. I have already held above that probationers cannot be part of a promotion process unless and until the probationary officers stand confirmed as regular/permanent employees. Admittedly, respondent allowed (may be just before the interviews were conducted) probationary officers to be part of the selection process however, that cannot mean that the entire selection process can be scrapped because all that it means is that probationary officers who were wrongly considered in the process will have to be ousted from the merit list which has to be finalized and the merit list which has to be finalized can in law only be of those employees who participated in the selection process as regular/permanent employees of the respondent. Therefore, there is no reason to scrap the entire selection process and all that is required is that the probationary officers who in the first place could not have been considered in the selection process, cannot be validly considered for the selection process merely because of the circular of the respondent dated 11.1.2013, Therefore, it will suffice to direct the respondent that in the present case the selection process can be completed without at all considering the probationary officers for appointments to the 22 posts of Junior Executive (HR) which are to be filled up by promotion.

10. In view of the above, the writ petition is allowed. Respondent is directed to now finalize the select/merit list of the 22 promotion posts of Junior Executive (HR) in terms of the selection process which culminated by the interviews from 04.01.2013 to 10.01.2013. Since the probationary officers cannot be considered as valid candidates who are entitled to participate in the selection process, if any select list has already been made by the respondent including therein probationary employees, though not published, a fresh select Ust/merit list will be made whereby probationary officers would be excluded and only the regular/permanent employees will be considered for appointments by promotion to the posts of Junior Executive (HR) in terms of the merit list. Direction is given to the respondent to finalize the merit list/select list in terms of this judgment within a period of eight weeks from today. Parties are left to bear their own costs.”

9. The learned Senior Advocate for the appellant impugned the judgment dated 28.11.2013 and argued that the entire selection process has been scrapped on account of irregularities in the selection process, as the recruitment and promotion rules do not bar the probationers from appointment by promotion to the post of Junior Executive (HR); the original circulars dated 20.06.2011 and 05.07.2011 were faulty because they wrongly denied entitlement of consideration to the probationers and the said defect was removed subsequently by the letter dated 11.01.2018 issued by the appellant. The learned Senior Advocate for the appellant justified the scrapping of the selection process vide circular dated 03.04.2013 due to administrative reasons. Referring to State of A.P. and Ors. V D. Dastagiri and Ors., (2003) 5 SCC 373, he contended that no vested right is accrued in favour of the selected candidates to claim appointment and the appellant was entitled to cancel the selection process.

10. The records reflect that vide circular dated 20.06.2021, the appellant invited applications for filing up of 22 posts of Junior Executive HR by promotion from the candidates who were M.B.A. graduates and have secured at least 60% marks in the graduation. The said circular was supplemented by another circular dated 05.07.2021 whereby candidates having degree in M.A. with Personnel Management or equivalent were also invited. Vide circular dated 11.01.2013, the appellant also made it eligible for participation in selection process, for filling of 22 posts of Junior Executive HR, of those who had completed their probation period till the date of interviews. The appellant subsequently scrapped the selection process vide circular dated 03.04.2013 by citing administrative reasons. The circular dated 03.04.2013 reads as under: “ Further to vacancy circular No.A.60011/20/2011-EH dated, 20.06.2011 and 05.07.11 and subsequent letter of even number dated 17.12.2012 on the subject cited above, it is informed that due to administrative reasons, the Competent Authority has decided to set aside the aforementioned departmental exam. Accordingly, the process for filling up the vacancies notified in the above mentioned vacancy circular shall be initiated afresh.”

11. The perusal of circular dated 03.04.2013 reflects that it does not contain the details of reasons due to which the appellant has decided to set aside the departmental examination for filling up 22 posts of Junior Executive HR by promotion.

12. The administrative authority which is vested with power to determine questions affecting the rights of individuals must exercise power in conformity with the rules of natural justice and the requirement of passing reasoned orders by the administrative authorities is one of the important aspects of natural justice. Due to expanding horizon of judicial review, requirement to give reasons has become an indispensable part of judicial review. The Privy Council in Minister of Natural Revenue V Wright’s Vanadian Ropes Ltd., (1947) AC 109 held that a Minister who had failed to give reasons for a special tax assessment had not shown that it was correct and that the taxpayer's appeal must be allowed. In R V Civil Service Appeal Board exp Cunningham, (1991) 4 A AIIER 310 an award of abnormally low compensation to an unfairly dismissed prison officer by the Civil Service Appeal Board, which made it a rule not to give reasons was quashed by the court of Appeal by holding that natural justice demanded the giving of reasons both in deciding whether dismissal was unfair and in assessing compensation. In England, in a series of cases it has been held that statutory tribunals must give satisfactory reasons in order that the losing party may know whether he should exercise his right of appeal on a point of law. (See also Nortan Tool Co. Ltd. V Tewson, [1973] WLR 234. 12.[1] It is suitably established in India that an adjudicatory authority is required to give reasons for its decision. The Supreme Court in Siemens Engineer and Manufacturing Co. V Union of India, AIR 1976 SC 1785 reiterated the principle with an emphasis that the rule requiring reasons to be given in support of an order is a basic principle of natural justice, which must inform the quasi-judicial process. It should be observed in its proper spirit and "mere pretence of compliance with it would not satisfy the requirement of law". It was observed in Maneka Gandhi V Union of India, AIR 1990 SC 1984 that giving of reasons is a healthy check against abuse or misuse of power. The requirement of duty to give reasons was further crystallized in S.N. Mukherjee V Union of India, AIR 1990 SC 1984 and reasons due to which a reasoned decision must be passed were discussed. It was observed that reasoned decision: (i) guarantee consideration by the authority; (ii) introduce clarity in decisions; and (iii) minimize chances of arbitrariness in decision-making thereby ensuring fairness in the process. It was observed as under: “ In our opinion, therefore, the requirement that reason must be recorded must be recorded should govern the decisions of govern the an administrative authority exercising quasijudicial functions irrespective of fact whether the decision is subject to appeal, revision or judicial review. It may, however, be added that it is not required that the reasons should be as elaborate as in the decision of a court of law. The extent and nature of the reasons would depend on particular facts and circumstances. What is necessary is that the reasons are clean and explicit so as to indicate that the authority has given due consideration to the points in controversy.” 12.[2] The Supreme Court in Rani Lakshmi Bai Kshetriya Gramin Bank V Jagdish Sharan Varshney & others, (2009)4SCC496 held that the purpose of disclosure of reasons is that people should have confidence in judicial and quasi-judicial authorities and minimize chances of arbitrariness. It was held as under:- “The purpose of disclosure of reasons, as held by a Constitution Bench of this Court in the case of S.N.Mukherjee vs. Union of India reported in (1990) 4 SCC 594, is that people must have confidence in the judicial or quasi-judicial authorities. Unless reasons are disclosed, how can a person know whether the authority has applied its mind or not? Also, giving of reasons minimizes chances of arbitrariness. Hence, it is an essential requirement of the rule of law that some reasons, at least in brief, must be disclosed in a judicial or quasi-judicial order, even if it is an order of affirmation.” 12.[3] The Supreme Court in The Supreme Court in the case of Namit Sharma V Union of India, (2013) (1) SCC 745 regarding duty to give reasons held as under:- “It is not only appropriate but is a solemn duty of every adjudicatory body, including the tribunals, to state the reasons in support of its decisions. Reasoning is the soul of a judgment and embodies one of the three pillars on which the very foundation of natural justice jurisprudence rests. It is informative to the claimant of the basis for rejection of his claim, as well as provides the grounds for challenging the order before the higher authority/constitutional court. The reasons, therefore, enable the authorities, before whom an order is challenged, to test the veracity and correctness of the impugned order. In the present times, since the fine line of distinction between the functioning of the administrative and quasi- judicial bodies is gradually becoming faint, even the administrative bodies are required to pass reasoned orders. In this regard, reference can be made to the judgments of this Court in the cases of Siemens Engineering & Manufacturing Co. of India Ltd. v. Union of India & Anr. [(1976) 2 SCC 981]; and Assistant Commissioner, Commercial Tax Department Works Contract and Leasing, Kota v. Shukla & Brothers [(2010) 4 SCC 785].”

13. Negation of arbitrariness in exercise of public power is considered a cardinal component of the Rule of Law. The Courts have invalidated arbitrary exercise of administrative power. Article 14 of the Constitution strikes at arbitrariness in State action and ensures fairness and equality of treatment. The decision making process should be reasonable and rational and should not be arbitrary and violative of Article 14 of the Constitution. The Supreme Court in E. P. Royappa V State of Tamil Nadu, AIR 1978 SC 555 observed that Article 14 of the Constitution embodied a guarantee against arbitrariness. The Supreme Court in Maneka Gandhi V Union of India, AIR 1978 SC 597 observed that Article 14 of the Constitution strikes at arbitrariness in State action and ensure fairness and equality of treatment. The power of judicial review is considered to be an integral part of constitutional system and is described as basic and essential feature of the Constitution of India. It was also observed in S. R. Bommai V Union of India, AIR 1994 SC 1917 that the purpose of judicial review is to ensure that the individual is given fair treatment by the authority and is basic feature of the Constitution.

14. We are of the view that the learned Single Judge has rightly decided that the State does not have a license to act in an arbitrary manner and the decision not to fill up the vacancies has to be taken for bonafide and appropriate reasons. The appellant cannot scrap the entire selection process on account of change of rules of the selection process, particularly, when the selection process has already been initiated in view of the circulars dated 20.06.2011 and 05.07.2011. The appellant has not pointed out any valid reason for scrapping the entire selection process initiated in pursuance of circulars dated 20.06.2011 and 05.07.2011 and not finalizing the Select List and thereafter, appointing the candidates on the basis of the Select List. The learned Single Judge has rightly held that the probationers cannot be a part of the promotion process until and unless the Probationary Officer stands confirmed as regular/permanent employees. The appellant was not justified in scrapping the entire selection process.

15. The learned Single Judge has also rightly dismissed the review petition bearing no. 299/2014 vide order dated 04.07.2018.

16. We do not find any merit in the present appeal, hence it is dismissed.

SUDHIR KUMAR JAIN, J NAJMI WAZIRI, J JANUARY 27, 2023 sk/sd