Komal Nagpal v. Sonia Bhandari & Anr.

11. This, therefore, seems to us to be pre-eminently a case for allowing the amendment. The authorities also lead us to the same view. In L.J. Leach & Co. case [(1957) SCR 438] a suit for damages for conversion was by amendment allowed to be converted into a suit for damages for breach of contract after that claim had become barred, the necessary facts, as in the case in hand, being already in the plaint. In Charan Das case [LR 47 IA 255] an amendment adding a claim for possession after a suit for such claim had become barred was allowed in a suit which originally had only claimed a declaration of a right to pre-empt. In the last mentioned case, the plaintiff had in spite of warning at the earliest stage refused to make the amendment which he later sought and got. It was, therefore, a case where the plaintiff had initially deliberately refused to make a claim and an amendment being allowed later permitting that claim to be raised after it had become barred. It was in a sense a stronger case than the present one where the plaintiff had omitted to make the claim initially on a wrong notion and a wrong legal advice. Punishing of mistakes is, of course, not administration of justice.

12. It is true that the plaint does not set out the details of the work done. But there never was any dispute about them. Indeed the respondent had prepared a final bill of the appellant's dues for the work done under the contract and the appellant had accepted that bill as correct except on the question as to the proper rate chargeable under the clause. Strictly the details of the work done were not necessary in the plaint for it would be a waste of time of a court to go into them, it not being unusual to direct an enquiry by a commissioner or a subordinate officer about such details when, as in the present case, the items of work done are innumerable. It would be enough in such cases to file the details before the authority making the enquiry. Besides, in Pirgonda Hongonda Patil case [(1957) SCR 595, 603] in a suit for a declaration of title, this Court permitted an amendment setting out the detailed facts on which the title was claimed after the suit had become time barred. The absence of the details of the work does not furnish a legitimate ground for refusing the amendment.

13. It may be that as a result of the amendment, if the respondent chooses to raise a controversy about the work done, that is, about the quantity, quality and other things concerning it, which it had never raised so long, the matter will have to be gone into. That again would not justify a refusal of leave to amend. It would not mean any waste of time or money, or any duplication of work. That investigation would now be made for the first time and nothing done so far would become futile. Such an enquiry was indeed directed in L.J. Leach & Co. case [(1957) SCR 438].

14. The amendment sought is necessary for a decision of the real dispute between the parties which is, what are their rights under the contract? That dispute was clearly involved in the plaint as originally framed. All the necessary basic facts had been stated. Only through a misconception a relief which could be asked on those facts had not been asked. It would not have been necessary to ask for it unless the plaintiff had at a late stage taken the point that the suit should fail without more in the absence of that relief. We find the present case indistinguishable from Charan Das case [LR 47 IA 255].”

11. Mr. Sibal also heavily relied upon the judgment of the Supreme Court in Revajeetu Builders & Developers v. Narayanaswamy & Sons[6] and drew the attention of the Court to the salient principles which were culled out in the said decision governing the scope of the power of a court to allow amendments including the precept that claims which are barred by limitation, should not be permitted to be introduced by way of an amendment of pleadings. Mr. Sibal drew the attention of the Court to the following passages as appearing in that decision.:-

“55. In Haridas Aildas Thadani v. Godrej Rustom Kermani [(1984) 1 SCC 668] this Court said that: (SCC pp. 669- 70, para 1) “1. … It is well settled that the Court should be extremely liberal in granting prayer of amendment of pleading unless serious injustice or irreparable loss is caused to the other side. It is also clear that a Revisional Court ought not to lightly interfere with a discretion exercised in allowing amendment in absence of cogent reasons or compelling circumstances.”

56. In B.K. Narayana Pillai v. Parameswaran Pillai [(2000) 1 SCC 712], a suit was filed by A for recovery of possession from B alleging that B was a licensee. In the written statement B contended that he was a lessee. After the trial began, he applied for amendment of the written statement by adding an alternative plea that in case B is held to be a licensee, the licence was irrevocable. The amendment was refused. Setting aside the orders refusing amendment, this Court stated: (SCC p. 715, para 3) “3. The purpose and object of Order 6 Rule 17 CPC is to allow either party to alter or amend his pleadings in such manner and on such terms as may be just. The power to allow the amendment is wide and can be exercised at any stage of the proceedings in the interests of justice on the basis of guidelines laid down by various High Courts and [the Supreme Court]. It is true that the amendment cannot be claimed as a matter of right and under all circumstances. But it is equally true that the courts while deciding such prayers should not adopt a hypertechnical approach. Liberal approach should be the general rule particularly in cases where the other side can be compensated with the costs. Technicalities of law should not be permitted to hamper the courts in the administration of justice between the parties. Amendments are allowed in the pleadings to avoid uncalled for multiplicity of litigation.”

57. In Suraj Prakash Bhasin v. Raj Rani Bhasin [(1981) 3 SCC 652] this Court held that: (SCC p. 653) “… liberal principles which guide the exercise of discretion in allowing amendment are that multiplicity of proceedings should be avoided, that amendments which do not totally alter the character of an action should be readily granted while care should be taken to see that injustice and prejudice of an irremediable character are not inflicted on the opposite party under pretence of amendment, that one distinct cause of action should not be substituted for another and that the subject-matter of the suit should not be changed by amendment.” Factors to be taken into consideration while dealing with applications for amendments

63. On critically analysing both the English and Indian cases, some basic principles emerge which ought to be taken into consideration while allowing or rejecting the application for amendment: (1) whether the amendment sought is imperative for proper and effective adjudication of the case; (2) whether the application for amendment is bona fide or mala fide; (3) the amendment should not cause such prejudice to the other side which cannot be compensated adequately in terms of money; (4) refusing amendment would in fact lead to injustice or lead to multiple litigation; (5) whether the proposed amendment constitutionally or fundamentally changes the nature and character of the case; and (6) as a general rule, the court should decline amendments if a fresh suit on the amended claims would be barred by limitation on the date of application.”

12. Mr. Sibal further submitted that the suit which has been instituted seeks a declaration in respect of a sale deed dated 18 February 2001. It was his contention that since the suit came to be instituted only in the year 2019, it would clearly be barred by time in light of Article 58 as appearing in the Schedule to the Limitation Act,. It was Mr. Sibal‟s submission that not only was the suit time barred, even the averments which are sought to be introduced by virtue of the amendment application would be beyond the statutory period of limitation. The 1963 Act

13. Controverting the aforesaid submissions, Mr. Sindhwani, learned Senior Counsel appearing for the Plaintiff, has firstly alluded to the oft repeated principles as flowing from the various judgments rendered on the subject and which command courts to adopt a liberal approach while granting prayers for amendments that may be made. Mr. Sindhwani submitted that the injunction which was granted on the suit noticed above was a fact which came to the knowledge of the Plaintiff only recently and more particularly in the last week of January 2020 and viewed in that light, it would be evident that the objection of the claims being barred by limitation is clearly unfounded.

14. Learned Senior Counsel submitted that the grounds on which the sale deed dated 18 February 2001 was sought to be questioned are merely in addition to those which stand incorporated in the plaint. Mr. Sindhwani submitted that while considering amendments which are proposed, courts are essentially obliged to consider whether those would be necessary for deciding the real controversy which arises between the parties and to avoid multiplicity of proceedings. Learned Senior Counsel in support of the aforenoted submissions relied upon the judgment of the Supreme Court in Andhra Bank vs. ABN Amro Bank N.V.[8] and to the following principles which were laid down therein: -

15. Mr. Sindhwani also referred the Court to the judgment of the Supreme Court in Mohinder Kumar Mehra vs. Roop Rani Mehra & Ors.[9] where the fundamental principles which govern the exercise of powers under Order VI Rule 17 were explained as follows: -

8. The judgment on which much reliance has been placed by learned counsel for the appellant is Rajesh Kumar Aggarwal & Ors. Vs. K.K. Modi & Ors. (2006) 4 SCC 385. This Court had occasion to consider and interpret Order VI Rule 17 in Paragraphs 15 and 16, in which following has been held:-

9. Although Order VI Rule 17 permits amendment in the pleadings “at any stage of the proceedings”, but a limitation has been engrafted by means of Proviso to the effect that no application for amendment shall be allowed after the trial is commenced. Reserving the Court‟s jurisdiction to order for permitting the party to amend pleading on being satisfied that in spite of due diligence the parties could not have raised the matter before the commencement of trial. In a suit when trial commences? Order XVIII of the C.P.C. deal with “Hearing of the Suit and Examination of Witnesses”. Issues are framed under Order XIV. At the first hearing of the suit, the Court after reading the plaint and written statement and after examination under Rule 1 of Order XIV is to frame issues. Order XV deals with “Disposal of the Suit at the first hearing”, when it appears that the parties are not in issue of any question of law or a fact. After issues are framed and case is fixed for hearing and the party having right to begin is to produce his evidence, the trial of suit commences. This Court in Vidyabai & Ors. Vs. Padmalatha & Anr., (2009) 2 SCC 409 held that filing of an affidavit in lieu of examination-in-chief of the witnesses amounts to commencement of proceedings. In Paragraph 11 of the judgment, following has been held:-

18. In the facts of the present case, final determination as to whether the claim could be held to be barred by time could have been decided only after considering the evidence led by the parties. Whether plaintiff had any share in the property, which was sold in the year 2000 and what was the nature of his share and whether he can claim recovery of his share within twelve years were all the questions on which final adjudication could have been made after considering the evidence and at the stage of considering the amendment in the facts of the present case, it was too early to come to a conclusion that limitation was only three years and not twelve years as claimed by the plaintiff. The High Court on the one hand refrained from expressing any opinion and on the other hand has expressed his agreement with the view taken by the Additional District Judge rejecting the application as barred by time.

20. Although, learned counsel for the parties in their submissions have raised various submissions on the merits of the claim of the parties, which need no consideration by us since the only issue which has to be considered is as to whether the amendment application filed by the plaintiff deserves to be allowed or not. We make it clear that we have neither entered into merits of the claim nor have expressed any opinion on the merits of the claim of either party and it is for the trial court to consider the issues on merits while deciding the suit.

21. Taking into overall consideration of the facts of the present case and specially the fact that evidence by the parties was led after the filing of the amendment application, we are of the view that justice could have been served in allowing the amendment application. We thus allow the appeal and set aside the order of the High Court as well as the order of the Additional District Judge. The amendment application I.A. No. 1001 of 2011 stand allowed. Both the parties have led their evidences and case has already been fixed for hearing, however, to avoid any prejudice to the parties, justice will be served in giving a limited opportunity to the parties to lead additional evidence, if they so desire.”

17. It was also urged that courts while dealing with a prayer for amendment are not liable to go into the question of either the veracity or the truthfulness of the allegations that may be made. That, according to Mr. Sindhwani, is a subject which must be reserved for final determination in the suit proceedings. In support of the said submission, Mr. Sindhwani placed reliance upon the following observations as appearing in the decision of the Supreme Court in Ramesh B. Desai vs. Bipin Vadilal Mehta10:-

This principle would be equally applicable to a company petition. Therefore, unless it becomes apparent from the reading of the company petition that the same is barred by limitation the petition cannot be rejected under Order 7 Rule 11(d) CPC.”

18. Reliance was also placed on the judgment of the Supreme Court in Harshwardhan & Ors. vs. M/S Jai Jalaram Infrastructure Firm & Ors.11 where while dealing with the issue of claims being barred by time and such objections being taken at the stage of introduction of amendments, the Supreme Court explained the legal position in the following terms: - “ Having heard learned counsel for the parties, we are of the view that there was nothing perverse in the order of the trial Court allowing the amendment. The High Court was not correct in interfering on the two grounds stated by it. As was correctly pointed out by learned counsel for the appellants, the application to amend the plaint clearly states that it is only after the written statement was filed that the application to amend has been made as the written statement referred to the alleged cancellation. Further, as has been held in “L.J. Leach & Co. Ltd. & Anr. Vs. Messrs. Jardine Skineer & Co.”, AIR 1957 SC 357 and “Pirgonda Hongonda Patil Vs. Kalgonda Shidgonda Patil & Ors”, AIR 1957 SC 363”, the plea of time bar is not absolute to reject amendments. As was held in those judgments, time bar is one factor to be considered, and the opposite party can always be compensated in costs, if the amendment is allowed. In the present case, we have seen that costs were also imposed for allowing the amendment. This being the case, we set aside the judgment of the High Court and restore the judgment of the trial Court. The trial will now proceed in accordance with law. The appeal is allowed accordingly.”

19. For a more comprehensive analysis of the basic principles which would regulate the exercise of power under Order VI Rule 17 Mr. Sindhwani lastly placed reliance upon a recent decision rendered by the Supreme Court in Life Insurance Corporation of India vs. Sanjeev Builders Pvt. Ltd. & Anr.12 and more particularly to the following conclusions as enunciated therein: - CIVIL APPEAL NO(s).18246 of 2017 dated 11.12.2017

“(i) Order II Rule 2 CPC operates as a bar against a subsequent suit if the requisite conditions for application thereof are satisfied and the field of amendment of pleadings falls far beyond its purview. The plea of amendment being barred under Order II Rule 2 CPC is, thus, misconceived and hence negatived.

(ii) All amendments are to be allowed which are necessary for determining the real question in controversy provided it does not cause injustice or prejudice to the other side. This is mandatory, as is apparent from the use of the word “shall”, in the latter part of Order VI Rule 17 of the CPC.

(iii) The prayer for amendment is to be allowed

(i) if the amendment is required for effective and proper adjudication of the controversy between the parties, and

(ii) to avoid multiplicity of proceedings, provided

(a) the amendment does not result in injustice to the other side, (b) by the amendment, the parties seeking amendment does not seek to withdraw any clear admission made by the party which confers a right on the other side and

(c) the amendment does not raise a time barred claim, resulting in divesting of the other side of a valuable accrued right (in certain situations).

(iv) A prayer for amendment is generally required to be allowed unless

(i) by the amendment, a time barred claim is sought to be introduced, in which case the fact that the claim would be time barred becomes a relevant factor for consideration,

(ii) the amendment changes the nature of the suit,

(iii) the prayer for amendment is malafide, or

(iv) by the amendment, the other side loses a valid defence.

(v) In dealing with a prayer for amendment of pleadings, the court should avoid a hypertechnical approach, and is ordinarily required to be liberal especially where the opposite party can be compensated by costs.

(vi) Where the amendment would enable the court to pinpointedly consider the dispute and would aid in rendering a more satisfactory decision, the prayer for amendment should be allowed.

(vii) Where the amendment merely sought to introduce an additional or a new approach without introducing a time barred cause of action, the amendment is liable to be allowed even after expiry of limitation.

(viii) Amendment may be justifiably allowed where it is intended to rectify the absence of material particulars in the plaint.

(ix) Delay in applying for amendment alone is not a ground to disallow the prayer. Where the aspect of delay is arguable, the prayer for amendment could be allowed and the issue of limitation framed separately for decision.

(x) Where the amendment changes the nature of the suit or the cause of action, so as to set up an entirely new case, foreign to the case set up in the plaint, the amendment must be disallowed. Where, however, the amendment sought is only with respect to the relief in the plaint, and is predicated on facts which are already pleaded in the plaint, ordinarily the amendment is required to be allowed.

(xi) Where the amendment is sought before commencement of trial, the court is required to be liberal in its approach. The court is required to bear in mind the fact that the opposite party would have a chance to meet the case set up in amendment. As such, where the amendment does not result in irreparable prejudice to the opposite party, or divest the opposite party of an advantage which it had secured as a result of an admission by the party seeking amendment, the amendment is required to be allowed. Equally, where the amendment is necessary for the court to effectively adjudicate on the main issues in controversy between the parties, the amendment should be allowed. (See Vijay Gupta v. Gagninder Kr. Gandhi, 2022 SCC OnLine Del 1897)”

20. Mr. Sindhwani finally urged that even if the present amendment application was viewed as having been filed with delay, that too would not constitute sufficient ground to reject the same especially when it was clearly designed to obviate multiplicity of proceedings. Learned Senior Counsel placed for the consideration of the Court the following principles as late down in Pankaja vs. Yellappa13:- “12. So far as the court's jurisdiction to allow an amendment of pleadings is concerned, there can be no two opinions that the same is wide enough to permit amendments even in cases where there has been substantial delay in filing such amendment applications. This Court in numerous cases has held that the dominant purpose of allowing the amendment is to minimise the litigation, therefore, if the facts of the case so permit, it is always open to the court to allow applications in spite of the delay and laches in moving such amendment application.

13. But the question for our consideration is whether in cases where the delay has extinguished the right of the party by virtue of expiry of the period of limitation prescribed in law, can the court in the exercise of its discretion take away the right accrued to another party by allowing such belated amendments.

14. The law in this regard is also quite clear and consistent that there is no absolute rule that in every case where a relief is barred because of limitation an amendment should not be allowed. Discretion in such cases depends on the facts and circumstances of the case. The jurisdiction to allow or not allow an amendment being discretionary, the same will have to be exercised on a judicious evaluation of the facts and circumstances in which the amendment is sought. If the granting of an amendment really subserves the ultimate cause of justice and avoids further litigation the same should be allowed. There can be no straitjacket formula for allowing or disallowing an amendment of pleadings. Each case depends on the factual background of that case.

15. This Court in the case of L.J. Leach and Co. Ltd. v. Jardine Skinner and Co. [AIR 1957 SC 357] has held: (AIR p. 362, para

16) “16. It is no doubt true that courts would, as a rule, decline to allow amendments, if a fresh suit on the amended claim would be barred by limitation on the date of the application. But that is a factor to be taken into account in exercise of the discretion as to whether amendment should be ordered, and does not affect the power of the court to order it, if that is required in the interests of justice.”

16. This view of this Court has, since, been followed by a three- Judge Bench of this Court in the case of T.N. Alloy Foundry Co. Ltd. v. T.N. Electricity Board [(2004) 3 SCC 392]. Therefore, an application for amendment of the pleading should not be disallowed merely because it is opposed on the ground that the same is barred by limitation, on the contrary, application will have to be considered bearing in mind the discretion that is vested with the court in allowing or disallowing such amendment in the interest of justice.

18. We think that the course adopted by this Court in Ragu Thilak

19. We have already noted, hereinabove, that there is an arguable question whether the limitation applicable for seeking the relief of declaration on facts of this case falls under Entry 58 of the Limitation Act or under Entry 64 or Entry 65 of the Limitation Act which question has to be decided in the trial, therefore, in our view, following the judgment of this Court in the case of Ragu Thilak D. John [(2001) 2 SCC 472] we set aside the impugned orders of the courts below, allow the amendment prayed for, direct the trial court to frame necessary issue in this regard and decide the said issue in accordance with law bearing in mind the law laid down by this Court in the case of L.J. Leach and Co. Ltd. [AIR 1957 SC 357]”

21. Having noticed the rival submissions which have been addressed on behalf of respective parties, the Court firstly notes that that the plaint as originally framed rests on the allegation that the Defendants had misrepresented the truth and played fraud upon the Plaintiff as well as her father in proceeding to obtain a conveyance in respect of the entire suit property. It was the case of the Plaintiff that the sale deed was executed under the impression that apart from the first floor which was in her occupation, it was the remainder parts of the suit property alone which were sought to be transferred in furtherance of the arrangement arrived at between the Defendants and her father who was facing severe financial constraints.

22. The Plaintiff further asserts that it was only on or about September 2019 that the Defendants apprised her of the sale deed being in respect of the entire property including the share apportioned to her. She is stated to have thereafter obtained a certified copy of the sale deed from the concerned Sub-Registrar and instituted the present suit. Insofar as the sale deed being a nullity on account of the injunction of 08 July 1993, it is her case that it was only recently and while inspecting relevant records on the web portal of the Court that she became aware of the order dated 08 July 1993. It is thereafter that she is stated to have inspected the records relating to the proceedings taken before the Debts Recovery Tribunal. It is in that background that the instant amendment came to be proposed.

23. It must at the outset be noted that the grounds which are taken in the amendment essentially appear to be an additional and ancillary challenge to the validity of the sale deed. The cause of action and the principal dispute remains that of the validity of the sale deed. In terms of the amendment, the Plaintiff additionally seeks to challenge its validity on the ground of the same being rendered a nullity in light of the injunction which is stated to operate.

24. It becomes pertinent to observe that at the stage of considering whether those amendments are liable to be allowed, the Court is not obliged to weigh in or enter a definitive finding with respect to the correctness of the assertion of the Plaintiff that the facts surrounding the injunction order were only recently discovered or that the sale deed executed in teeth of the injunction that operated is a nullity. Those and other aspects connected therewith would necessarily have to await trial and after parties have been afforded an opportunity to address submissions. The amendment application alludes to the recent discovery of facts relating to the injunction order. It is asserted that the sale deed having been executed in violation of the injunction, is rendered a nullity. In the absence of any material or evidence which may have established, even prima facie, that the Plaintiff was aware of those facts earlier in point of time and has chosen to raise a claim which is hopelessly barred by time, the Court would be clearly justified in permitting the proposed amendments.

25. That then takes the Court to assess and evaluate the relevancy of the facts which are proposed to be introduced. While dealing with this issue, the Court would have to evaluate whether the allegations have relevance to the controversy which forms part of the suit and whether the facts which are sought to be introduced have a material bearing on the issues forming the subject matter of the suit. Whether the sale deed is in fact null and void and whether the injunction restrained the vendor and the defendants from entering into a sale consideration are all issues relating to the merits of the dispute inter partes. Notwithstanding the above, the assertions made in respect of the challenge to the sale deed clearly appear to be germane to the controversy which forms the subject matter of the suit. What also weighs in the balance and in favour of the plaintiff is the principle of avoidance of multiplicity of proceedings. If the Court were to refuse the amendments which are proposed, it would still be open to the Plaintiff to institute an independent action, subject of course to whatever objections that may be available in law for the defendants to raise. On this ground too, the amendment application is liable to be allowed.

26. As was noticed hereinabove, the assertion of a recent discovery of new facts as made on behalf of the Plaintiff was neither questioned nor assailed on behalf of the defendants. The arguments on the aspect of limitation were essentially raised and urged in respect of the issues arising in the original suit and whether the Plaintiff could have sought a declaration with respect of a sale deed executed in February 2001 by way of a suit which ultimately came to be instituted in 2019. That question clearly does not arise for determination presently since the only issue which merits consideration at this stage is the amendments which are proposed to be introduced. Those facts clearly appear to be pertinent to the dispute forming part of the original suit.

27. As would be evident from a reading of the proposed amendments, the facts which are sought to be introduced clearly appear to be an additional plank on which the validity of the sale deed dated 18 February 2001 is sought to be assailed. The challenge is based on the discovery of additional facts by the Plaintiff. The principal challenge in the suit essentially remains the same, namely, the validity of the sale deed dated 18 February 2001. Whether the Plaintiff would ultimately succeed in the grant of that relief notwithstanding the fact that she was a marginal witness to the sale deed also does not merit consideration at this stage. In any case, it clearly does not appear to fall within the mischief of the “new case” rule as propounded by our courts while examining the scope of Order VI Rule 17.

28. The aforesaid claim is also not shown or established to be hopelessly barred by time or the statute of limitation which applies. As was pertinently observed by the Supreme Court in Mohinder Kumar Mehra as well as Ramesh B. Desai, a question of limitation is not an abstract issue and would necessarily have to be considered bearing in mind the facts that may ultimately be brought on the record of the suit proceedings. A plea of limitation, as is well settled, is a mixed question of law as well as fact. In any case and as was explained by the Supreme Court in Life Insurance Corporation of India, a prayer for amendment is ordinarily to be allowed unless the amendment ex facie proposes to introduce what appears to be a time barred claim.

29. Mr. Sibal had contended that the suit for declaration as presented would necessarily be governed by Article 58 of the Schedule appended to the Limitation Act. The said provision prescribes that such a suit must be presented within three years from the time when the right to sue first accrues. The expression „right to sue first accrues‟ has been consistently explained by precedents to be the point of commencement when the right asserted in the suit was first infringed or when a clear or unequivocal threat to that right is raised. It also encompasses the point in time when the Plaintiff would have first derived knowledge of the infringement. Insofar as cases where fraud is alleged, the provisions of Section 17 of the 1963 Act also assume significance.

30. Tested on those principles, the Court finds itself unable to hold that the claim raised in the amendment application can be said to be, at least prima facie, barred by limitation. The Court deems it necessary to clarify that the submission of Mr. Sibal that the original suit itself is barred by limitation is not an issue which warrants examination at this stage. Presently and at this stage all that may be observed is that the allegations with respect to the sale deed being void in light of the injunction which operated is neither shown nor established to be barred by time. At the cost of repetition, it may be noted that the Defendants failed to establish that the Plaintiff did in fact have knowledge of those facts prior to the asserted date of knowledge and that limitation in terms of Article 58 read with Section 17 was thus liable to be computed from a point of time earlier than the one suggested in the amendment application.

31. Consequently, and for all the aforesaid reasons, the amendment application is allowed.

32. The Court notes that an amended plaint already stands placed on the record. The Defendants in the light of the present order may file an additional Written Statement within a period of four weeks from today.

33. Let I.A. 315/2020 and I.A. 319/2020 be called on 18.05.2023.

YASHWANT VARMA, J. FEBRUARY 21, 2023 neha/SU