Milan Saini v. Kamal Kumar & Anr.

7.2. On being queried, Milan Saini further confirmed that he had instructed Siri Chand Saini to sign the vakalatnama, pleadings and affidavits which are subject-matter of the allegations in the present applications, for and on his behalf; and further confirmed that he stands by the contents of the pleadings and affidavits so signed and filed;

7.3. Furthermore, Siri Chand Saini presented his identity credentials by way of his PAN Card and Aadhaar Card, which were seen and copies were retained on the court record. Siri Chand Saini was also identified by his counsel, thereby confirming his identity.

7.4. On being queried as to whether the signatures appearing on the vakalatnama, pleadings and affidavits were his signatures, Siri Chand Saini confirmed that they are.

8. Suffice it to say therefore, that insofar as Milan Saini, the petitioner who appointed the SPA-holder to represent him in the matter; and Siri Chand Saini, the SPA-holder so appointed, are concerned, there is neither any dispute nor discord between them as to the authenticity and validity of the signatures of the SPA-holder appearing on the record of these proceedings; nor does Milan Saini dispute the contents of what has been said thereby. Factually therefore, the applicant has no case to allege forgery, or creation of any false documents, on any count whatsoever.

9. Though there are also allegations as to the name, parentage, address and age of Siri Chand Saini being false, in the opinion of this court, to say that someone‟s name is not Siri Chand Saini but Shri Chand Saini; that his father‟s name is not Pirthi but Prithwi; that his address is not 396 but WZ-396; or that his age is not 62 but 71 as per some other records, when there is no dispute about those aspects between the principal and the appointed attorney; nor does anything on merits even remotely turn upon these frivolous typographical errors or omissions, is, to say the least, an exercise in utter uselessness; which must be considered only to be summarily rejected.

10. Now, to answer the interpretation and construction sought to be placed by the applicant on when a person can be alleged to have forged his own signatures, the essential ingredients of the offences under sections 436 and 464 of the Indian Penal Code, 1860 („IPC‟ for short) are required to be noticed.

11. The relevant portions of the aforesaid provisions are extracted below: Section 463 IPC

463. Forgery.—Whoever makes any false documents or false electronic record or part of a document or electronic record, with intent to cause damage or injury, to the public or to any person, or to support any claim or title, or to cause any person to part with property, or to enter into any express or implied contract, or with intent to commit fraud or that fraud may be committed, commits forgery. Section 464 IPC

464. Making a false document.—A person is said to make a false document or false electronic record— First.—Who dishonestly or fraudulently— (a) makes, signs, seals or executes a document or part of a document; (b) makes or transmits any electronic record or part of any electronic record;

(c) affixes any electronic signature on any electronic record;

(d) makes any mark denoting the execution of a document or the authenticity of the electronic signature, with the intention of causing it to be believed that such document or part of a document, electronic record or electronic signature was made, signed, sealed, executed, transmitted or affixed by or by the authority of a person by whom or by whose authority he knows that it was not made, signed, sealed, executed or affixed; or Secondly.......... Thirdly.......... Illustrations (a) – (k)......... Explanation 1.—A man's signature of his own name may amount to forgery. Illustrations (a) A signs his own name to a bill of exchange, intending that it may be believed that the bill was drawn by another person of the same name. A has committed forgery. (b) – (e)......... Explanation 2.......... Illustration......... Explanation 3..........‖ (emphasis supplied)

12. In one of its recent decisions in Sheila Sebastian vs. R. Jawaharaj and Anr.[3] the Supreme Court explains the crux of sections 463 and 464 IPC, where it inter-alia observes as follows: ―19. A close scrutiny of the aforesaid provisions makes it clear that, Section 463 defines the offence of forgery, while Section 464 substantiates the same by providing an answer as to when a false document could be said to have been made for the purpose of committing an offence of forgery under Section 463 IPC. Therefore, we can safely deduce that Section 464 defines one of the ingredients of forgery i.e. making of a false document. Further, Section 465 provides punishment for the commission of the offence of forgery. In order to sustain a conviction under Section 465, first it has to be proved that forgery was committed under Section 463, implying that ingredients under Section 464 should also be satisfied. Therefore unless and until ingredients under Section 463 are satisfied a person cannot be convicted under Section 465 by solely relying on the ingredients of Section 464, as the offence of forgery would remain incomplete. * * * * *

(ii) he altered or tampered a document; or

(iii) he obtained a document by practising deception, or from a person not in control of his senses.‖ ―22. In Mohd. Ibrahim [Mohd. Ibrahim v. State of Bihar, (2009) 8 SCC 751: (2009) 3 SCC (Cri) 929], this Court had the occasion to examine forgery of a document purporting to be a valuable security (Section 467 IPC) and using of forged document as genuine (Section 471 IPC). While considering the basic ingredients of both the offences, this Court observed that to attract the offence of forgery as defined under Section 463 IPC depends upon creation of a document as defined under Section 464 IPC. It is further observed that mere execution of a sale deed by claiming that property being sold was executant's property, did not amount to commission of offences punishable under Sections 467 and 471 IPC even if title of property did not vest in the executant. * * * * * ―24. In Mir Nagvi Askari v. CBI [Mir Nagvi Askari v. CBI, (2009) 15 SCC 643: (2010) 2 SCC (Cri) 718], this Court, after analysing the facts of that case, came to observe as follows: (SCC p. 687, para

164) ―164. A person is said to make a false document or record if he satisfies one of the three conditions as noticed hereinbefore and provided for under the said section. The first condition being that the document has been falsified with the intention of causing it to be believed that such document has been made by a person, by whom the person falsifying the document knows that it was not made. Clearly the documents in question in the present case, even if it be assumed to have been made dishonestly or fraudulently, had not been made with the intention of causing it to be believed that they were made by or under the authority of someone else. The second criteria of the section deals with a case where a person without lawful authority alters a document after it has been made. There has been no allegation of alteration of the voucher in question after they have been made. Therefore, in our opinion the second criteria of the said section is also not applicable to the present case. The third and final condition of Section 464 deals with a document, signed by a person who due to his mental capacity does not know the contents of the documents which were made i.e. because of intoxication or unsoundness of mind, etc. Such is also not the case before us. Indisputably therefore the accused before us could not have been convicted with the making of a false document.‖ * * * * * ―26. The definition of ―false document‖ is a part of the definition of ―forgery‖. Both must be read together. ―Forgery‖ and ―fraud‖ are essentially matters of evidence which could be proved as a fact by direct evidence or by inferences drawn from proved facts. In the case in hand, there is no finding recorded by the trial court that the respondents have made any false document or part of the document/record to execute mortgage deed under the guise of that ―false document‖. Hence, neither Respondent 1 nor Respondent 2 can be held as makers of the forged documents. It is the imposter who can be said to have made the false document by committing forgery. In such an event the trial court as well as the appellate court misguided themselves by convicting the accused. Therefore, the High Court has rightly acquitted the accused based on the settled legal position and we find no reason to interfere with the same.”

13. In the first place therefore, to allege that a person has forged his own signatures, is a very tall order. The foundation of that allegation falls once the person signing admits the signatures to be his own. It falls even further once the person on whose behalf he has signed also admits such person‟s authority to sign, as also the latter‟s signatures. That is not to mention that both the principal and the SPA-holder even admit to the contents of the documents so signed.

14. Explanation I to section 464 IPC which says that a man‟s signatures of his own name may amount to forgery, is contextualized by the illustration that follows, to say that a person signing a document (a bill of exchange in the illustration) intending that it may be believed that the document was drawn by some other person of the same name, commits forgery. There is nothing even remotely similar happening in the present case.

15. Before concluding, a word about the applicability of section 340 Cr.P.C. to the principal allegation made in the present case may also be in order. In the leading decision on the point in Iqbal Singh Marwah (supra), while upholding the decision in Sachida Nand Singh& Anr vs. State of Bihar & Anr.4, the Supreme Court has ruled as follows: ―33. In view of the discussion made above, we are of the opinion that Sachida Nand Singh [(1998) 2 SCC 493: 1998 SCC (Cri) 660] has been correctly decided and the view taken therein is the correct view. Section 195(1)(b)(ii) CrPC would be attracted only when the offences enumerated in the said provision have been committed with respect to a document after it has been produced or given in evidence in a proceeding in any court i.e. during the time when the document was in custodia legis.‖ In the present case, the allegation is of signatures having been forged on the vakalatnama, pleadings and applications before these were filed in court. There is no allegation of any forgery having been committed during the time when the documents were in custodia legis. Clearly therefore, section 195(1)(b)(ii) Cr.P.C. would not be attracted. Besides, the Supreme Court has further opined that: ―23. In view of the language used in Section 340 CrPC the court is not bound to make a complaint regarding commission of an offence referred to in Section 195(1)(b), as the section is conditioned by the words ―court is of opinion that it is expedient in the interests of justice‖. This shows that such a course will be adopted only if the interest of justice requires and not in every case. Before filing of the complaint, the court may hold a preliminary enquiry and record a finding to the effect that it is expedient in the interests of justice that enquiry should be made into any of the offences referred to in Section 195(1)(b). This expediency will normally be judged by the court by weighing not the magnitude of injury suffered by the person affected by such forgery or forged document, but having regard to the effect or impact, such commission of offence has upon administration of justice. It is possible that such forged document or forgery may cause a very serious or substantial injury to a person in the sense that it may deprive him of a very valuable property or status or the like, but such document may be just a piece of evidence produced or given in evidence in court, where voluminous evidence may have been adduced and the effect of such piece of evidence on the broad concept of administration of justice may be minimal. In such circumstances, the court may not consider it expedient in the interest of justice to make a complaint. The broad view of clause (b)(ii), as canvassed by learned counsel for the appellants, would render the victim of such forgery or forged document remediless. Any interpretation which leads to a situation where a victim of a crime is rendered remediless, has to be discarded.‖ As observed above, what is alleged to have been done by the petitioner and the SPA-holder, though the allegations are meritless even otherwise, does not affect the administration of justice even minimally. For this additional reason, the applications are wholly without merit.

16. Accordingly, the allegations contained in the applications are so completely bereft of a factual basis or merit, that in the opinion of this court, no further judicial time or ink need be wasted on them.

17. The applications are accordingly dismissed in-limine. In order to emphasize the frivolity of the applications, the dismissal is subject to payment of costs of Re.1/- by the applicant.

18. Costs be treated as paid.

19. Applications stand disposed of.

ANUP JAIRAM BHAMBHANI, J. FEBRUARY 06, 2023