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HIGH COURT OF DELHI
C.O. (COMM.IPD-TM) 55/2021 ANUBHAV JAIN ..... Petitiner
Through: Ms. Kangan Roda and Mr. Nitesh Jain, Mr. Vatsal Chandra and Mr. Sharad Besoya, Advs.
Through: Mr. Gaurav Barathi, Ms. Muskan Arora and Mr. Vishal Shrivastava, Advs. for R-1
JUDGMENT
08.02.2023
1. This petition under Section 57 of the Trade Marks Act, 1999 seeks cancellation and removal, from the Register of Trade Marks, of the device mark.
2. Registration was granted, by the Registrar of Trade Marks, for the disputed mark, vide certificate dated 18th June 2021, with effect from 26th May 2008, being the date of application for registration. The impugned mark stands registered under Class 32 in respect of “mineral and aerated waters, all types of non-alcoholic drinks, fruits drinks and fruit juices, shikanji, nimbu pani, soda, soft drinks, lemonades, syrups and other preparations for making beverages”.
3. Ms. Kangan Roda, learned Counsel for the petitioner, submits that the impugned mark is liable to be taken off the Register of Trade Marks under Section 57(1) and (2)1 read with Clause (a) of Section 9(1)2 of the Trade Marks Act, as, in her submission, the mark “Jain Shikanji”, being merely a combination of a common Hindu surname and a reference to the drink which the respondent was making and selling, could not be validly registered as a trademark, as it lacked distinctiveness.
4. On the face of it, the contention is not acceptable. The entitlement of a trademark to registration has to be examined by seeing the mark as a whole, and not by vivisecting it into various parts. As such, the applicability of Section 9(1)(a) of the Trade Marks Act, to the impugned mark, has also to be examined by seeing the impugned mark as a whole.
5. In the first place, it becomes apparent that the impugned mark is not a word mark, but a device mark. The device mark, as it stands, is clearly distinctive. It is not the case of the petitioner that any similar device mark was being used by others.
6. Additionally, even as a word mark, “Jain Shikanji”, when seen as a whole, cannot be inherently said to lack distinctiveness. It is not a
57. Power to cancel or vary registration and to rectify the register. – (1) On application made in the prescribed manner to the High Court or to the Registrar by any person aggrieved, the Registrar or the High Court, as the case may be, may make such order as it may think fit for cancelling or varying the registration of a trade mark on the ground of any contravention, or failure to observe a condition entered on the register in relation thereto. (2) Any person aggrieved by the absence or omission from the register of any entry, or by any entry made in the register without sufficient cause, or by any entry wrongly remaining on the register, or by any error or defect in any entry in the register, may apply in the prescribed manner to the High Court or to the Registrar, and the Registrar or the High Court, as the case may be, may make such order for making, expunging or varying the entry as it may think fit.
9. Absolute grounds for refusal of registration. – (1) The trade marks – (a) which are devoid of any distinctive character, that is to say, not capable of distinguishing the goods or services of one person from those of another person; ***** shall not be registered: matter of common usage that a Hindu surname is used as a prefix in a trade mark used for a drink which was being made and sold by the proprietor of the trade mark. Seen as one mark, therefore, “Jain Shikanji” cannot be inherently said to lack in distinctiveness. There are several such marks which stand registered such as, for example, “Delhi Public School”.
7. The plea of the petitioner, predicated on Section 9(1)(a) of the Trade Marks Act cannot, therefore, sustain.
8. Ms. Roda chose, thereafter, to abandon Section 9 altogether and urge what, according to her, were technical deficiencies in the grant of registration to the respondent’s impugned mark. In this regard, she has advanced two contentions.
9. User 9.[1] The Registrar has, while granting registration of the impugned mark to the respondent, accepted the plea of user, by the respondent, of the impugned mark with effect from 14th June 1996, as is apparent from the status of the impugned mark as reflected on the website of the Registrar of Trademarks, which reads thus: 9.[2] The first contention of Ms. Roda relates to the claim, by the respondent, of having used the impugned mark with effect from 14th June 1996. She points out that the registration that has been granted by the Trade Marks Registry to the impugned mark also certifies its user since 14th June 1996. 9.[3] Ms. Roda invokes Rule 25 of the Trade Mark Rules, 2017, which mandatorily requires a user affidavit to be filed with every application seeking registration of a trade mark, along with documents evidencing user as claimed in the affidavit. Ms. Roda points out that the respondent did not file any user affidavit with its application seeking registration of the impugned mark. It was only in response to the First Examination Report (FER) dated 17th December 2008, that the respondent filed a user affidavit claiming user since 14th June
1996. No document, evidencing user from the said date, she submits, was submitted with the affidavit. The only document that was filed with the affidavit was a certificate of a Chartered Accountant, certifying user, by the respondent, of the impugned mark, with effect from 2004. She, therefore, submits that (i) no document, evidencing user of the impugned mark by the respondent since the date of claimed user i.e.14th June 1996 was ever filed before the Trade Mark Registry and (ii) even with respect to the user claim of 2004, the only evidence filed was by way of a Chartered Accountant’s certificate with no corroborative documents. As such, she submits that the respondent has not made out any claim of user of the impugned mark before the 9.[4] The objection of Ms. Roda with respect to the alleged default on the part of the respondent in filing any proper user affidavit, supported with relevant documents, with its application seeking registration, may not have substance, as the application was filed in May 2008, at which time the rules in force were the Trade Marks Rules, 2002. Rule 1583 of the Trademark Rules, 2017, even while repealing the 2002 Rules, saves all actions taken under the said Rules prior to the enactment of the 2017 Trademark Rules. As such, the respondent cannot be faulted in not having filed a user affidavit with his application and that fact,
158. Repeal. – The Trade Marks Rules, 2002, are hereby repealed without prejudice to anything done under such rules before the coming into force of these rules. by itself, cannot be taken as a ground to discredit the registration granted to the respondent. 9.[5] Ms. Roda, however, further points out that, with the reply filed before this Court in response to the present petition, the respondent has placed on record the following certificate issued by the Zila Parishad: 9.[6] Ms. Roda submits that user has to be established of the mark for which registration is sought. The document of the Zila Parishad, filed by the respondent before this Court, too, she submits is a mere receipt of money received from “Jain Shikanji, Kadrabad”. This document, therefore, she submits, cannot in any manner evidence user of the impugned mark from 1996. As such, she submits that there is no justification for the Registrar of Trademarks having certified, in the registration granted to the respondent, user from 14th 9.[7] Mr. Gaurav Barathi, learned Counsel for the respondent relies, apart from the receipt issued by the office of the Zila Parishad, to which illusion has already been made hereinbefore, to a license dated 10th May 1996, issued by the Uttar Pradesh governmental authorities under the U P Food Adulteration Rules, 1976, which has granted license, to the respondent, to sell “cold drinks, chaat, namkeen etc”. 9.[8] At a bare glance, it is apparent that neither of these documents can evidence user, by the respondent, of the impugned mark from 14th June 1996 as claimed. I am also not convinced that a mere Chartered Accountant’s certificate, unsupported by any other document, could suffice as evidence for user. That apart, the Chartered accountant certified user, by the respondent, of the impugned mark, from 2004, whereas, in its user affidavit, the respondent claimed user since 14th June 1996. This discrepancy in user claim was itself a matter which warranted further inquiry. 9.[9] In these circumstances, the Court is completely befuddled as to how the Registrar has, while granting registration of the impugned mark to the respondent, accepted the respondent’s claim of user since 14th
9.10 The date of user is an important aspect for any trademark registration especially in view of Section 34 of the Trade Marks Act which accords precedence to priority of user.
9.11 Ms. Roda submits that the petitioner and the respondent are locked in litigation involving allegations of infringement and the like in which, if the claim of user by the respondent, as made before the result in irreparable prejudice to the petitioner.
9.12 Be that as it may, it is clear that there is no basis for the mark to the defendant, user, by the defendant, of the said mark with effect from 14th June 1996. To that extent, therefore, I am of the opinion that the impugned registration calls for interference.
10. Re. Section 11 10.[1] Ms. Roda also sought to raise, as a third contention, the fact that, in the FER dated 17th December 2008, certain objections relatable to Section 11 of the Trade Marks Act were also raised on the ground that the mark, of which registration was sought, was deceptively similar to pre-existing marks. She points out that as many as six conflicting marks were cited in the FER, namely (i) “JAIN CO.” registered in favour of Rajesh Kumar Jain under Class 32 for mineral and aerated waters,
(ii) the label mark “JAIN” registered in favour of Jain
Irrigation Systems Ltd. under Class 32 for beer, ale and porter, mineral and aerated waters and other non-alcoholic drinks, syrup(s) and other preparation for making beverages,
(iii) the label “JAINAM” registered in favour of Ms. Pallavi
Rajan Lakdawala under Class 32 for non-alcoholic drinks, fruit drinks and fruit juices, syrups and other preparations for marking beverages being included in the class,
(iv) the mark “JAIN” registered in favour of Hira Lal in Class
(v) the mark “JAIN MINERALS” registered in favour of B.
(vi) the mark “JAIN BEQILE AQUA” registered in favour of
Mr. Sunil Jain in Class 32 for package drinking water. 10.[2] She submits that no reply was filed by the respondent in response to the aforesaid FER and that the respondent merely filed a user affidavit, to which reference has already been made hereinbefore. Nonetheless, she submits, the Registrar completely ignored the objection raised and predicated on Section 11 of the Trade Marks Act and proceeded to grant registration to the respondent. 10.[3] Apropos this contention of Ms. Roda, Mr. Barathi submits that, after the FER was issued on 17th December 2008, the respondent submitted a reply thereto, in which the objections were met. No copy of the reply is on record. 10.[4] However, what the court has before it is the following communication dated 15th April 2009, from the Assistant Registrar of Trade Marks, to the respondent, which has been produced before this Court by learned Counsel for both sides: “No. TMR/PARM/GLV/2009/12 Dated: 15.04.2009 To M/s Jain Shikanji Restaurant Vikas Nagar Colony, Kadrabad Delhi-Meerut Road, Modinagar Distt. Ghaziabad, U.P. Sub:- Application no. 1690990 in Class-32 For registration of trade mark “Jain Shikanji” (Label) In the name of M/S Jain Shikanji Restaurant, Gzb, U.P. Sir/Gentlemen, In view of your reply/evidence submitted in support of application for registration of trade mark, the said application shall be advertised in the Trade Marks Journal as before acceptance under the provisions of Section 20(1) of the Trade Marks Act, 1999 subject to: No exclusive rights for the word “Shikanji”. Please note that if no compliance, if any, is received within the 30 days from the receipt of this order, the application shall deemed to have been abandoned without any further notice in lack of prosecution under Section 132 of the Act. Yours faithfully, Sd./- (G.L.Verma) Asstt. Registrar of Trade Marks” 10.[5] Following the above, as already noticed, the impugned registration came to be granted by the Registrar on 18th June 2021. 10.[6] To a query from the Court as to why there is no reference, in the communication dated 15th April 2009, to the objections raised in the FER with respect to Section 11 of the Trade Marks Act, Mr. Barathi submits that, as a matter of practice, the Trade Mark Registry never returns findings on the objections in the FER and the Registrar, if he is satisfied with the reply given by the applicant, merely proceeds to register a mark. 10.[7] He also submits that the law does not require any detailed or reasoned order to be passed on the objections raised in the FER. Mr Barathi relies, for the purpose, on sub-setions (4) and (5)4 of Section
18. Application for registration. – ***** (4) Subject to the provisions of this Act, the Registrar may refuse the application or may accept it absolutely or subject to such amendments, modifications, conditions or limitations, if any, as he may think fit. 18 of the Trade Marks Act. 10.[8] To my mind, such a state of affairs cannot be allowed to continue. 10.[9] Section 18(5) of the Trade Marks Act requires the Registrar to record reasons either for refusal or for conditionally accepting an application seeking registration of a trade mark.
10.10 Rules 33 and 365 of the Trade Marks Rules, 2017 deal with the (5) In the case of a refusal or conditional acceptance of an application, the Registrar shall record in writing the grounds for such refusal or conditional acceptance and the materials used by him in arriving at his decision.
33. Examination, Objection to acceptance, hearing. – (1) The Registrar shall cause the application to be examined as per provisions of the Act, wherein a search shall also be conducted amongst the earlier trade marks, registered or applied for registration, for the purpose of ascertaining whether there are on record in respect of the same goods or services or similar goods or services any trade mark identical with or deceptively similar to the trade mark applied for. The Registrar may cause the re-examination of the application including research of earlier trade marks at any time before the acceptance of the application but shall not be bound to do so. (2) If, on consideration of the application for registration of a trade mark and any evidence of use or of distinctiveness or of any other matter which the applicant may or may be required to furnish, the Registrar has any objection to the acceptance of the application or proposes to accept it subject to such conditions, amendments, modifications or limitations as he may think fit to impose under sub-section (4) of Section 18, the Registrar shall communicate such objection or proposal in writing to the applicant in the form of an examination report. (3) If, on consideration of the application for registration of a trade mark and any evidence of use or of distinctiveness or of any other matter which the applicant may or may be required to furnish, the Registrar accepts the application for registration absolutely, he shall communicate such acceptance to the applicant and cause the application to be advertised as accepted under sub-section (1) of Section 20. (4) If, within one month from the date of receipt of the examination report, the applicant fails to respond to the communication, the Registrar may treat the application as abandoned. (5) In case the response to the examination report is received within the aforesaid time, the same shall be duly considered and if the Registrar accepts the application for registration, he shall communicate such acceptance to the applicant and cause the application to be advertised as accepted under sub-section (1) of Section 20. (6) If the response to the examination report is not satisfactory or where the applicant has requested for hearing, the Registrar shall provide an opportunity of hearing to the applicant and the same shall be conducted as per Rule 115. (7) In case the applicant fails to appear at the scheduled date of hearing and no reply to the office objection has been submitted by the applicant, the Registrar may treat the application as abandoned. (8) Where the applicant has submitted his reply to the examination report within the aforesaid period or has appeared in the hearing and made his submissions, the Registrar shall pass an appropriate order.
36. Decision of Registrar. – (1) The decision of the Registrar under Rules 33, 34 or 41 shall be communicated to the applicant in writing at his address of service and if the applicant intends to appeal from such decision he may within thirty days from the date of such communication apply in Form TM-M to the Registrar requiring him to state in writing the grounds of, and the materials used by him in arriving at, his decision. issuance of the FER and the procedure to be followed thereafter. A reading of Rule 33 makes it clear that the exercise of consideration of the objections in the FER, and the response of the applicant thereto, is quasi-judicial in nature, involving notice to show cause, a reply thereto, and personal hearing if sought. An FER has to set out the reasons for prayer for registration of the mark being proposed to be refused. The applicant has a right to file a response. The applicant is also given a right to seek a personal hearing. After a response is filed by the applicant and hearing, if sought, is granted, sub-rule (8) of Rule 36 requires the Registrar to “pass an appropriate order”.
10.11 An “order” jurisprudentially, especially when it follows upon a quasi-judicial proceeding, has necessarily to be informed by reasons. Else, it is not an order in the eyes of law. Reasons constitute, as it were, the raison d’etre of the order.
10.12 The requirement of reasons also flows from Rule 36 of the Trade Marks Rules, which already stands reproduced hereinabove.
10.13 Mr. Barathi points out that Rule 36 envisages providing of reasons only where an application for grant of registration of the mark is proposed to be rejected, so that the applicant could appeal therefrom. Though, strictly statutorily speaking, the submission is correct, in my considered opinion, holistically and conjointly read, even in a case where the Registrar is proceeding to accept the application seeking registration, the reasons for accepting the (2) In a case where the Registrar makes any requirements to which the applicant does not object the applicant shall comply the said requirement before the Registrar issues a statement in writing under sub-rule (1). (3) The date when the statement in writing under sub-rule (1) is received by the applicant, shall be deemed to be the date of the Registrar's decision for the purpose of appeal. application must be forthcoming. An order which is open to challenge before a higher authority has necessarily to be reasoned as, else, neither would the aggrieved party, who seeks to challenge the order, know why the order was passed, nor would the authority before whom the challenge is laid be so aware. Section 57 permits a challenge to a mark which already stands registered. The person seeking to so challenge the grant of registration is entitled to know the reasons for the dismissal, by the Registrar, of the objections in the FER. Else, the authority before whom the challenge has been laid would have no option but to presume that there has been no application of mind to the said objections. Particularly when objections have been raised in the FER, and the applicant has submitted his reply thereto, there must be some evidence of application of mind, by the Registrar, to the objections and to the applicant’s reply. They need not be detailed. They may be brief. They must, however, be present. The oft quoted adage, that reasons constitute the life blood of every judicial and quasi-judicial decision, must inform the decision to be taken under Rule 33(8) of the Trade Marks Rules, as much as it must any other.
10.14 In a case such as the present, for example, the Registrar ought, at the very least, to have observed that he did not find the objections raised in the FER predicated on Section 11 of the Trade Marks Act, to have substance, before proceeding to grant registration to the respondent. Else, any person seeking to challenge the registration, such as the petitioner in the present case, would have no idea as to the view that the registrar took with respect to the objections in the FER predicated on Section 11. It is not possible, from the record, to discern even whether the Registrar applied his mind to the objections contained in the FER, predicated on Section 11, citing pre-existing marks. Conclusion
11. In that view of the matter, I am of the opinion that, while the impugned registration of the impugned mark cannot be said to violate Section 9 of the Trade Marks Act, the matter is required to be reexamined by the learned Registrar on two counts, namely,
(i) the objections predicted on Section 11 of the Trade
(ii) the date of user of the impugned mark by the respondent.
12. Given the fact that the impugned mark is subject matter of various litigations, the Registrar is directed to give an opportunity of personal hearing to the petitioner as well as to the respondent on 15th February 2023, solely limited to the aforesaid two issues and to take a decision therein within 10 days therefrom.
13. In order to avoid any confusion, and at the cost of repetition, the order passed by the Registrar (or any other competent officer duly authorised by him) should address (i) the date of user of the impugned by the respondent, as claimed by him, and (ii) the objections predicated on Section 11 of the Trade Marks Act, as contained in the FER dated 17th December 2008.
14. Till a decision is taken by the learned Registrar in the de novo proceeding as directed hereinabove, the respondent shall be entitled to continue to use the registered trade mark as granted to him but shall not be permitted to assert any right consequent to such registration in any judicial proceedings which may be pending vis-à-vis the said marks.
15. Needless to say, should any party be aggrieved by the decision taken by the learned Registrar, the remedy available in law to such party shall remain reserved.
16. This petition stands allowed in the aforesaid terms, with no order as to costs.
C.HARI SHANKAR, J FEBRUARY 8, 2023/kr/dsn