Sh Krishan Kumar Sharma v. Sh Naresh Kumar Sharma & Ors.

10. That since the severance of status of the properties owned by the mother of the parties to suit has already been affected by the mother of the parties to suit, during her lifetime, therefore the present suit claiming the right, title or interest in favour of the plaintiff does not exists.

11. That the Plaintiff by filing the present suit aims to extort money from the Defendants No. 1 & 2, by blackmailing them or say committing acts of "legal extortion", in as much as the Plaintiff is well aware of the fact that the Plaintiff has no subsisting, rights, title and Interest in the suit property and therefore the present suit is not maintainable and deserves to be dismissed.”

9. A perusal of the abovementioned portion of the Written Statement shows that it is the case of the Defendants No.1 & 2 that Defendant No.1 being the eldest child, has helped the family by every means, i.e. physically, emotionally and financially and has contributed his hard-earned money for the welfare of all the siblings, which includes the Plaintiff herein also.

10. The Written Statement further reveals that late Smt. Shanti Devi purchased a property being, Flat No. C-2, Green, View Apartments, Sector- 9, Rohini, Delhi-110085, and at the time of purchase of the said property, it was agreed that the same shall be used and occupied by the Defendant NO. 1, being the eldest son. It is stated that the said property was pre-booked in the name of the Defendant No. 1 but due to some income tax enquiry regarding the purchase of the said property, the same was purchased in the name of the Plaintiff. However, the payments for the purchase of the said property and the maintenance charges to the Society were paid by the Defendant No. 1, the Defendant No. 2 and wife of the Defendant No. 1 through cheques, the details of which has been given in the Written Statement. It is stated that though the said property was purchased for the Defendant No. 1, the same was transferred in the name of the Plaintiff so as to avoid any legal complications arising out of income tax enquiry but the Plaintiff had agreed to transfer the said property to the Defendant No.1.

11. It is further stated in the Written Statement that Late Smt. Shanti Devi booked a property with Sunehra Apna Ghar Co-operative Group Housing Society Ltd. in 2009 and paid Rs.28,00,000/- towards the said property. It is stated that in this property, the Defendant No.2 was appointed as Nominee of her mother however, the builder has not handed over the possession of the said Property till date. It is stated that Late Smt. Shanti Devi has already made the severance of status of the entire properties she owned or possessed directly or indirectly, during her life time.

12. It is pertinent to mention that the details of that severance are neither given in the Written Statement nor any other documents filed along with the Plaint. There is nothing in the Written Statement to show as to what was the severance of the properties. Other than a self-serving statement of severance being made and without there being any details of such severance even evidence cannot be led on this issue.

13. Defendant No.3 has also filed her Written Statement, in which she has stated that she is not interested in the properties and has accepted to relinquish her share in the properties in favour of the brothers.

14. An attempt to amicably settle the matter was made and the parties were sent to mediation. However, mediation has failed.

15. The law relating to Order XII Rule 6 of the CPC has been crystallized by the Apex Court in several Judgments. In its latest Judgment in Rajiv Ghosh v. Satya Naryan Jaiswal

writing, the Court may at any stage of the suit, either on the application of any party or of its own motion and without waiting for the determination of any other question between the parties, make such order or give such judgment as it may think fit, having regard to such admissions. (2) Whenever a judgment is pronounced under sub-rule (1) a decree shall be drawn up in accordance with the judgment and the decree shall bear the date on which the judgment was pronounced.

LEGISLATIVE CHANGES

20. By the Code of Civil Procedure (Amendment) Act, 1976, the following changes had been effected: (1) Original Rule 6 had been substituted and redrafted into sub-rule (1) and (2) Sub-rule (2) had been newly inserted, OBJECT OF AMENDMENTS

21. Rule 6, as originally enacted, enabled a court to pronounce judgment or admission “either in pleading or otherwise”. It read thus: “6. Judgment on admissions.— Any party may, at any stage of a suit. where admissions of facts have been made, either on pleadings or otherwise, apply to the Court for such judgment or order as upon such admissions he may be entitled to, without waiting for the determination of any other question between the parties and the Court may upon such application make such order or give such judgment, as the Court may think just.”

22. The Law Commission considered the provision. With a view to clarify the position as to admission and also to empower the court to pronounce a judgment: suo motu and to draw a decree on such judgment, recommended to modify the rule. It stated: “Where a claim is admitted, a court has jurisdiction under Order XII Rule 6 to enter a judgment for the plaintiff, and to pass a decree on the admitted claim (with liberty to the plaintiff to proceed with the suit in the ordinary way as to the remainder of the claim). The object of the rule is to enable a party to obtain speedy judgment, at least to the extent of the relief to which, according to the admission of the defendant, the plaintiff is entitled. The rule has been held to be wide enough to cover oral admissions. The use of the words ‘or otherwise’ in Rule 6, without the words ‘in writing’ which are used in Rule 1 of Order XII, shows that a judgment may be given even on an oral admission. It is desirable to codify this interpretation. It may be noted that under the present rule, a judgment on admission can be passed only on an application. According to a local amendment. the Court may, on the application of any party or of its own motion, make such order or give such judgment. This is a useful amendment, and should be adopted. In our view, it is also desirable to provide that a decree shall follow or “judgment on admissions.” (See: Law Commission's Fifty-fourth Report, p. 145)

23. In Statement of Objects and Reasons, it had been stated: “Clause 65, sub-clause (ii)- Under Rule 6, where a claim is admitted, the Court has jurisdiction to enter a judgment for the plaintiff and to pass a decree on the admitted claim. The object of the rule is to enable a party to obtain speedy judgment at least to the extent of relief to which, according to the admission of the defendant, the plaintiff is entitled. The rule is wide enough to cover oral admissions. The rule is being amended to clarify that oral admissions are also covered by the rule” (See: Notes on Clauses, Gazette of India, dt. 08-04-1974, Pt. II, S. 2, Extra., p. 316)

24. Rule 6(1) empowers the court to pronounce a judgment upon admissions made by parties without waiting for the determination of other questions.

25. Rule 6(2) states that a decree shall be drawn up in accordance with the judgment.

26. The primary object underlying Rule 6 is to enable a party to obtain speedy judgment at least to the extent of admission. Where a plaintiff claims a particular relief or reliefs against a defendant and the defendant makes a plain admission, the former is entitled to the relief or reliefs admitted by the latter. [See: Uttam Singh v. United Bank of India, (2000) 7 SCC 120]

27. As observed in the Statement of Objects and Reasons for amending Rule 6, “where a claim is admitted, the court has jurisdiction to enter a judgment for the plaintiff and to pass a decree on admitted claim. The object of the Rule is to enable the party to obtain a speedy judgment at least to the extent of the relief to which according to the admission of the defendant, the plaintiff is entitled.”

28. The provisions of Rule 6 are enabling, discretionary and permissive. They are not mandatory, obligatory or peremptory. This is also clear from the use of the word “may” in the rule.

29. The powers conferred on the court by this rule are untrammeled and cannot be crystallized into any rigid rule of universal application. They can be exercised keeping in view and having regard to the facts and varying circumstances of each case.

30. If the court is of the opinion that it is not safe to pass a judgment on admissions, or that a case involves questions which cannot be appropriately dealt with and decided on the basis of admission, it may, in exercise of its discretion, refuse to pass a judgment and may insist upon clear proof of even admitted facts.

31. To make order or to pronounce judgment on admission is at the discretion of the court. First, the word “may” is used in Rule 6 and not the word “shall” which prima facie shows that the provision is an enabling one. Rule 6 of Order 12 must be read with Rule 5 of Order 8 which is identical to the Proviso to Section 58 of the Evidence Act. Reading all the relevant provisions together, it is manifest that the court is not bound to grant relief to the plaintiff only on the basis of admission of the defendant. (See: Sher Bahadur v. Mohd. Amin, AIR 1929 Lah 569)

32. In the leading decision of Throp v. Holdsworth, Jessel, [L.R.] 3 Ch. 637 (640) M.R. said:“This rule enables the plaintiff or the defendant to get rid of so much of the action, as to which there is no controversy.”

33. In Uttam Singh (Supra) the plaintiff bank filed a suit for recovery of a large sum of money against the defendant. It also filed an application under Order 12, Rule 6 for judgment upon admission in respect of part of claim. The application was allowed and a decree was passed. An appeal against the decree was also dismissed by the High Court. The defendant approached this Court. It was contended before this Court by the defendant that (i) Rule 6 of Order 12 covers only those admissions made in pleadings; (ii) the effect of the admissions can only be considered at the trial of the suit; and (iii) the provision of Order 12, Rule 6 must be read along with the provisions of Order 8 and the court should call upon the plaintiff to prove its case independent of so called admissions.

34. Negativing the contentions and referring to the object of Order 12, Rule 6, the Court observed that “where a claim is admitted, the court has jurisdiction to enter a judgment for the plaintiff and to pass a decree on admitted claim. The scope of Rule 6 should not be narrowed down where a party applying for judgment is entitled to succeed on a plain admission of the opposite party. The admission by the defendant was clear, unambiguous, unequivocal and unconditional. The courts below were, therefore, right in decreeing the suit of the plaintiff.”

35. The words “or otherwise” are wide enough to include all cases of admissions made in the pleadings or de hors the pleadings. Under Rule 6, as originally enacted, it was held that the words “or otherwise” without the words “in writing” used in Rule 1 showed that a judgment could be given upon oral or verbal admission also. [See: Beeny, re, (1894) 1 Ch D 499] The Amendment Act of 1976, however, made the position clear stating that such admissions may be “in the pleading or otherwise” and “whether orally or in writing”. Thus, after the amendment in Rule 6, the admissions are not confined to Rule 1 or Rule 4 of Order 6, but are of general application. Such admissions may be express or implied (constructive); may be in writing or oral; or may be before the institution of the suit, after the suit is brought or during the pendency of proceedings.

36. A Division Bench of the Delhi High Court very correctly laid down the following interpretation of the provision of O. 12, R. 6, CPC, in the decision of ITDC Limited v. Chander Pal Sood and Son, (2000) 84 DLT 337 (DB): (2000 AIHC 1990): “Order 12, R. 6 of Code gives a very wide discretion to the Court. Under this rule the Court may at any stage of the suit either on the application of any party or of its own motion and without determination of any other question between the parties can make such order giving such judgment as it may think fit on the basis of admission of a fact made in the pleadings or otherwise whether orally or in writing.”

37. The use of the expression ‘otherwise’ in the aforesaid context came to be interpreted by the High Court. Considering the expression the Court interpreted the said word by stating that it permits the Court to pass judgment on the basis of the statement made by the parties not only on the pleadings but also dehors the pleadings i.e. either in any document or even in the statement recorded in the Court. If one of the parties' statement is recorded under O. 10, Rr. 1 and 2 of the Code of Civil Procedure, the same is also a statement which elucidates matters in controversy. Any admission in such statement is relevant not only for the purpose of finding out the real dispute between the parties but also to ascertain as to whether or not any dispute or controversy exists between the parties. Admission if any is made by a party in the statement recorded, would be conclusive against him and the Court can proceed to pass judgment on the basis of the admission made therein.

38. Rule 6 of Order XII, before the amendment, allowed judgment on admission only on an application by a party. The Law Commission, however, suggested that a judgment may be pronounced either on an application by a party or even suo motu [See: Throp (supra)]

39. This rule authorizes the court to enter a judgment where a claim is admitted and to pass a decree on such admitted claim. This can be done at any stage. [See: Uttam Singh (supra)]. Thus, a plaintiff may move for judgment upon admission by the defendant in his written statement at any stage of the suit although he has joined issue on the defence.” [See: Brown v. Pearson, [L.R.] 21 Ch. 716]. Likewise, a defendant may apply for dismissal of the suit on the basis of admission by the plaintiff in rejoinder.

40. The court may, in an appropriate case, give a judgment at an interlocutory stage of the proceedings on admission by a party. [See: Balraj Taneja v. Sunil Madan, (1999) 8 SCC 396]. But if the case involves questions which cannot conveniently be disposed of at a motion stage, the court may not give judgment at that stage. [See: Simla Wholesale Mart (Supra)]

41. Sub-rule (2) of Rule 6 as inserted by the Code of Civil Procedure (Amendment) Act, 1976 requires the court to draw up a decree in accordance with the judgment on admission. Sub-rule (2) is thus consequential and logical sequence to sub-rule (1).

42. Since the object of sub-rule (1) is to enable the plaintiff to get judgment on admission of the defendant to the extent of such admission, he must get the benefit thereof immediately without waiting for the determination of “non-admitted claim”. Sub-rule (2) makes it imperative for the court to draw up a decree in terms of judgment on admission which can be executed by the plaintiff.” [See: Uttam Singh (supra)]. In such cases, there may be two decrees; (i) in respect of admitted claim; and (ii) in respect of “nonadmitted” or contested claim. [See: Bai Chanchal v. United Bank of India, (1970) 3 SCC 124: AIR 1971 SC 1081].

43. A decree under Rule 6 may be either preliminary or final. [See: Sivalinga v. Narayani, AIR 1946 Mad 151]

44. We are of the view having regard to the clear and unequivocal admission made by the defendant in his written statement, the High Court committed no error much less any error of law in decreeing the suit applying Order XII Rule 6 of the CPC.

45. At this stage we should take note of the submission canvassed by the learned counsel that the petitioner is not governed by the provisions of the West Bengal Premises Tenancy Act, 1997 and therefore the entire discussion as regards Section 2(g) of the Act, 1997 was unnecessary. In other words, the attempt on the part of the learned counsel was to persuade us to accept the argument that if Section 2(g) of the Act, 1997 is not applicable then in such circumstances the petitioner has a right to continue in occupation of the premises in question as the legal heir of the original tenant.” (Emphasis Supplied)

16. Applying the settled principles of law governing Order XII Rule 6 CPC and the law laid by the Apex Court to the facts of the present case, this Court finds that the admissions made by Defendant Nos. 1 and 2 in their Written Statement are clear, unequivocal and sufficient to entitle the Plaintiff to a preliminary decree of partition. Defendant Nos. 1 and 2 have expressly admitted the relationship between the parties, the ownership of the Suit Property by late Smt. Shanti Devi, her intestate demise, and the consequent devolution of the Suit Property upon the Plaintiff and Defendant Nos. 1 and 2. It is further admitted that Defendant Nos. 3 and 4 have relinquished their respective shares in favour of their brothers. These admissions leave no dispute with regard to the joint ownership of the Suit Property, to the extent of one-third share each in favour of the Plaintiff, Defendant No.1 and Defendant No.2.

17. The vague plea taken in paragraphs 8 and 9 of the Written Statement that late Smt. Shanti Devi had allegedly effected a “severance of status” or “settled the properties during her lifetime” is wholly insufficient to dilute or neutralise the categorical admissions otherwise made. No particulars of such alleged settlement, severance or disposition have been pleaded; no document evidencing such arrangement has been placed on record; and no legal mode of transfer recognised under law has been disclosed. A bald and self-serving assertion, unsupported by pleadings or documentary material, cannot create a triable issue so as to defeat an application under Order XII Rule 6 CPC, particularly when the foundational facts of co-ownership and succession stand admitted.

18. It is well settled that while exercising jurisdiction under Order XII Rule 6 CPC, the Court is not required to weigh the defence as in a full trial, but only to ascertain whether the admission is plain, unambiguous and unconditional. In the present case, the admissions of Defendant Nos. 1 and 2 regarding title, succession and shares are not hedged by any legally sustainable qualification. The alleged oral understanding or undefined settlement pleaded by the Defendants does not meet the requirements of law and cannot override statutory succession or defeat a claim for partition. Permitting the Suit to proceed to trial in the absence of any legally cognisable defence, would only result in unnecessary prolongation of litigation.

19. Accordingly, this Court is of the considered opinion that the Plaintiff is entitled to a judgment on admissions. A preliminary decree is therefore passed declaring that the Plaintiff, Defendant No.1 and Defendant No.2 are each entitled to one-third undivided share in the Suit Property bearing No. C-33, Bhagwan Dass Nagar, East Punjabi Bagh, New Delhi-110026.

20. The application under Order XII Rule 6 CPC is accordingly allowed. The Suit shall proceed for the purposes of effecting final partition in accordance with law.

21. With these observations, the Application is disposed of.

22. List before the Joint Registrar on 12.01.2026. CS(OS) 2/2017, CC 3/2020, I.A. 103/2017, I.A. 6503/2024 SUBRAMONIUM PRASAD, J DECEMBER 16, 2025 Rahul