Virender Singh v. Surinder Singh & Anr.

Delhi High Court · 27 Feb 2023 · 2023:DHC:1537

Tushar Rao Gedela

CM(M) 299/2023

2023:DHC:1537

civil petition_dismissed Significant

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The Delhi High Court dismissed the petition challenging eviction execution orders, holding that adverse possession claims require acknowledgment of true ownership and that a non-necessary party cannot challenge eviction decrees in rent control proceedings.

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Neutral Citation Number 2023/DHC/001537

CM(M) 299/2023
HIGH COURT OF DELHI

JUDGMENT

delivered on: 27.02.2023

CM(M) 299/2023
VIRENDER SINGH ..... Petitioner

versus

SURINDER SINGH & ANR. ..... Respondents
HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE TUSHAR RAO GEDELA Advocates who appeared in this case:
For the Petitioner : Mr. Ashish Aggarwal, Advocate.
For the Respondents : None.

CORAM:

JUDGMENT

TUSHAR RAO GEDELA, J. (ORAL)
[ The proceeding has been conducted through Hybrid mode ]

1. Exemption is allowed, subject to all just exceptions. CM APPL. 9125/2023 (for exemption)

2. The application stands disposed of.

3. Petitioner challenges the order dated 17.11.2022 in RCA DJ NO. 78/2019 titled as “Sh. Virender Singh vs. Sh. Surinder Singh and Anr.,”, whereby the First Appellate Court has dismissed the appeal of the petitioner upholding the dismissal of his objections by the Executing Court. CM(M) 299/2023 & CM APPL. 9124/2023 (for stay)

4. Learned counsel submits that the Executing Court as well as the First Appellate Court overlooked the basic aspect that vide order dated 04.01.2018, the learned DRC had deleted the name of the petitioner/ objector from the rent control proceedings, bearing RC No. 5828/2016 titled as “Surinder Singh vs. Sh. Prabhu Kuttan and Anr.,” on the ground that the petitioner is not a necessary party.

5. Learned counsel submits that having deleted the petitioner from the array of parties, the learned rent control Court observed that the dispute of title raised by the petitioner could be decided in a separate independent suit, wherein the parties would establish their own title in accordance with law.

6. Learned counsel also submits that another relevant observation made by the learned Trial Court while passing the order dated 04.01.2018 was, that any party which does not fall within the relationship of landlord and tenant would obviously not be relevant to the lis and on that ground, the petitioner was deleted from the array of parties.

7. Mr. Aggarwal, learned counsel further submits that accordingly the petitioner has filed a suit seeking establishment of title against the respondent Sh. Surinder Singh and others.

8. Learned counsel submits that in the interregnum, the ARC had also passed an eviction decree in favour of respondent Sh. Surinder Singh, whereon, the execution proceedings were initiated by the said respondent.

9. Learned counsel submits that both, the learned Executing Court as well as the First Appellate Court overlooked the relevant aspect that the petitioner was in possession of the suit property by virtue of an independent title and not a sub-tenant of the tenant before the Rent Control Court. On that basis, learned counsel submits that the objections ought to have been dealt akin to a suit whereby, the First Appellate Court ought to have determined the issues in disputes after requiring leading cogent evidence by the parties.

10. Learned counsel submits that having not done so, this Court ought to interfere with the impugned orders.

11. This Court has considered the submissions made by Mr. Aggarwal and perused the impugned judgment dismissing the objections of the petitioner.

12. At the outset, it is relevant to point out that the sub stratum of the petitioner of establishing his title over the suit property, is by prescription of adverse possession and not by a regular title.

13. It is trite that a person claiming adverse possession has to plea of animus possidendi as against the true owner and the said plea would fail if the said assertion is made against any person other than the true owner of the subject suit property.

14. Applying the aforesaid principle, it becomes clear that the petitioner, admittedly, had made a specific assertion in the rent control proceedings that he has become owner by way of adverse possession and had denied the ownership and title of the respondent Sh. Surinder Singh.

15. On that basis, learned First Appellate Court had passed the impugned order observing that the plea of adverse possession so raised by the petitioner would obviously fail since the petitioner was denying the ownership and title of the respondent Sh. Surinder Singh.

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16. It is observed that the learned First Appellate Court has examined each and every issue and objection raised by the petitioner before it and has categorically distinguished every objection and has come to the correct conclusion insofar as the plea of adverse possession is concerned.

17. Obviously since the eviction order is in a lis, to which the present petitioner is a stranger, the petitioner has no locus to challenge the findings of the Rent Control Court. Having regard thereto, the learned First Appellate Court, considering the judgments relevant to the issue, concluded in para Nos. 14, 15 and 16 of its judgment at page 50, as under:-

“14. In as much as the appellant has himself denied the ownership of the respondent no.1 to the suit premises, there can be no question of plea of acquisition of title through adverse possession by the appellant against the respondent no.1. The question of denying title by hostile possession against the respondent no.1 cannot arise without first acknowledging the title of respondent no.1. Also, having denied the title of the respondent no.1, when the appellant was claiming that he acquired title on the basis of adverse possession, it was incumbent upon the appellant to plead as to who was the true owner according to the appellant against whom the appellant was claiming that he acquired title through adverse possession. The plea of adverse possession inherently presupposes that the person claiming title by adverse possession acknowledges the title of the true owner and claims acquisition of title through adverse possession against such true owner. In the present case, not only has the appellant pleaded that the respondent no.1 was not the true owner, but the appellant has not pleaded as to who was the true owner against whom the appellant was claiming acquisition of title by way of adverse possession. Furthermore, the appellant has also failed to even plead in his objections as to how he came into possession of the premises and what was the nature of his possession. As already mentioned, the appellant has pleaded that he never entered into rent agreement or licence agreement with anyone nor he has paid any rent or licence fee to anyone.

15. In light of the above, I would hold that the necessary ingredients for a plea of acquisition of title on the basis of adverse possession are missing in the pleadings made by the appellant in the objection petition. A simple statement that the appellant was in exclusive, open, hostile and uninterrupted possession of the subject property since 04/05/1999, without stating as to who was the true owner according to the appellant against whom the appellant was claiming adverse possession and without even stating as to how the appellant came into possession, would not be sufficient pleadings for the plea of ownership through adverse possession. Thus, there was no question of framing of issue regarding acquisition of title on the basis of adverse possession and entering into a trial on the issue.

16. I would hold that the Ld. SCJ/RC has correctly held that there was no merit in the objections and that the same were filed with malafide intentions, just to delay the proceedings. As held by the Hon’ble High Court of Delhi in Preeti Chawla v. Dr. Akshay Mehra 2022 SCC OnLine Del 2188, objections which are either mala fide, frivolous or an abuse of process in the sense of having been filed only to delay the execution proceedings are liable to be dismissed summarily without the Executing Court conducting a lengthy trial in respect of the same.”

18. In view of the aforesaid, this Court does not find that there has been any illegality, material irregularity, judicial impropriety or any other such reason committed by the First Appellate or Trial Court, for this Court to interfere in the impugned orders under Article 227 of the Constitution of India.

19. Having said that, this Court is of the opinion that the aforesaid observations made by this Court are only for the purpose of deciding the legality or otherwise of the impugned order.

20. The present petition along with pending application is disposed of with no order as to costs.

TUSHAR RAO GEDELA, J FEBRUARY 27, 2023

Virender Singh v. Surinder Singh & Anr.

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