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HIGH COURT OF DELHI
JUDGMENT
RADICO KHAITAN LTD. ..... APPELLANT
Advocates who appeared in this case:
For the Appellants: Mr. Sagar Chandra, Ms. Srijan Uppal, Mr. Abhishek Bhati and Ms. Natasha, K., Advocates
For the Respondents: Mr. Sachin Gupta, Mr. Rohish Arora, Ms. Jasleen Kaur, Ms. Swati Meena, Ms. Yashi Agrawal and
Ms. Kanika Marwaha, Advocates
HON’BLE MR. JUSTICE TUSHAR RAO GEDELA
1. Appellant impugns order dated 28.03.2017 whereby the application under Order VII Rule 11 Code of Civil Procedure (CPC for short) filed by the respondent has been allowed holding that the Court does not have the territorial jurisdiction to entertain the suit.
2. Subject Suit for permanent injunction, for restraining the respondents from infringing the trademark of the appellant/plaintiff, passing off, delivery of, rendition of accounts, etc., was filed by the appellant alleging that the respondents had adopted the trademark “GOA” and “GO4” of the appellant and that the respondent had also applied for excise approvals of the labels of alcoholic products.
3. It is contended that the excise application was objected to by the Appellants, however on 28.04.2015 the office of the Commissioner State Excise, Maharashtra, Mumbai approved the labels of respondent of no. 1. Thereafter the subject suit for injunction has been filed.
4. Respondents filed an application under Order VII Rule 11 CPC seeking dismissal of the Suit for lack of territorial jurisdiction. It is contended in the application that the Courts at Delhi do not have the territorial jurisdiction as neither the respondents are residing in Delhi nor carrying on their business within the territorial jurisdiction of Delhi and further that no cause of action has arisen within the territorial jurisdiction of the Courts at Delhi.
5. It was contended that the registered office of respondent no. 1 and respondent no. 2 was at Mumbai and Pune, respectively and the manufacturing by respondent no. 1 and the marketing by respondent no. 2 was in the State of Maharashtra.
6. It was further contended that the mark in issue was in respect of alcoholic beverages which is a State excisable product and could not be sold/marketed unless necessary label approvals are obtained from the respective State Excise Departments. It is contended that the approvals were sought from the Maharashtra State Excise Department and no approval has been sought from the Delhi State Excise Department.
7. It is further contended that the appellant/plaintiff had an office at Mumbai and a bottling unit at Aurangabad; both within the State of Maharashtra and as such the Courts at Delhi had no territorial jurisdiction.
8. In response to the application, appellant contended that the registered office of respondent no. 1 was at Solapur, Maharashtra and that plaintiff had no office in Aurangabad and the bottling unit at Aurangabad was that of a separate legal entity i.e. a private limited company in which appellant had a 36% shareholding.
9. It was further contended that the Mumbai office of the appellant was a subordinate sale office and not the principal place of business. Further the principal place of business was stated to be at the corporate office at Delhi though the registered office of the appellant/plaintiff was at Rampur, Uttar Pradesh.
10. It was further contended that the dynamic effects of respondents’ action in obtaining an excise clearance was felt in Delhi as there was likelihood that the respondent could launch their products in Delhi. Consequently the Courts at Delhi would have the territorial jurisdiction to entertain the suit.
11. Learned Single Judge by the impugned order, referring to the decision of a Division Bench of this Court in Ultra Home Construction Pvt. Ltd. vs. Purushottam Kumar Chaubey; 2016 (65) PTC 469 (Del) (DB) (of which one of us, Sanjeev Sachdeva J., was also a member), held that as part of the cause of action had arisen at a place where the plaintiff had a subordinate branch office, the suit would lie only at the subordinate office and not at the principal office.
12. The Division Bench of this Court in Ultra Home Construction Pvt. Ltd. (Supra), after considering the judgment of the Supreme Court in Indian Performing Rights Society Ltd. vs. Sanjay Dalia
19. As per the appellants the dynamic effect of the approval of labels by the Excise department was felt in Delhi and as such the courts at Delhi would have jurisdiction. If the dynamic effect of an approval of excise labels by the Excise Department at Mumbai is felt at Delhi then its dynamic effect would also be felt at Mumbai, where admittedly the appellants have their branch office. If a part of cause of action has arisen in Mumbai, then applying the ratio of the judgment in Ultra Home Construction Pvt. Ltd. (Supra), the jurisdiction would only lie with the courts at Mumbai and the appellants/plaintiff would be precluded from suing in Delhi.
20. It may further be noticed that the learned Single Judge has also noticed that an application under Order VI Rule 17 CPC had been filed by the plaintiff contending that the respondents had started its commercial operation.
21. Learned Single Judge noticed that the Label of the product which was relied on by the appellant specifically stated “for sale in Maharashtra State only”, which established that the respondents were affecting sales only in Mumbai and the cause of action would accrue to the plaintiff at Mumbai and the Courts at Mumbai alone would have jurisdiction to entertain the suit.
22. Learned Single Judge has rightly held that the averments of the appellant that the dynamic effects of obtaining an excise clearance at Mumbai was being felt at Delhi would imply that if dynamic effects is felt in Delhi then it would also be felt in Mumbai as the sales are to be effected in the State of Maharashtra.
23. Accordingly, there is no infirmity in the finding returned by the learned single judge that the courts at Delhi would have no jurisdiction and the Suit would lie only in the courts at Mumbai.
24. While holding that the Courts at Delhi had no jurisdiction, the learned single judge has gone on to consider, what he called as an ancillary issue: “whether the subordinate office should be the exact place of cause of action or it is sufficient if there is subordinate office of the plaintiff in the State in which cause of action has accrued.”
25. Learned Single Judge has held as under:
18. Reference to the word “place” in the judgments, in my opinion has to be construed as the “State”. The judiciary of the State is one and the division of the territorial jurisdiction into districts is a matter of administrative convenience and exigency. All the State districts would come under the supervision of the High Court of the State and thus the words “place” has to be read as the “State” within which cause of action has arisen, even if cause of action may have been arisen in any particular district of the State and not in the district or the city where the subordinate office of the plaintiff is situated.”
26. Learned Single Judge has held that a reference to the word ‘place’ in Indian Performing Rights Society Ltd. Vs. Sanjay Dalia; 2015 (10) SCC 161; has to be construed as the “State”. Learned Single Judge has held that the judiciary of the State is one and the division of the territorial jurisdiction into districts is a matter of administrative convenience and exigency and all the said districts given under the supervision of the High Court of the State and within the word ‘place’ has to be read as ‘State’ within which the cause of action has arisen and even if cause of action may have arisen in any particular district of the State and not in the district or the city where the subordinate office of the plaintiff is situated.
27. We are of the view that after holding that the cause of action had arisen in Mumbai and that the Appellant/Plaintiff had a subordinate office in Mumbai, there was no necessity for the learned single judge to have opined upon the so called ancillary issue.
28. We are also in respectful disagreement with the observations of the learned single judge that ‘place’ has to be read as ‘State’ for the reason that judiciary of a State is not divided into districts as a matter of mere administrative convenience or exigency for the reason that division of a State into Districts has a historical background and statutory significance.
29. Such an interpretation would also fall foul of Section 134 of the Trade marks Act, 1999, which reads as under:
30. Further, we may note that jurisdiction is conferred on Districts and District Judges not only by the Constitution of India, Code of Civil Procedure, Criminal Procedure Code, but also several Statutes inter alia, Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1925, Commercial Courts Act, 2016, Companies Act, 2013, Consumer Protection Act, Patents Act, 1970, Copyright Act, 1957, Trade Marks Act 1999, Indian Succession Act, 1925 etc.
31. However, this discussion need not detain us any further for the reason that in the facts of the present case, this ancillary issue does not arise for consideration, Furthermore part of the cause of action has admittedly arisen in Mumbai, where the Appellant/Plaintiff has its branch office.
32. We accordingly hold that the observations of the learned single judge in paragraphs 15 to 18 of the impugned judgment, extracted hereinabove, in so far as they hold that ‘Place’ has to be read as ‘State’ are obiter dicta and not to be taken as a binding principle of law.
33. In view of the above, we find no infirmity in the impugned order holding that the Courts at Delhi have no jurisdiction. The appeal in accordingly dismissed. There shall be no orders as to costs.
SANJEEV SACHDEVA, J TUSHAR RAO GEDELA, J FEBRUARY 28, 2023 ‘rs’