Hitachi Energy India Limited v. Sterlite Power Transmission Limited

Delhi High Court · 28 Feb 2023 · 2023:DHC:1405
Yashwant Varma
O.M.P.(I) (COMM.) 382/2022
2023:DHC:1405
civil petition_dismissed Significant

AI Summary

The Delhi High Court dismissed the petition restraining encashment of unconditional bank guarantees, holding that such guarantees are payable on demand except in cases of egregious fraud or irretrievable harm.

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Neutral Citation Number: 2023/DHC/001405
O.M.P.(I) (COMM.) 382/2022
HIGH COURT OF DELHI
Order reserved on: 08 February 2023
Order pronounced on: 28 February 2023
O.M.P.(I) (COMM.) 382/2022, I.A. 21662/2022 (Leave to add.
Document), I.A.2484/2023 HITACHI ENERGY INDIA LIMITED ..... Petitioner
Through: Mr. Vikas Goel, Mr. Vivek Gupta and Mr. Harmanbir Singh Sandhu, Advs.
VERSUS
STERLITE POWER TRANSMISSION LIMITED..... Respondent
Through: Mr. Deepak Khurana, Mr. Abhishek Bansal and Mr. Ashwini Tak, Advs.
CORAM:
HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE YASHWANT VARMA O R D E R
JUDGMENT

1. The instant petition preferred under Section 9 seeks a restraint upon the Respondent from enchasing Bank Guarantees[1] which have been set forth in paragraph 8 of the petition. The facts in brief which merit notice are the following.

2. The Petitioner is stated to have been awarded an Erection and Supply Contract on 13 July 2018. According to the Petitioner, the contract itself was for the establishment of the Goa Tamnar Transmission Project Limited and which entailed the construction of sub-stations under transmission project system. The contracts were initially awarded to ABB India Limited. However, and subsequently on 19 June 2020 in terms of the Novation Agreement, the Petitioner [earlier known as ABB Power Products and Systems India Limited] stepped into its shoes for the purposes of execution of the Erection and Supply Contracts.

3. It becomes pertinent to note that the Erection Contract was awarded on a lump sum and turnkey basis. Pursuant to the provisions made in both the contracts, the Petitioner was also called upon to submit Performance Bank Guarantees[2] and Advance Bank Guarantees[3]. Those are stated to have been deposited on 22 July 2020 and 28 September 2020. It is asserted that the validity period of all the BGs was to expire on 31 May 2022.

4. The Petitioner contends that no demands were raised against any of the BGs and thus the Respondent is clearly disentitled from taking any steps for encashment of those guarantees. As per the Petitioner‟s own admission, the Respondent by its letter of 17 August 2022 unilaterally extended the validity period of both the contracts till 30 October 2022. The aforesaid unilateral extension was assailed by PBGs the Petitioner in terms of their communication dated 25 August 2022. Despite the said letter, the Respondent in terms of their communication of 28 August 2022 insisted upon the Petitioner to accept the provisional extension of both the contracts up to 30 October

2022. The Petitioner is thereafter stated to have submitted its acceptance on 29 August 2022.

5. The Respondent, however, in terms of its letter of 13 October 2022 issued a termination notice. As would be evident from a reading of the aforesaid communication, the said termination notice was based on an advisory issued by the Central Electricity Authority which appears to have mandated minimizing land usage for construction of 400/220 KV green field AIS sub-stations to GIS sub-stations in Goa. It was in the aforesaid backdrop that the Respondent proceeded to terminate both the contracts in terms of Clause 27.[1] of the Supply Contract and Clause 28.[1] of the Erection Contract. The amicable resolution process which was envisaged under both the contracts also did not bear fruit. It is thereafter that the instant petition came to be filed.

6. Learned counsel appearing for the Petitioner has submitted that once the period of the contract had come to an end and the Respondent had failed to raise any demand in connection therewith, the retention of the BGs as well as the apprehended invocation thereof would cause irreparable loss and injury to the Petitioner. It was further submitted that a reading of the termination letter itself would show that it is not based on any alleged wrongdoing on the part of the Petitioner or a failure to comply with contractual obligations.

7. From the objections which have been filed on behalf of the Respondent, the Court notes that it is firstly urged that the Bank Guarantees in question constitute a separate contract and that such an injunction is not liable to be granted in the absence of any irretrievable injury or special equities having been established. It was also emphasized that the guarantees were unconditional, irrevocable and irreversible.

8. The Respondents have additionally referred to the relevant provisions of the Erection Contract and the Supply Contract. Articles 10 and 12 to the extent they would be relevant for our purposes are being reproduced hereinbelow:- “ARTICLE I0 - PAYMENT & PROCEDURES: 10.[1] Payment Terms: 10.1.[1] Post the Effective Date of the Contract, SPGVL shall, upon written request from the Contractor, release the advance payment equivalent to 5% (five percent) of the basic value plus GST of the Contract Price ("Advance Payment-1") within a period of 30 (thirty) days from the date of submission of the following to SPGVL by the Contractor. (a) Submission of advance bank guarantee ("ABG-1") having value equivalent to the Advance Payment-1, valid till Operational Acceptance plus 3 months additional claim period which shall be reduced on quarterly basis for the amount adjusted against Advance Payment-1 only after 6 months from the Effective Date of the Contract. ABG-1 shall be submitted within 30 days from the Effective Date of the Contract. (b) Submission of contract performance bank guarantee ("CPBG-1") having value equivalent to 5% of the Contract Value valid till Operational Acceptance plus 3 months additional claim period. CPBG-1 shall be submitted within 30 days from the Effective Date of the Contract.

(c) Submission of L-1 schedule and its approval by

(d) Appointment of Co-ordination Manager.

10.1.[2] Post the Notice to Proceed (NTP) date, SPGVL shall upon written request from the Contractor release the advance payment equivalent to 5% (five percent) of the basic value of the Contract Price ("Advance Payment-2") within a period of 30 (thirty) days from the date of submission of the following to SPGVL by the Contractor: (a) Submission of advance bank guarantee ("ABG-2") having value equivalent to Advance Payment-2 valid till Operational Acceptance plus 3 months‟ additional claim period which shall be reduced on quarterly basis for the amount adjusted against Advance Payment-2 only after 6 months from the Notice to Proceed date. ABG-2 shall be submitted within 30 days from the Notice to Proceed date. (b) Submission of contract performance bank guarantee ("CPBC-2") having value equivalent to 5% of the Contract Value valid till Operational Acceptance plus 3 months' additional claim period. CPBG-2 shall be submitted within 30 days from the date of Notice to Proceed.

(c) Submission of L-2 schedule and its approval by

(d) EAR policy

(e) Appointment of Project Manager, its key personnel along with Project and Organization Organogram. (f) Notice to Proceed issued by SPGVL. 10.1.[3] Hereinafter, Advance Payment -1 and Advance Payment - 2 are collectively referred to as the "Advance Payment". 10.1.[4] Hereinafter, ABG-1 and ABG-2 are collectively referred to as the "ABGs". 10.1.[5] Hereinafter, CPBG-1 and CPBG-2 are collectively referred to as the "CPBGs". 10.1.[6] For payment following table shall be considered; Description Contract Value for Works A) Payment Terms Advance Payment -1 5% Advance Payment -2 5% Monthly Progressive bill payment for Works 80% On Operational Acceptance of the Element 10% Total: 100% 10.1.[7] Definitions; (a) Monthly Progressive bill payments - certified invoices (SPGVL Project Manager) submitted by the Contractor on monthly basis. (b) All other payments percentages mentioned in table above are total value (with GST and freight).

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(c) GST as applicable shall be paid along with the invoices.

(d) All payments shall be paid within 30 days through Cheque /

RTGS from the date of submission of invoices along with all supporting documents as per Appendix 7. 10.[2] Payment Procedure: 10.2.[1] Payment Schedule/Billing Break-up for Payments:

(i) To facilitate the payments after Advance Payments, the billing break-up of the Contract Price attached as Appendix-1 ("Billing Break-Up") shall be used. Any payment under the Contract, subsequent to the Advance Payments, shall be made only upon certification by the SPGVL's Project Manager.

(ii) All commercial invoices shall be accompanied with the supporting documents as mentioned in Appendix 7. 10.2.[2] Currency of Payment

(i) The Contract Price shall be paid In Indian Rupees

(INR). 10.2.[3] Due Dates for Payment a. The payment shall be made upon fulfillment of the conditions specified in Article 10.[1] and receipt of the Contractor‟s invoice along with all necessary supporting documents for such payment. The Contractor shall submit all running bills along with supporting documents to the SPGVL's Project Manager latest by 25th of each month. The SPGVL shall make the progressive payments as specified. 10.2.[4] Mode of payment: a. All payments shall be made within Thirty (30) days by cheque (payable at par)/RTGS from the date of submission of the Contractor's bill/invoice to the SPGVL, provided that the documents submitted are complete and correct in all respects. (Appendix 7) ARTICLE 12 - BANK GUARANTEES: The bank guarantees to be provided by the Contractor in terms of Article 10 shall be subject to the following conditions: 12.[1] Advance Bank Guarantees (ABGs) - The Contractor shall submit ABG-1 and ABG-2 in accordance with Article 10 for release of Advance Payment-1 and Advance Payment-2 respectively. The ABGs shall be irrevocable, unconditional and irreversible and in a format provided by SPGVL in Appendix-5. The value of ABG-1 shall be proportionally reduced on quarterly basis for the amount adjusted against Advance Payment-1 only after 6 months from the Effective Date. The value of ABG-2 shall be proportionately reduced on quarterly basis for the amount adjusted against Advance Payment-2 only after 6 months, from the Notice to Proceed date) 12.1.[1] ABG-1 shall be submitted within Thirty (30) days from the Effective Date of the Contract. 12.1.[2] ABG-2 shall be submitted within Thirty (30) days from the date of Notice to Proceed. 12.1.[3] The validity of the ABGs shall be extended by the Contractor periodically (if required) till the final recovery of the Advance Payments in accordance with the Contract. 12.[2] Contract Performance Bank Guarantees (CPBGs) – The Contractor shall submit a CPBG-1 and CPBG-2 in accordance with Article 10 in order to guarantee the performance of Contractor's obligations by the Contractor.

12.2. I CPB G-1 shall be submitted within Thirty (30) days from the Effective Date of the Contract. 12.2.[2] CPBG-2 shall be submitted within Thirty (30) days from the date of Notice to Proceed. 12.2.[3] The validity of the CPBGs shall be extended by the Contractor periodically (if required) till the actual date of Operational Acceptance/ Deemed Operational Acceptance of Element in accordance with the Contract. 12.2.[4] The CPBGs shall be unconditional, irrevocable and irreversible and in format provided by SPGVL in Appendix-6. 12.[3] Performance Bank Guarantee (PBG) - In addition to ABGs and CPBGs, the Contractor shall submit an irrevocable and unconditional bank guarantee having value equivalent to 10% (Ten Percent) of the total Contract Price plus applicable GST in order to guarantee the performance of Contractor‟s obligations during the Defect Liability Period and valid till 24 months from the date of Operational Acceptance or Deemed Operational Acceptance plus 3 (Three) months additional claim period. Further if the DLP is required to be extended in accordance with Article 21 of this Contract, for any part of the Supplies, the PBG equivalent to 10% of the Contract Price of that part only shall be extended for the period of extended DLP for the said part This PBG shall be submitted at least 15 (fifteen) days prior to the expiry of CPBGs and release of retention payment. In the event, the Contractor fails to submit the PBG by the period as specified above, SPGVL shall have a right to encash/ invoke the CPBGs and appropriate the amount so received. The validity of the PBG shall be extended by the Contractor periodically (if required) at the request of SPGVL as per the requirements of the Contract. The PBGs shall be unconditional, irrevocable and irreversible and in format provided by SPGVL in Appendix-6. 12.[4] The Contractor understands and accepts that the submission of the aforementioned Bank Guarantees are an integral part of the Contract and any delay on this account shall lead to material breach of the Contract and the Contractor would be liable to appropriate actions available to SPGVL under the Contract, or as per the Applicable Law. 12.[5] The aforementioned bank guarantees (i.e. the ABGs, the CPBGs and the PBG (collectively referred to as the "Bank Guarantees")) shall be issued from the following banks: 12.5.[1] By a Public Sector Bank located in India, or 12.5.[2] a Scheduled Indian Bank or any other bank acceptable to SPGVL 12.[6] In case of enforcement of the Bank Guarantees by SPGVL, the Contractor shall forthwith reinstate the same to their respective original value.”

9. As is evident from a reading of Clause 12.1, the ABGs were stipulated to be irrevocable, unconditional and irreversible. The said provision also prescribed that the value of the ABGs shall be proportionately reduced on a quarterly bases for the amount adjusted against Advance Payment-1. Undisputedly, the Supply Contract also carried similar provisions. The Respondent asserts that various advance payments amounting to Rs.5,38,44,016/- have already been paid to the Petitioner and which amount is liable to be refunded in the absence of any work having been performed or supplies having been effected. It is its contention that in the absence of any steps having been taken under the contracts, the stage for raising invoices did not arise and consequently no amount was adjusted against the advance payment made to the Petitioner. The stand in essence is that since advance payments are yet to be refunded, the question of grant of injunctive relief as claimed by the Petitioner would be wholly unwarranted. It is in the aforesaid backdrop that the prayers as made in the present petition preferred under Section 9 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 are liable to be evaluated.

10. As would be manifest from the reliefs which are claimed, the solitary injunction which is sought is with respect to the BGs detailed in paragraph 8 of the petition. A BG as is well settled is an independent and distinct contract between the bank and the beneficiary. Our courts have consistently held that the said contract can be interfered with and a restraint granted only if a party is able to unequivocally establish irretrievable harm or injustice being caused or where special equities may be found to exist.

11. The Court bears in mind the following pertinent observations as were entered by the Supreme Court in Hindustan Steelworks Construction Ltd. vs. Tarapore & Co.[4] while underlining the special features which underlie a BG:-

“14. The High Court also committed a grave error in restraining the appellant from invoking bank guarantees on the ground that in India only a reasonable amount can be awarded by way of damages even when the parties to the contract have provided for liquidated damages and that a
term in a bank guarantee making the beneficiary the sole judge on the question of breach of contract and the extent of loss or damages would be invalid and that no amount can be said to be due till an adjudication in that behalf is made either by a court or an arbitrator, as the case may be. In taking that view the High Court has overlooked the correct position that a bank guarantee is an independent and distinct contract between the bank and the beneficiary and is not qualified by the underlying transaction and the primary contract between the person at whose instance the bank guarantee is given and the beneficiary. What the High Court has observed would be applicable only to the parties to the underlying transaction or the primary contract but can have no relevance to the bank guarantee given by the bank, as the transaction between the bank and the beneficiary is independent and of a different nature. In case of an unconditional bank guarantee the nature of obligation of the bank is absolute and not dependent upon any dispute or proceeding between the party at whose instance the bank guarantee is given and the beneficiary. The High Court thus failed to appreciate the real object and nature of a bank guarantee. The distinction which the High Court has drawn between a guarantee for due performance of a works contract and a guarantee given towards security deposit for that contract is also unwarranted. The said distinction appears to be the result of the same fallacy committed by the High Court of not appreciating the distinction between the primary contract between the parties and a bank guarantee and also the real object of a bank guarantee and the nature of the bank's obligation thereunder. Whether the bank guarantee is towards security deposit or mobilisation advance or working funds or for due performance of the contract if the same is unconditional and if there is a stipulation in the bank guarantee that the bank should pay on demand without a demur and that the beneficiary shall be the sole judge not only on the question of breach of contract but also with respect to the amount of loss or damages, the obligation of the bank would remain the same and that obligation has to be discharged in the manner provided in the bank guarantee. In General Electric Technical Services Co. Inc.v. Punj Sons (P) Ltd. [(1991) 4 SCC 230] while dealing with a case of bank guarantee given for securing mobilisation advance it has been held that the right of a contractor to recover certain amounts under running bills would have no relevance to the liability of the bank under the guarantee given by it. In that case also the stipulations in the bank guarantee were that the bank had to pay on demand without a demur and that the beneficiary was to be the sole judge as regards the loss or damage caused to it. This Court held that notwithstanding the dispute between the contractor and the party giving the contract, the bank was under an obligation to discharge its liability as per the terms of the bank guarantee. Larsen and Toubro Ltd. v. Maharashtra SEB [(1995) 6 SCC 68] and Hindustan Steel Workers Construction Ltd. v. G.S. Atwal & Co. (Engineers) (P) Ltd. [(1995) 6 SCC 76] were also cases of work contracts wherein bank guarantees were given either towards advances or release of security deposits or for the performance of the contract. In both these cases this Court held that the bank guarantees being irrevocable and unconditional and as the beneficiary was made the sole judge on the question of breach of performance of the contract and the extent of loss or damages an injunction restraining the beneficiary from invoking the bank guarantees could not have been granted. The above-referred three subsequent decisions of this Court also go to show that the view taken by the High Court is clearly wrong.
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23. We are, therefore, of the opinion that the correct position of law is that commitment of banks must be honoured free from interference by the courts and it is only in exceptional cases, that is to say, in case of fraud or in a case where irretrievable injustice would be done if bank guarantee is allowed to be encashed, the court should interfere. In this case fraud has not been pleaded and the relief for injunction was sought by the contractor/Respondent 1 on the ground that special equities or the special circumstances of the case required it. The special circumstances and/or special equities which have been pleaded in this case are that there is a serious dispute on the question as to who has committed breach of the contract, that the contractor has a counter-claim against the appellant, that the disputes between the parties have been referred to the arbitrators and that no amount can be said to be due and payable by the contractor to the appellant till the arbitrators declare their award. In our opinion, these factors are not sufficient to make this case an exceptional case justifying interference by restraining the appellant from enforcing the bank guarantees. The High Court was, therefore, not right in restraining the appellant from enforcing the bank guarantees.”

12. The Supreme Court in Dwarikesh Sugar Industries Ltd. vs. Prem Heavy Engineering Works (P) Ltd.[5] had culled out the basic grounds on which an injunction could be sought or obtained in respect of a BG. The Court deems it apposite to extract the following passages from that decision: -

“21. Numerous decisions of this Court rendered over a span of nearly two decades have laid down and reiterated the principles which the courts must apply while considering the question whether to grant an injunction which has the effect of restraining the encashment of a bank guarantee. We do not think it necessary to burden this judgment by referring to all
of them. Some of the more recent pronouncements on this point where the earlier decisions have been considered and reiterated are Svenska Handelsbanken v. Indian Charge Chrome [(1994) 1 SCC 502], Larsen & Toubro Ltd. v. Maharashtra SEB [(1995) 6 SCC 68], Hindustan Steel Workers Construction Ltd. v. G.S. Atwal & Co. (Engineers) (P) Ltd. [(1995) 6 SCC 76] and U.P. State Sugar Corpn. v. Sumac International Ltd. [(1997) 1 SCC 568] The general principle which has been laid down by this Court has been summarised in the case of U.P. State Sugar Corpn. [(1997) 1 SCC 568] as follows: (SCC p. 574, para
12) “The law relating to invocation of such bank guarantees is by now well settled. When in the course of commercial dealings an unconditional bank guarantee is given or accepted, the beneficiary is entitled to realize such a bank guarantee in terms thereof irrespective of any pending disputes. The bank giving such a guarantee is bound to honour it as per its terms irrespective of any dispute raised by its customer. The very purpose of giving such a bank guarantee would otherwise be defeated. The courts should, therefore, be slow in granting an injunction to restrain the realization of such a bank guarantee. The courts have carved out only two exceptions. A fraud in connection with such a bank guarantee would vitiate the very foundation of such a bank guarantee. Hence if there is such a fraud of which the beneficiary seeks to take the advantage, he can be restrained from doing so. The second exception relates to cases where allowing the encashment of an unconditional bank guarantee would result in irretrievable harm or injustice to one of the parties concerned. Since in most cases payment of money under such a bank guarantee would adversely affect the bank and its customer at whose instance the guarantee is given, the harm or injustice contemplated under this head must be of such an exceptional and irretrievable nature as would override the terms of the guarantee and the adverse effect of such an injunction on commercial dealings in the country.” Dealing with the question of fraud it has been held that fraud has to be an established fraud. The following observations of Sir John Donaldson, M.R. in Bolivinter Oil SA v. Chase Manhattan Bank [(1984) 1 All ER 351, CA] are apposite: “… The wholly exceptional case where an injunction may be granted is where it is proved that the bank knows that any demand for payment already made or which may thereafter be made will clearly be fraudulent. But the evidence must be clear, both as to the fact of fraud and as to the bank's knowledge. It would certainly not normally be sufficient that this rests on the uncorroborated statement of the customer, for irreparable damage can be done to a bank's credit in the relatively brief time which must elapse between the granting of such an injunction and an application by the bank to have it discharged.” (emphasis supplied) The aforesaid passage was approved and followed by this Court in U.P. Coop. Federation Ltd. v. Singh Consultants and Engineers (P) Ltd. [(1988) 1 SCC 174]

22. The second exception to the rule of granting injunction, i.e., the resulting of irretrievable injury, has to be such a circumstance which would make it impossible for the guarantor to reimburse himself, if he ultimately succeeds. This will have to be decisively established and it must be proved to the satisfaction of the court that there would be no possibility whatsoever of the recovery of the amount from the beneficiary, by way of restitution.”

13. The precedents which have been rendered on this subject were exhaustively noticed and reviewed in a recent judgment rendered by a learned Judge of the Court in CRSC Research & Design Institute Group Co. Ltd. v. Dedicated Freight Corridor Corporation of India Limited and Others[6]. The Court deems it apposite to extract the following passages from the aforesaid decision:

26. The following principles clearly emerge from the decision in Vinitec Electronics:

(i) Bank guarantees, which are payable on demand by the guarantor, are unconditional bank guarantees.

(ii) Unconditional bank guarantees entitled the guarantor to realisation thereof, irrespective of any pending disputes. In fact, disputes between the guarantor, and the parties, at whose instance the bank has given the guarantee, are immaterial and of no consequence. Enforcement of the guarantee cannot be injuncted on the pretext that the condition for enforcing the bank guarantee, in terms of the agreement between the parties, has not been fulfilled. What is relevant are the terms incorporated in the guarantee (and not those in the agreement between the parties). The mere fact that the bank guarantee refers to the principal agreement, without referring to any specific clause, does not make the bank guarantee conditional.

(iii) Courts should, therefore, be slow in injuncting realisation of unconditional bank guarantees.

(iv) The only exceptions, to this general rule, are where there exist/exists

(a) fraud of an egregious nature, or (b) irretrievable injustice resulting to the parties, at whose instance the bank gave the guarantee, were the injunction not granted, or

(c) special equities, of which the possibility of irretrievable injustice is itself one. (v) “Irretrievable injustice”, for this purpose, has to be of such an exceptional nature as would override the terms of the guarantee and the adverse effect of the grant of such injunction on commercial dealings in the country.

28. These paras illustrate, lucidly, the distinction between a conditional bank guarantee and an unconditional bank guarantee. The judgment in Vinitec Electronics makes it abundantly clear that the first aspect, to be taken into consideration, is the bank guarantee itself, and the terms thereof. If the bank guarantee is conditional, then, if the conditions have not been fulfilled, injunction, against encashment and invocation, may unquestionably follow. If, however, the bank guarantee is unconditional, then injunction can be granted only if egregious fraud, irretrievable injustice, or special equities, exist, and not otherwise.

29. The issue was revisited, by the Supreme Court, in its more recent decision in Standard Chartered Bank v. Heavy Engineering Corporation Ltd. The terms of the bank guarantees, in that case, contemplated their invocation “against any loss or damage caused to or suffered by the Corporation by reason or any breach or failure by the said supplier, in due performance of the aforesaid contract”. The specifics of the controversy between the parties need not detain us. Suffice it to state that the Supreme Court held the bank guarantees to be “unconditional” and “specific in nature”. Thereafter, the Supreme Court, relying on its earlier decisions Ansal Engineering Projects Ltd. v. Tehri Hydro Development Corporation Ltd., Hindustan Construction Co. Ltd. v. State of Bihar, State Bank of India v. Mula Sahakari Sakhar Karkhana Ltd., Himadri Chemicals and Gujarat Maritime Board v. Larsen & Toubro Infrastructure Development Projects Ltd., reiterated the principles already set out hereinabove, and emphasised, additionally, that fraud or special equities had, to support the prayer for stay of invocation of bank guarantees, to be “pleaded and prima facie established by strong evidence as a triable issue”.

32. Some scope for debate, however, arises, on the concept of “special equities”. The decisions of the Supreme Court - perhaps, advisedly - do not delineate, in precise contours, the ambit of the expression. Significantly, Fenner India Ltd. regards “irretrievable injustice” as a specie of the “special equities” genus, whereas Standard Chartered Bank treat “special equities” and “irretrievable injustice” as distinct circumstances, either of which would justify injuncting the invocation of a bank guarantee.“Irretrievable injustice”, to reiterate, has to be of such a magnitude as would override the twin considerations of the express terms of the guarantee and the adverse effect, from the grant of injunction, on commercial dealings in the country. “Special equities”, too, must, therefore, be so “special” so as to prevail over these two considerations, otherwise paramount while examining a prayer for injunction against invocation of a bank guarantee. While, therefore, examining whether “special equities” exist, so as to justify the grant of a prayer for injuncting invocation of a bank guarantee, the Court has to tread warily, and cannot confer, on the expression “special equities”, so elastic a construction, as would snap the rule.

49. Which leaves us with the third circumstance, in which stay of invocation of an unconditional bank guarantee can be legitimately directed by the court, i.e. the existence of special equities. Again, the petitioner has, undoubtedly, averred, in the petition, that such “special equities” do exist; the justifiability of the averment, however, requires to be examined.

50. Without extracting the specific references, to the existence of “special equities”, as made in the petition, suffice it to state that the only ground, on which the petitioner has urged the existence of such “special equities”, is its averment that its claim, against Respondent No. 1, is far in excess of the amounts of the bank guarantees. There is no other ground, on which the existence of “special equities” has been pleaded.

51. Can a mere claim, of the petitioner, against the respondent - the sustainability of which is yet to be adjudicated - constitute “special equities”, so as to justify injuncting the invocation of unconditional bank guarantees, issued by the bank, at the petitioner's instance, in favour of Respondent No. 1, even if such a claim is in excess of the amount covered by the bank guarantees? In my considered opinion, it cannot.

52. Extrapolating from the principle enunciated in Fenner India Ltd. in the context of irretrievable injury, I have already opined, hereinbefore, that “special equities” must be so special as to override the twin considerations of the sanctity of the terms of the bank guarantee, and the deleterious effect which the grant of injunction, against honouring of unconditional bank guarantees, would have on the commercially transacting public. The Supreme Court has held, in Meet Singh v. State of Punjab, that the word “special” means “distinguished by some unusual quality, peculiar or out of the ordinary” and that it “has to be understood in contradistinction to the word „general‟ or „ordinary‟.” Viewed in this background, Respondent NO. 1 is entitled, on the express terms of the bank guarantees, to their invocation in its favour, subject to Respondent No. 1 submitting the required signed statements. The Performance Guarantee goes so far as to specifically stipulate that Respondent No. 1 was not required to prove or establish the breach of contract, on the part of the petitioner, before being entitled to the invocation of the bank guarantee. These are strong equities in favour of Respondent No. 1, and the sanctity attached to bank guarantees, and to the credibility of the banking system which provides such guarantees, serves to augment the equities. Can these equities be offset by the mere fact that the petitioner may have a yet to be established claim, against Respondent No. 1, so as to justify restraining the Bank from honouring the covenants of the bank guarantees? The answer, in my opinion, has necessarily to be in the negative.”

14. It must, at the outset, be noted that the Petitioner here neither alleges nor has it asserted or proven a case of fraud. The Court also bears in mind the test in relation to injunctions in respect of Bank Guarantees having been formulated to be fraud of an “egregious” nature. As is evident from the aforesaid recital of facts, all that comes to the fore is the existence of a contractual dispute between the parties. The Court also bears in mind the objection taken by the Respondent who contended that the advance payments held by the Petitioner are liable to be refunded. It becomes pertinent to note that the aforesaid assertion as set forth in the reply which was submitted has not been controverted by the Petitioner. In view of the aforesaid, the Court is of the firm opinion that no case of irretrievable harm or special equities exists.

15. The petition along with pending applications fails and shall consequently stand dismissed.

YASHWANT VARMA, J. FEBRUARY 28, 2023