Sonu Kumar, BPM & Ors. v. Union of India & Ors.

Delhi High Court · 20 Mar 2023 · 2023:DHC:1966-DB
V. Kameswar Rao; Anoop Kumar Mendiratta
W.P.(C) 11973/2016
2023:DHC:1966-DB
administrative petition_allowed Significant

AI Summary

The Delhi High Court held that the benefit of its judgment reinstating terminated employees must be extended to all similarly situated persons, including those not party to the original writ petition, directing reinstatement on the principle of 'no work no pay.'

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2023:DHC:1966-DB
W.P.(C) 11973/2016 Page 1
HIGH COURT OF DELHI
Date of Decision: 20th March, 2023
W.P.(C) 11973/2016
SONU KUMAR, BPM & ORS. ..... Petitioners
Through: Mr. Sudhir Naagar, Mr. Mukesh Giri & Mr. Vikrant Mehta, Advs.
VERSUS
UNION OF INDIA & ORS ..... Respondents
Through: Ms. Arunima Dwivedi, CGSC with Ms. Swati Jhunjhunwala, Ms. Pinky Pawar & Mr. Aakash Pathak, Advs. for UOI
CORAM:
HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE V. KAMESWAR RAO
HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE ANOOP KUMAR MENDIRATTA V. KAMESWAR RAO, J (ORAL)
CM APPL. 45858/2022
JUDGMENT

1. This application has been filed by the applicant Harmesh Choudhary with following prayers: “It is therefore, most respectfully, prayed that this Hon'ble Court may kindly be pleased to:- (a) Issue appropriate directions to the official respondents to extend the benefit of judgment dated 16.01.2020 passed by this Hon'ble Court in Writ Petition (Civil) No.11973/2016, to the applicants/respondents thereby reinstating them and treating them at par with the petitioners; and/or (b) Pass any other order, as this Hon'ble Court may deem fit in the facts and circumstances of the case, in the interest of justice.”

2. The facts as noted from the application are that the petitioner along with 65 other similarly placed persons had filed an Original W.P.(C) 11973/2016 Page 2 Application being OA 2910/2015 before the Central Administrative Tribunal, Principal Bench, New Delhi („Tribunal‟, for short) primarily challenging various termination orders issued on June 24, 2015. The OA was dismissed by the Tribunal vide order dated August 30, 2016. The said judgment of the Tribunal became a subject matter of challenge before this Court in a writ petition being W.P.(C) 11973/2016 decided on January 16, 2020, whereby this Court had set aside the order of the Tribunal dated August 30, 2016 and directed the reinstatement of the petitioners who had filed the writ petition, within a period of eight weeks, however by following the principle of „no work no pay‟.

3. It may be stated here that the applicant herein was not the petitioner in that writ petition. As he was an applicant in the Original Application, he was impleaded as performa respondent No.8.

4. The judgment of this Court dated January 16, 2020 became a subject matter of a Special Leave Petition being SLP 12311/2020, filed by the official respondents herein, which was dismissed by the Supreme Court. The effect thereof is that the order dated January 16, 2020 became final.

5. The submission of the learned counsel for the applicant is all the petitioners before this Court were given the benefit of the judgment of this Court dated January 16, 2020. He submits, though the applicant herein was an applicant before the Tribunal, but had not challenged the judgment and as such was not a petitioner before this Court. Therefore, the benefit of the Judgment of this Court dated January 16, 2020, was not given to him as he has not been reinstated though he is similarly placed like the petitioners in the writ petition. W.P.(C) 11973/2016 Page 3

6. His plea is that the applicant was under a bonafide belief that the benefit of the order of this Court shall also be given to him. In fact, after the dismissal of the SLP, a legal notice dated July 2, 2022 was served on the respondents for compliance of the order passed this Court in favour of the applicant. The respondents replied to the applicant stating that the benefit cannot be given to him was he was not amongst the petitioners in the aforesaid writ petition. He submits that the applicant was also part of the omnibus termination order dated June 24, 2015 which has already been set aside by this Court and the petitioners who are similarly placed like the applicant have been reinstated.

7. He states that the judgment of this Court is applicable to all similarly placed persons whose services have been terminated on June 24, 2015 and on mere technicality, the benefit should not be denied to the applicant herein. In support of his submission, he has relied upon the judgment in the case of State of U.P. v. Arvind Kumar Srivastava, (2015) 1 SCC 347, to contend that any judgment in rem should be made applicable to similarly placed persons and all such persons should not be made to rush to the Court seeking benefit thereof.

8. On the other hand, learned counsel appearing for the respondents would submit that, as the applicant was not the petitioner before this Court, he is not entitled to the benefit, though he do concede to the fact that the applicant is similarly placed like the petitioners before this Court, who got the benefit of the Judgment dated January 16, 2020.

9. He seeks the dismissal of the application.

10. Having heard the learned counsel for the parties, the short issue W.P.(C) 11973/2016 Page 4 which arises for consideration is whether the applicant herein is entitled to the benefit of the Judgment dated January 16, 2020 passed by this Court. The answer to the said question has to be in the affirmative inasmuch as the applicant was a part of the Original Application which challenged the order dated June 24, 2015 before the Tribunal. It is a fact that the petitioner did not join the petitioners before this Court for the reasons best known to him. This Court had set aside the order of the Tribunal and granted the relief to the petitioners, who had approached this Court for reinstatement. Naturally, as the applicant was not the petitioner, he was not given the benefit of the said Judgment. I must state when the respondents had filed an SLP before the Supreme Court, the applicant was also made a pro-forma respondent, as he was a party in the original proceedings before the Tribunal.

11. This Court while setting aside the order of the Tribunal has relied upon the judgment of the Allahabad High Court in Union of India v. Archna Mishra, Writ Petition (Civil) No.49864/2017, decided on April 30, 2018 wherein the Division Bench of the Allahabad High Court dismissed the petition upholding the order of the Tribunal by stating that the incumbents being the holders of Civil Post, the order of termination is a punitive termination as procedure under Article 311(2) of the Constitution of India, was required to be followed.

12. So, to that extent, finding of this Court in the order dated January 16, 2020, shall equally be applicable to the applicant herein. No doubt, merely the applicant was not a petitioner before this Court, the benefit of the order which was confined to 56 petitioners who are similarly placed like the applicant herein, there is no reason why the W.P.(C) 11973/2016 Page 5 benefit of the said judgment should not be given to the applicant herein. Otherwise, it would so happen that despite the fact that termination has been set aside, the benefit of reinstatement, shall not enure to the benefit of the applicant herein.

13. It is not a case where applicant had not challenged the order of termination issued by the respondents as he had already filed an Original Application before the Tribunal which had dismissed the same. Learned counsel for the applicant is justified in relying upon the Judgment of the Supreme Court in the case of Arvind Kumar Srivastava (supra) wherein the Supreme Court has summed up the principles with regard to whether or not the benefit of a judgment could be extended to those who are not parties to the litigation. The Supreme Court has in paragraph 22 held as under:

“22. The legal principles which emerge from the reading of the aforesaid judgments, cited both by the appellants as well as the respondents, can be summed up as under. 22.1. The normal rule is that when a particular set of employees is given relief by the court, all other identically situated persons need to be treated alike by extending that benefit. Not doing so would amount to discrimination and would be violative of Article 14 of the Constitution of India. This principle needs to be applied in service matters more emphatically as the service jurisprudence evolved by this Court from time to time postulates that all similarly situated persons should be treated similarly. Therefore, the normal rule would be that merely because other similarly situated persons did not approach the Court earlier, they are not to be treated differently. 22.2. However, this principle is subject to well-recognised exceptions in the form of laches and delays as well as acquiescence. Those persons who did not challenge the wrongful action in their cases and acquiesced into the same
W.P.(C) 11973/2016 Page 6 and woke up after long delay only because of the reason that their counterparts who had approached the court earlier in time succeeded in their efforts, then such employees cannot claim that the benefit of the judgment rendered in the case of similarly situated persons be extended to them. They would be treated as fence-sitters and laches and delays, and/or the acquiescence, would be a valid ground to dismiss their claim.
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22.3. However, this exception may not apply in those cases where the judgment pronounced by the court was judgment in rem with intention to give benefit to all similarly situated persons, whether they approached the court or not. With such a pronouncement the obligation is cast upon the authorities to itself extend the benefit thereof to all similarly situated persons. Such a situation can occur when the subject-matter of the decision touches upon the policy matters, like scheme of regularisation and the like. On the other hand, if the judgment of the court was in personam holding that benefit of the said judgment shall accrue to the parties before the court and such an intention is stated expressly in the judgment or it can be impliedly found out from the tenor and language of the judgment, those who want to get the benefit of the said judgment extended to them shall have to satisfy that their petition does not suffer from either laches and delays or acquiescence.” (emphasis supplied)

14. Similarly, the Supreme Court in Government of NCT of Delhi & Anr. v. Somvir Rana (TGT ENG) & Ors., Diary No (s) 23663/2017, decided on September 1, 2017, has also on similar issues stated as under: “Delay condoned. We find that there are several matters in which the aggrieved employees have been going to the Tribunal, then to the High Court and thereafter those matters are brought before this Court at the instance of the Union of India/NCT of Delhi. W.P.(C) 11973/2016 Page 7 Once the question, in principle, has been settled, it is only appropriate on the part of the Government of India to issue a Circular so that it will save the time of the Court and the Administrative Departments apart from avoiding unnecessary and avoidable expenditure. The present situation is that the stepping up is available only to those who have approached the Court. But since the issue has otherwise become final, we direct the Government of India to immediately look into the matter and issue appropriate orders for granting the pay-scale so that people need not unnecessarily travel either to the Tribunal or the High Court or this Court. With the above observations and directions, the special leave petitions are dismissed. Pending application(s), if any, shall stand disposed of.”

15. In view of our above discussion, the applicant is also entitled to the benefit of the judgment of this Court dated January 16, 2020 in W.P.(C) No.11973/2016. The respondents are directed to reinstate the applicant within eight weeks from today. For the purpose of seniority, promotion and notional fixation of pay, the period between the date of termination of service and date of reinstatement will be treated as period in service. However, on the principle of “no work no pay” the applicant would not be entitled to any arrears of pay for the said period.

16. The application is disposed of.

V. KAMESWAR RAO, J.

ANOOP KUMAR MENDIRATTA, J. MARCH 20, 2023/jg/aky