The Delhi High Court upheld the framing of charges for abetment of suicide under Section 306 IPC against accused persons for dowry-related harassment leading to the deceased's suicide, emphasizing the limited scope of interference at the charge framing stage.
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NEUTRAL CITATION NO. 2023/DHC/001673
CRL. REV.P 577/2018 HIGH COURT OF DELHI
Reserved on: 17.02.2023 Pronounced on: 06.03.2023
CRL.REV.P. 577/2018 & CRL.M.A. 12358/2018 SHRI NAGENDER & ANR. ..... Petitioners Through: Mr. Ashwin Vaish and Mr. V. Thomas, Advocates.
VERSUS
STATE ..... Respondent Through: Mr. Naresh Chahar, APP for the State.
CORAM:
HON'BLE MS. JUSTICE SWARANA KANTA SHARMA
JUDGMENT
SWARANA KANTA SHARMA, J.
1. The present revision petition under Section 397/401 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (‗Cr.P.C.‘) has been filed by the petitioners against the order on charge and framing of charge dated 25.04.2018 passed by learned Additional Sessions Judge–04, (East), Karkardooma Courts, Delhi in FIR bearing no. 626/2015, registered at Police Station Yamuna Depot Metro, Delhi, for the offences punishable under Section 4 of Dowry Prohibition Act read with Section 34 of Indian Penal Code, 1860 ('IPC‘) and Sections 306/34 of IPC, whereby charges have been framed against petitioners under Section 4 of Dowry Prohibition Act read with Section 34 IPC and Section 306/34 of IPC.
2. The brief facts of the case are that the petitioner is a Doctor by profession, and petitioner no. 2, retired from the Indian Army, is father of petitioner no. 1. The deceased was a pharmacist who was engaged to petitioner no.1. On 22.11.2015, deceased committed suicide by jumping in front of metro train from Platform No. 3, Yamuna Bank Metro Station. The family members of the deceased were informed by the police and the brother of the deceased lodged a complaint against the accused persons stating that the marriage of deceased Anjali was fixed with accused Dr. Nagender on the basis of a matrimonial advertisement, and engagement ceremony was held on 31.05.2015. Initially the accused persons did not demand anything but during the engagement ceremony, accused Lalta Prasad demanded rupees Rs. 3 lakhs in cash and articles worth Rs. 1 lakh. The father of the complainant paid Rs. 50,000/- to the grandmother of the accused Nagender. Thereafter, in the month of sawan, accused Lalta Prasad again demanded gifts etc along with Rs. 2 lakhs, which were also paid by the father of the deceased in the presence of family members and relatives of the accused. After her engagement, deceased started talking with accused Nagender and they became emotionally attached. In November, 2015 accused Lalta Prasad demanded the balance amount of Rs. 50,000/- and Rs. 1 lakh in lieu of articles on the pretext that it would not be feasible to bring the articles from Allahabad at the time of marriage. The father of the deceased expressed his inability and assured accused Lalta Prasad to make the balance payment at the time of marriage, which was fixed for 13.12.2015. Accused Lalta Prasad did not pay any heed to the request of the father of deceased. When complainant came to know about this fact, he also talked with petitioner no. 1 Nagender but he also did not agree for the same. When deceased Anjali came to know about it, she also requested with accused Nagender but without any success. The accused persons insisted to fulfill their demands before Diwali otherwise they threatened that they would cancel the marriage. On 22.11.2015, the family members of the accused persons and the complainant had met at India Gate, Delhi and again requested to make the balance payment at the time of marriage but the accused persons remained adamant and told them that they would cancel the marriage if the money was not paid to them. Deceased Anjali, who was also present in the meeting, was shocked and she had begged accused Nagender but the accused persons did not accede to the repeated requests of deceased and her family members and cancelled the marriage. Thereafter, the family members of the deceased took Metro for going to Vaishali, Ghaziabad. On account of rush in the metro train, complainant, his father, deceased Anjali and friend of the father got separated and when the metro remained stationed at Preet Vihar Metro Station for long time, the complainant received telephonic information that deceased Anjali had committed suicide due to the harassment caused by the accused persons. FIR was then registered under Section 306 IPC and the matter was investigated. The accused persons were arrested. The witnesses were examined and after completion of investigation, charge, sheet was filed against the accused persons.
3. Learned counsel for the petitioners argues that the conversation mentioned from page no. 28 to page no. 31 does not reflect that there was any instigation on part of petitioners to force the deceased to commit suicide.
4. It is argued that the conversation, at best, reflects that there were temperamental differences between the deceased and the petitioner no.1 and they cannot be forced to face trial under Section 306 of IPC. He also states that the conversation may reflect dowry demand and he is not challenging framing of charge under Section 4 of Dowry Prohibition Act read with Section 34 of IPC.
5. Per contra, learned APP for the State submits that the specific demand for dowry and inability of the parents of the petitioners not being able to fulfill their demands, and the fear of cancellation of marriage had been instrumental in abating the suicide of the deceased. It is also pointed out that accused Nagender had not even co-operated with the investigation and had refused to give his voice samples and thus, adverse inference has to be drawn against him.
6. Learned counsel for the petitioners again reiterated that petitioners are not challenging the charge as far as Section 4 of Dowry Prohibition Act is concerned, however, no case under section 306 of IPC is made out as it was the deceased who was over sensitive and she must have committed suicide due to being scolded by her brother and father for her bad behavior towards the petitioners. It is also stated that there is a time gap between the meeting between the parties on 22.11.2015 at India Gate and deceased committing suicide on the same day. It is also argued that the deceased and her uncle were in different coaches of Metro and father and brother of the deceased were in another coach which strengthens their argument that father and brother of the deceased must have scolded her between 5.00 pm and 6.30 pm on date of incident and she must have commit suicide due to that. It is also stated that the uncle of the deceased can be seen with his hand in his pocket and he did not try to save the deceased when she had jumped in front of the Metro, which raises doubt against his conduct.
7. This Court has heard arguments of both the parties and perused the material on record.
8. Before getting into the merits of the case it is important to look at the statutory law with respect to discharge and framing of charge which is provided under Sections 227 and 228 of Cr.P.C., and the same is reproduced as under for reference: ―227. Discharge. If, upon consideration of the record of the case and the documents submitted therewith, and after hearing the submissions of the accused and the prosecution in this behalf. the Judge considers that there is not sufficient ground for proceeding against the accused, he shall discharge the accused and record his reasons for so doing."
“228. Framing of charge.
(1) If, after such consideration and hearing as aforesaid, the
Judge is of opinion that there is ground for presuming that
the accused has committed an offence which-
(a) is not exclusively triable by the Court of Session, he may, frame a charge against the accused and, by order, transfer the case for trial to the Chief Judicial Magistrate, and thereupon the Chief Judicial Magistrate shall try the offence in accordance with the procedure for the trial of warrant- cases instituted on a police report;
(b) is exclusively triable by the Court, he shall frame in writing a charge against the accused. (2) Where the Judge frames any charge under clause (b) of sub- section (1), the charge shall be read and explained to
the accused and the accused shall be asked whether he pleads guilty of the offence charged or claims to be tried.‖
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9. The Hon‘ble Apex Court, in Manendra Prasad Tiwari v. Amit Kumar Tiwari and Anr. 2022 SCC OnLine SC 1057, explained the wellsettled law on exercise of power under Section 397 and Section 482 of Cr.P.C. by the Courts while deciding as to whether the charges framed against an accused be quashed or not, as under: ―21. The law is well settled that although it is open to a High Court entertaining a petition under Section 482 of the CrPC or a revision application under Section 397 of the CrPC to quash the charges framed by the trial court, yet the same cannot be done by weighing the correctness or sufficiency of the evidence. In a case praying for quashing of the charge, the principle to be adopted by the High Court should be that if the entire evidence produced by the prosecution is to be believed, would it constitute an offence or not. The truthfulness, the sufficiency and acceptability of the material produced at the time of framing of a charge can be done only at the stage of trial. To put it more succinctly, at the stage of charge the Court is to examine the materials only with a view to be satisfied that prima facie case of commission of offence alleged has been made out against the accused person. It is also well settled that when the petition is filed by the accused under Section 482 CrPC or a revision Petition under Section 397 read with Section 401 of the CrPC seeking for the quashing of charge framed against him, the Court should not interfere with the order unless there are strong reasons to hold that in the interest of justice and to avoid abuse of the process of the Court a charge framed against the accused needs to be quashed. Such an order can be passed only in exceptional cases and on rare occasions. It is to be kept in mind that once the trial court has framed a charge against an accused the trial must proceed without unnecessary interference by a superior court and the entire evidence from the prosecution side should be placed on record. Any attempt by an accused for quashing of a charge before the entire prosecution evidence has come on record should not be entertained sans exceptional cases.
22. The scope of interference and exercise of jurisdiction under Section 397 of CrPC has been time and again explained by this Court. Further, the scope of interference under Section 397 CIPC at a stage, when charge had been framed, is also well settled. At the stage of framing of a charge, the court is concerned not with the proof of the allegation rather it has to focus on the material and form an opinion whether there is strong suspicion that the accused has committed an offence, which if put to trial, could prove his guilt. The framing of charge is not a stage, at which stage the final test of guilt is to he applied. Thus, to hold that at the stage of framing the charge, the court should form an opinion that the accused is certainly guilty of committing an offence, is to hold something which is neither permissible nor is in consonance with the scheme of Code of Criminal Procedure
23. Section 397 CrPC vests the court with the power to call for and examine the records of an inferior court for the purposes of satisfying itself as to the legality and regularity of any proceedings or order made in a case. The object of this provision is to set right a patent defect or an error of jurisdiction or law or the perversity which has crept in the proceeding.‖
10. The principles with reference to exercise of power under Sections 397 and 482 of Cr.P.C. by the Courts were enlisted by the Apex Court in Amit Kapoor v. Ramesh Chander (2012) 9 SCC 460. The principles listed are as under: ―27. Having discussed the scope of jurisdiction under these two provisions, i.e., Section 397 and Section 482 of the Code and the fine line of jurisdictional distinction, now it will be appropriate for us to enlist the principles with reference to which the courts should exercise such jurisdiction. However, it is not only difficult but is inherently impossible to state with precision such principles. At best and upon objective analysis of various judgments of this Court, we are able to cull out some of the principles to be considered for proper exercise of jurisdiction, particularly, with regard to quashing of charge either in exercise of jurisdiction under Section 397 or Section 482 of the Code or together, as the case may be:
27.1. Though there are no limits of the powers of the Court under Section 482 of the Code but the more the power, the more due care and caution is to be exercised in invoking these powers. The power of quashing criminal proceedings, particularly, the charge framed in terms of Section 228 of the Code should be exercised very sparingly and with circumspection and that too in the rarest of rare cases.
27.2. The Court should apply the test as to whether the uncontroverted allegations as made from the record of the case and the documents submitted therewith prima facie establish the offence or not. If the allegations are so patently absurd and inherently improbable that no prudent person can ever reach such a conclusion and where the basic ingredients of a criminal offence are not satisfied then the Court may interfere.
27.3. The High Court should not unduly interfere. No meticulous examination of the evidence is needed for considering whether the case would end in conviction or not at the stage of framing of charge or quashing of charge.
27.4. Where the exercise of such power is absolutely essential to prevent patent miscarriage of justice and for correcting some grave error that might be committed by the subordinate courts even in such cases, the High Court should be loathe to interfere, at the threshold, to throttle the prosecution in exercise of its inherent powers.
27.5. Where there is an express legal bar enacted in any of the provisions of the Code or any specific law in force to the very initiation or institution and continuance of such criminal proceedings, such a bar is intended to provide specific protection to an accused.
27.6. The Court has a duty to balance the freedom of a person and the right of the complainant or prosecution to investigate and prosecute the offender.
27.7. The process of the Court cannot be permitted to be used for an oblique or ultimate/ulterior purpose.
27.8. Where the allegations made and as they appeared from the record and documents annexed therewith to predominantly give rise and constitute a ‗civil wrong‘ with no ‗element of criminality‘ and does not satisfy the basic ingredients of a criminal offence, the Court may be justified in quashing the charge. Even in such cases, the Court would not embark upon the critical analysis of the evidence.
27.9. Another very significant caution that the courts have to observe is that it cannot examine the facts, evidence and materials on record to determine whether there is sufficient material on the basis of which the case would end in a conviction, the Court is concerned primarily with the allegations taken as a whole whether they will constitute an offence and, if so, is it an abuse of the process of court leading to injustice.
27.10. It is neither necessary nor is the court called upon to hold a full-fledged enquiry or to appreciate evidence collected by the investigating agencies to find out whether it is a case of acquittal or conviction.
27.11. Where allegations give rise to a civil claim and also amount to an offence, merely because a civil claim is maintainable, does not mean that a criminal complaint cannot be maintained.
27.12. In exercise of its jurisdiction under Section 228 and/or under Section 482, the Court cannot take into consideration external materials given by an accused for reaching the conclusion that no offence was disclosed or that there was possibility of his acquittal. The Court has to consider the record and documents annexed with by the prosecution.
27.13. Quashing of a charge is an exception to the rule of continuous prosecution. Where the offence is even broadly satisfied, the Court should be more inclined to permit continuation of prosecution rather than its quashing at that initial stage. The Court is not expected to marshal the records with a view to decide admissibility and reliability of the documents or records but is an opinion formed prima facie.
27.14. Where the charge-sheet, report under Section 173(2) of the Code, suffers from fundamental legal defects, the Court may be well within its jurisdiction to frame a charge.
27.15. Coupled with any or all of the above, where the Court finds that it would amount to abuse of process of the Code or that interest of justice favours, otherwise it may quash the charge. The power is to be exercised ex debito justitiae, i.e. to do real and substantial justice for administration of which alone, the courts exist.
27.16. These are the principles which individually and preferably cumulatively (one or more) be taken into consideration as precepts to exercise of extraordinary and wide plenitude and jurisdiction under Section 482 of the Code by the High Court. Where the factual foundation for an offence has been laid down, the courts should be reluctant and should not hasten to quash the proceedings even on the premise that one or two ingredients have not been stated or do not appear to be satisfied if there is substantial compliance to the requirements of the offence.
11. Having noted the principles enunciated above that are to be considered while deciding whether or not to frame charge against an accused, for evaluating the material on record for the purpose of considering whether there are sufficient materials to presume that the accused has committed the offence under Section 306 IPC, it will be appropriate to take note of the ingredients which are essential to attract Section 306 IPC. ―306. Abetment of suicide. — If any person commits suicide, whoever abets the commission of such suicide, shall be punished with imprisonment of either description for a term which may extend to ten years, and shall also be liable to fine‖.
12. ‗Abetment‘ has been defined under Section 107 of IPC which reads as under: ―107. Abetment of a thing. — A person abets the doing of a thing, who - First. - Instigates any person to do that thing; or secondly – Engages with one or more other person or persons in any conspiracy for the doing of that thing, if an act or illegal omission takes place in pursuance of that conspiracy, and in order to the doing of that thing; or Thirdly – Intentionally aids, by any act or illegal omission, the doing of that thing. Explanation 2 – Whoever, either prior to or at the time of the commission of an act, does anything in order to facilitate the commission of that act, and 5 thereby facilitate the commission thereof, is said to aid the doing of that act.‖
13. In Ramesh Kumar v. State of Chhattisgarh (2001) 9 SCC 618, the Hon‘ble Apex Court has observed that where the accused by his acts or by a continued course of conduct creates such circumstances that the deceased was left with no other option except to commit suicide, an ―instigation‖ may be inferred. As held by Hon‘ble Supreme Court in Ude Singh v. State of Haryana (2019) 17 SCC 301, some action must be shown on part of accused which compelled the person to commit suicide and such an action ought to be proximate to the time of occurrence. It was also held that if accused plays an active role in tarnishing the selfesteem and self-respect of the victim, which eventually draws the victim to commit suicide, the accused may be held guilty of abetment of suicide. It has further been held in Daxaben v. State of Gujarat 2022 SCC OnLine SC 936 by the Hon‘ble Apex Court that even an indirect act of incitement to commission of suicide would constitute offence under Section 306 of IPC.
14. We shall now apply the principles enunciated above to the present case in order to find out whether or not the learned Trial Court was justified in framing charge against petitioners under Section 306 of IPC
15. This court has gone through the case file and also gone through the transcripts of the conversations between the deceased and petitioner no. 1 and brother of the deceased on different dates. This Court has also gone through the complaint which mentions in detail the acts and conduct of the accused persons and their insistence for fulfillment of demand for dowry even prior to the date of marriage and their threat to cancel the marriage in case their demands of dowry were not met, despite the family members of the deceased pleading for being given time for the same and their inability to fulfill all their demands. They had also made arrangements of marriage and the invitation cards had been distributed. The brother of the deceased can be clearly seen pleading with the petitioner no.1 that breaking of marriage due to non-fulfillment of their dowry demands would cause unexplained humiliation to the deceased and her family in the society.
16. The contention of learned counsel for petitioners that the deceased was over sensitive and there were temperamental differences between the deceased and accused Nagender are questions of trial which can be ascertained only by producing on record the entire conversation between the parties and in the context in which they were made.
17. However, since the learned counsel for petitioners repeatedly drew the attention of the Court towards transcript and wanted this Court to rely on them to set aside the order, this Court has given its consideration to the transcripts. Learned counsel for petitioners place emphasis on the fact that in the conversation dated 14.11.2015 the petitioner no. 1 and deceased could be observed not being temperamentally compatible. It is insisted that the deceased was not behaving properly with the petitioner no.1 and therefore, he was not interested in marriage. However, the transcript dated 05.11.2015 shows that petitioner no. 1 is categorically talking to the brother of the deceased about their insistence on fulfillment of demands of dowry and upon a question being asked that in case it will not be fulfilled, will the marriage be cancelled? The petitioner answered with ‗Yes‘. It is, therefore, contradictory that reliance is sought to be placed on conversation of 14.11.2015 for this Court to believe that petitioner no. 1 was not even interested to get married to the deceased, however, the conversation dated 05.11.2015 belies the said contention. Unfortunately, the deceased is not there to tell her part of the story and therefore to malign her by calling her over sensitive and indulging in bad behavior would be unfair. It is clear from the record as to how her family was pleading consistently with the petitioners that they were not able to fulfill their growing demands of dowry and payment of money. The conversation dated 05.11.2015 reads as under:
18. As far as the contention regarding the deceased committing suicide due to temperamental differences between deceased and petitioner no. 1 is concerned, it will be important to note of the meeting of parties on 21.11.2015 at India Gate. It will have to be noted that the marriage was fixed for 13.12.2015 and parents and family of the deceased had already made preparations by booking the banquet hall, confectioner, and marriage cards had been distributed and all other preparations in connection with marriage had been completed. The meeting of 21.11.2015 in this background is of importance as on the said date, the petitioners and one of their uncles had met at India Gate where they were again requested by deceased and her family that Rs. 1,50,000/will be given at the time of marriage. However, the petitioners did not agree to it and petitioners decided to break the relationship and marriage. The deceased was present in the meeting who had started crying and had also pleaded with the petitioners. However, both the petitioners did not pay any attention to her pleas and told her that the marriage will be cancelled. Despite the deceased and her family explaining them that they will be defamed in society and it will be equivalent to death for them, they did not try to understand them and insisted that the remaining amount be given to them then and there, or consider it as the end of relationship.
19. The deceased had even pleaded with petitioner no. 1 that since her father had already given him Rs. 2,50,000/-, the remaining Rs. 1,50,000/will be given on the day of marriage since money had been spent on the preparation for marriage and furnishing of their home. However, the petitioners warned her that they are not interested in marriage, in case money is not given on that day. Thereafter, in this tense situation, at 5.00 pm, the family of deceased moved from India Gate and came to Mandi House Metro Station by Auto and at 5.45 pm, they were seated in the Vaishali Metro and due to overcrowding, they were in different coaches. When the Metro was stationed for a long time at Preet Vihar at about
6.30 pm, information was received that the deceased had committed suicide by jumping before metro at Yamuna Bank Metro Station. It is thus, clear that even prima facie, there was nexus between the conversation and meetings between deceased and the petitioners at India Gate and the little distance she had travelled by Auto to Metro Station, and she was highly upset, which in the present context, is understandable. The allegations and charges have to be appreciated and evaluated in the social contexts. For a girl, whose family has spent all money they had on marriage, preparations and all arrangements had been made and cards distributed, she would have been hurt, wounded and upset. It is a serious issue for a girl's family even today. Also, to have seen her father and brother pleading repeatedly and requesting time to give money to the petitioners, which had to be given only because the girl was to get married to them, would have broken any girl's heart.
20. There is a gap of only 1.[5] hours between the meeting, cancellation of marriage, the request of family being turned down by petitioners and their persistence on being paid money, thus establishing prima facie nexus as envisaged under Section 306 of IPC. It is not disputed that petitioner no. 1 refused to give his voice samples.
21. In light of the material on record, it cannot be said that the trial court was in error in drawing an inference that the appellant had ―instigated‖ the deceased to commit suicide and therefore, there was ground for presuming that the appellant has committed an offence punishable under Section 306 read with Section 34 IPC, at least for the purpose of framing of charge.
22. In view of the foregoing discussion, this Court finds no illegality or infirmity or any reason to interfere with the impugned order.
23. Accordingly, the present petition stands dismissed.
24. It is, however, clarified that the observations made by this Court are only for the purpose of deciding the present petition and shall have no bearing on the merits of the case during the trial.
SWARANA KANTA SHARMA, J MARCH 6, 2023
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