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HIGH COURT OF DELHI
Date of Decision: - 07.03.2023
BABITA & ORS. ..... Appellants
Through: Mr.Manish Maini with Mr.Vibhor Jain, Ms.Yashika Miglani, Advs.
Through: Mr.Shailendra Akhouri with Mr.N.P.Singh, Advs for R-1 & 2.
Mr.S.P.Jain, Adv for R-3.
JUDGMENT
1. The present appeal under Section 173 of the Motor Vehicles Act, preferred by the wife of the deceased namely Sh. Balbir Singh, seeks to assail the award dated 02.05.2019 passed by the learned Motor Accidents Claims Tribunal. Vide the impugned award, the learned Tribunal has rejected the claim of the appellants primarily on the ground that the appellant no.1/wife of the deceased had already received a sum of Rs.5,00,000/- from the owner and driver of the offending vehicle by way of a Panchayati Settlement dated 22.10.2017 entered into between the parties. The learned Tribunal has further held that since MACT proceedings in respect of the same incident were already pending before the learned Tribunal at Faridabad, the proceedings before the learned Tribunal at Delhi were even otherwise, not maintainable.
2. Learned counsel for the appellants submits that the learned Tribunal has failed to appreciate that the appellant no.1, having lost her husband at a young age, was asked to sign certain blank papers by the owner and the driver of the offending vehicle and being under a belief that she was being paid a sum of Rs. 5,00,000/- towards the loan advanced by her deceased husband, she accepted the amount and signed the papers. The learned Tribunal, however, failed to appreciate this aspect and accepted the respondents’ plea that she had already received compensation and therefore rejected her claim. He submits that merely because the appellant no.1 accepted this meagre amount of Rs. 5,00,000/- from the owner and driver of the vehicle, the right of the minor children to receive compensation could not be said to have been waived. He, therefore, prays that the appeal be allowed and the matter be remanded back to the learned Tribunal for adjudication on merits.
3. On the other hand, learned counsel for the respondents support the impugned award by contending that once the appellant no.1 had entered into a compromise and received the sum of Rs. 5,00,000/-, she cannot now be permitted to raise any further claim for compensation. They, therefore, pray that the appeal be dismissed.
4. Having considered the submissions of learned counsel for the parties and perused the record, I find that insofar as the pendency of the claim petition before the learned Tribunal at Faridabad is concerned, this issue need not detain me as it is an admitted position that the claim petition, which was pending before the learned Tribunal at Faridabad stands already withdrawn. Moreover the same was not filed at the instance of the appellants, but was based on a Detailed Accident Report(DAR) filed by the investigating authority. The only other ground on which the claim petition has been rejected is that the appellant no.1 had already entered into a settlement with respondent nos. 1 & 2, i.e., the owner and driver of the offending vehicle.
5. The appellant has vehemently urged that this settlement was under a belief that she was being refunded the loan advanced by her husband and that she had not signed on any compromise agreement but had only signed blank papers. This stand, it is urged, was taken by the appellants even before the learned Tribunal but was not even considered by it while passing the impugned award. In order to appreciate this plea, it would be appropriate to refer to the cross-examination of the appellant no.1 before the learned Tribunal. The same reads as under:- “The compromise dated 22.10.2017 as allegedly done between the petitioner and the respondent Tej Pal Singh, the father of the respondent no.1 and 2 has been put to the petitioner by the Tribunal.
Ans. My husband was a driver and used to earn Rs.14000-15000/p.m. but besides that he used to do some other work like dealing in copper etc.
6. From a perusal of the aforesaid cross examination of the appellant no.1, it is evident that the appellant no.1 had categorically stated before the learned Tribunal that she had put her signatures on blank papers and that the amount of Rs.5,00,000/- received by her was towards the return of the loan advanced by her late husband.
7. It has been urged on behalf of the appellant that the learned Tribunal did not even considered these submissions and therefore, it would be necessary to note the relevant extracts of the impugned award, which reads as under: - “Ld. Counsel for the respondents submit that the petition is not maintainable as claim of the petitioners has already been initiated by the MACT, Faridabad on a report as filed by the SHO of the concerned PS. Ld. Counsel for the respondents no.1 & 2 has placed on record certified copy of the proceedings as pending in the mentioned court. Ld. Counsel further submits that on 27.11.2018, the court thoroughly examined the petitioner no.1 Ms. Babita as she had already received compensation from the respondents no.1 & 2 after a settlement. I have gone through the record. The statement of the petitioner no.1 Babita clearly shows that she had already received the desired amount from the respondents after settling the matter. To the mind of the Tribunal, despite having received the desired amount from the respondents, the petitioner filed a false claim before this Tribunal. The petitioner should infact be prosecuted for making a false claim. Further, the proceeding regarding the claim of the petitioners has already been initiated by the MACT Faridabad. Under the given facts and circumstances, the claim of the petitioners is dismissed. File be consigned to record room.”
8. In the light of the aforesaid, what emerges is that despite the appellant no.1 having made a categoric statement on oath that she had signed blank papers, the learned Tribunal did not even deem it necessary to delve into this aspect as to whether the purported compromise deed pursuant whereto, a sum of Rs. 5,00,000/- was paid to her, could be treated as a voluntary settlement agreement. The learned Tribunal has hastened to reject the claim of the appellants by passing a cryptic order, which merely states that since she had already received the compensation after a settlement, the claim petition was not maintainable.
9. In my view, taking into account the benevolent nature of the provisions of the Motor Vehicles Act, this kind of approach ought not to have been adopted by the learned Tribunal. It appears that the learned Tribunal overlooked the important fact that it was dealing with a claim by a widow and her minor children, who had lost the sole bread earner of their family and therefore their right to receive fair compensation could not have been curtailed and that too when the appellant had specifically denied having entered into a settlement agreement.
10. In the light of the aforesaid, the appeal deserves to be allowed and is, accordingly, allowed by setting aside the impugned award. The claim petition is remanded back to the learned Tribunal for adjudication on merits. It is however made clear that while passing a fresh award, it will be open for the learned Tribunal to consider as to how the amount of Rs. 5,00,000/- already received by the appellant no.1 should be adjusted.
11. The parties will appear before the learned Tribunal on 14.04.2023 for further proceedings in accordance with law.
JUDGE MARCH 7, 2023