Ruksana Bano & Ors. v. Government of NCT of Delhi & Ors.

Delhi High Court · 07 Mar 2023 · 2023:DHC:1739
Mini Pushkarna
W.P.(C) 5517/2020
2023:DHC:1739
property appeal_allowed Significant

AI Summary

The Delhi High Court set aside an ex parte vesting order under the DLR Act as without jurisdiction after the land was urbanized by DDA notification, holding such orders violate natural justice and are nullities.

Full Text
Translation output
Neutral Citation Number: 2023/DHC/001739
W.P.(C) 5517/2020
HIGH COURT OF DELHI
W.P.(C) 5517/2020 & CM APPL. 19871/2020
SMT RUKSANA BANO & ORS. ..... Petitioners
Through: Mr. Sanjay Poddar, Sr.
Advocate with Mr. S.C.
Malhotra, Advocate
VERSUS
GOVERNMENT OF NCT OF DELHI & ORS. ..... Respondents
Through: Mr. Rishikesh Kumar, ASC, GNCTD, Mr. Aditya Raj, Ms. Sheenu Priya, Advocates for R-
1 to 5 (M:7073011531)
CORAM:
HON'BLE MS. JUSTICE MINI PUSHKARNA
JUDGMENT
07.03.2023 MINI PUSHKARNA, J.

1. The present writ petition has been filed for setting aside ex parte order dated 24.06.2010 passed by the Sub Divisional Magistrate (SDM)/Revenue Assistant (RA), Najafgarh, in Case No. 02/2010, by which the land of the petitioners has been vested in the Gram Sabha, Goela Khurd. The present petition has been filed raising the plea that the land in question had been notified beyond the purview of the Delhi Land Reforms (DLR) Act, 1954 after publication of the zonal plan by Delhi Development Authority (‘DDA’) for South West Delhi, including village Goela Khurd, on 04.06.2010 under the Master Plan for Delhi 2021, thereby rendering the impugned order as without any jurisdiction.

2. Prayer has been made for direction to respondents to release and hand over possession of the vested land to the petitioners, on the premise that the vesting is in violation of the notification dated 04.06.2010 issued by the DDA and also in violation of the Principles of Natural Justice as the petitioners were not given any hearing before vesting the said land to Gram Sabha by the concerned authority.

3. By order dated 24.06.2010 issued by the court of SDM/RA (Najafgarh), Government of NCT of Delhi, proceedings under Section 81 of the DLR Act were decided thereby declaring that the land in question stands vested in Gaon Sabha, since the said land was being used for non-agricultural purposes. The said order as passed by SDM/RA (Najafgarh) is reproduced as below: “No. SDM/RA/NG/2010/ID-2496/147 Dated: 24/06/2010 IN REF:- CASE NO: 02/2010 UNDER SECTION:- 81 DLR ACT GAON SABHA GOELA KHURD

VERSUS

Rajiv Chaudhary, Sanjiv Chaudhary Ss/O Mahender Singh, Dalip Singh S/O Hari Singh, Surajbhan, VedParkash, Kuldeep Ss/o Birkhe, Arun S/o Om Parkash, Naresh, Nirmla, Sushila, Urmila S/D/O Mauji Ram, Rajesh Kumar S/O Rajender Singh, North-East Tribal Welfare Society C/14, New Krishna Park, New Delhi-18, Through Chairman Mr. LalDitsaklavour & Secretary Sh. C.H. Vunga ORDER By this order I shall dispose off the case of under section-81 of Delhi Land Reforms Act, 1954 which was initiated on the basis of Halqa Patwari report dated 02/01/2010 in which it was stated that Khasra No. 24/6/1/2(0-18), 15/2(1-12), 10/2(0-15), 25/11(4-16), 12(1-14), 25/20/1(0-8), 20/2(3-18), situated in the revenue estate of village GOELA KHURD New Delhi had been converted into non-agricultural use by the respondent thereby contravening the provisions of Section 81 of Delhi Land Reforms Act. The undersigned has made the visit on the abovementioned Khasras and found to be the violation Restrain Order. The land is used for non-agricultural purpose in the form of developing un-authorised colony. If further time will be given, it will be developed into un- authorized colony. A report dated 02/01/2010 of Halqa Patwari- village Goela Khurd is available on file which also confirms that the land has been plotted by doing D.P.C., construction on it and houses exist on the suit land in violation of Section-81 of Delhi Land Reforms Act, 1954. Since the respondent has failed to comply with Restrain order therefore the land is vested in Gaon Sabha. Consequently the bhoomidhar stands ejected from the suit land and land in question stands vested in the Gram Sabha with immediate effect. Copy of this order be sent to Tehsildar (Palam) and B.D.O. (South-West) and SHO (Chhawla) for necessary action. Given under my hand and seal of this court on 24/06/2010. File be consigned to record room. -Sd- (RAJESH SHUKLA) REVENUE ASSISTANT/SDM NAJAFGARH: DELHI”

4. It is the case of the petitioners that they are owners of the land bearing Khasra Nos. 24/6/1/2 (0-18), 15/2 (1-12), 25/10/1 (0-15), 25/11 (4-16), 12 (1-14), 25/20/1 (0-8) and 20/2 (3-18), situated in the Revenue estate of village Goela Khurd, New Delhi. The petitioners claim ownership over the land in question on the basis of General Power of Attorneys (GPAs) executed by transferees of the original owners/bhumidars of the land in question, executed in their favour during the period 2009-2010.

5. It is the case of the petitioners that they being defence personnel/family members of defence personnel, had purchased the land in question for purpose of their post retirement settlement. The said land was purchased in good faith and belief after an assurance by the sellers that the said property/land was free from any encumbrances.

6. In January 2016, the petitioners found a board put up on site of their land notifying that the land belongs to Education Department of Govt. of NCT of Delhi, (GNCTD) and that trespassers will be prosecuted. The petitioners approached the office of the SDM concerned and learnt that the land had been vested by the Government of Delhi under Section 81 of the DLR Act, as per orders of SDM/RA passed in Case No. 02/2010 titled as “Gram Sabha, Goela Khurd Vs. Rajiv Choudhary and Others”. They further learnt that the land in question had been handed over to the Education Department, GNCTD for opening a school.

7. It is the case of the petitioners that the DDA had issued a notification on 04.06.2010, under the provisions of Master Plan of Delhi 2021 including village Goela Khurd, where the property in question is located, as urban area. This has been accepted by this Court in its judgment in the case of M/s Shri Neelpadmaya Consumer Products Pvt. Ltd. Vs. Sh. Satyabir @ Satbir and Ors., 2016 SCC OnLine Del 761.

8. It is, thus, the case of the petitioners that any policy notification by DDA shall necessarily be the only final policy in matters of land planning and development for the purposes of urbanisation. The DDA notification of 04.06.2010 has put the land in village Goela Khurd beyond the purview of DLR Act. It is submitted that on 24.06.2010 when the order of vesting was passed and till 2016, when Education Department took possession of the land and put up its board on site, the land in question was in physical possession of the petitioners. Thus, reliance is placed upon order passed by the Lieutenant Governor of Delhi vide letter No. F.1-33/UC/UD/Policy/2007/20670-2068[6] dated 12.12.2007, wherein all land vested in Gaon Sabha where physical possession is with the original land owners, has been defined as private land.

9. It is the case of the petitioners that being aggrieved by the order of the SDM/RA dated 24.06.2010 vesting their land in Gram Sabha, petitioners submitted a letter dated 03.02.2016 to the Chief Minister of Delhi, with copy to District Magistrate (South West). Thereafter the petitioners personally met the District Magistrate, who assured them that a proper response would be given after due verification of facts. They were subsequently informed that their case had been forwarded to the higher authorities.

10. It is submitted on behalf of the petitioners that since the original/recorded owners of the plots had already sold their land to various innocent buyers, the original owners/bhumidars did not prefer any appeal against the vesting orders. During all these proceedings for vesting of the land, there was no notice of either the vesting order or of possession being taken over, issued to the existing owners, i.e., the petitioners herein. The possession of Gram Sabha after the vesting of disputed land by SDM/RA was only on paper. As such, the petitioners remained unaware of this development. The petitioners came to know the change in status of their land only when the notice board was installed over their land. It was only on further enquiry that the petitioners came to know that the said land had been allotted to the Education Department for construction of a school, through an order dated 13.10.2015.

11. Since the petitioners were unable to get any relief, they filed a writ petition being W.P.(C) 11217/2018 before this Court. The said writ petition was dismissed as withdrawn, with liberty to the petitioners to file a representation before the Lieutenant Governor of Delhi. Subsequent thereto, petitioners made a representation dated 26.12.2018 to the Lieutenant Governor of Delhi.

12. The case of the petitioners was referred to the Divisional Commissioner (Kapashera) for further action from the office of the Lieutenant Governor. The petitioners also made a representation to the Deputy Commissioner (South), who assured them of an early action.

13. The petitioners thereafter received a notice from the office of SDM/RA (Kapashera) dated 15.05.2019 informing them that their representations had been received and they were called for appearance. The petitioners along with their pleader appeared before the Court of SDM/RA on 24.07.2019. However, it is submitted on behalf of the petitioners that after long deliberation on the issues, the petitioners were advised by SDM/RA not to pursue their representation as a legal matter and that he would process the same on the administrative side.

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14. It is submitted that the petitioners did not get any decision from SDM/RA in the hearing conducted in their case on 24.07.2019. Thus, petitioners once again met the Divisional Commissioner at Kapashera, where they were advised to approach the office of the Lieutenant Governor.

15. It is submitted that the petitioners have been running from pillar to post to get justice. Thus, the present writ petition has been filed with prayer for quashing and setting aside the order dated 24.06.2010 passed by SDM/RA, Najafgarh, Delhi, vesting the land of the petitioners in the Gram Sabha.

16. On behalf of the petitioners it is contended that the ex parte order dated 24.06.2010 vesting the land in Gram Sabha, is illegal and without jurisdiction. The land on the date of the said vesting order was outside the purview of the DLR Act post notification of Master Plan for Delhi 2021 on 07.02.2007 and subsequent notification of Zonal Plan for District (SW) on 04.06.2010, declaring the land as urban.

17. In support of its submissions, petitioners have relied upon the following judgments:

I. M/s Shri Neelpadmaya Consumer Products Pvt. Ltd.

Vs. Sh. Satyabir @ Satbir and Ors., CS (OS) NO. 78/2007

II. Indu Khorana Vs. Gram Sabha and Ors., W.P.(C)

4143/2003

III. Sanvik Engineers India Pvt. Ltd & Anr. Vs. Govt. Of

IV. Harshad ChimanLal Modivs DLF Universal LTD, 2005(7)

V. Gaon Sabha Vs. Nathi. 2004 (12) SCC 555

VI. Harpal Singh Vs. Ashok Kumar, 2018(11) SCC 113

VII. Raju Ramsing Vasave Vs. Mahesh Deorao Bhivapurkar,

18. On the other hand, on behalf of respondents, it is submitted that as per the report submitted by the Halqa Patwari on 02.01.2010, the land in question situated in the revenue estate of village Goela Khurd, New Delhi was being used for non-agricultural purposes by way of construction of boundary wall and other construction. On the basis of report of Halqa Patwari dated 02.01.2010, respondent No.4 issued a restraint order dated 14.01.2010 with direction to the SHO (Police Station Chhawla) as well as Block Development Officer (BDO)(South West), ACP Najafgarh and Halqa Patwari to ensure that no further illegal activities are carried out in violation of Section 81 of the DLR Act.

19. It is the case of the respondents that vide order dated 24.06.2010, respondent No.4 disposed of case bearing No. 02/2010 under Section 81 of the DLR Act, 1954. It is submitted that as per the said order, land in question was physically inspected by respondent No.4 and it was found that the land was being used for nonagricultural purposes by plotting of land and raising construction thereon in violation of Section 81 of the DLR Act, 1954.

20. It is submitted that the petitioners have not filed any authentic title documents before this Court. There is no entry of record found in the revenue record with respect to the alleged GPAs in favour of the petitioners. It is submitted that on the directions of respondent No.4, the revenue staff took possession of the land in question and handed over the same to BDO (SW). Subsequently, letter dated 13.10.2015 of Director (Panchayat) of GNCTD of Delhi was issued to the Director, Directorate of Education, GNCTD regarding allotment of Gaon Sabha land measuring 15 bigha 18 biswa bearing khasra Nos. 24/6/1/2 (0- 18), 15/2 (1-12), 25/10/1 (0-15), 25/11 (4-16), 12 (1-14), 25/20/1 (0-8) and 20/2 (3-18) of village Goela Khurd to the Education Department of GNCTD for opening of a Government school.

21. It is further submitted on behalf of the respondents that the petitioners ought to have approached firstly, the District Magistrate, then the Financial Commissioner. If they were aggrieved by the order of the Financial Commissioner, only then could the petitioners have approached this Court. It is further submitted that the notification in the present case was only issued by the DDA and not the Municipal Corporation of Delhi (MCD), therefore, the case of the petitioners is not covered by the judgments relied upon by the petitioners, as it cannot be said that the land stood urbanised by issuance of notification by the DDA.

22. It is further submitted on behalf of the respondents that as per the judgment of Supreme Court in the case of Suraj Lamp and Industries Private Limited Vs. State of Haryana and Another, (2012) 1 SCC 656, it has been held that transactions of the nature of GPA sales do not convey any title or create any interest in an immoveable property. Thus, it is submitted that the respondents have no right, title or interest over the land in question. It is prayed on behalf of the respondents that the present writ petition may be dismissed.

23. The Court has heard the ld. Counsels for the parties and has perused the record.

24. It is undisputed fact that the DDA had issued a notification dated 04.06.2010 under the provisions of Master Plan of Delhi 2021 notifying zonal plan for District South West Delhi, including village Goela Khurd. Thus, when the land in question was covered under the zonal plan issued by the DDA, then the said land cannot be said to be governed by the provisions of DLR Act any longer. The contention on behalf of the respondents that the said area cannot be considered to be urbanised on the said date as no notification under Section 507 of the Delhi Municipal Corporation Act, 1957 (DMC Act) had been issued, has to be rejected.

25. The matter in question on the aspect of village Goela Khurd having been urbanised upon issuance of notification by the DDA on 04.06.2010, is no longer res integra. This question was considered by this Court in the case of M/s Shri Neelpadmaya Consumer Products Pvt. Ltd. Vs. Sh. Satyabir @ Satbir and Ors.1. In the said case, this Court has categorically held as follows:

“23. I agree with the argument which is urged on behalf of the plaintiff that a notification for urbanization need not only be through a notification under Section 507 of the Delhi Municipal Corporation Act as the later part of Section 3(13) of the Act does not in any way require that there is only one manner of notification viz only under Section 507 of the Delhi Municipal Corporation Act. This
2016 SCC OnLine Del 761 later part of Section 3(13) of the Act does not talk of a notification only under Section 507 of the Delhi Municipal Corporation Act. The requirement of this later part of Section 3(13) of the Act is only that a notification is issued in the Official Gazette to make the land as part of the Delhi town and New Delhi town. Once a notification is issued applying a zonal plan issued pursuant to the master plan showing that subject lands are covered under the zonal plan issued by the DDA, in such a situation, it has to be held that the lands cease to be the lands covered under the Act because of issuance of a notification in the Official Gazette results in the lands becoming part of the Delhi town. Additional reasoning on this aspect can be understood from the object and the language found in Section 1 and Sections 3(5) and 3(15) of the Act and which Sections show that once an area falls within a town area and an area ceases to be an agricultural land because it has to be developed as part of the development of the Delhi town or New Delhi town, then such an area no longer remains an agricultural area for being covered under the expression land as defined in Section 3(13) of the Act. With humility, I am in complete agreement with the observations made by the learned Single Judge of this Court in the case of Guru Pratap Singh (supra) and which arrives at the same conclusion that once the land ceases to be agricultural, the land ceases to be the subject matter of the Act.
24. I may note that the plaintiff has proved the zonal plan Ex.PW 5/1 and the notification Letter dated 4.6.2010 as Ex.PW 5/2 and these documents clearly show that the entire village Goela Khurd and wherein the suit land is located is the subject matter of the zonal plan issued under the Delhi Development Authority. As per the aforesaid discussion, as also the ratio of the learned Single Judge in Gur Pratap Singh (supra), once the land is the subject matter of a zonal plan issued under Section 11 of the Delhi Development Act, the land is beyond the purview of the Act........”

26. Hence, the position is clear that a land becomes urbanised not only by way of notification issued under Section 507 of DMC Act, 1957 but also by way of notification by the DDA issuing zonal plan under the Master Plan for areas in question. Once zonal plan has been issued by the DDA under the Master Plan for an area in question, the said lands cease to be lands covered under the DLR Act. Even a notification issued by the Central Government under Section 11 of The Delhi Development Act, 1957 bringing an area within the ambit of a zonal plan of the DDA, has the effect of encompassing such area within the limits of urbanised land. Thus, when village Goela Khurd, wherein the land in question is located, is subject matter of the zonal plan issued by the DDA, the said village stood urbanised and provisions of DLR Act ceased to have any applicability over the said area.

27. This Court in the case of Gur Partap Singh Vs. Union of India & Ors.[2] took note of the fact that by its gazette notification, the DDA amended the Master Plan wherein construction for commercial use was allowed in certain rural zones. Thus, it was held that once such option for construction for commercial use was available, then such land would cease to be agricultural and in that eventuality there was no question of application of DLR Act. Para-19 of the said judgment reads as follows:

“19. This matter can be looked into from another aspect. The notification amending the Master Plan clearly provides that the land in question can be used for the purpose of a motel. Once this option is available and is
2004 SCC OnLine Del 269 exercised by owner of the land, the land is no more being used for agricultural purposes. Thus, once the land is elected to be used by the owner for a motel, permission for which has been granted under the amendment to the Master Plan, it no more remains agricultural land under the meaning of Section 3(13) of the Land Reforms Act. For this reason also, there would be no occasion for obtaining any permission. The Land Reforms Act is an enactment for protecting the agricultural use of the land. Once this land itself ceased to be agricultural, there is, really speaking, no question of application of the Land Reforms Act. Needless to say, this is on account of the fact that there is permissible non-agricultural use of a motel in pursuance to the notification of 1995.”

28. In view of the aforesaid, when the land in question ceased to be governed by the DLR Act, the order dated 24.06.2010 passed by the Court of SDM/RA (Najafgarh) under Section 81 of the DLR Act, is clearly without any jurisdiction. As noted hereinabove, the area in question stood converted to urban land with effect from 04.06.2010. Therefore, the SDM/RA had no authority to pass any order under Section 81 of the DLR Act on 24.06.2010.

29. Once a particular area is subject matter of notification under The Delhi Development Act, 1957 by notifying the Master Plan or Zonal Plan, then such land becomes urbanised and is out of the scope of the application of the DLR Act. Resultantly, the jurisdiction of the revenue authority ceases and is ousted.

30. This Court in the case of Sanvik Engineers India Pvt. Ltd. and Another[3] has held in categorical terms that there would remain no 2022 SCC OnLine Del 360 legitimate or useful purpose to continue proceedings under Section 81 of the DLR Act, once the operation of the DLR Act over the land has drawn to a close. It has been held that provisions of the DLR Act essentially seek to protect agricultural land from being used for nonagricultural purposes. However, once land becomes urbanised, it does not remain as agricultural land. Therefore, continuance of proceedings under Section 81 of DLR Act after urbanisation of the land, is illogical and without any purpose. Thus, in the case of Sanvik Engineers (Supra), it has been held as follows:

84. Having traversed this distance and upon consideration of the seminal questions which arose in this batch, the court in summation records its conclusions as follows: “........ (E) While dealing with matters which would fall within the ambit of Case No. 2, it must be held that once notifications come to be issued under the DMC or the DDA Acts, they manifest an unequivocal fact of the land becoming urbanised and no longer falling within the sweep of Section 3(13). The court also bears in mind the indubitable fact that Section 81 is primarily concerned with ensuring that rural land is not diverted to uses other than those specified in Section 3(13). If that be the primary and solitary objective of Section 81, as this Court duly recognises it to be, it would be wholly illogical and incongruous to require the owner or the occupier to restore the land to its agricultural state even though the surrounding area may have become totally urbanised. (F) Where proceedings have merely reached the stage of initiation or a conditional order having been passed, they must be held liable to be dropped or closed. There would remain no legitimate or useful purpose to continue those proceedings once the aforesaid factual position comes to hold the field. Once the operation of the DLR over the land has drawn to a close, there can be no justification to hold that the proceedings under Section 81 which remain at an inchoate stage and a final order of vesting yet to be passed, to be continued and the occupier compelled to restore the land to its agricultural state. (G) The fact that action under Sections 81 and 82 had commenced based on an infraction which occurred prior to the issuance of the notifications under the DMC or the DDA Acts would not constitute a valid ground for continuance of those proceedings bearing in mind the purpose and intent of the twin provisions of the DLR. The provisions essentially seek to protect agricultural land from being diverted to uses other than those sanctioned and contemplated under that enactment. It would thus be wholly illogical to sanction continuance of those proceedings and turn a blind eye to the topographical transformation of the entire area which may have come about in the meanwhile.........”

31. Since the revenue authority did not have any jurisdiction under the DLR Act on 24.06.2010, the ex parte order dated 24.06.2010 passed by the revenue authority is clearly illegal and without jurisdiction and is, thus, a nullity. An order passed by an authority having no jurisdiction, is non-est and invalid. Thus, Supreme Court in the case of Harshad Chiman Lal Modi Vs. DLF Universal Ltd. and Another[4], has held as follows:

“32. In Bahrein Petroleum Co. [(1966) 1 SCR 461 : AIR 1966 SC 634] this Court also held that neither consent nor waiver nor acquiescence can confer jurisdiction upon a court, otherwise incompetent to try the suit. It is well settled and needs no authority that “where a court takes
upon itself to exercise a jurisdiction it does not possess, its decision amounts to nothing”. A decree passed by a court having no jurisdiction is non est and its invalidity can be set up whenever it is sought to be enforced as a foundation for a right, even at the stage of execution or in collateral proceedings. A decree passed by a court without jurisdiction is a coram non judice.

33. In Kiran Singh v. Chaman Paswan [(1955) 1 SCR 117: AIR 1954 SC 340] this Court declared: (SCR p. 121) “It is a fundamental principle well established that a decree passed by a court without jurisdiction is a nullity, and that its invalidity could be set up whenever and wherever it is sought to be enforced or relied upon, even at the stage of execution and even in collateral proceedings. A defect of jurisdiction … strikes at the very authority of the court to pass any decree, and such a defect cannot be cured even by consent of parties.” (emphasis supplied)”

32. The contention of the respondents that the petitioners have no right, title and interest on the basis of GPAs in their favour, again holds no water. The GPAs, which the petitioners are relying upon, were executed in their favour in the years 2009 and 2010. The judgment in the case of Suraj Lamp and Industries Private Limited (Supra) declaring that transactions of the nature of GPA sales do not convey title and cannot be recognised as valid mode of transfer of immovable property, came only in October 2011. The said judgment has prospective operation, therefore, any sale transaction on the basis of GPAs prior to the said judgment, would hold good.

33. On account of the non-est and ex parte order dated 24.06.2010 passed by the SDM/RA, valuable rights of the petitioners to their property, have been adversely affected and they have been divested of their property. Supreme Court has held that Right to Property is not only a Constitutional or a Statutory Right, but also a Human Right. Thus, in the case of Tukaram Kana Joshi and Others Vs. Maharashtra Industrial Development Corporation and Others[5], (2013) 1 SCC 353, it has been held as follows:

“9. The right to property is now considered to be not only a constitutional or a statutory right but also a human right. Though, it is not a basic feature of the Constitution or a fundamental right. Human rights are considered to be in realm of individual rights, such as the right to health, the right to livelihood, the right to shelter and employment, etc. Now however, human rights are gaining an even greater multifaceted dimension. The right to property is considered very much to be a part of such new dimension. (Vide Lachhman Dass v. Jagat Ram [(2007) 10 SCC 448] , Amarjit Singh v. State of Punjab [(2010) 10 SCC 43 : (2010) 4 SCC (Civ) 29] , State of M.P. v. Narmada Bachao Andolan [(2011) 7 SCC 639 : (2011) 3 SCC (Civ) 875 : AIR 2011 SC 1989] , State of Haryana v. Mukesh Kumar [(2011) 10 SCC 404 : (2012) 3 SCC (Civ) 769 : AIR 2012 SC 559] and Delhi Airtech Services (P) Ltd. v. State of U.P. [(2011) 9 SCC 354 : (2011) 4 SCC (Civ) 673 : AIR 2012 SC 573] )” (citations provided)

34. The present dispute had its genesis in January 2016, when the petitioners found notice board erected on their land by the Education Department, GNCTD, announcing the same as a site for school. The petitioners have been approaching different authorities for redressal of their grievances, before approaching this Court a second time by filing the present writ petition.

35. The respondents have taken the objection that the present writ petition is not maintainable as the petitioners have alternate efficacious remedy available by way of firstly, filing an appeal before the District Magistrate and thereafter before the Financial Commissioner. As regards the said objection of the respondents, the same is liable to be rejected. It has been held time and again that exclusion of writ jurisdiction on the ground of alternative remedy, is a rule of discretion and where writ petition pertains to challenge to orders or proceedings, passed without jurisdiction, such writ petition can be entertained, even though alternative remedy may be available. Thus, Supreme Court in the case of Harbanslal Sahnia and Another Vs. Indian Oil Corpn. Ltd. and Others[6], has held as follows:

“7. So far as the view taken by the High Court that the remedy by way of recourse to arbitration clause was available to the appellants and therefore the writ petition filed by the appellants was liable to be dismissed is concerned, suffice it to observe that the rule of exclusion of writ jurisdiction by availability of an alternative remedy is a rule of discretion and not one of compulsion. In an appropriate case, in spite of availability of the alternative remedy, the High Court may still exercise its writ jurisdiction in at least three contingencies: (i) where the writ petition seeks enforcement of any of the fundamental rights; (ii) where there is failure of principles of natural justice; or (iii) where the orders or proceedings are wholly without jurisdiction or the vires of an Act is challenged. (See Whirlpool Corpn. v. Registrar of Trade Marks [(1998) 8 SCC 1] .) The present case attracts applicability of the first two contingencies. Moreover, as noted, the petitioners' dealership, which is their bread and butter, came to be
terminated for an irrelevant and non-existent cause. In such circumstances, we feel that the appellants should have been allowed relief by the High Court itself instead of driving them to the need of initiating arbitration proceedings.”

36. In view of the aforesaid, it is considered appropriate to entertain the present writ petition. It would not be justified to relegate the petitioners at this stage to file appeal before the appropriate authorities as per alternative remedy available, when the matter pertains to an order that has been passed without any jurisdiction and authority. It is noteworthy that the said order has already been held by this Court to be a nullity.

37. It is also pertinent to note that the order dated 24.06.2010 passed by the SDM/RA vesting the land in Gram Sabha, is ex parte. During all these proceedings, there was no notice issued to the existing owners. The petitioners were neither issued any notice or given any hearing at the time of passing of the vesting order nor at the time of taking over the possession. Thus, it is apparent that the said order was passed without any notice to the petitioners and was passed without following the Principles of Natural Justice.

38. This Court notes that vide order dated 21.08.2020, status quo order was passed in favour of the petitioners considering the facts and circumstances of the present case. Therefore, though the land in question was handed over to the Education Department, GNCTD, fact remains that in view of the status quo order passed by this Court, the land in question has not been utilised by the Education Department, GNCTD. There is no submission on behalf of the respondents that the land in question has already been utilised.

39. In view of the aforesaid detailed discussion, the impugned order dated 24.06.2010 passed by the SDM/RA (Najafgarh), GNCTD is hereby set aside, as being non-est and nullity, and having been passed without any jurisdiction. Consequently, the respondents are directed to hand over possession of the land under the ownership of the petitioners forthwith, viz. land comprised in Khasra Nos. 24/6/1/2 (0- 18), 15/2 (1-12), 25/10/1 (0-15), 25/11 (4-16), 12 (1-14), 25/20/1 (0-8) and 20/2 (3-18), situated in the revenue estate of village Goela Khurd, New Delhi. The petitioners are directed to approach the concerned Revenue Authorities with requisite documents of ownership in their favour for taking over possession of their respective lands.

40. The present writ petition is allowed in the aforesaid terms.

JUDGE MARCH 7, 2023