Full Text
HIGH COURT OF DELHI
Order reserved on: 20 March 2023
Order pronounced on: 23 March 2023
SMT SAVITA SARDANA ..... Decree Holder
Through: Mr. D. Verma, Adv.
Through: Mr. Arvind Chaudhary, Adv. for J.D. Nos. 1 & 3.
Ms. Neha Sharma, Adv. for J.D. Nos. 2 to 4 Mr. Ashim Vachher, Mr. P.
Piyush and Mr. Kunal Lakra, Advs. for Objectors.
JUDGMENT
1. By means of the instant order, the Court proceeds to decide the instant objections which have been preferred purporting to be referable to Rules 90 and 97 of Order XXI of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908[1].
2. The present execution proceedings have been instituted in respect of a final decree of partition dated 05 November 2019. Undisputedly, the aforesaid judgement and decree has attained finality since parties to the aforesaid proceedings have neither questioned nor assailed the aforesaid decree.
3. As per the disclosures made in the objections, it is the case of the Objector that the property bearing number R-496, New Rajinder Nagar, New Delhi[2] was originally applied for being allotted in the name of late Shri Ram Bheja Mal as a displaced person in lieu of properties left behind by him and his family members in Pakistan after partition. It is the case of the Objector that the application itself was made by the late Shri Ram Bheja Mal for the benefit of himself as well as his family members. The objections further disclose that the late Shri Ram Bheja Mal expired prior to the allotment of the said property in his name. He is stated to be survived by three sons namely late Shri Prakash Chandra Khetarpal, late Shri Jagdish Chander Paul and late Shri Ramesh Chander Paul. The three surviving sons, it is asserted, jointly contributed funds to acquire the said Rajinder Nagar property. It may be noted at this stage itself that the Objectors are the son and daughter of the late Shri Ramesh Chander Paul. However and undisputedly, the perpetual lease deed in respect of the said property came to be executed and made in favour of the Late Shri Jagdish Chander Paul.
4. The Objectors further aver that after allotment, money was contributed by all three brothers for the purposes of construction of the property which stands in place over the allotted plot. It is further averred that the late Shri Ramesh Chander Paul was in joint suit property possession with the other two brothers, namely, the late Shri Prakash Chander Khetarpal and late Shri Jagdish Chander Paul.
5. It is further averred that the late Shri Ramesh Chander Paul who was serving as an officer in the Ministry of External Affairs of the Union Government used to be posted out of India. However, according to the Objectors, he always retained possession of the first floor of the suit property. It is also asserted that the late Shri Ramesh Chander Paul right from the time when the property was originally constructed in 1962 held himself out to be the exclusive owner of the first floor of the suit property. It is further disclosed that upon retiring from service on 30 November 1981, the late Shri Ramesh Chander Paul along with his wife, the late Smt. Sudharshan Paul and the Objectors shifted into the first floor of the suit property on 05 October 1981 and continued to occupy the same without interruption and the late Shri Ramesh Chander Paul always held himself out to be its exclusive owner. According to the Objectors, the possession of the late Shri Ramesh Chander Paul was actual, visible, exclusive and hostile and continued as such for more than twelve years from 05 October 1981. It is on the aforesaid basis that the Objectors assert that late Shri Ramesh Chander Paul obtained rights of ownership by virtue of adverse possession.
6. The Objectors have placed on the record, electricity bills, water bills, copies of the passports issued in favor of the late Shri Ramesh Chander Paul, his wife as well as that of the Objectors here on the basis of which it was contended that all the aforesaid documentation would establish that they were not only in continuous and exclusive possession of the first floor of the suit property, they are entitled in law to be recognised as having obtained rights of ownership by virtue of adverse possession. It is in the aforesaid backdrop that the Objectors contend that they are entitled to the release of the first floor of the suit property with the Court recognizing their rights of exclusive ownership and the final decree being liable to be read accordingly.
7. It would be pertinent to note that during the pendency of the suit proceeding, the Objectors also appear to have moved an application for impleadment. While dealing with the said application, a learned Judge of the Court in terms of the order of 12 December 2018 noted their contention, addressed on lines identical to those which are reiterated in the present objections, that they had been in possession of the first floor of the suit property and thus claimed rights on the basis of prescription. The Court, however, upon due consideration of the aforesaid pleas came to conclude that a claim of lawful title and one which is based on prescription are antithetical to each other and are not maintainable. It accordingly proceeded to hold that the Objectors were neither necessary nor proper parties to the suit. While parting, the Court clarified that the aforesaid observations would not bind the Objectors in any other proceedings that may be instituted by them.
8. After the passing of the decree of which execution is sought, the Objectors have also independently instituted a suit for declaration and permanent injunction against the decree holders and judgement debtors seeking the following reliefs: - “a. pass a decree of Declaration in favour of the Plaintiffs and against the Defendants thereby declaring and holding that the Plaintiffs are the joint exclusive owners of the First Floor of the said Rajinder Nagar property bearing No. R- 496, New Rajinder Nagar, New Delhi-110060; and b. pass a decree of the permanent injunction in favour of the Plaintiffs and against the Defendants thereby restraining the Defendants, their agents, assigns, servants, employees, representatives etc. from selling, alienating, transferring or parting with or creating any third-party interest with respect to the First Floor of the said Rajinder Nagar property bearing No. R-496, New Rajinder Nagar, New Delhi- 110060; and c. pass a decree of the permanent injunction in favour of the Plaintiffs and against the Defendants thereby restraining the Defendants, their agents, assigns, servants, employees, representatives etc. from interfering in the peaceful possession of the Plaintiffs in the First Floor of the said Rajinder Nagar property bearing No. R-496, New Rajinder Nagar, New Delhi- 110060; d. award the costs of the present suit to the Plaintiffs; e. in that behalf, pass such other orders and directions as may be deemed fit, proper and necessary.”
9. It would be relevant to note that while summons on the aforesaid suit have been issued, no injunction or interim order recognizing a prima face right inhering in the Objectors has come to be issued thereon.
10. Appearing in support of the present objections, Mr. Vachher, learned counsel submitted that the Objectors are clearly entitled in law to claim ownership over the first floor of the suit property by virtue of the principle of adverse possession. It was further submitted that Order XXI Rule 97 of the Code clearly empowers this Court to rule upon the rights which are claimed by them. Learned counsel also placed reliance upon Rules 98 and 101 as falling in Order XXI to submit that all questions that may arise in the course of execution are liable to be determined by the Court. According to Mr. Vachher, as is manifest from a reading of Order XXI Rule 101 of the Code, the said objections are liable to be determined by the Court in the execution proceedings itself, and the Objectors are, otherwise, not even liable to institute a separate suit.
11. Mr. Vachher further submitted that the principle of adverse possession is not merely a defense which may be taken but one which is recognized in law as giving birth to a right to claim ownership itself. Learned counsel placed reliance on the decision rendered by three learned Judges of the Supreme Court in Ravinder Kaur Grewal & Ors. vs. Manjit Kaur & Ors.[3] in support of the aforesaid submission. Reliance was additionally placed on the judgement rendered by a learned Judge of the Court in Sarvinder Singh and Anr. vs. Vipul Tandon[4] where, according to Mr. Vachher, on identical facts, the Court had upon finding substance and merit ultimately framed issues and accorded an opportunity to parties to adduce evidence in that respect.
12. The objections are opposed by the original plaintiffs and defendants to the suit who submit that no right had ever been asserted by the Objectors relating to ownership over the first floor prior to the institution of the suit or for that matter the filing of the present objections. It was submitted that electricity, water, telephone bills, gas connection papers or any other identity documents that may have been
2022 SCC OnLine Del 2046 obtained by either the Objectors or their parents cannot constitute material which may be read or accepted as being sufficient in law to sustain a plea based on adverse possession.
13. According to the said parties, the possession on the first floor was merely consensual and permissive. It was further submitted that the various documents which have been relied upon, in any case, do not identify any right of exclusive ownership that may be claimed by the Objectors in respect of the first floor of the suit property. It was highlighted that all those documents only mentioned the suit property as a whole. The submission in essence was that even those documents do not recognize either a right claimed by the Objectors or their predecessors of exclusive ownership over the first floor of the suit property nor do they in any case evidence a conceded position with respect to the first floor being in the exclusive ownership of the Objectors.
14. Learned counsel appearing for the decree holder also placed reliance upon the judgment rendered by the Supreme Court in Maria Margarida Sequeira Fernandes & Ors. v. Erasmo Jack de Sequeira (Dead) Through LRs.[5] to submit that mere long possession is not sufficient to uphold a claim of title based upon the doctrine of adverse possession. It was submitted that once the title of the decree holder and the judgement debtors over the suit property had been recognised, the mere possession of the first floor of the property by the Objectors and their predecessors would not justify the grant of the prayers as made since their right would always remain subordinate to those of the actual owner.
15. Having noticed the submissions addressed by and on behalf of respective parties, the Court at the outset notes that Mr. Vachhar did not dispute the obligations and duty cast upon the Objectors to meet the threshold test of establishing before this Court that the asserted right of title was open and hostile to the actual owners. While the various bills and other materials which has been placed on the record may indicate a permissive possession of the first floor of the suit property, in the considered opinion of this Court, those documents cannot be read as conclusive evidence of an assertion of title and animus possidendi.
16. It would be relevant to note that in Ravinder Kaur Grewal, the principles pertaining to adverse possession were lucidly explained by the Supreme Court in the following terms: -
30. In an article published in Harvard Law Review on “Title by Adverse Possession” by Henry W. Ballantine, as to the question of adverse possession and acquisition of title it has been observed on strength of various decisions that adverse possession vests the possessor with the complete title as effectually as if there had been a conveyance by the former owner. As held in Toltec Ranch Co. v. Cook [Toltec Ranch Co. v. Cook, 1903 SCC OnLine US SC 226: 48 L Ed 291: 191 US 532 (1903)], US at p. 542. But the title is independent, not derivative, and “relates back” to the inception of the adverse possession, as observed. (See Field v. Peoples [Field v. Peoples, 180 Ill 376, 383: 54 NE 304 (1899)]; Bellefontaine Improv. Co. v. Niedringhaus [Bellefontaine Improv. Co. v. Niedringhaus, 181 Ill 426: 55 NE 184 (1899)]. Lasalle County Carbon Coal Co. v. Sanitary District [Lasalle County Carbon Coal Co. v. Sanitary District, 260 Ill 423, 429: 103 NE 175 (1913)]; AMES, LECTURES ON LEGAL HIST. 197; 3 ANGLO-AMERICAN ESSAYS, 567.) The adverse possessor does not derive his title from the former owner, but from a new source of title, his possession. The “investitive fact” is the disseisin and exercise of possession as observed in Camp v. Camp [Camp v. Camp, 5 Conn 291 (1824)]; Price v. Lyon [Price v. Lyon, 14 Conn 279, 290 (1841)] and Coal Creek Consol. Coal Co. v. East Tennessee Iron & Coal Co. [Coal Creek Consol. Coal Co. v. East Tennessee Iron & Coal Co., 105 Tenn 563: 59 SW 634, 636 (1900)] It has also been observed that titles to property should not remain uncertain and in dispute, but that continued de facto exercise and assertion of a right should be conclusive evidence of the de jure existence of the right.
34. The operation of the statute of limitation in giving a title is merely negative; it extinguishes the right and title of the dispossessed owner and leaves the occupant with a title gained by the fact of possession and resting on the infirmity of the right of others to eject him. Perry v. Clissold [Perry v. Clissold, 1907 AC 73 (PC)] has been referred to in Nair Service Society Ltd. v. K.C. Alexander [Nair Service Society Ltd. v. K.C. Alexander, AIR 1968 SC 1165] in which it has been observed that it cannot be disputed that a person in possession of land in the assumed character of owner and exercising peaceably the ordinary rights of ownership has a perfectly good title against all the world but the original owner, and if the original owner does not come forward and assert his title by the process of law within the period prescribed under the statute of limitation applicable to the case, his right is forever extinguished and the possessory owner acquires an absolute title. In Ram Daan v. Urban Improvement Trust [Ram Daan v. Urban Improvement Trust, (2014) 8 SCC 902: (2014) 4 SCC (Civ) 669], this Court has observed thus: (SCC p. 907, para 11)
40. In Hemaji Waghaji Jat v. Bhikhabhai Khengarbhai Harijan [Hemaji Waghaji Jat v. Bhikhabhai Khengarbhai Harijan, (2009) 16 SCC 517], relying on T. Anjanappa v. Somalingappa [T. Anjanappa v. Somalingappa, (2006) 7 SCC 570], observed that title can be based on adverse possession. This Court has observed thus: (Hemaji Waghaji Jat case [Hemaji Waghaji Jat v. Bhikhabhai Khengarbhai Harijan, (2009) 16 SCC 517], SCC p. 525, para 23)
60. The adverse possession requires all the three classic requirements to co-exist at the same time, namely, nec vi i.e. adequate in continuity, nec clam i.e. adequate in publicity and nec precario i.e. adverse to a competitor, in denial of title and his knowledge. Visible, notorious and peaceful so that if the owner does not take care to know notorious facts, knowledge is attributed to him on the basis that but for due diligence he would have known it. Adverse possession cannot be decreed on a title which is not pleaded. Animus possidendi under hostile colour of title is required. Trespasser's long possession is not synonymous with adverse possession. Trespasser's possession is construed to be on behalf of the owner, the casual user does not constitute adverse possession. The owner can take possession from a trespasser at any point in time. Possessor looks after the property, protects it and in case of agricultural property by and large the concept is that actual tiller should own the land who works by dint of his hard labour and makes the land cultivable. The legislature in various States confers rights based on possession.
61. Adverse possession is heritable and there can be tacking of adverse possession by two or more persons as the right is transmissible one. In our opinion, it confers a perfected right which cannot be defeated on re-entry except as provided in Article 65 itself. Tacking is based on the fulfilment of certain conditions, tacking may be by possession by the purchaser, legatee or assignee, etc. so as to constitute continuity of possession, that person must be claiming through whom it is sought to be tacked, and would depend on the identity of the same property under the same right. Two distinct trespassers cannot tack their possession to constitute conferral of right by adverse possession for the prescribed period.
62. We hold that a person in possession cannot be ousted by another person except by due procedure of law and once 12 years' period of adverse possession is over, even owner's right to eject him is lost and the possessory owner acquires right, title and interest possessed by the outgoing person/owner as the case may be against whom he has prescribed. In our opinion, consequence is that once the right, title or interest is acquired it can be used as a sword by the plaintiff as well as a shield by the defendant within ken of Article 65 of the Act and any person who has perfected title by way of adverse possession, can file a suit for restoration of possession in case of dispossession. In case of dispossession by another person by taking law in his hand a possessory suit can be maintained under Article 64, even before the ripening of title by way of adverse possession. By perfection of title on extinguishment of the owner's title, a person cannot be remediless. In case he has been dispossessed by the owner after having lost the right by adverse possession, he can be evicted by the plaintiff by taking the plea of adverse possession. Similarly, any other person who might have dispossessed the plaintiff having perfected title by way of adverse possession can also be evicted until and unless such other person has perfected title against such a plaintiff by adverse possession. Similarly, under other articles also in case of infringement of any of his rights, a plaintiff who has perfected the title by adverse possession, can sue and maintain a suit.”
17. As would be manifest from the legal position as enunciated in Ravinder Kaur Grewal, the Supreme Court had reiterated the wellsettled position with respect to adverse possession as flowing originally from the decisions rendered by the Privy Council that a person in possession exercising ordinary rights of ownership would be presumed to have a perfectly good title against all except the rightful owner. The doctrine of adverse possession further recognizes that if the rightful owner fails to come forward and assert title or take steps which may run contrary to the presumption which arises, his right too stands extinguished and the possessory owner acquires absolute title.
18. It was however, also emphasized that for a plea of adverse possession to be established, it would be incumbent upon the possessory owner to establish continuity of possession over a reasonable period of time, adequacy of publicity in denial of title and which would have to necessarily be in the knowledge of the actual owner and thus a reiteration of the open and hostile principles as recognised as being the essential elements of a plea of adverse possession. However, it was significantly noted that mere long possession would not be sufficient to sustain a plea of adverse possession.
19. The decision in Ravinder Kaur Grewal also assumes significance since it had also proceeded to enunciate that a plea of adverse possession is not merely a defense that may be taken but also one which may be positively adopted in support of an assertion of absolute rights over the property itself. This is evident from the following passages of that decision: - “41. In the light of the aforesaid discussion, when we consider the decision in Gurdwara Sahib v. Gram Panchayat Village Sirthala [Gurdwara Sahib v. Gram Panchayat Village Sirthala, (2014) 1 SCC 669: (2014) 1 SCC (Civ) 630] decided by the two- Judge Bench wherein a question arose whether the plaintiff is in adverse possession of the suit land this Court referred to the Punjab and Haryana High Court decision on Gurdwara Sahib Sannauli v. State of Punjab [Gurdwara Sahib Sannauli v. State of Punjab, 2009 SCC OnLine P&H 3826: PLR (2009) 154 P&H 756] and observed that there cannot be “any quarrel” to the extent that the judgments of the courts below are correct and without any blemish. Even if the plaintiff is found to be in adverse possession, it cannot seek a declaration to the effect that such adverse possession has matured into ownership. The discussion made is confined to paras 4 & 8 only. The same is extracted hereunder: (SCC pp. 671-72 & 673, paras 4 & 8) “4. Insofar as the first issue is concerned, it was decided in favour of the plaintiff returning the findings that the appellant was in adverse possession of the suit property since 13-4-1952 as this fact had been proved by a plethora of documentary evidence produced by the appellant. However, while deciding the second issue, the court opined that no declaration can be sought on the basis of adverse possession inasmuch as adverse possession can be used as a shield and not as a sword. The learned Civil Judge relied upon the judgment of the Punjab and Haryana High Court in Gurdwara Sahib Sannauli v. State of Punjab [Gurdwara Sahib Sannauli v. State of Punjab, 2009 SCC OnLine P&H 3826: PLR (2009) 154 P&H 756] and thus, decided the issue against the plaintiff. Issue 3 was also, in the same vein, decided against the appellant. ***
8. There cannot be any quarrel to this extent that the judgments of the courts below are correct and without any blemish. Even if the plaintiff is found to be in adverse possession, it cannot seek a declaration to the effect that such adverse possession has matured into ownership. Only if proceedings are filed against the appellant and the appellant is arrayed as defendant that it can use this adverse possession as a shield/defence.” (emphasis supplied) It is apparent that the point whether the plaintiff can take the plea of adverse possession was not contested in the aforesaid decision and none out of the plethora of the aforesaid decisions including of the larger Bench were placed for consideration before this Court. The judgment is based upon the proposition of law not being questioned as the point was not disputed. There no reason is given, only observation has been recorded in one line.
49. The conclusion reached by the High Court is based on an inferential process because of the language used in the IIIrd Column of Article 65. The expression is used, the limitation of 12 years runs from the date when the possession of the defendant becomes adverse to the plaintiff. Column 3 of Schedule of the Act nowhere suggests that suit cannot be filed by the plaintiff for possession of immovable property or any interest therein based on title acquired by way of adverse possession. There is absolutely no bar for the perfection of title by way of adverse possession whether a person is suing as the plaintiff or being sued as a defendant. The inferential process of interpretation employed by the High Court is not at all permissible. It does not follow from the language used in the statute. The large number of decisions of this Court and various other decisions of the Privy Council, High Courts and of English courts which have been discussed by us and observations made in Halsbury's Laws based on various decisions indicate that suit can be filed by the plaintiff on the basis of title acquired by way of adverse possession or on the basis of possession under Articles 64 and 65. There is no bar under Article 65 or any of the provisions of the Limitation Act, 1963 as against a plaintiff who has perfected his title by virtue of adverse possession to sue to evict a person or to protect his possession and plethora of decisions are to the effect that by virtue of extinguishment of title of the owner, the person in possession acquires absolute title and if actual owner dispossesses another person after extinguishment of his title, he can be evicted by such a person by filing of suit under Article 65 of the Act. Thus, the decision of Gurdwara Sahib v. Gram Panchayat Village Sirthala [Gurdwara Sahib v. Gram Panchayat Village Sirthala, (2014) 1 SCC 669: (2014) 1 SCC (Civ) 630] and of the Punjab and Haryana High Court cannot be said to be laying down the correct law. More so because of various decisions of this Court to the contrary.
51. The statute does not define adverse possession, it is a common law concept, the period of which has been prescribed statutorily under the law of limitation in Article 65 as 12 years. Law of limitation does not define the concept of adverse possession nor anywhere contains a provision that the plaintiff cannot sue based on adverse possession. It only deals with limitation to sue and extinguishment of rights. There may be a case where a person who has perfected his title by virtue of adverse possession is sought to be ousted or has been dispossessed by a forceful entry by the owner or by some other person, his right to obtain possession can be resisted only when the person who is seeking to protect his possession, is able to show that he has also perfected his title by adverse possession for requisite period against such a plaintiff.
52. Under Article 64 also suit can be filed based on the possessory title. Law never intends a person who has perfected title to be deprived of filing suit under Article 65 to recover possession and to render him remediless. In case of infringement of any other right attracting any other Article such as in case the land is sold away by the owner after the extinguishment of his title, the suit can be filed by a person who has perfected his title by adverse possession to question alienation and attempt of dispossession.
53. Law of adverse possession does not qualify only a defendant for the acquisition of title by way of adverse possession, it may be perfected by a person who is filing a suit. It only restricts a right of the owner to recover possession before the period of limitation fixed for the extinction of his rights expires. Once the right is extinguished another person acquires prescriptive right which cannot be defeated by re-entry by the owner or subsequent acknowledgment of his rights. In such a case suit can be filed by a person whose right is sought to be defeated.
56. There is the acquisition of title in favour of the plaintiff though it is negative conferral of right on extinguishment of the right of an owner of the property. The right ripened by prescription by his adverse possession is absolute and on dispossession, he can sue based on “title” as envisaged in the opening part under Article 65 of the Act. Under Article 65, the suit can be filed based on the title for recovery of possession within 12 years of the start of adverse possession, if any, set up by the defendant. Otherwise right to recover possession based on the title is absolute irrespective of limitation in the absence of adverse possession by the defendant for 12 years. The possession as trespasser is not adverse nor long possession is synonymous with adverse possession.
57. In Article 65 in the opening part a suit “for possession of immovable property or any interest therein based on title” has been used. Expression “title” would include the title acquired by the plaintiff by way of adverse possession. The title is perfected by adverse possession, has been held in a catena of decisions.”
20. The Court finds that the Objectors rest their claim on a plea of adverse possession alone. Although it is asserted that all the brothers contributed funds for the construction of the property undisputedly, the perpetual lease deed came to be executed only in favour of one of them. Neither the father nor the Objectors ever laid a claim that the property came into existence based upon their monetary contribution which constituted the “nucleus”.
21. The Court additionally finds that the Objectors have woefully failed to establish that any assertion of title was made in open hostility to the rights inhering in the registered owner. The Court notes that while it would have been open for the Objectors to claim a positive right of actual ownership over the first floor of the suit property as also to assert that there was an annihilation of the rights of the actual owner, the same would ultimately have to be adjudged based on the material that stands placed on the record.
22. The principles of the impact of possession over properties as well as the importance of pleadings to sustain such a plea was succinctly explained by the Supreme Court in Maria Margarida in the following terms: -
23. When tested on the aforesaid principles also, the Court finds itself unable to hold that the Objectors have been able to satisfy the minimum requirements for sustaining a plea of adverse possession. As noticed hereinabove, while the various materials and documents that have been relied upon may tend to indicate that the Objectors were in permissive occupation of the first floor, they have woefully failed to establish that they had openly asserted an independent and exclusive right of ownership over the first floor of the suit property or that the said assertion was open and hostile to the actual owners. As is evident from the judgements rendered by the Supreme Court on the subject and noticed hereinbefore mere permissive possession cannot translate into possession being adverse to the actual owners.
24. The Court upon due consideration of the evidence placed on the record further finds that none of those documents either recognize or are liable to be read as being sufficient to sustain a plea of adverse possession over the first floor of the property. As was rightly contended by learned counsel for the plaintiff, those documents refer to the suit property as a whole and cannot possibly be read as evidencing an actual division or separation of the first floor from the rest of the suit property.
25. Insofar as the judgement in Sarvinder Singh is concerned, the Court notes that the same is clearly distinguishable in light of the following facts. In Sarvinder Singh, the Objectors had laid a claim on the suit property by virtue of a registered Agreement to Sell which had been executed in their favour by the mother of the decree holder. It was also their stand that they had been in possession of the suit property and had further constructed second and third floors thereon in the knowledge of the decree holders. The mother of the decree holder had proceeded to execute the Agreement to Sell as well as the subsequent sale deed based upon a Letters of Administration[6] which had been granted to her. Although the aforesaid LoA ultimately came to be revoked, the learned Judge in Sarvinder Singh noted that the said revocation came to be made long after the sale deed had been executed in favour of the Objectors. The Court in Sarvinder Singh thus found sufficient material which merited the parties being accorded an opportunity to lead evidence.
26. The objections as filed in the present proceedings however clearly falter and fall bearing in mind the skeletal evidence that has been placed in support of the plea of adverse possession. The Court notes that despite repeated opportunities, Mr. Vachher was unable to draw its attention to any material placed on the record which could have been read as constituting an assertion of absolute title over the first floor in the knowledge of the original owners and one which could be recognized as being in open denial of the title of the original owner.
27. Accordingly, and for all the aforesaid reasons, the objections fail and shall stand dismissed.
1. Let the matter be called again on 20.07.2023.
YASHWANT VARMA, J. MARCH 23, 2023 neha