Full Text
HIGH COURT OF DELHI
Date of Decision: December 18, 2025
PRIYA NARAYANAN & ORS. .....Petitioners
Through: Mr. Arvind K. Gupta, Mr. R.P. Singh and Ms. Sakshi Mendiratta, Advocates.
Through: Mr. Sunil Kumar Gautam, APP for the State
Vijay Kumar, PS Dwarka North.
DELHI PUBLIC SCHOOL DWARKA .....Petitioner
Through: Mr. Arvind K. Gupta, Mr. R.P. Singh and Ms. Sakshi Mendiratta, Advocates.
Through: Mr. Sunil Kumar Gautam, APP for the State
Vijay Kumar, PS Dwarka North.
JUDGMENT
1. The present petitions have been filed under Sections 397/401 read with Section 482 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (‘CrPC’) challenging the order dated 15.03.2023 (hereafter ‘impugned order’) passed by the learned Additional Sessions Judge (‘ASJ’), Dwarka Courts, New Delhi in Sessions Case No. 486/2022.
2. The learned ASJ by the impugned order took cognizance of the offence under Section 21 of the Protection of Children from Sexual Offences Act, 2012 (‘POCSO Act’) against the petitioners in CRL.REV. P. 311/2023, and issued summons to them. The learned ASJ, by the impugned order, also issued notice to the Principal of the petitioner school in CRL.REV.P. 322/2023 to explain how they gained possession of the statement of the witnesses under Section 161 of the CrPC.
3. The brief facts are that on 25.04.2022, the complainant (mother of the prosecutrix) had picked her daughters up from school, whereafter, she saw that the prosecutrix (the complainant’s younger daughter) was upset. After asking her as to what had happened, she told the complainant that the photographs for ID cards were being taken in school on that day.
4. It is alleged that the prosecutrix told the complainant that while the prosecutrix was getting her photograph clicked, the photographer’s helper had touched her inappropriately and allegedly tried to hold her in his arms.
5. It is alleged that the prosecutrix freed herself with great difficulty and immediately informed about the alleged incident to the teacher who was present in the classroom, who advised the prosecutrix to meet the school counsellor regarding the same.
6. It is alleged that the prosecutrix thereafter met the school counsellor who called the prosecutrix 4-5 times, whereafter, the counsellor took the prosecutrix to the Vice-Principal office.
7. It is alleged that after learning about the alleged incident, the complainant spoke to the school authorities who informed that they had done an internal inquiry at their level and brushed the matter aside.
8. Pursuant to a complaint given by the complainant, the police registered FIR No. 261/2022 dated 25.04.2022 at Police Station Dwarka North for the offences under Sections 354/354A of the Indian Penal Code, 1860 (‘IPC’) and Section 10 of the POCSO Act.
9. The police, after completion of investigation on 23.06.2022, filed chargesheet against the accused for the offences under Sections 354/354A of the IPC and Section 10 of the POCSO Act.
10. During the course of the trial, the complainant filed an application under Section 173(8) of the CrPC to conduct inquiry against the petitioners in CRL.REV. P. 311/2023. Pursuant to the same, further investigation was carried out by the police and a supplementary chargesheet was filed on 28.11.2022.
11. The learned ASJ, by the impugned order, observed that a prima facie case is made out against the petitioners in CRL.REV.
12. The learned ASJ, by the impugned order, also issued notice to the principal of the petitioner school in CRL.REV. P. 322/2023 in order to ascertain as to how the petitioner school got access to the statement of the prosecutrix under Section 161 of the CrPC. The learned ASJ noted that the proceedings under the POCSO Act are meant to be confidential and are aimed at protecting the identity of the child victim.
13. By judgment dated 10.10.2025, this Court had allowed the present petitions. However, the said judgment was recalled on 06.12.2025 as it came to the notice of this Court that inadvertently, the judgment recorded the impugned order to be one by way of which charge was framed. The arguments were heard again.
14. The learned counsel for the petitioners submits that the learned ASJ failed to appreciate the fact that there is no time period mentioned under Section 21 of the POCSO Act to report an incident of child abuse. He submits that the learned ASJ failed to appreciate the fact that the delay in reporting the alleged incident was due to the in-house inquiry done by the petitioners. He submits that the inquiry was conducted right after the receipt of information and the same was done in accordance with the Guidelines for Prevention of Child Abuse, 2013, which have been framed by Delhi Commission for Protection of Child Rights (‘DCPCR’).
15. He submits that the learned ASJ erred in observing that the petitioners in CRL.REV. P. 311/2023 were more worried about the reputation of the school and failed to appreciate that there is no material evidence on record to establish that a prima facie case for the offence under Section 21 of the POCSO Act was made out against the petitioners in CRL.REV. P. 311/2023.
16. He submits that the learned ASJ failed to appreciate the fact that the chargesheet had already been filed on 23.06.2022 and the copies of the statement of the prosecutrix were made accessible to the accused. He submits that the statement was also accessible to the counsel for DCW, who was appearing for the prosecutrix. He submits that the concerned statement was being referenced during arguments by the respective counsel for the accused and the prosecutrix, who were present in Court.
17. He submits that the learned ASJ failed to appreciate the fact that the Investigating Officer in the present case did not allege that the petitioner school in CRL.REV. P. 322/2023 colluded with the accused or that the petitioner school tried to illegally gain access to the statements of the prosecutrix.
18. Per contra, the learned Additional Public Prosecutor for the State vehemently opposes the arguments as raised by the learned counsel for the petitioners. He consequently prays that the present petition be dismissed.
19. None appears for the complainant despite service. It is seen that none had appeared for the complainant on the last date of hearing as well.
20. This Court does not consider it apposite to give further adjournment awaiting the appearance of the complainant since the arguments had already been heard. Analysis
21. The petition, being CRL.REV.P. 311/2023, has been filed under Sections 397/401 of the CrPC read with Section 482 of the CrPC challenging the issuance of summons against the petitioners therein, including all consequential proceedings arising therefrom. While this Court needs to exercise restraint in stifling prosecution, however, revisional jurisdiction can be exercised by this Court to examine the record and test the correctness, legality or propriety of any findingand inherent jurisdiction can be exercised if it is found that the continuance of criminal proceedings would be a clear abuse of process of law. The Hon’ble Apex Court in the case of State of Haryana v. Bhajan Lal:1992 Supp (1) SCC 335has illustrated the category of cases where the Court may exercise itsinherent jurisdiction under Section 482 of the CrPC to quash the proceedings. The relevant portion of the same is reproduced hereunder:
value and accepted in their entirety do not prima facie constitute any offence or make out a case against the accused. (2) Where the allegations in the first information report and other materials, if any, accompanying the FIR do not disclose a cognizable offence, justifying an investigation by police officers under Section 156(1) of the Code except under an order of a Magistrate within the purview of Section 155(2) of the Code. (3) Where the uncontroverted allegations made in the FIR or complaint and the evidence collected in support of the same do not disclose the commission of any offence and make out a case against the accused. (4) Where, the allegations in the FIR do not constitute a cognizable offence but constitute only a non-cognizable offence, no investigation is permitted by a police officer without an order of a Magistrate as contemplated under Section 155(2) of the Code. (5) Where the allegations made in the FIR or complaint are so absurd and inherently improbable on the basis of which no prudent person can ever reach a just conclusion that there is sufficient ground for proceeding against the accused. (6) Where there is an express legal bar engrafted in any of the provisions of the Code or the concerned Act (under which a criminal proceeding is instituted) to the institution and continuance of the proceedings and/or where there is a specific provision in the Code or the concerned Act, providing efficacious redress for the grievance of the aggrieved party. (7) Where a criminal proceeding is manifestly attended with mala fide and/or where the proceeding is maliciously instituted with an ulterior motive for wreaking vengeance on the accused and with a view to spite him due to private and personal grudge.” (emphasis supplied)
22. The learned ASJ by the impugned order has taken cognizance of the offence under Section 21 of the POCSO Act and issued summons to the petitioners in CRL.REV. P. 311/2023 after finding that a prima facie case is made out against the said petitioners. The aforesaid offence deals with the punishment for the offence under Section 19 of the POCSO Act. Section 19 and Section 21 of the POCSO Act are reproduced hereunder: “19. Reporting of offences.—(1) Notwithstanding anything contained in the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of1974) any person (including the child), who has apprehension that an offence under this Act is likely to be committed or has knowledge that such an offence has been committed, he shall provide such information to,— (a) the Special Juvenile Police Unit; or (b) the local police. (2) Every report given under sub-section (1) shall be— (a) ascribed an entry number and recorded in writing; (b) be read over to the informant;
(c) shall be entered in a book to be kept by the Police Unit.
(3) Where the report under sub-section (1) is given by a child, the same shall be recorded under sub-section (2) in a simple language so that the child understands contents being recorded. (4) In case contents are being recorded in the language not understood by the child or wherever it is deemed necessary, a translator or an interpreter, having such qualifications, experience and on payment of such fees as may be prescribed, shall be provided to the child if he fails to understand the same. (5) Where the Special Juvenile Police Unit or local police is satisfied that the child against whom an offence has been committed is in need of care and protection, then, it shall, after recording the reasons in writing, make immediate arrangement to give him such care and protection including admitting the child into shelter home or to the nearest hospital within twenty-four hours of the report, as may be prescribed. (6) The Special Juvenile Police Unit or local police shall, without unnecessary delay but within a period of twenty-four hours, report the matter to the Child Welfare Committee and the Special Court or where no Special Court has been designated, to the Court of Session, including need of the child for care and protection and steps taken in this regard. (7) No person shall incur any liability, whether civil or criminal, for giving the information in good faith for the purpose of sub-section (1).
21. Punishment for failure to report or record a case.—(1) Any person, who fails to report the commission of an offence under sub-section (1) of section 19 or section 20 or who fails to record such offence under sub-section (2) of section 19 shall be punished with imprisonment of either description which may extend to six months or with fine or with both. (2) Any person, being in-charge of any company or an institution (by whatever name called) who fails to report the commission of an offence under sub-section (1) of section 19 in respect of a subordinate under his control, shall be punished with imprisonment for a term which may extend to one year and with fine. (3) The provisions of sub-section (1) shall not apply to a child under this Act.”
23. From a bare perusal of the aforesaid provisions, it can be seen that the provisions provide for punishment in cases where such incidents are not reported, however, there is no time period mentioned in the said provisions for reporting of such incidents.
24. It is the case of the petitioners that the learned ASJ has failed to appreciate that there is no time period mentioned under Section 21 of the POCSO Act to report the alleged offence. It is contended that the petitioners in CRL.REV. P. 311/2023 conducted an in-house inquiry into the alleged incident promptly after gaining knowledge of the same. It is argued that the matter was reported to Petitioner No.2 in CRL.REV. P. 311/2023, who is the head mistress, at around 11:40 a.m. and the complainant was informed between 1 p.m. and 1:15 p.m.
25. After conducting further investigation, in the supplementary chargesheet, the police found no incriminating material against the petitioners in CRL.REV. P. 311/2023 and noted that the delay on part of the petitioners in CRL.REV. P. 311/2023 to report the alleged incident was on account of the inhouse inquiry being conducted by them.
26. The Coordinate Bench of this Court in the case of Jasvinder Kaur and Another v. State and Another: 2024 SCC OnLine Del 3337 held that a person cannot be prosecuted for an offence under Section 21 of the POCSO Act merely on account of delay in reporting the incident as the aforesaid provision provides the punishment for non-compliance of the provision of Section 19 of the POCSO Act, instead of belated compliance.
27. It is important to caution that merely because no specific time is prescribed for reporting an incident, the same cannot be construed as a liberty to withhold the information for an undue period of time despite being aware of the offence. In the opinion of this Court, such offences require prompt investigation due to the sensitivity of the matter as there is a high peril of crucial evidence being lost due to the delay in the reporting of the incident.
28. However, in the peculiar facts of the present case, as noted above, Petitioner No.2 in CRL.REV. P. 311/2023 was informed regarding the alleged incident at 11:40 a.m. and the petitioners conducted an in-house inquiry into the allegations timely. It is argued that Child Abuse Monitoring Committee called the complainant to the school and briefed her about the alleged incident. It is also argued that the petitioners asked the complainant to report the incident to police authorities, however, the complainant stated that there may have been a misunderstanding and asked the petitioners to not report the incident to police. As noted by the learned ASJ, as per the case of the complainant, she was informed about the incident by the victim herself and there is no mention of the complainant being called to school. The supplementary chargesheet however mentions that the complainant received a call from school around 1 p.m. to 1:15 p.m., which supports the contention of the concerned petitioners.
29. Even otherwise, a complaint in regard to the incident was admittedly made at 2:58 pm itself. As the FIR was registered within a few hours of the incident, it cannot be inferred from the facts of the case that any of the school authorities had any deliberate intention to conceal the allegations. Although the allegations are serious in nature, the petitioners in CRL.REV. P. 311/2023 cannot be faulted for conducting a preliminary in-house inquiry into the alleged incident, especially since the same was conducted expeditiously in accordance with the Guidelines for Prevention of Child Abuse, 2013 and wrapped swiftly.
30. The said guidelines provide for constitution of Child Abuse Monitoring Committee within the institution and for an inquiry to be initiated within 24 hours of the incident being reported. The guidelines also provide for a report to be given to the local police at the earliest within forty-eight hours. They further provide that the institution shall intimate the emergency contact person within twenty-four hours.
31. Although it seems that no such report was given to the police by the school, in the opinion of this Court, Section 21 of the POCSO Act cannot be attracted against the petitioners due to the same and no foul play can be ascribed to the said petitioners at this stage merely because they conducted an inquiry. Admittedly, the complaint was in fact given to the Police within few hours of the incident though by the Parents. Thus only because the parents were the first one to report the incident cannot be a ground to allege that the school failed to report the incident. When two persons are aware of the incident, it is but obvious that one of them would be the first to report.
32. In the present case, as noted above, it is apparent that the Child Abuse Monitoring Committee was constituted promptly after gaining knowledge of the alleged incident. While the learned ASJ has rightly noted that the school cannot step into the shoes of the investigating agency to investigate the offence, merely because the incident was not reported immediately to the police authorities, the same cannot be construed as a failure on part of the petitioners in CRL.REV. P. 311/2023 to report the incident.
33. It is settled law that issuance of summons is a serious issue and it is thus imperative that the summoning order shows due application of mind and examination of the facts of the case as well as the evidence on record. In the case of Pepsi Foods Ltd. and Another v. Special Judicial Magistrate and Others: (1998) 5 SCC 749, the Hon’ble Apex Court had observed as under: “28. Summoning of an accused in a criminal case is a serious matter. Criminal law cannot be set into motion as a matter of course. It is not that the complainant has to bring only two witnesses to support his allegations in the complaint to have the criminal law set into motion. The order of the Magistrate summoning the accused must reflect that he has applied his mind to the facts of the case and the law applicable thereto. He has to examine the nature of allegations made in the complaint and the evidence both oral and documentary in support thereof and would that be sufficient for the complainant to succeed in bringing charge home to the accused. It is not that the Magistrate is a silent spectator at the time of recording of preliminary evidence before summoning of the accused. The Magistrate has to carefully scrutinise the evidence brought on record and may even himself put questions to the complainant and his witnesses to elicit answers to find out the truthfulness of the allegations or otherwise and then examine if any offence is prima facie committed by all or any of the accused.
29. No doubt the Magistrate can discharge the accused at any stage of the trial if he considers the charge to be groundless, but that does not mean that the accused cannot approach the High Court under Section 482 of the Code or Article 227 of the Constitution to have the proceeding quashed against him when the complaint does not make out any case against him and still he must undergo the agony of a criminal trial....” (emphasis supplied)
34. From the aforesaid discussion, it is apparent that no sufficient ground has been canvassed by the prosecution for proceeding against the petitioners in CRL.REV. P. 311/2023 as the learned ASJ has failed to duly appreciate the law in relation to Section 21 of the POCSO Act.
35. In view of the above, in the opinion of this Court, the learned ASJ erred in taking cognizance of the offence under Section 21 of the POCSO Act and issuing summons against the petitioners in CRL.REV. P. 311/2023.
36. Insofar as the notice issued to the principal of the petitioner school in CRL.REV.P. 322/2023 is concerned, it is undisputed that the police after conducting investigation had filed chargesheet on 23.06.2022 before the learned ASJ. It is the case of the petitioner school that on the concerned date, arguments were being addressed on behalf of the counsel for the prosecutrix as well as the main accused, who made reference to the concerned statement of the prosecutrix.
37. After the police have concluded their investigation and have filed chargesheet before the concerned court, the documents as well as the statements of the witnesses annexed with the chargesheet are made accessible to the accused. As the accused had a copy of the chargesheet as well as the annexed documents, including the statement of the prosecutrix under Section 161 of the CrPC, the possibility of the same being provided by the accused to the counsel appearing for the petitioner school at the time of arguments cannot be ruled out. The explanation tendered by the petitioner school appears to be plausible.
38. While this Court is cognizant that the confidentiality of the prosecutrix is of utmost importance, the same cannot be said to have been breached by mere reference to the prosecutrix’s statements in Court. No criminality can be ascribed to the petitioner school for the same. Conclusion
39. In light of the aforesaid discussion, I find merit in the present petitions.
40. The impugned order dated 15.03.2023 is set aside. The present petitions are allowed. Pending application(s), if any, also stand disposed of.
41. A copy of this order be placed in both the matters. AMIT MAHAJAN, J DECEMBER 18, 2025 DU