Harinagar Sugar Mills Ltd. v. State of Maharashtra

10 (1967) 3 SCR 525 our attention to letter dated 10 October 2019 by which petitioners acted on the requisition for filing of fresh applications and indeed filed fresh applications on 10 October

2019. She would then invite our attention to letters dated 4 November 2019 in support of her contention that even fresh applications dated 10 October 2019 were rejected directing petitioners to file fresh applications once again. She would therefore assert that the State Government has taken a decision by rejecting Petitioners’ application for closure within the period of 60 days and that therefore there is no question of deemed permission under provision of Section 25-O(3) of the ID Act. That the State Government has recorded detailed reasons while rejecting their applications by due application of mind. That petitions filed on 26 November 2019 are premature as petitioners were called upon to file fresh applications. She would draw our attention to Form XXIV prescribed under the Maharashtra Rules for giving notice for closure of an establishment and would submit that the annexure to the form must mandatorily contain statement of reasons, which were absent in the applications dated 28 August 2019.

14. Ms. Chavan has placed on record additional affidavit dated 6 February 2023 and thereby produced copies of file noting leading to issuance of letter dated 25 November 2019. On the basis of those file noting, she would urge that the Hon’ble Minister took a decision on petitioners’ application for closure of establishments.

15. Mr. Shaikh, the learned counsel appearing for respondent no. 3 – Union in Writ Petition No. 3397 of 2019 (Shangrila Food Products Ltd.) has opposed that petition contending that the direction to resubmit application for closure would itself mean rejection of petitioners’ applications dated 28 August 2019. He would further submit that Petitioners’ main grouse is non-following of procedure laid down under Section 25-O(2) of the ID Act while entertaining its applications for closure, for which they have remedy of seeking review and/or reference of State Governments’ decision under Section 25-O(5) of the ID Act.

16. Mr. Shaikh would further submit the ID Act is a beneficial legislation and in the event of possibility of two interpretations, one that favours working class is required to be accepted. This submission is raised by Mr Shaikh on the premise that even if confusion exists as to whether decision of rejection of closure application was taken or not, benefit of doubt must be given to working class and not to the establishments. He would submit that even if this court comes to a plausible conclusion, that decision was indeed taken, there would not be closure by deeming fiction.Mr. Shaikh would take us through the communication dated 25 September 2019 and 4 November 2019 in which petitioners were called upon to re-submit applications for closure citing deficiencies in the earlier applications. He would further submit that since authority informed petitioners that unless fresh applications were submitted, the State Government was not in a position to take decision for closure, communication dated 25 September 2019 would clearly constitute a decision rejecting the petitioners’ closure application. He would contend that the petitioners application for closure were returned by the State Government on 25 September 2019 and having returned the said application there was no question of taking any decision thereof. Mr. Naidu would invite our attention to the provisions of Section 82(B) of the Industrial Disputes (Maharashtra) Rules, 1957(“Maharashta Rules”) in support of his contention that all the modalities prescribed in Rule 82 (B) were scrupulously followed by the petitioners while making application dated 28 August 2019 and that there was not even a single defect in the application.

17. Mr. Shaikh would further submit that this court is required to gather the real intention behind the action of the State Government rather than giving too much importance to the words used in the communication. He would submit that the State Government has taken a stand on affidavit that it intended to reject the petitioners application for closure. Mr. Shaikh would seek to rely upon the very judgments cited by Mr. Naidu contending that they actually favour his clients. Lastly, Mr Shaikh would rely upon the judgment of this court in Maharashtra General Kamgar Union vs Vazir Glass Works & Ors.11.

18. Mr. Pathak learned counsel appearing for respondent NO. 3 in Writ Petition no. 3447 of 2019 would also oppose the petition submitting that on the date of filing of the present petition i.e 26 November 2019 the respondent-union secured an ad-interim order from the Industrial Court restraining petitioners from closing down its manufacturing activities. He 11 1996 II CLR 990 would submit that since the issue relating to closure of establishment of petitioners is already sub-judice before the Industrial Court this court would be loath in entertaining the present petition. He would submit that the petitioners have not challenged letters dated 25 September 2019 by which they were appraised of rejection of their closure applications. He would submit that petitioners have efficacious remedy of seeking review/reference under section 25-O(5) of the ID Act. He would take us through list of various companies of the petitioners in support of his contention that petitioners are otherwise financially sound to operate manufacturing units. Mr. Pathak would rely upon judgment of this court in Eurotex Industries and Exports Limited vs. Additional Commissioner of Labour-cum-Specified Authority & Ors.12 decided on 25 February 2020. Lastly, Mr. Pathak would contend that any communication made by the State Government under Section 25-O(2) of the ID Act would obviate closure by deeming fiction under Section 25-O(3).

19. In rejoinder, Mr. Naidu would submit that the remedy of review/reference under section 25-O(5) is available only in respect of an ‘order’ granting or refusing to grant closure. In

12 Writ Petition no. 10345 of 2019 the present case there is no such ‘order’ as contemplated under Section 25-O(2) and mere communications addressed by the State Government not constituting ‘order’ would not prevent automatic closure by deeming fiction under section 25- O(3) of the ID Act. He would dispute contention of Mr. Shaikh that petitioners’ application for closure was ‘returned’. In so far as the contention of Mr. Pathak about communication dated 25 September 2019 is concerned, Mr. Naidu would submit that for triggering the deeming fiction under section 25-O(3), what is needed is absence of an ‘order’ and mere communications/letters would not constitute an ‘order’ Reasons and analysis

20. Petitioners are seeking a declaration that their establishments are deemed to have been closed under provisions of Section 25-O(5) of the ID Act. It would therefore be necessary to reproduce provisions of Section 25-O as under: 25-O. Procedure for closing down an undertaking (1) An employer who intends to close down an undertaking of an industrial establishment to which this Chapter applies shall, in the prescribed manner, apply, for prior permission at least ninety days before the date on which the intended closure is to become effective, to the appropriate government, stating clearly the reasons for the intended closure of the undertaking and a copy of such application shall also be served simultaneously on the representatives of the workmen in the prescribed manner: Provided that nothing in this sub-section shall apply to an undertaking set up for the construction of buildings, bridges, roads, canals, dams or for other construction work. (2) Where an application for permission has been made under sub-section(l),the appropriate government, after making such enquiry as it thinks fit and after giving a reasonable opportunity of being heard to the employer, the workmen and the persons interested in such closure may, having regards to the, genuineness and adequacy of the reasons stated by the employer, the interests of the general public and all other relevant factors, by order. and for reasons to be recorded in writing, grant or refuse to grant such permission and a copy of such order shall be communicated to the employer and the workmen. (3) Where an application has been made under sub-section (1) and the appropriate government does not communicate the order granting or refusing to grant permission to the employer within a period of sixty days from the date on which such application is made, the permission applied for shall be deemed to have been granted on the expiration of the said period of sixty days. (4) An order of the appropriate government granting or refusing to grant permission shall, subject to the provisions of sub-section (5), be final and binding on all the parties and shall remain in force for one year from the date of such order. (5) The appropriate government may, either on its own motion or on the application made by the employer or any workman, review its order granting or refusing to grant permission under sub-section (2) or refer the matter to a Tribunal for adjudication: Provided that where a reference has been made to a Tribunal under this sub-section, it shall pass an award within a period of thirty days from the date of such reference. (6) Where no application for permission under sub-section (l) is made within the period specified therein, or where the permission for closure has been refused, the closure of the undertaking shall be deemed to be illegal from the date of closure and the workmen shall be entitled to all the benefits under any law for the time being in force as if the undertaking had not been closed down. (7) Notwithstanding anything contained in the foregoing provisions of this section, the appropriate government may, if it is satisfied that owing to such exceptional circumstances as accident in the undertaking or death of the employer or the like it is necessary so to do, by order, direct that the provisions of sub-section (1) shall not apply in relation to such undertaking for such period as may be specified in the order. (8) Where an undertaking is permitted to be closed down under sub-section (2) or where permission for closure is deemed to be granted under sub-section (3), every workman who is employed in that undertaking immediately before the date of application for permission under this section, shall be entitled to receive compensation which shall be equivalent to fifteen days’ average pay for every completed year of continuous service or any part thereof in excess of six months.

21. The scheme of section 25-O of the ID Act envisages making of an application by the employer to the appropriate Government seeking prior permission at least 90 days before date on which the intended closure is to become effective. The application must state clearly the reasons for intended closure of undertaking. On receipt of application for closure under Section 25-O(1), the appropriate Government, which in the present case means the Hon’ble Minister for Labour, is required to make an inquiry and give reasonable opportunity of hearing to the employer, a workmen and persons interested in closure. He would also keep in mind the interest of general public as well as all other relevant factors and then take a decision either to grant or refuse to grant permission for closure by recording reasons in writing. Section 25-O(3) contains deemed fiction under which upon failure of the appropriate Government to communicate an order granting or refusing to grant permission to the employer within a period of 90 days of making of the application, the permission for closure is deemed to have been granted on expiration of period of 60 days. Section 25-O(4) seeks to give finality to the order of the appropriate Government and further directs that the order passed would remain in force for a period of one year. Section 25-O(5) provides remedy to the aggrieved party to seek review of the order of the State Government or to seek reference to the Industrial Tribunal for adjudication. The power of review under Section 25-O(5) can also be exercised by the appropriate Government suo moto. Section 25-O(6) casts a liability on the employer to pay all the benefits payable under the law in the event of permission for closure being refused.

22. Petitioners have come up with a case that their applications have not been decided by passing orders as envisaged in Section 25-O(2). Therefore the entire controversy revolves around the issue as to whether petitioners’ applications for closure submitted on 28 August 2019 have been decided or not. What is contemplated by Section 25-O(2) of the ID Act is making of an order granting or refusing to grant permission for closure. The deeming fiction under Section 25-O(3) would be triggered only in the event of the appropriate Government failing to pass an order within a period of 60 days. It is common ground that the State Government has not granted permission for closure. Therefore it is necessary to find out whether the State Government has passed any order refusing to grant permission for closure.

23. As observed above, petitioners filed application for closure under Section 25-O(1) in the format prescribed under section 85(B) of the Maharashtra Rules on 28 August 2019 and a copy thereof was also served upon the workmen-Unions. The period of 60 days would come to an end on 27 October

2019. However, before 27 October 2019, the State Government issued communications dated 25 September 2019 to Petitioners and according to the State Government, that constitutes ‘order’ refusing to grant permission for closure. On the contrary petitioners contend that those communication did not convey any decision refusing permission for closure. It would be appropriate to reproduce the communication dated 25 September 2019 as under: egkjk"Vª 'kklu dz-%&Dykstj&82019@iz-dz- 2@dke&2 m|ksx] mtkZ o dkexkj foHkkx] eknke dkek ekxZ] gqrkRek jktxq# pkSd]ea=ky;] eqacbZ 400 032fnukad %& 25 lIVsacj] 2019 izfr] vf/kd`r Lok{kjhdrkZ] es-gfjuxj ‘kqxj feYl fy-],y-ch-,l- ekxZ HkkaMqi ¼i-½ eqacbZ&78 fo”k; %& es-gfjuxj ‘kqxj feYl fy-],y-ch-,l- ekxZ HkkaMqi ¼i-½] eqacbZ&78;sFkhy;quhV can dj.;kdjhrk 25¼vks½¼1½ varxZr ijokuxh feG.;kckcrpk vtZlanHkZ %& vkiyk fn- 28-08-2019 jksthpk vtZegksn;] mijksDr lanHkkZ/khu vtkZUo;s vki.k es-gfjuxj ‘kqxj feYl fy-,y-ch-,l-ekxZ] HkkaMqi ¼i-½] eqacbZ&78;sFkhy;quhV can dj.;klkBh vkS|ksfxd fookn vf/kfu;e] 1947 P;k dye 25¼vks½¼1½ vUo;s fn- 28-08-2019 jksth ‘kklukl vtZ lknj dsyk vkgs- 2- lnjgw vtkZps voyksdu dsys vlrk] vkiY;k daiuhus es-fczVkfu;k baVLVªht fy-;kapslkscr fcLdhV mRiknu dj.;klkBh dsysyk tkWc djkj fn- 27-11-2019 iklwu jÌ gks.kj vlY;keqGs] lnjgw foHkkxkdMs dks.krsgh dke f’kYyd jkgr ukgh] vls dkj.k uewn d#u lnjpk fcLdhV foHkkx (Biscuit Division) can dj.;kl ijokuxh ns.;klkBh fn-28-08-2019 vUo;s ‘kklukl vtZ lknj dsyk vkgs- 3- rFkkfi] lnj foHkkx can gksÅ u;s];klkBh vU; dks.kdks.krs iz;Ru dsys;kckcrpk dks.krkgh mgkiksg vtkZe/;s dsysyk ukgh- rlsp foHkkx can dj.;klkBh ifjiw.kZ o leFkZfu; dkj.ks ns[khy fnysyh ukghr- lcc] vki.k mRiknu can gksÅ u;s;klkBh dsysys vU;s iz;Ru rlsp leFkZfu; o ifjiw.kZ dkj.kfeekalslg vtZ Qsjlknj dsY;kuarj vkiY;k fouarhP;k vuq”kaxkus dk;Zokgh dj.ks ‘kD; gksbZyvkiyk] Lok{kjh @& ¼’k-ek-lkBs½ mi lfpo] egkjk”Vª ‘kklu izr %& 1- dkexkj vk;qDr] dkexkj vk;qDr;kaps dk;kZy;] dkexkj Hkou] lh&20] bZ&CykWd] ckanzk&dqykZ ladqy] ckanzk ¼iwoZ½ eqacbZ&400 051 2- ek- ea=h ¼dkexkj½;kaps [kktxh lfpo-

24. The first objection of Mr Naidu is that even if communications dated 25 September 2019 were to be assumed as decisions, the decisions are not taken by the authority, viz. Hon’ble Minister for Labour but the same is taken by the Deputy Secretary. To counter the contention, the State Government has placed on record the file noting on the basis of which the communications dated 25 September 2019 were issued. The file noting would indicate that note was prepared by Desk Officer on 30 August 2019 stating that as per notification dated 25 June 2013, the powers under Section 25- O(2) are conferred upon the Hon’ble Minister for Labour. It is further stated that the petitioners’ applications were required to be forwarded to the Hon’ble Minister for further action. However, there appears to be an endorsement in hand writing towards the end of the noting to the effect that petitioners failed to furnish complete and cogent reasons in their applications. The noting was approved by various officers in the hierarchy and finally came to be approved by Hon’ble Minister with a remark accepting hand written endorsement with further direction that the establishment should be intimated to file application with cogent reasons. In accordance with the above decision of the Hon’ble Minister, the letters dated 25 September 2019 were addressed to petitioners. We therefore repel the objection of the petitioners that the decision in communications was not taken by the Hon’ble Minister.

25. Different interpretations are placed by the parties about the letters dated 25 September 2019. The State Government has contended that the letters would constitute decision/order refusing to grant permission for closure under Section 25-O(2) of the ID Act. Mr. Shaikh would construe the letters meant ‘return’ of closure application, which was deficient. Mr. Naidu, on the other hand, would submit that the letters do not contain any decision at all, much less a decision refusing to grant permission for closure.

26. It is the petitioners’ case that the applications for closure submitted by them on 28 August 2019 were complete in all respects. However, when the State Government directed them to resubmit applications by adducing complete and cogent reasons and also to disclose the efforts taken to prevent closure of operations, petitioners responded by letter dated 10 October 2019 seeking to adduce reasons for closure as well disclosing efforts taken to prevent closure of operations. The letter dated 10 October 2019 reads thus: Ref. No. 76/19-20 Date: 10.10.2019 To, Shri S.M.Sathe, The Dy.Secretary State of Maharashtra Mantralaya Mumbai Sub: Permission sought under Section 25-O(1) of I.D.Act for closure of M/s. Harinagar Sugar Mills Ltd. (Biscuit Division) Ref: Your letter dated 25.09.2019. Dear Sir, On 01.10.2019 we have received your letter dated 25.09.2019 with regard to the aforesaid subject. It is a fact that for last 32 years, the Company used to do job work of manufacturing biscuits only for Britannia Industries Ltd. For manufacturing biscuits for Britannia Industries Ltd., the raw material as well as necessary plant and machinery used to be provided and installed by Britannia Industries Ltd. After receiving termination of job work agreement from BIL, the Company immediately persuaded the management of BIL to continue the agreement and the job work with the Company. However, said persuation did not work or yield any result. The Company had then approached other biscuit manufacturers such as M/s. Mondelez India Limited and M/s. ITC Ltd. On 15.07.2019, the top management of the Company had meeting with Mr. T. Arunkumar, CMO, Manager of M/s. Mondelez India Limited and then as per his requirement had forwarded e-mail on 24.07.2019. However, thereafter there was no response. Similarly the top management of the Company had discussed with Mr. Divi of M/s. ITC Foods. However, on 17.07.2019 Mr. Divi replied that there is no requirement of contract manufacturing unit to them at present. Once again on 24.07.2019 mail was forwarded to Mr. Divi of M/s. ITC Foods but there was no response to the said mail. We enclose copies of e-mails forwarded to M/s. Mondelez India Ltd. and M/s. ITC Foods, The management of the Company had also talked and discussed with Mr. Ajay Chauhan of Parle Biscuits to provide job work to the Company. However, there was no positive response even from Parle Biscuits. The reason for closing down the manufacturing activities is there is no job work which can be done in the said factory. As stated in the closure application the company for last 32 years was doing only the job work for Britannia Industries Ltd and the efforts mentioned hereinabove will support the contention of the Company that there is no other way out but to close its manufacturing operations.

FOR HARINAGAR SUGAR MILLS LTD (BISCUIT DIVISION) (AUTHORISED SIGNATORY) Thus petitioners’ did not take a stand that the reasons and efforts were already furnished/disclosed in the closure applications.

27. Ms. Chavan has suggested that the petitioners’ letter dated 10 October 2019 would therefore constitute fresh applications as per liberty granted in letters dated 25 September 2019, thereby annulling earlier applications dated 28 August 2019. We may not completely agree to the suggestion of Ms. Chavan, as letters dated 10 October 2019 are not in the prescribed form under the Maharashtra Rules. However, it does appear that far from taking a plea that they had already furnished reasons for closure in the applications, petitioners’ did adduce reasons and disclosed efforts made to prevent closure of operations in the letters dated 10 October

2019. By this conduct, petitioners’ acquiesced in the position that their earlier applications dated 28 August 2019 were deficient.

28. No doubt, right to close an establishment is a fundamental right under Article 19 of the Constitution of India. A reasonable restriction is put on that right in the form of Section 25-O of the ID Act. Since fundamental right is sought to be restricted, the legislature has made special provisions in the form of Section 25-O(3) by creating a deeming fiction in the event of appropriate Government failing to decide the application for closure within 60 days. The full bench of this court in Britannia Industries (supra) has considered the objective behind creation of deeming fiction under Section 25- O(5). The objective is to prevent the appropriate Government from keeping closure applications pending indefinitely. Another objective is limited life of one year for operation of order of closure under Section 25-O(5).

29. In the present case, appropriate Government did not keep petitioners’ applications for closure pending indefinitely. Within two days of receipt of applications, the Desk Officer put up a file noting on 30 August 2019 apprising the Hon’ble Minister on requirement of taking decision. The Desk Officer further made an endorsement in handwriting that the petitioners had failed to disclose complete and cogent reasons for seeking permission of closure. Since this endorsement is in handwriting, Mr. Naidu did seek to suggest it as a ‘subsequent interpolation’, but we would not be able to accept the same as taking of decision on a file involves deliberations at different hierarchical levels and mere appearance of an endorsement in handwriting would not be a sufficient reason to hold that there is subsequent interpolation. Also, the Hon’ble Minister has approved that handwritten endorsement. The suggestion therefore deserves to be rejected.

30. The Hon’ble Minister further directed that the petitioners’ should submit applications with complete and cogent reasons. Petitioners’ applications were thus found defective or deficient. It is not that petitioners’ disputed this position, rather they acquiesced in the same and sought to adduce reasons by letters dated 10 October 2019. Since petitioners themselves accepted the position that the applications dated 28 August 2019 were not complete in all respect, the deeming fiction would not kick in. On deficient applications for closure, the State Government was not expected to pass order thereon by following procedure contemplated under Section 25-O(2). The appropriate Government could have simply rejected the applications holding the same to be incomplete/deficient. Petitioners’ would then had to adopt remedy of review or reference under Section 25-O(5). Thus without there being any decision on merits, the matter would have proceeded further. The Government therefore granted an opportunity to the petitioners’ to adduce reasons for closure as well as to disclose efforts taken by it to prevent closure. In these circumstances, it is difficult to hold that the deeming fiction created under Section 25-O(3) would trigger. Failure to communicate an order refusing to grant permission for closure on an incomplete/deficient application would not entail deemed permission under Section 25-O(3). The fact that authority was not convinced with the application of the petitioner and had communicated that cogent reasons are not spelt out in the application would be sufficient to conclude that the authority did not grant the application for closure. What was contemplated by letter dated 25 September 2019 was “re-submission” of the application. Petitioners however chose to add reasons to the pending applications on 10 October 2019. Petitioners failed to submit fresh applications by providing statement of reasons as directed by State Government vide letters dated 25 September 2019. This is the reason why the State Government was once again required to convey to petitioners that they were required to resubmit the applications by subsequent communications dated 4 November

2019. It is only after receipt of letters dated 4 November 2019 petitioners took a stand of deemed permission under section 25-O(3) of the ID Act in their letters dated 22 November 2019.

31. We are therefore unable to accept the contention raised on behalf of the petitioners that the closure applications filed by them on 28 August 2019 were complete in all respects so as to trigger deemed permission under provisions of Section 25- O(3) on expiration of period of 60 days. Petitioners themselves accepted the position that the closure applications were incomplete by seeking to adduce reasons for closure by letters dated 10 October 2019. It therefore cannot be held that the establishments of the petitioners are deemed to have been closed on expiration of period of 60 days from the date of submission of closure applications dated 28 August 2019.

32. The objection on behalf of Respondent-Unions about maintainability of Petitions on account of pendency of same dispute with Industrial Tribunal deserves summary rejection. It is stand of State Government that the Petitioners’ applications for closure are not granted. We therefore fail to comprehend as to what is the occasion for Respondent-Unions to approach the Industrial Tribunal. Also scheme of Section 25-O envisages approach to Industrial Tribunal only through a reference made by appropriate Government under Section 25- O(5). The Respondent-Unions have also urged before us that Petitioners have several other divisions/companies where manufacturing activities are still under progress. We are afraid, we cannot go into these issues at this stage as the same would touch upon merits of entitlement of Petitioners to close their operations.

33. What remains now is to deal with various judgments cited by Mr. Naidu:

(i) In Hitkari Potteries (supra) the application for closure was made on 15 January 1998 and a letter was sent on behalf of the Government on 2 April 1998 to the effect that application was defective in certain aspects and it was rejected. Thus, communication that the application was defective as well as rejection thereof was made after expiry of period of 60 days. On facts therefore the judgment is clearly distinguishable. Even otherwise, the Apex Court has not discussed or interpreted provisions of Section 25-O(3) of the ID Act and the order of the Apex Court cannot be considered as a binding precedent for present case where communication about application being deficient was made within 60 days.

(ii) Ashok Leyland Ltd (supra) is relied upon in support of the contention that whenever a legal fiction is created by a statute the same is required to be given full effect. There can be no dispute about this proposition. In the present case however, petitioners’ application for closure was incomplete and so also the same was communicated within 60 days therefore deemed fiction under Section 25-O(3) of the ID Act would not be triggered on expiration of period of 60 days. In fact, the respondent-union has relied upon paragraph 72 and 73 of the judgment in support of their contention that the object of the Act must be taken into consideration. ID Act, being beneficial provision for workmen, keeping that object of the Act in mind, it is difficult to hold that there is deemed closure in the present case.

(iii) Excel Wear (supra) and Orissa Textiles & Steel Ltd

(supra) are relied upon essentially to demonstrate as to how the twin deficiencies of absence of obligation to record reasons and non-prescription of definite time limit for deciding application for closure, came to be cured by amendment to ID Act by insertion of amended section of 25-O. The judgments are relied upon essentially to highlight the importance and objective behind insertion of provision laying down definitive time limit for deciding closure applications. Though the objective cannot be disputed, it cannot at the same time be contended that even a incomplete/deficient application would entail deemed closure on expiration of period of 60 days, especially when the appropriate Government conveys deficiencies within 60 days. Both the judgments therefore do not throw any light about the controversy involved in the present petitions.

(iv) In Vazir Glass Ltd. (supra) is relied upon in support of contention that the period of 60 days is consciously prescribed under section 25-O(3) so that an employer does not suffer any hardship on account of failure on the part of the State Government to dispose of such application for permission for closure expeditiously. It is pertinent to note that the word used by the Apex Court in paragraph 29 of the judgment is “dispose of”. In the present case the petitioners’ application for closure was found to be incomplete/deficient which position is accepted by the petitioners themselves. The judgment therefore would be of little assistance to the petitioners.

(v) The full bench judgment of this court in Britannia

Industries Ltd (supra) is relied upon in support of the contention that restriction of time is imposed with a view to protect interest of affected parties. Again, there can be no dispute on this proposition. The State Government cannot keep the application for closure pending indefinitely and must act on the same within a period of 60 days. In the present case after the application was filed on 28 August 2019, cognizance thereof was immediately taken by placing file noting by the desk officer within two days on 30 August 2019. The Hon’ble Minister took the decision to direct the petitioners to submit fresh application with complete and cogent reasons on or about 30 September 2019 and the said decision was communicated to the petitioners vide letter dated 25 September 2019. The objective behind imposing time limit under Section 25-O(3) of the ID Act, in our view, is fully met with.

(vi) In Ramchandra Keshav Adke (supra) the celebrated decision in Taylor vs Taylor13 is referred in support of 13 (1876) 1 Ch D 426 proposition that where power is given to do a certain thing in a certain way, the thing must be done in that way or not at all and that other methods of performance are necessarily forbidden. Again, there can be no dispute about this proposition. The facts of the present case indicate that the State Government promptly acted on petitioners’ application for closure and communicated its decision to the effect that the applications were incomplete calling upon them upon to resubmit the same with complete and cogent reasons. The State Government could have simply rejected the applications on the ground that they were unsupported by reasons, however with a view to give opportunity to them to furnish complete and cogent reasons, it was granted liberty to file fresh applications. The petitioners’ did act upon that direction, but instead of filing fresh applications, it chose to adduce reasons for closure as well as disclosed efforts to prevent closure by way of its letters dated 10 October 2019. It therefore cannot be stated the State Government did something in a way that is not prescribed under the Act.

(vii) Raghunath Rai Bareja (supra) and Rohitash Kumar

(supra) relate to the principles of interpretation of statute. The language of Section 25-O is simple and clear and there is no need to interpret the same. It is incumbent upon the petitioners’ to disclose reasons for closure under the heading “Statement of Reasons” as required under Form XXIV-C prescribed by Rule 82-B of the Industrial Disputes (Maharashtra) Rules, 1957. The State Government was of the opinion that petitioners did not furnish complete and cogent reasons for closure in their applications. After receipt of communications dated 25 September 2019, petitioners did not maintain that the reasons were already supplied, on the contrary they chose to add reasons by way of letters dated 10 October 2019. In such a scenario, the irresistible conclusion that emerges is that the petitioners’ applications for closure were incomplete and the deeming fiction under Section 25-O(3) would come into effect on expiration of period of 60 days.

(viii) Satwant Singh Sawhney (supra) is relied upon by petitioners in support of their contention that every executive action must be supported by some legislative authority. We fail to comprehend as to how reliance on this judgment would be of any aid to the case of the petitioners. We are unable to hold that action of the State Government in addressing communication dated 25 September 2019 to them is unsupported by legislative authority. If the State Government is of the opinion that the applications were incomplete, it is entitled to call upon petitioners to file proper and complete applications for its decision on merits.

34. It must also be borne in mind that the permission for closure operates for a period of one year only. Petitioners have every right to make a fresh application for closure which can be decided on merits. Even if the petitioners’ application for closure were to be rejected on merits, they could have made fresh applications after expiration of period of one year. In the present case petitioners could have filed fresh applications for closure, as directed by the State Government, which could have been decided on merits. Even now petitioners would be entitled to file fresh applications for closure of their respective establishments and the State Government is bound to decide the same on merits as per scheme of Section 25-O of the ID Act.

35. Resultantly, we are of the considered view that petitioners’ establishment cannot be deemed to have been closed under the provision of Section 25-O(3) of the ID Act. The Writ Petitions are devoid of merits. They are dismissed without any orders as to costs.

36. In view of the dismissal of the petitions, interim applications do not survive and the same are also disposed of. (SANDEEP V. MARNE, J.) (ACTING CHIEF JUSTICE)

37. At this stage, the learned counsel for the petitioners submits that the initial order passed on 28 November 2019 recording statement of the learned Advocate for respondent no.3 that employees shall maintain peace and harmony, so also the statement made by the petitioners and accepted, be continued for a period of eight weeks.

38. The same is opposed by the learned counsel for the respondents.

39. Considering that the statements made by respondent NO. 3 and the petitioners exist since 28 November 2019, the same shall continue for a period of two weeks from today.

40. Needless to state that on lapse of two weeks, said statements would come to an end. (SANDEEP V. MARNE, J.) (ACTING CHIEF JUSTICE)