Yogesh Chandulal Mehta and Suresh Chabndulal Mehta v. The State of Maharashtra and Others

6. It is the case of the Petitioners that the said public notice was issued without supplying a copy of the written application filed by the Respondent No.4 for acquiring the writ property. On 3rd April, 2010, the Petitioners filed their written objections with the Deputy Collector (Encroachment), the Competent Authority and the Additional Collector (Encroachment), Mumbai Suburban District in respect of the proposed acquisition of the subject property and pointed out that they being the owners were interested in development of the subject property themselves under the Slum Rehabilitation Scheme and therefore writ property should not be acquired under Section 14 of the Slums Act.

7. Some time in the year 2010, the Petitioners filed a Writ Petition No. 970 of 2010 in this Court inter-alia challenging the public notice dated 30 March, 2010 proposing to acquire the Petitioners’ property by the Slum Authority. It is the case of the Petitioners that the Petitioners filed an affidavit pointing out that they were always ready and willing to implement the Slum Rehabilitation Scheme on the subject property and they would also rehabilitate all the eligible slum dwellers under Regulation 33(10) of the Amended Development Control and Promotion Regulation 2034. On 10 February, 2011, this Court disposed of the said Writ Petition No. 970 of 2010 and directed that the Competent Authority shall consider the proposal in light of those objections raised by the Petitioners including on the basis of the law as laid down by the Division Bench in the aforesaid case. It was made clear that in the event, State Government decided to acquire the land, intimation of that decision shall be furnished to the Petitioner to take recourse to such remedies as are available in law.

8. On 17 February, 2011, the Petitioners raised the detailed objections to the Slum Authority in respect of the proposed acquisition of the writ property. On 15 June, 2011, the Petitioners through their Advocate called upon the Authorities not to take any steps in respect of acquisition of the subject property and also pointed out about the order dated 10 February, 2011 passed by this Court. On 4 January, 2012, the Respondent No.2, the Chief Executive Officer of SRA issued public notice under Section 37(1) (B) of the MRTP Act, calling for suggestions and objections for change of reservation in respect of the subject property as the same was reserved for the purpose of recreation ground as per D.P. remarks of Municipal Corporation.

9. On 31 January, 2012, the Petitioners vide their letter conveyed that they had no objection for change of reservation provided the Petitioners are allowed to implement the Slum Rehabilitation Scheme on the writ property. On 3rd February, 2012, the Petitioners submitted objections in pursuance to the notice issued by the Chief Executive Officer of SRA under Section 37(1)(B) of the MRTP Act and requested to allow the Petitioners being the owners to implement the Slum Rehabilitation Scheme under the Regulation 33(10) of the DCPR 2034.

10. On 3 March, 2012, the Petitioners requested the Chief Executive Officer of SRA to allow them to implement the Slum Rehabilitation Scheme on the writ property and also requested to record the proposal submitted by the Respondent No.4 in respect of the writ property on the basis of forged, fraudulent and bogus documents. The Petitioners also raised the objection against the Public notice dated 4 January 2012 and requested that the Petitioners be allowed to implement the Slum Rehabilitation Scheme on the writ property and further made it clear that if they are allowed to implement the Scheme on the writ property, they shall have no objection for the change of reservation in respect of the writ property. On 21st April, 2012, the Petitioners were called upon for hearing by the Chief Executive Officer, SRA on 8 May, 2012 in respect of the change of reservation issue.

11. On 8 May, 2012, the Petitioners appeared and pointed out that they had no objection for change of reservation provided that they are allowed to implement the Slum Rehabilitation Scheme on their property being the owners. On 21 November, 2013, the Chief Executive Officer of SRA issued alleged notice under Section 14 of the Slums Act in Free Press Journal and Navakal. On 2 December, 2014, the CEO of SRA submitted his report to the Chief Secretary, Housing Department for acquiring the writ property without following the directions of this Court in Writ Petition No. 970 of 2010 and even without issuing any show cause notice to the Petitioner, being the owners of the writ property.

12. It is the case of the Petitioners that on 31st August, 2015, without following the due process of law and without issuing any show cause notice to the Petitioners as contemplated under Section 3(c)(1) of the Slums Act, the CEO of the SRA issued notification under Section 3(c) of the Slums Act.

13. The Petitioners filed S.C.Suit bearing No.127 of 2016 in the Bombay City Civil Court, Borivali Division at Dindoshi, praying for restraining the Respondent No.4 from taking any steps for implementation of the Slum Rehabilitation Scheme on the subject property without the express consent of the Petitioners and prayed for an order and direction against the CEO of the SRA that he should not take steps towards implementation of the Slum Rehabilitation Scheme on the writ property at the instance of the Respondent No.4 and others.

14. On 10 November, 2016, the City Civil Court was pleased to pass ad-interim orders in the Notice of Motion filed by the Petitioners granting injunction restraining the Defendant No.1, their officers, servants from accepting the proposal of Defendant Nos.[2] and 3 therein or any person claiming through them from implementing Slum Rehabilitation Scheme on the suit plot of land i.e. Survey NO. 19, having corresponding C.T.S. No. 31, admeasuring about 4464 sq.yd. Equivalent to 3705.[2] sq.mtrs. of Village Dindoshi, Taluka Borivali, Goregaon (E), Mumbai without express consent of the Petitioners.

15. On 17 November, 2016, the CEO of SRA issued the impugned notification under Section 14 (1) of the Slums Act inter-alia for acquisition of the writ property. On 23 November, 2016, the said impugned notification was forwarded by the Respondent No.1 to the Respondent No.2 CEO. On 28 November, 2016 the Petitioners through the legal notice addressed to the Slum Authority pointed out the order of City Civil Court dated 10 November, 2016 requesting them to ensure compliance thereof and requested not to accept and process with the proposal of the M/s. Atlantic Construction Company on behalf of the Respondent No.4 in respect of the writ property.

16. On 20 March, 2014, the Petitioners through their advocate raised objection against the Notification dated 17 November, 2016 and also objected to the proceedings under Section 17 of the Slums Act by pointing out the orders passed by this Court as well as City Civil Court. On 11 April 2017, the Petitioners raised their objection against acquisition of the writ property without following due process of law as contemplated under Section 14(1) of the Slums Act and requested the CEO to recall the notification dated 17 November, 2016. It is the case of the Petitioners that the Petitioners obtained a copy of the said notification dated 17 November, 2016 from the website of Government of Maharashtra. In the month of April, 2017, the Petitioners filed this Writ Petition for various reliefs.

17. On 5 June, 2017, the Petitioners requested then Chief Executive Officer of SRA to adjourn the proceedings initiated under Section 17 of the Slums Act, as the present Petition was supposed to be heard on 23 June, 2017, the CEO, however kept the matter on 13 June, 2017. At the request of the learned Advocate for the Petitioners, the CEO placed the matter on 27 June, 2017. It is the case of the Petitioners that on 15 June, 2017, the Petitioners along with their family members were out of station from 16 June, 2017 to 19 June,

2017.

18. According to the Petitioners, a notice dated 15 June, 2017 was pasted at the residence of the Petitioners stating that the date of hearing of the Petitioners’ case has been preponed from 27 June, 2017 to 19 June, 2017. The Petitioners thus could not remain present for hearing on 19 June, 2017 as the Respondent No.2 has already kept the matter on 27 June, 2017.

19. The CEO proceeded with the hearing in absence of the Petitioners at 3.00 p.m. on 19 June, 2017. According to the Petitioners, Respondent No.4 through its advocate made an application with malafide intention for hearing of the matter on the same date and the Respondent No.2 allegedly heard the matter on the same day i.e. 19 June, 2017 when the Petitioners were out of station. It is the case of the Petitioners that on 20 June, 2017 as per Roznama dated 19 June, 2017, the proceedings were adjourned to 27 June, 2017, however, were preponed to 19 June, 2017 with malafide intention and to bypass the order dated 23 June, 2017 passed by this Court.

20. According to the Petitioners the said Roznama was anti-dated. As per the Roznama, the matter was heard on 19 June, 2017 and closed for orders. On 20 June, 2017, the CEO made an Award under Section 17 of the Slums Act. On 11 July, 2017, the Respondent No.2 issued a notice upon the Petitioners directing them to remain present before him within eight days and to accept the Demand Draft as per the impugned Award dated 20 June, 2017.

21. Mr. Damle, learned Senior Counsel for the Petitioners invited our attention to some of the documents annexed to the Petition and also to the affidavits in reply and rejoinder. He also invited our attention to the order dated 23 June, 2017 passed by the Division Bench of this Court in this Petition. He submitted that this Court had recorded the categorical assertion on the part of the Petitioners owners that inspite of directions passed by the Division Bench in 2011 when so-called action was alleged to have been initiated in the year 2014, no notice of any nature was given to the Petitioners which was mandatory under Section 14(1) of the Slums Act.

22. This Court also recorded the statement made by the Petitioners that the CEO of the SRA was to be retiring on 30 June, 2017 and it is reliably learnt by the Petitioners that the CEO had assured the Respondent to pass favourable orders for redevelopment and accordingly hearing was initially preponed to 19 June, 2017 and now listed on 27 June,

2017. This Court also recorded the statement of the Petitioners that since the CEO was going to be retiring on 30 June, 2017, even if the Petitioners appear before the Authority, they would not be able to place on record the entire matter, apart from the basic challenge raised in the Petition that no show cause notice was issued to the owners. This Court accordingly directed the CEO of the SRA not to proceed with the inquiry pursuant to the Notification dated 17 November, 2016 which was listed on 27 June, 2017 till the next date of hearing.

23. It is submitted by the learned Senior Counsel that the said order dated 23 June, 2017 was passed by this Court after hearing the learned counsel for the parties including the Respondent State, the CEO of the SRA and the Respondent No.4 Society. He submitted that inspite of injunction order passed by this Court, the CEO preponed the matter and kept for hearing on 19 June, 2018 and passed the order on 20 June, 2018 ex-parte. He submitted that the CEO has passed antidated Award to favour the Respondent No.4 Society and the Developer.

24. It is submitted by the learned Senior Counsel that on 3 February, 2010, the Petitioner No.1 had addressed a letter to the then CEO of SRA opposing the execution of any agreement between the Respondent No.4-Society with any Developer for redevelopmen of the writ property under the Slum Rehabilitation Scheme. The Petitioners also pointed out that the said property stands in their names. The Petitioners had requested the CEO not to implement the Slum Rehabilitation Scheme on the writ land without their consent. The Petitioners pointed out the corresponding address of the Petitioners in the said letter for information of the CEO. The Petitioners informed the CEO that they are going to implement the said Slum Rehabilitation Scheme in near future. It is the case of the Petitioners that there was no response to the said letter dated 3 February, 2010 from the Respondent.

25. Learned Senior Counsel invited our attention to the letter dated 12 March, 2010 addressed by the Petitioner No.1 to the Senior Police Inspector, Goregaon (E) Police Station with a copy of the letter forwarded to the CEO of SRA, stating that the Respondent No.6 Developer had displayed a board stating that they were going to redevelop the slum area with the Respondent No.4 Society. The Petitioners contended that nobody can do the work of redevelopment without permissions of the original owners. Petitioners stated that in the near future, the Petitioners would go to implement the Slum Redevelopment Scheme and there is provision for it in Slum Redevelopment Act. The Petitioners contended that the parties who have no right to do the work of redevelopment has displayed a board. The photographs showing the board was forwarded to the local police station and also to the CEO of SRA. The Petitioners once again raised objection to any redevelopment work carried out by any other person on the writ land.

26. Learned Senior Counsel for the Petitioners invited our attention to the affidavit filed by the Petitioners in earlier Writ Petition No. 970 of 2010 clearly stating that the Petitioners were the owners of the writ property and were always ready and willing to redevelop the writ property under the amended D.C. Regulations 33(10) of the DCPR 2034. The Petitioners also stated that they were trying to get consent of all the dwellers residing on the said property. The Petitioner No.1 undertook before this Court that if the said Scheme is sanctioned in favour of the Petitioners, they would rehabilitate all the eligible slum dwellers residing on the suit property under DC Regulation 33(10) of the DCPR 2034.

27. The Architect of the Petitioners had already prepared the plans for redevelopment of the said property. The Petitioners accordingly contended that if it was necessary to acquire the properties of the Petitioners under Section 14(1) of the Slums Act, the Petitioners being the owners were ready to redevelop the writ property. A copy of this affidavit was served on the Respondents in the said Writ Petition. It is submitted by the learned Senior Counsel that under D.C. Regulation 33(10) of the DCPR, the first preference for redevelopment of the property even if declared as slum has to be given to the owners.

28. Learned Senior Counsel invited out attention to the order dated 10 February, 2011 passed by the Division Bench of this Court in Writ Petition No. 970 of 2010 impugning the notification dated 15 October, 1977 issued under Section 4(1) of the Slums Act. This Court recorded the contention of the Petitioners that in view of the Judgment of the Division Bench of this Court in case of Anil Gulabdas Shah Vs. State of Maharashtra (2011) 1 Mh.L.J. 797, the Petitioners as the land owners should be furnished an opportunity to submit a scheme for redevelopment which would obviate the necessity for the acquisition of the land. This Court accordingly directed the Competent Authority to consider the proposal in light of those objections including on the basis of the law as laid down by the Division Bench of this Court in case of Anil Gulabdas Shah (supra).

29. This Court made it clear that upon a report being submitted to the State Government by the Authority and in the event that the State Government decides to acquire the land, intimation of that decision shall be furnished to the Petitioners so as to enable the Petitioners to take recourse to such remedies as are available in law. This Court observed that at that stage, the Respondent No.2 was only seized with the proposal submitted by the Respondent No.4 Society for the acquisition of the lands and as mandated by the proviso to sub section (1) of Section 14 on a notice to show cause being issued to the landowners, it is to open to the landowners to show cause in writing as to why the land should not be acquired. The objections of the Petitioners would be considered at that stage and, the Competent Authority would need to have due regard to the judgment of the Division Bench in Anil Gulabdas Shah (supra).

30. Learned Senior Counsel for the Petitioner submitted that though the said order was passed by this Court on 10 February, 2011 in the earlier writ petition filed by the Petitioners, no such notice was served upon the Petitioners as directed by the Division Bench of this Court. It is submitted that on 4 January, 2012, the SRA issued notice under Section 37(1)(B) of the MRTP Act in respect of the modification of the designation of “Recreation Ground” to “Residential Zone” and informing objections from the Petitioners. It is submitted that the Petitioners vide Advocate letter dated 31 January, 2012 made it clear that that the Petitioners did not have any objection to the said change however subject to an opportunity being given to the Petitioners for development of the writ property under slum scheme and not to Respondent No.6 who had fraudulently procured signatures of slum dwellers stating that they were the owners of the land.

31. The Petitioners also forwarded various documents relating to title of the Petitioners in respect of the writ lands. Learned Counsel placed reliance on the letter dated 3 February, 2012 addressed to the SRA raising objections and the public notice dated 4 January, 2012 issued under Section 37(1)(B) of the MRTP Act raising similar objections which were raised earlier. He relied upon the letter dated 3 March, 2012 from the Petitioners to the CEO once again giving their no objection for the change however subject to an opportunity of implementing Slum Rehabilitation Scheme to be given to the Petitioner and not to Respondent No.6. Learned Senior Counsel for the Petitioner submitted that the Petitioners were called upon to the office of the Chief Executive Officer in respect of change in reservation. The Petitioner appeared on 8 May, 2012 for such purpose.

32. Learned Senior Counsel for the Petitioners invited our attention to the public notice issued by the SRA on 21 November, 2013 under Section 14(1) of the Slum Act to the Petitioners and Respondent No.4 Society in respect of land bearing C.T.S.No. 31 admeasuring 3911.[6] sq.mtrs. He submitted that on 2 December, 2014, the CEO of the SRA submitted a report to the Chief Secretary, Housing Department. He submitted that in the said report, the CEO deliberately did not refer to the injunction order passed by this Court and also by the City Civil Court in favour of the Petitioners in respect of the writ lands. He submitted that in para 4 of the said report, admittedly the names of the Petitioners were referred to as the owners of the writ property. No notice or hearing was granted by the CEO or by the Chief Secretary. He invited out attention to the prayers in the Notice of Motion filed by the Petitioners before the City Civil Court in S.C. Suit No. 127 of 2016 for injunction and the ad-interim order passed by the City Civil Court in favour of the Petitioners and against the Defendants therein.

33. Learned Senior Counsel invited our attention to letter dated 28 November, 2016 from the Advocates of the Petitioners to the Principal Secretary, Housing Department, CEO of the SRA, Additional Collector, Deputy Collector and the Legal Adviser of SRA informing about the orders passed by this Court and the City Civil Court granting injunction. By the said notice also, the Petitioners had requested all of them not to accept the proposal submitted by Respondent Nos. 4 and 6 and any other person in respect of the writ property without the express consent of the Petitioners.

34. Learned Senior Counsel invited our attention to the notification dated 31 August, 2015 issued by the SRA under Section 3(c)(1) of the Slums Act declaring the writ property in addition to other lands “slum area”. He invited our attention to the notice dated 2nd December, 2014 from the SRA to the Chief Secretary informing that the Petitioners were the owners of the writ property and had raised objection in respect of any redevelopment by the 3rd party. He relied upon Section 3(B)(5) of the Slums Act and submitted the area has to be first declared as Slum Rehabilitation Area for permitting any scheme on the said land. He relied upon Section 2(h-b) of the Slums Act defining the Slum Rehabilitation Area.

35. Learned Senior Counsel submitted that notice was required to be issued under Section 3(c) of the Slums Act to the Petitioners. He relied upon Section 12(A)(B) of the Slums Act duly amended. He relied upon Section 17 of the Slums Act and submitted that notice under Section 17 for determination of compensation was issued directly on 20 March, 2017. He submitted that on 11 April, 2017, the Petitioners had already issued a reply to the said notice to the CEO of the SRA again expressing their readiness and willingness to the redevelopment of the said property and raising various objections to the said notice under Section 17 of the Slums Act.

36. It is submitted that the Petitioners came to know about the notice under Section 14(1) only when the notice under Section 17 for determination of compensation was issued. Learned Senior Counsel invited our attention to the notice dated 15 June, 2017 and submitted that by the said notice purported to have been issued, the CEO preponed the date of hearing from 27 June, 2017 to 19 June, 2017. The CEO of the SRA preponed the hearing slated for 27 June, 2017 to 19 June, 2017. The Petitioners were not given any notice for preponement of the date of hearing. He invited our attention to the Roznama of the hearing alleged to have been held on 19 June, 2017 recording that the Petitioners had remained absent and accordingly meeting was adjourned to 27 June, 2017.

37. It is submitted that in the said Roznama, though the meeting was adjourned to 27 June, 2017, it was stated that the said meeting was preponed and since the Petitioners were present on 11 April, 2017, 25 April, 2017, 26 April, 2017, 5 June, 2017 and 13 June, 2017, fresh notice was not issued to the Petitioners. It was stated in the said Roznama that the Petitioner was trying to postpone the hearing by approaching the High Court in Writ Petition No. 1121 of 2017, however, the High Court had not issued any stay order. The CEO closed the hearing on 19 June, 2017 and passed an Award on 20 June, 2017. He submitted that this action on the part of the CEO in pre-poning the date of the hearing is in gross violation of the orders passed by this Court. He submitted that the CEO has favoured the Respondent No.4 and the Developer by anti-dating the order and the date of hearing.

38. Learned Senior Counsel for the Petitioner invited our attention to some of the averments made in the affidavit dated 20 June, 2017 filed by the Petitioners pointing out that the Petitioners along with the family were out station from 16 June, 2017 to 19 June, 2017. He submitted that though this Court had directed the CEO of the SRA to issue notice under Section 14(1) of the Slums Act to the Petitioners, the order passed by this Court has not been complied with by the CEO by issuing notice. He submitted that the order passed by the CEO disclosed total non application of mind. He submits that in the affidavit filed by the State Government, it is not mentioned that the personal notice to the Petitioner was issued. It is submitted that the impugned award thus passed by the CEO deserves to be quashed and set aside.

39. Mr. Cherag Balsara, learned counsel for Respondent No.4 Society, on the other hand, submitted synopsis, written arguments and tendered a compilation of judgments for consideration of this Court and made the following submissions Writ Petition No.2338 of 2017

40. It is submitted that on 15 October, 1977, writ property along with the adjoining areas have been declared as Slum by issuing of Notification under Section 4 of the Slum Act. On 26 August, 2015, the writ property admeasuring 12511 sq. mtrs. has been declared as Slum under Section 3(c) (1) of the Slum Act. Respondent No.4 is a Slum Society comprising 719 Slum Dwellers residing on the CTS No. 28,29 (1 to 3), 30 and 32 at Village Dindoshi which includes the writ property. On 19 September, 1985, the Petitioners had purchased the suit property vide registered agreement of sale. Accordingly, name of the Petitionerd was entered into the record of writ property.

41. It is submitted that in the year 2006, the Respondent No.4 Society came to be formed by the Slum Dwellers who were residing on the writ property in unhygienic condition and without basic amenities. The land owner/s did not show any intention of implementing the said scheme over writ property. It is submitted that on 6 March, 2007, Respondent No.4 Society made an application under Section 14 of the Slum Act with the Controller of Slum. The said application was forwarded to the Slum Rehabilitation Authority on 4 April, 2013 for further inquiry.

42. It is submitted by the learned counsel for Respondent No.4 Society that Respondent No. 4 Society appointed Respondent No.6 Atlantic Construction Company as their Developer. The Developer filed a S.C. Suit NO. 1124/2007 in the City Civil Court, Dindoshi for seeking injunction against the Respondent No.4 Society from transferring and assigning the Development rights. He relied upon the consent terms dated 21 January, 2009 in the said suit between the developer and the society and also the decree dated 6 April, 2009 obtained in the said S.C. Suit No. 1124 of

2007.

43. It is submitted that the land owners thereafter on 3 February, 2014 made representation to the Respondent No.2 CEO- Chief Executive Officer, SRA intimating their intention to implement the said scheme on the subject property. He invited our attention to the letter dated 12 March, 2010 addressed by the Petitioners to the Senior Inspector of Police, Goregaon Police Station, stating that the Respondent No.4 Society has put up a board of Respondent No.6 for implementing the Slum Scheme. However, the Petitioner have no intention to implement the said slum scheme.

44. It is submitted that Respondent No.3 SRA pasted a public notice on the subject property for the proposed acquisition of the subject property on 20 March, 2010. The Petitioners filed his Written Objection on 3 April, 2010 to the process of survey for acquisition to the Respondent No.3 and the Senior Inspector, Goregaon Police Station. It is submitted that Respondent No.2 issued public notice in daily newspapers – Free Press Journal and Navakal to show cause as to why the subject property shall not be acquired for the public purpose within 15 days from the date of issuance of the public notice. Respondent No.2 issued another notice under Section 14(1) of the Slum Act on 24 December, 2013 thereby fixing the schedule of hearing in the office of the Respondent No.2 in respect of the writ property.

45. Learned counsel for Respondent No. 4 Society also relied upon the show cause notice under Section 14(1) of the Slum Act dated 22 January, 2014 and submitted that the said notice was pasted on the subject property. He submitted that on 3 February, 2014, 10 March, 2014 and 11 April, 2014 Petitioners failed to appear for hearing held before Respondent No.2 CEO in respect of acquisition of the subject property under section 14(1) of the Slum Act. The Petitioners had chosen to remain absent despite notice. The Petitioners never put forth the scheme for implementing slum scheme on the subject property.

46. The learned counsel placed reliance on the order passed by this Court in Writ Petition No. 1152 of 2002 and submitted that Slum Rehabilitation scheme can be implemented even on the open spaces which are reserved for gardens, parks, playgrounds, recreational spaces, maidans, no development zones, pavements, roads and carriageways with the permission of the Court. The Petitioner, however, neither submitted any proposal with the Slum Rehabilitation Authority nor filed any petition to seek permission for implementing slum scheme on the subject property.

47. It is submitted by the learned counsel that only after receiving a report recommendation and representation from the Respondent No.2, CEO SRA, the State Government published a Notification on 17 November, 2016 and acquired the subject property by issuing a Notification under Section 14(1) of the Slums Act. The property, accordingly stood vested absolutely on the State Government free from all encumbrances.

48. Learned counsel placed reliance on Notice dated 20 March, 2017 issued by Respondent No.2 CEO to the Petitioners and other interested persons for determining the compensation for acquisition. On 11 April, 2017, Petitioners appeared before Respondent No.2 and objected to the entire process of acquisition. The Petitioners also intimated their intention to implement the slum scheme. It is submitted that several hearings were held in the office of Respondent No.2 for fixing the compensation.

49. It is submitted that on 20 June, 2017, Respondent No.2 rightly passed an Award under the provisions of the Slum Act for determining the compensation. He relied upon the order dated 24th June, 2017 passed by this Court stating about holding inquiry by disbursement of the compensation pursuant to the letter dated 17 June, 2016. It is submitted that the inquiry was already pending at that relevant time for determining the compensation. The Petitioner could have not raised any objection to the validity of Section 14(1) of the Slum Act.

50. Learned counsel placed reliance on the Roznama of the proceedings and submitted that the officer who passed the order, was different. Only issue of compensation was pending. Mr. Nirmal Deshmukh had already retired. This Court while granting the impugned stay by ad-interim order vesting of property in Government, the compensation was ultimately decided by Mr. Vishwas Patil, CEO, SRA on 20 June, 2017. It is submitted by the learned counsel that public notice dated 20 March, 2010 was pasted at the subject property by the SRA for the proposed acquisition. The Petitioner submitted their written objection on 3 April, 2010 to the process of survey of the acquisition to Respondent No.3.

51. The Petitioners had challenged the said process by filing Writ Petition No. 970 of 2010 and for the first time pointed out that they were always ready and willing to implement the scheme. However, the Petitioners never submitted any proposal for implementation of the said scheme. The writ petition came to be disposed of on 10 February, 2011 by directing the landowner to show cause in writing as to why the land should not be acquired.

52. It is submitted that only thereafter the Petitioner submitted five representations to the SRA, however, miserably failed to put any bonafide efforts by submitting a proposal for implementation of the scheme. The Petitioners have never genuinely intended to implement the said scheme, though several opportunities were available to the Petitioners. Since notice had already been pasted on the subject property, the Petitioners cannot be allowed to urge that no notice was served upon the Petitioners. The pasting of notice at site is sufficient mode of service under Section 36 of the Slum Act. He submitted that in any event there is no statutory provision under the Slum Act, which provides that, by want of notice, the acquisition proceeding can be vitiated.

53. It is submitted that the other land owners who are also the interested parties were already present on the basis of the said public notice published before the CEO of SRA on various dates. If the Petitioners were not diligent in attending the hearing and to submit a scheme in spite of sufficient opportunity, entire acquisition proceedings cannot be vitiated on the ground of want of service. The Slum Rehabilitation Scheme is approved for benefit of larger masses.

54. It is submitted by the learned counsel that the principles of natural justice are not to be put in a straight jacket formula. The scope of hearing to satisfy the principles of natural justice would vary depending on the legislative provisions and object of the inquiry In support of the submissions, he placed reliance on case of Sara Harry D’Mello Vs The State of Maharashtra and Ors. [2013(4) Mh. L.J. 348] (Page 211 and 242 of Compilation of Judgment and notification). The learned counsel also placed reliance on the judgment of this Court in case of Deena Pramod Baldota Vs State of Maharashtra and Ors. passed in Wrti Petition (L) No.1962[6] of 2022 (page 24 to 55 of Compilation of Judgment and notification) and made an attempt to distinguish the judgment of this Court in case of Indian Cork Mills Pvt. Ltd. Vs State of Maharashtra and Ors. [(2018) 4 Bom CR 618]. He submitted that the decision of Indian Cork Mills Pvt. Ltd. (supra.) does not lay down any proposition that for want of notice to owner, whatsoever may be the fact situation, sequitur would be quashing of the acquisition proceedings.

55. The learned counsel for Respondent No.4 placed reliance on the judgment of this Court in case of A.H. Wadia Trust and others Vs. The State of Maharashtra and Ors. passed in Writ Petition No. 1347 of 2019 (page 146-168 of Compilation of Judgment and Notification ) in support of the submissions that, there is no straight jacket formula applicable while following the principles of natural justice. He also relied upon the the judgment of the Supreme Court in case of Dharampal Satyapal Ltd.Vs Deputy Commissioner of Central Excise, Gauhati & Ors. [(2015) 8 SCC 519] (page 263-287 of Compilation of Judgment and Notification). In support of the submission that there is no violation of principles of natural justice and in any event, the Petitioner was responsible for not appearing before the Chief Executive Officer of SRA for hearing.

56. It is submitted by the learned counsel that the SRD Scheme being implemented through out the city in the year 1997 upon issuance of Notification under the provisions of Section 47 of Slum Act. The Petitioners could have implemented the SRD Scheme. Municipal Corporation of Greater Bombay was the Planning Authority for implementing the SRD Scheme. The SRA had issued Notification dated 16 October, 1997 for conversion of Old Approved SRD Scheme to New SRA Scheme under the provisions of Rule 8.[6] of Amended Draft DCR 33(10).

57. It is submitted that since the Petitioners did not implement the Slum Scheme for more than 30 years, the slum dwellers lost confidence in the Petitioners on account of inability/ failure to implement the Slum Scheme. The representations made by the Petitioners at least seven times, were without submission of the Scheme for Redevelopment. Learned counsel for the Society relied upon the judgment of this Court in case of F.E. Dinshaw Charities and Ors. Vs. State of Maharashtra and Ors. passed in Writ Petition No. 1171 of 2019 (page 1 to 23 of the Compilation of Judgment and Notification) and also relied upon the judgment of this Court in case of Marathwada Society Chawl Committee & Ors. Vs. State of Maharashtra & Ors. passed in Writ Petition No. 1036 of 2017 decided on

58. It is submitted by the learned counsel for the Society that this Slum Scheme is already accepted on 24 June, 2020. Several NOCs in favour of Respondent No.4 Society have been processed. However, at the last quarter of 2020, the SRA stopped processing the Scheme of Respondent No.4 and Respondent No.6 upon the complaint made by the adjoining owner. It is submitted that in view of this situation, this Court may not interfere by exercising its discretionary power with the order of acquisition passed by the Slum Rehabilitation Authority and sanction of the scheme.

59. It is submitted by the learned counsel for the Developer that the provisions of Section 14 of the Slum Act are independent under which the lands are being acquired by the State subject to the hearing of the objection pursuant a show cause, and a decision has to be taken thereafter. He submitted that the Petition cannot be allowed to stall the redevelopment after the property is entirely acquired by the State Government under Section 14 of the Slum Act. At this stage, this Court cannot interfere with the sanctioned slum scheme and the acquisition of the writ property as the objection of enacting the Slum Act would be frustrated.

60. It is submitted by the learned counsel that the provisions of Section 14 of the Slum Act is an exception. He relied upon the judgment of the Supreme Court in case of Murlidhar Teckchand Gandhi & Ors. Vs. State of Maharashtra and Ors. passed in Civil Appeal No. 11077 of 2017. Submissions of Mr. Damle, learned Senior Counsel for the Petitioner in Writ Petition No. 2338 in rejoinder

61. Learned Senior Counsel for the Petitioners in Rejoinder, invited our attention to the order passed by this Court dated 10 February, 2011 passed by the Division Bench of this Court in Writ Petition No. 970 of 2010 in case of Yogesh Chandulal Mehta and Anr. annexed at Exhibit ‘M’ (Page 111-128 of the Writ Petition) and submitted that the said order clearly observed that the Tahasildar in the Affidavit in Reply filed in the said Writ Petition had clearly stated that the Petitioners would be given notice and the objections of the Petitioners with regard to the acquisition of the lands together with the report of the Deputy Collector would be forwarded to the State Government as required under Section 14 before notifying the land for acquisition.

62. It is submitted that no such averment was made in the said writ petition by the Tahasildar and no notice was served upon the Petitioners. He submitted that though by the said order dated 10 February, 2011, the Authority was directed to consider the objection, the Competent Authority did not give opportunity to the Petitioners and did not consider the proposal of scheme submitted by the Petitioners.

63. Learned counsel for the Petitioners firstly invited our attention to the averments made by Ajinkya Padwal, working as Deputy Collector-WS for SRA on behalf of Respondent No.2 notarized on 23 June, 2017 and more particularly paragraph Nos.13, 17 and 18. In paragraphs 13, 17 and 18, it is contended by the Respondent No.2 that the public notice under Section 14(1) of Slum Act was also published in the newspaper i.e. Free Press Journal on 21 November, 2013 and Navakal dated 21 November, 2023. He submitted that the said notice published in the newspaper was contrary to the order passed by the Division Bench of this Court on 10 February, 2011.

64. Learned Senior Counsel for the Petitioners vehemently urged that the Petitioners had placed reliance on several representations made by the Petitioners and admitted by the Respondents that the Petitioners had shown readiness and willingness to redevelop the writ property. The Respondent–Authority, however, has totally overlooked the initial aspects and the documents produced by the Petitioners.

65. Insofar as the submission regarding malice and fraud, canvassed by Mr. Singh, learned counsel in Writ Petition No. 2283 of 2017 is concerned, Mr. Damle, learned Senior Counsel in this writ petition reiterated the said arguments. He submitted that under Section 14 of the Slum Act, the Authority has to call upon the owner before publishing of notice to show cause as to why the land in question shall not be acquired with reasons. The State Government has to take its decision after application of mind which in this case has not been applied. Submissions of the Learned Additional Government Pleader for State

66. Mr. Patki, learned Additional Government Pleader for the State in both the matters tenders a Compilation of documents and also Synopsis for consideration of this Court. He supported the impugned order passed by the CEO of SRA and submitted that no interference is warranted with the impugned order passed by the CEO of SRA. Submission on behalf of Mr. Desai, learned Counsel for the Respondents- SRA – Developer Authority

67. Learned counsel for the Developer adopted the submissions made by Learned Counsel Mr. Balsara, learned counsel for the Society and tendered the proposal approved by the Slum Rehabilitation Authority on 22nd June, 2020. He also relied upon the judgment of this Court in case Marathwada Society Chawl Committee and Ors. Vs. State of Maharashtra and Ors. [2017 SCC Online B om 8547), more particularly paragraph Nos. 11,18, 20 and submitted that any interference with the Scheme would cause serious prejudice not only to the members of the Respondent No.4 Society, but also to the developer.

REASONS AND CONCLUSIONS IN WRIT PETITION No.2338 OF 2017

68. We shall first decide the issue raised by the Petitioners, as to whether the order passed by the Respondent No.2, the then Chief Executive Officer, Shri Vishwas Patil is anti-dated and the order purported to have been passed on 20 June, 2017 by preponing the hearing fixed on 27 June, 2017 to 19 June, 2017 has committed violation of principles of natural justice and acted with malafide intention or not?

69. It is not in dispute that the Petitioners had filed this Writ Petition on 18 April, 2017, inter alia, praying for a Writ of Certiorari for quashing and setting aside the impugned notification dated 17 November, 2016 under Section 14(1) of the Slum Act. Papers and proceedings along with notice were served on the office of Respondent No.2 by the Petitioners. On 21 April, 2017, this Court issued notice on the Respondents and on the learned Additional Government Pleader for Respondent Nos. 1 and 3. The matter was adjourned to 23 June, 2017.

70. On 23 June, 2017, this Court noticed the order dated 10 February, 2011 passed by this Court in Writ Petition No. 970 of 2010 filed by the Petitioners challenging the Notification dated 15 October, 1997 under Section 14(1) of the Slum Act. This Court has held as per the provision of Sectin 14(1) of the Slum Act, it is mandatory to give a notice of hearing before issuing Notification under Section 14(1) of the Slum Act, however, in the present case, the Notification of acquisition is issued on 17 November, 2016 without any Notice to the Petitioner being the owner of the proeprty and hence the said notification is nullity and without following the due process of law. It is open to land owner to claim as to why the land should not be acquired. The objections of the Petitioners would be considered at that stage and the Competent Authority would have to held due regard to the judgment of the Division Bench in the case of Anil Gulabdas Shah Vs. State of Maharashtra [2011(1) M.LJ.797].

71. This Court directed the Competent Authority to consider the proposal in the light of those objections including on the basis of the law as laid down by the Division Bench of this Court in case of Anil Shah (Supra). This Court further held that upon a report being submitted to the State Government by the competent authority, and in the event that the State Government decided to acquire the land, intimation of that decision shall be furnished to the Petitioner so as to enable the Petitioner to take recourse to such remedies as are available in law. It is clear that though Respondent No.2 SRA was served with the papers and proceedings for appearing in Court on 21 April, 2017, Respondent No. 2 did not bother to appear.

72. On 23 June, 2017, this Court noticed that the Chief Executive Officer of the Respondent No.2-SRA was retiring on 30 June, 2017. This Court noticed that the Petitioners had reliably learnt that the said Chief Executive Officer of SRA had assured to pass favourable orders for development and, therefore, the hearing was initially preponed to 19 June, 2017 instead of 27 June, 2017. Respondent No.2 was represented by an Advocate before this Court on 23 June, 2017.

73. This Court recorded the apprehension of the Petitioners that since the Chief Executive Officer would be retiring on 30 June, 2017, even if Petitioners appear before the Authority, they not be able to place on record the entire matter, apart from the basic challenge raised in the petition that no show cause notice was issued to the owner. This Court accordingly, directed Respondent No.2 not to proceed with the inquiry as per the Notification dated 17 December, 2016 which was listed on 27 June, 2017 till next date of hearing and directed the office to place the matter after two weeks.

74. It is the case of the Petitioners that the said order was duly communicated to Respondent No.2 by the Petitioners. The Petitioners had requested Respondent No.2 to adjourn the proceeding initiated under Section 17 of the Slum Act beyond 23 June, 2017, on which date, this Writ Petition was kept for hearing before this Court. However, despite the same, Respondent No.2 kept the matter only on 13 June, 2017. We have perused the Roznama placed by the Petitioners. On 13 June, 2017, Advocate for the Petitioners requested Respondent No.2 that the Writ Petition was kept for admission and interim relief on 23 June, 2017. Respondent No.2 accordingly kept the matter on 23 June, 2017 as is clearly indicated in the Roznama dated 13 June, 2017.

75. It is placed on record by the Petitioners that in view of the proceedings already post-poned to 27 June, 2017 initially and that the Petitioners along with their family members were out of station from 16 June, 2017 to 19 June, 2017, the Petitioners were neither served with any notice nor they could remain present on 19 June, 2017. It is the case of the Petitioners that on 19 June, 2017, though the matter was adjourned to 27 June, 2017 at 11.00 a.m., the Advocate for Respondent No.4 made request for hearing the matter on the same day and accordingly when the Petitioners were absent, Respondent No.2 has alleged to have heard the matter on 19 June, 2017 and close for orders. The Roznama dated 19 June, 2017 would indicate the version of the Petitioners.

76. We have perused the Affidavit in Reply filed by Respondent No.2 on 23 June, 2017. The said Affidavit does not indicate that on 20 June, 2017, Respondent No.2 had already passed an order by pre-poning the date of hearing though this Court by order dated 23 June, 2017, had directed the SRA Authority not to proceed with the inquiry pursuant to the Notification dated 17 November, 2016 and listed the matter to 27 June, 2017.

77. A perusal of the record clearly indicates that though by order dated 23 June, 2017, after hearing the learned counsel for Respondent No.2, the matter was adjourned to 27 June, 2017 directing the SRA Authority not to proceed with the enquiry pursuant to the Notification dated 17th November, 2016 till next date of hearing the Respondent No.2 purported to have preponed the date of hearing and circumvented the order passed by this Court and with a view to favour the Respondent No.4 Society and Respondent No.6 Developer.

78. We have perused the Affidavit in Reply filed by Respondent No.4 on 27 April, 2018. Even in the said Affidavit, Respondent No.4 has not explained as to why an application was made for pre-poning the hearing before Respndent No.2 and how the Respondent No.2 SRA could have preponed the hearing and circumvented the stay granted by this Court on 27 June, 2017.

79. The Learned Additional Government Pleader also did not address this Court on the serious allegations made by the Petitioners on the aspect of the order passed by Respondent No.2 thereby preponing the hearing and circumventing the order passed by this Court on 23 June,

2017.

80. Mr. Balsara, learned counsel for the Society also could not explain as to how the application was made before the Respondent No.2 by his client for pre-ponment of the hearing when the matter was already adjourned by this Court.

81. The Writ Petition appeared from time to time thereafter on board. Respondent No.2, however, did not explain before this Court as to why he pre-poned the hearing after order dated 23 June, 2017 passed by this Court, granting interim stay against Respondent No.2. If Respondent No.2 would have passed an order on 20 June, 2017 by preponing the date to 19 June, 2017, the Learned Advocate for Respondent No. 2 SRA ought to have brought this evidence on record before this Court on 23 June, 2017. This fact also clearly indicates that the order dated 20 June, 2017 was antidated after 27 June, 2017 so as to favour the Respondent No.4 Society and Respondent No.6 Developer.

82. We shall now deal with the issue as to whether the Respondent No.2 SRA has complied with the order dated 10 February, 2011 passed by this Court. A perusal of the record indicates that when the Petitioners had filed Writ Petition NO. 970/2010 in this Court, inter alia, challenging the public notice dated 15 October, 10787 issued by the Respondent No.2, proposing to acquire the writ property, the Petitioners had filed an affidavit pointing out that they were ready and willing to implement the slum scheme on the writ property and they were eligible to implement the slum development scheme under Section 33(1) of the Amended Development Control and Permission Regulation 2004.

83. Though this Court had directed the Respondents to consider the proposal in light of those objections raised by the Petitioners and in accordance with the principles laid down by this Court in case of Anil Gulabdas Shah (supra.), the Respondent No.2 Authority did not give opportunity to the Petitioners to raise their objections, nor considered the objections raised in Writ Petition No. 970 of 2010 and also did not consider the principles laid down in the case of Anil Gulabdas Shah (supra).

84. It is an admitted position that the Petitioners made representations to Respondent No.2 showing readiness and willingness to submit a scheme and to develop the property under the provisions of Development Control Regulations, Respondent No.2 Authority did not consider those proposals made by the Petitioners and passed an erroneous order contrary to the order passed by this Court on 30 March, 2010 and the principles laid down by this Court in case of Anil Gulabdas Shah (supra).

85. The Petitioners also pointed out the ad-interim relief granted by the City Civil Court on 10 November, 2016 in the Notice of Motion filed by the Petitioners restraining the Defendants therein from implementing the Slum Rehabilitation Scheme on the writ property, without express consent of the Petitioners, the Respondent No.2 did not consider the said order also while accepting the proposal submitted by the Respondent No.4 Society. It was common ground that the Respondent No.2 Chief Executive Officer was going to retire on 30 June, 2017. This apprehension was brought to the notice of this Court by the Petitioners that it will not be possible for the Petitioners to represent before the date of retirement of Respondent No.2 The Respondent No.2 Chief Executive Officer had thus ex-facie anti-dated the order.

86. Respondent No.2 did not consider the fact that the Petitioners had tendered an undertaking before this Court that they would develop the writ property. The architects of the Petitioners had already prepared the plans for redevelopment of the writ property. The Petitioners were issued the notice under Section 17 of the Slum Act for determination of compensation directly on 20 March, 2017. Event at that stage, the Petitioners expressed their readiness and willingness to develop the writ property and raised various objections to the determination of compensation.

87. The Division Bench of this Court in the case of Indian Cork Mills Pvt. Ltd. Vs. State of Maharashtra and Ors. [(2018) 4 Bom CR 618] has construed Section 14(1) of the Slum Act and has held that under proviso to Section 14(1), before publishing such notice, the State Government, or as the case may be the Competent Authority has to call upon by notice the owner of, or any other person who in its or his opinion may be interested in, such land to show cause in writing why the land should not be acquired with reasons thereof, to the competent authority within the period specified in the notice; and the competent authority shall, with all reasonable dispatch, forward any objections which were raised by the Petitioners to the acquisition and considering the said exercise, may pass appropriate order as it deems fit.

88. This Court held that under Section 3B(4) (c) and (e) r/w. Section 13(1) of the Slum Act, the owner of the property has vested right to have a first choice to undertake a Slum Rehabilitation Scheme and only on failure to do so, the State Government can proceed to acquire the land and not otherwise. Any such violation by the Slum Authority vitiates the acquisition on that ground as it suffers from lack of authority and power to acquire. This Court in the said judgment adverted to the earlier judgment of this Court in the case of Anil Gulabdas Shah (supra.) and was pleased to quash and set aside the order passed by the SRA under Section 14(1) of the Slum Act.

89. In our view the principles laid down by the Division Bench of this Court in the case of Indian Cork Mills Pvt. Ltd. (Supra.) apply to the facts of this case. In this case though the Petitioners had made various representations showing the readiness and willingness to carry out redevelopment of the writ property admittedly, Respondent No.2 overlooked the preferential rights of the Petitioners owner to undertake redevelopment of the writ property under Section 3B(4) (c) and (e) r/w. 13 (1) of the Slum Act and has sanctioned the proposal submitted by Respondent No.4 Society. The impugned order is contrary to the principles laid down by the Division Bench of this Court in case of Indian Cork Mills Pvt. Ltd. (Supra).

90. The Division Bench of this Court in case of Anil Gulabdas Shah (supra). has held that under Section 13 (1) of the Slum Act the SRA is obliged to offer the suit land to the first to the petitioner or to the occupants thereon to come forward for redevelopment of the same and only on their failure, the land could be handed over to a third party. The statutory scheme cannot be given go-by. Though this Court had specifically directed Respondent No.2 to consider the principles of law in the case of Anil Gulabdas Shah (supra)., by order dated 10 February, 2011, the Respondent No.2 decided contrary to the principles of law laid down by this Court in case of Anil Gulabdas Shah (supra)., which clearly apply to the facts of this case.

91. Insofar as the judgment of this Court in case of Deena Baldota Vs. State of Maharashtra (supra) relied upon by the learned counsel for Respondent No.4 Society is concerned, this Court had recorded a finding that there was bonafide intention on the part of the owner to redevelop the subject property. Sufficient opportunities were granted to the owner to submit a proposal for redevelopment. This Court was satisfied that the pre-requisite of Section 14 of the Slum Act was complied by the Authorities. The said judgment of this Court in case of Deena Baldota Vs. State of Maharashtra (supra) is clearly distinguishable on the facts. In this case none of the pre-requisite of Section 14 are complied with by the Respondent No.2.

92. Insofar as judgment of this Court in the case of A.H. Wadia Trust & Ors. Vs. State of Maharashtra (supra) relied upon by the learned counsel for Respondent No.4 of the Society is concerned, this Court had recorded a finding that the Petitioners in that case had made it clear that Petitioners owners in that case could not have redeveloped the property itself since the said issue was pending in the originating summons filed by owners. In the facts of that case, this Court did not interfere with the order passed by the SRA under Section 14(1) of the Slum Act. The said judgment is clearly distinguishable on the facts.

93. Insofar as the judgment of the Learned Single Judge of this Court in case of Jagnnath Sonawane and Ors. Vs. Slum Rehabilitation Authority & Ors. (supra). relied upon by the Learned counsel for the Respondent no.2 is concerned, this Court held that Section 3C(1) of the Slum Act does not in terms either grant or exclude an opportunity of hearing. The said judgment did not deal with the issue whether order under Section 14(1) may be passed by the SRA without complying with the principles of natural justice or not without giving an opportunity to the owners to exercise preference rights to redevelop the land under acquisition.

94. Insofar as the judgment of this Court in case of Nusli N. Wadia Vs. State of Maharashtra (supra). is concerned, this Court recorded a finding that the impugned award was declared after following the principles of the natural justice. The Award had been challenged only on the ground of inadequacy of compensation. This Court accordingly held that the Petitioners aggrieved by the quantum of compensation granted under the Award would have to resort to the remedy of filing an Appeal under Section 17(6) of the Slum Act. In our view the said judgment would not apply to the facts of this case.

95. So far as the judgment of this Court in case of this Court in case of F.F. Dinshaw Charities & Ors. (supra) is concerned, this Court has recorded a finding that the Chief Executive Officer of SRA had complied with the principles of natural justice under Section 14(1) of the Slum Act. In our view, the said judgment is clearly distinguishable on the facts and thus would not advance the case of the Respondents.

96. Insofar as the submission of Mr. Balsara, learned counsel for the Respondent No.4 Society that the slum scheme was already submitted on 24th June, 2020 and various NOCs have already been granted in favour of Respondent No.4 and thus at this stage shall not interfere with the order passed by the SRA under Section 14(1) of the Slum Act is concerned, in our view, since the order passed by Respondent No.2 was ex-facie anti-dated, in violation of the principles of natural justice, in violation of the stay order granted by this Court and also against the principles laid down by this Court in case of Anil Gulabdas Shah (supra.) and in case of Indian Cork Mills Pvt. Ltd. (Supra.), the subsequent steps taken by Respondent No.2 or by Respondent Nos.[4] and 6 would be of no consequence.

97. The subsequent steps taken by Respondent Nos. 2, 4 and 6 in furtherance of this illegal order passed by respondent No.2 would not legalize the illegal order passed by Respondent No.2. In our view, the Petitioners have thus made out a case for quashing and setting aside the impugned Award dated 20 June, 2017 passed by Respondent No.2 in respect of the writ property, for quashing and setting aside the Notification dated 17 December, 2020 and impugned Notice dated 20 March,2017 issued under Section 14(1) of the Maharashtra Slum Areas (Improvement, Clearance, Redevelopment) Act, 1971, to the extent of the acquisition of the Petitioner on land bearing CTS No. 31(Part) admeasuring 3705.[2] square meters of Village Dindoshi, Taluka Borivali, Mumbai herein deserves to be quashed and set aside.

98. We, accordingly pass the following order:

(i) Writ Petition No. 2338 of 2017 is allowed in terms of prayer clauses (b) (c), (d) and (d-i).

(ii) The application filed by Respondent No.4 Society before Respondent No.3- Chief Executive Officer, Slum Rehabilitation Authority for acquisition of the writ property is dismissed.

(iii) Rule is made absolute in the aforesaid terms.

(iv) There shall be no order as to costs.

99. Mr. Balsara, learned counsel for the Respondent No.4 – Society applies for stay of the operation of the order passed by this Court today, which is vehemently opposed by the learned counsel for the Petitioner. Application for stay is rejected. (M.M. SATHAYE. J.) ( R. D. DHANUKA, J. )