Jasveer Lal Gour v. M/S Delcap Financial Services Pvt. Ltd.

14. Learned Trial Court vide the Impugned judgment was pleased to dismiss the Counter Claim filed by the Appellant/Defendant and allowed the application under Order XII Rule 6 CPC filed by the Plaintiff/Respondent and a decree of possession was passed in favour of the Plaintiff.

15. Aggrieved by the same, the Appellant/Defendant preferred the present Appeal challenging the Impugned judgment.

SUBMISSIONS OF THE APPELLANT/DEFENDANT

16. Learned counsel for the Appellant/Defendant, Mr. Md. Azam Ansari, initiated his arguments by submitting that the learned Trial Court erred in passing the Impugned judgment and in over zealousness, ignored the basic law relating to a civil suit and counter claim.

17. The case set up by the Appellant/Defendant in its counter claim is that on 26.02.2023, the Defendant came to know that one Malti Devi is the absolute owner of the suit property and not the Plaintiff. The said fact was brought to notice of the learned Trial Court on 27.02.2023. In view of the subsequent development, the Defendant filed the Counter Claim on 10.03.2023. It is further his case that on 09.03.2023, relatives of Malti Devi had visited the suit property claiming its ownership and have also shown several documents to prove the same. The Appellant informed the relatives that he was inducted as a tenant and is not a trespasser. He furthered his case by submitting that the relatives left the suit property by stating that they will initiate legal proceedings against the Plaintiff. Furthermore, they did not provide any photocopy of those documents despite request.

18. It is the contention of the learned counsel for the Defendant/Appellant that a Counter Claim is treated as a civil suit and a civil suit cannot be dismissed on day one without issuing summons and without granting an opportunity to the Claimant to prove his case by leading evidence on the issues framed. He furthered his submissions by submitting that a written statement to the counter claim is mandatorily required to be filed which was not done by the learned Trial Court in the present case. It is further his submissions that although the word „may‟ has been used in Order V Rule 1 CPC but it is mandatory in nature. Hence, the judgment of the learned Trial Court is erroneous on this ground alone.

19. The next thrust of contention raised by the learned counsel for the Defendant is the cost of Rs.1,00,000/- (Rupees One Lakh) imposed by the learned Trial Court is absolutely illegal and unwarranted as the maximum cost that could be imposed under CPC is Rs.3000/- as per Section 35A (2) of CPC.

20. It is further the contention of the learned counsel for the Appellant that the Counter Claim can be filed even after filing of the written statement by the Defendant but before framing of issues and in certain exceptional cases, counter claim can be filed even after framing of issues but before recording evidence. Mr. Ansari, submitted that in the present case, even the issues were not framed by the learned Trial Court and thus the Appellant was fully entitled in law to file the Counter Claim and further he also contended that the Appellant has filed the Counter Claim within the period of limitation. With regard to that, he relied on the judgment of the Hon‟ble Apex Court in the matter of Ashok Kumar Kalra v. Wing CDR. Surendra Agnihotri reported as

21. It is contended by learned counsel for the Appellant that learned Trial Court ignored the subsequent facts which were made by the Appellant in the Counter Claim which completely nullifies the admission of the Defendant with regard to the landlord-tenant relationship.

22. Lastly, it was submitted by the learned counsel for the Appellant that the learned Trial Court was duty bound to let the matter go for trial to unearth the truth and not use the discretionary power under Order XII Rule 6 CPC, in order to let the Defendant produce evidence. Further, it was also contended by the learned counsel for the Appellant that the Defendant has not clearly, unconditionally and categorically admitted the case of the Plaintiff except the landlord-tenant relationship.

23. The learned counsel heavily relied on Karan Kapur v. Madhuri Kumar reported as (2022) 10 SCC 496 and averred that the discretion under Order XII Rule 6 CPC should only be exercised if there is a clear, categorical and unconditional admission.

SUBMISSIONS OF THE RESPONDENT/PLAINTIFF

24. Per Contra, Ms. Sonam Anand, learned counsel for the Respondent/Plaintiff while relying on the Impugned judgment submitted that the Impugned judgment passed by the learned Trial Court is legal, well-reasoned and does not need interference of this Hon‟ble Court.

25. It is the contention of the learned counsel for the Plaintiff/Respondent that the Defendant admitted the following facts which squarely falls within the ambit of Order XII Rule 6 CPC: a) He has been living as a tenant in the suit property and had taken the suit property on lease vide lease deed dated 25.09.2020. The Defendant admitted the tenancy and the lease deed in his statement dated 23.12.2021 given under Order X of CPC. In the statement dated 23.12.2021, it was admitted that the Defendant was asked to vacate the suit property by the Plaintiff. b) The lease deed dated 25.09.2020 was executed for a period of 11 months i.e., from 01.11.2020 to 30.09.2021 and the tenancy of the Defendant has come to an end by efflux of time on 30.09.2021. c) He has only paid Rs.1,50,000/- and has not paid any other amount, despite being in the suit premises. d) There is no clause in the lease deed which burdens the Plaintiff to obtain any permission for running of a hotel/Bed& Breakfast in respect of the suit property. Further, he has also admitted that the permission for running hotel/bed & breakfast in respect of his other rented premises at Tughlakabad was obtained by the Defendant himself. e) The Defendant in para 8 of the Para wise reply of his written statement submitted that the contention of the Plaintiff with regard to the payment of the security deposit of Rs.3,00,000/-, need no reply and hence admitted the requirement of the payment of the security deposit. f) Lastly, the Defendant in his statement given under Order X of CPC had admitted the dishonour of cheque bearing No. 549323 of Rs.20,000/- due to “Funds Insufficient”.

26. Accordingly, the Plaintiff/Respondent prayed for the dismissal of the Appeal filed by the Appellant/Defendant.

LEGAL ANALYSIS

27. This Court had heard the rival contentions of both the parties and perused the documents placed on record.

COUNTER- CLAIM

28. It is the contention of the learned counsel for the Defendant/Appellant that a Counter Claim is treated as a civil suit and a civil suit cannot be dismissed on day one without issuing summons and without granting an opportunity to the Claimant to prove his case by leading evidence on the issues framed. He furthered his submissions by submitting that a written statement to the Counter Claim is mandatorily required to be filed which was not done by the learned Trial Court in the present case. It is further his submission that although the word „may‟ has been used in Order V Rule 1 CPC but it is not mandatory in nature. It has also been argued by the learned counsel for the Appellant that the Counter Claim can be filed even after filing of the written statement by the Defendant but before framing of issues and in certain exceptional cases, Counter Claim can be filed even after framing of issues but before recording evidence

29. At this juncture, it is apposite to set out herein below Order VIII Rule 6-A CPC, which pertains to the Counter Claim, reads as under: “Order 8 Rule 6-A: 6-A. Counterclaim by defendant.—(1) A defendant in a suit may, in addition to his right of pleading a set-off under Rule 6, set up, by way of counterclaim against the claim of the plaintiff, any right or claim in respect of a cause of action accruing to the defendant against the plaintiff either before or after the filing of the suit but before the defendant has delivered his defence or before the time limited for delivering his defence has expired, whether such counterclaim is in the nature of a claim for damages or not: Provided that such counterclaim shall not exceed the pecuniary limits of the jurisdiction of the court. (2) Such counterclaim shall have the same effect as a cross-suit so as to enable the court to pronounce a final judgment in the same suit, both on the original claim and on the counterclaim. (3) The plaintiff shall be at liberty to file a written statement in answer to the counterclaim of the defendant within such period as may be fixed by the court. (4) The counterclaim shall be treated as a plaint and governed by the rules applicable to plaints.”

30. The majority decision of the three Judge Bench of the Hon‟ble Supreme Court in the matter of Ashok Kumar Kalra (supra) has held that:

31. In the present matter, the Defendant filed the written statement on 23.10.2021, however, the Defendant himself mentioned in the counter claim filed that the cause of action had first arisen on 26.02.2023. Thus, in terms of Order VIII Rule 6-A CPC, there is an embargo to the Counter Claim filed by the Defendant.

32. Further, it is quintessential to examine the conduct of the Defendant from the orders passed by the learned Trial Court: Firstly, Plaintiff filed an Application under Order XII Rule 6 CPC, however, inspite of the Defendant seeking time and persistent directions passed by the learned Trial Court vide its orders dated 28.03.2022, 07.06.2022, 14.11.2022, 15.11.2022, the Defendant filed the reply to the Application under Order XII Rule 6 CPC only on 27.02.2023. The above conduct of the Defendant is evident from the order dated 17.02.2023. Vide this order the learned Trial Court has also observed that the Defendant had not filed a reply to the Application under Order XII Rule 6 CPC and had further also sought an adjournment for 6 weeks and the learned Trial Court rightly observed that even though sufficient opportunities have been granted to the Defendant to file the reply. Howbeit, the defendant tactically changed the counsel every now and then just to gain the time and to delay the proceedings. Relevant part of the order is reproduced hereunder: “Sh. Mohd. Mustafa, Ld. counsel for the defendant who was earlier representing the defendant. Mr. Mustafa submits that in view of the fact that the defendant has engaged a new counsel, he may be discharged. He also submits that he has already returned the file to the defendant on 27.01.2023. Considering the submission, Ld.counsel is discharged from this case. Ld. counsel for the defendant submits that he has not received the certified copies. Earlier Ld. counsel was arguing that his client had not given the file as he did not have the file. However, after hearing the submissions of earlier counsel, now the defendant submits that he has lost his file in auto. This is a substantial improvement in the submission made on behalf of the defendant. Perusal of record would show that the application under Order XII rule 6 CPC is pending since 28.03.2022. Various opportunities have been granted to the defendant to file reply to the said application. Vide order dated 07.06.2022, further opportunity was granted for filing reply subject to cost of Rs 20,000/- to be deposited in DLSA South. The reply was not filed. On 14.11.2022, the defendant had appeared alongwith his counsel in presence of counsel for the plaintiff. It was noticed that previous cost was not paid by the defendant. On 15.11.2022, fresh vakalatnama was filed on behalf of the defendant and he informed that the defendant had paid the previous cost. However, it is informed today that the said cost was paid to counsel for the plaintiff and that it was not deposited in the DLSA. Be that as it may, on 15.11.2022 one last and final opportunity was granted to the defendant to file reply subject to further cost of Rs.20,000/- to be paid to the plaintiff. In these circumstances, the cost imposed vide order dated 15.11.2022 which was directed to be paid to the plaintiff is considered to be already paid in view of the abovementioned fact that the previous cost was paid by the defendant to the plaintiff. However, the defendant is directed to deposit the balance cost of Rs.20,000/- in the account of DLSA south. Ld. counsel submits that defendant will pay the cost in next three days. Today one application has been filed on behalf of the defendant for deciding the application of the defendant seeking adjournment of the six weeks which was moved on 28.01.2023. Submissions on application heard. Sufficient opportunities have been granted to the defendant to file the reply. It appears that the defendant tactically changes the counsel every now and then just to gain the time and to delay the proceedings. The application seeking adjournment for six weeks as above mentioned is therefore, without merits. It is dismissed and disposed of accordingly. Accordingly, the application moved today is also disposed of.” Secondly, the malafide conduct of the Defendant is also evident from various applications, such as Application under Order VII Rule 11 CPC, wherein the Defendant had questioned the jurisdiction of the learned Trial Court, however, the application was dismissed by the learned Trial Court vide its order dated 28.03.2022. Further, another Application for adjournment for 6 weeks was also filed by the Defendant which was also dismissed by the learned Trial Court vide its order dated 17.02.2023. Furthermore, an Application was also filed by the Defendant under Section 151 of the CPC seeking directions to the Plaintiff to place on record the proof of ownership of the suit property, however, the learned Trial court had dismissed that application vide its order dated 27.02.2023. Relevant part of the order dated 27.02.2023 is reproduced hereunder: “The plaintiff has filed the present suit against the defendant seeking possession of the suit property, arrears of rent, mesne profits and damages qua the property bearing No. N-43, Sainik Farms, New Delhi. The plaintiff has claimed itself to be the absolute owner of the suit property while the defendant is stated to be a tenant in the suit property. A lease deed dated 25.09.2020 is also stated to be executed between the parties. The defendant in his WS has admitted that he was inducted as tenant by the plaintiff in the suit property. Once, the defendant admits that he is in possession of the suit property as tenant of the plaintiff, the plaintiff is not required to prove his ownership in such a suit. Therefore, there is no requirement of any directions to the plaintiff to file the documents of ownership of the suit property. The application is therefore, dismissed and disposed of accordingly.”

33. Further, after the dismissal of Application of the Defendant seeking directions to the Plaintiff to place on record the proof of ownership of the suit property, was dismissed, the Defendant on 10.03.2023, filed a Counter Claim under Order VIII Rule 6A CPC, inter-alia on the ground that since the Plaintiff is not the true and absolute owner of the suit property and the Plaintiff has not produced any document to prove his title over the suit property and one Mrs. Malti Devi is the true and absolute owner of the suit property. Hence, the Plaintiff has fraudulently executed the lease deed dated 25.09.2020 with the Defendant and it should be declared non-est in law. Further, one of the prayers in the Counter Claim is that in view of the new facts, that the Plaintiff is not the owner of the suit property, the admission of the Defendant regarding tenant-landlord relationship be cancelled. The Defendant further goes on to say in his counter claim that even though the Appellant had requested the relatives of Mrs. Malti Devi to handover the photocopies of the property documents. However, they refused to hand over the same to the Defendant.

34. After the perusal of the orders of the learned Trial Court and the counter claim, it is clear from the conduct of the Defendant, that the Defendant had adopted dilatory tactics and filed the counter claim just to delay the disposal of the suit.

35. Even otherwise, the Defendant in terms of Section 116 of the Indian Evidence Act, 1872, the tenant during the continuance of the tenancy is debarred on the doctrine of estoppel from denying the title of his landlord through whom he claims tenancy. Further, it is needless to emphasize that admission of a party in the proceedings is the best evidence and the same does not need any further corroboration. Hence, the prayer with regard to the admission of the Appellant with regard to landlord-tenant relationship cannot be cancelled. Further, the Defendant also cannot claim that he has been harassed by the Plaintiff only because some party has approached him claiming ownership of the suit property.

36. At the outset, this Court is also of the opinion that there is no gainsaying that the procedural justice is imbibed to provide further impetus to the substantive justice. It is this extended procedural fairness provided by the national courts, which adds to the legitimacy and commends support of general public. On the other hand, we must be mindful of the legislative intention to provide for certainty and clarity. In the name of substantive justice, providing unlimited and unrestricted rights in itself will be detrimental to certainty and would lead to the state of lawlessness. In this regard, this Court needs to recognize and harmoniously stitch the two types of justice, so as to have an effective, accurate and participatory judicial system. Rules of procedure must not be interpreted in a manner that ultimately results in failure of justice. Hence, from the conduct of the Defendant, it seems that the Defendant had adopted dilatory tactics and filed the counter claim just to delay the disposal of the suit. Further, it is a cardinal rule of our jurisprudence that procedural provisions are not meant to thwart the course of justice, but to advance it.

37. Another issue raised by the learned counsel for the Defendant is with regard to the cost of Rs.1,00,000/- imposed by the learned Trial Court. It is his claim that the cost imposed is absolutely illegal and unwarranted as the maximum cost that could be imposed under CPC is Rs.3000/-.

38. The learned Trial Court vide its Impugned judgment has held as follows: “A cost of Rs. 1,00,000/- is also imposed on the defendant for filing such a frivolous counter claim just to delay the matter. Out of the cost Rs. 50,000/- shall be paid to the plaintiff and remaining amount of Rs. 50,000 /- shall be deposited in DLSA, South, Saket. The counter claim is disposed of accordingly.”

39. In this regard it is profitable to refer to the judgment of the Hon‟ble Supreme Court in the matter of Ashok Kumar Mittal v. Ram Kumar Gupta, reported as (2009) 2 SCC 656:

10. We do not however propose to examine or decide the above issues here, except to observe that courts should not exceed or overlook the limitations placed by the Code with reference to costs in civil litigation. Insofar this case is concerned, even though the order relating to costs may not strictly be correct, we do not propose to interfere with the same, in exercise of our jurisdiction under Article 136, as the order has not resulted in any injustice. It is stated that the respondents have already deposited the costs. The time for deposit of costs by the petitioner is extended at his request by a month from today.

11. We would however like to refer to two aspects of the order of the High Court relating to costs. The first is, whether a court, having reached a conclusion that a party deserves to be prosecuted for perjury, should let him off with what it considers to be a stiff penalty by way of costs, on the ground that courts are overburdened with work. We propose to leave open for the present, this question involving moral and ethical issues.

12. The second aspect relates to the recipient of the costs. In para 38 of the impugned judgment, the High Court specifically stated that it had decided to saddle the parties with heavy costs to be paid to the State which spends money on judicial infrastructure. Having said so, in para 39, the High Court directed that the costs should be paid to the Delhi High Court Legal Services Committee. The High Court Legal Services Committee, a statutory authority under the Legal Services Authorities Act, 1987, is not the “State” that spends money on providing judicial infrastructure, referred to in the earlier para. Once the Court held that costs had to be paid to the State, it should have directed payment of the costs to the State and not the High Court Legal Services Committee.

13. No litigant should be made to feel that heavy costs are being levied in some cases by Judges to create a corpus or expense fund for the High Court Legal Services Committee or the State Legal Services Authority. While levy of a uniform token sum, as costs payable to the Legal Service Authority/Committee by way of a deterrent fine, in regard to non-compliance with procedural requirements, delays in representation of papers, etc. may not be objectionable, levy of huge amounts as costs in selected cases, made payable to the Legal Service Authorities, may invite adverse comments and evoke hostility to legal services in general. We have also come across cases of costs being levied and made payable to some non-party charitable organisations. Levy of such costs should be avoided.”

14. The Delhi High Court Legal Services Committee when it receives the sum of rupees two lakhs as costs from the parties, shall make over the same to the State Government as directed in para 38 of the impugned judgment. Let a copy of this order be sent to the Delhi High Court Legal Services Committee, for compliance. In view of the above judgment of the Hon‟ble Supreme Court in Ashok Kumar Mittal (supra) the Impugned Judgment of the learned Trial Court, to the extent it levies costs of Rs. 1,00,000/- on the Defendant is set aside and in its place, it is directed that the Defendant shall pay the costs of Rs.3000/- as exemplary costs to the Plaintiff. Order XII Rule 6 CPC Application:

40. Now coming to the Application filed by the Plaintiff under Order XII Rule 6 of CPC which deals with judgment on admission. It is reproduced hereunder:

41. For passing a judgment/decree sought on admission in the facts of the present matter, the Defendant should have made admissions on three essential aspects i.e.:i) There is relationship of landlord and tenant between the parties.

(ii) The rate of rent of the suit property is above Rs. 3,500/- per month and The Delhi Rent Control Act, 1958 should not be applicable to the suit property; and iii) Tenancy was terminated.

42. This Hon‟ble Court in the matter of Delhi Jal Board v. Surender P. Malik reported as 2003 SCC OnLine Del 292 has explained the object of filing an Application under Order XII Rule 6 CPC.

43. This Hon‟ble Court in the matter of Rajpal Singh v. Deen Dayal Kapil reported as 2014 SCC OnLine Del 337, wherein it was held that two things are required to be established by Plaintiff-landlord. Firstly, the existence of the jural relationship of landlord and tenant between the parties and Secondly, the termination of the tenancy either by lapse of time or by notice served by the landlord under Section 106 of the Transfer of Property Act. “…6. In a suit for recovery of possession from a tenant whose tenancy is not protected under the provisions of the Rent Control Act, all that is required to be established by the Plaintiff-landlord is the existence of the jural relationship of landlord and tenant between the parties and the termination of the tenancy either by lapse of time or by notice served by the landlord Under Section 106 of the Transfer of Property Act. So long as these two aspects are not in dispute the Court can pass a decree in terms of Order XII Rule 6 of the Code of Civil Procedure,…” (Emphasis supplied)

44. Now coming to the factual matrix of the present case, in order to appreciate this controversy, it will be quintessential to peruse the written statement of Defendant. Relevant part of the written statement is reproduced hereunder:

45. After careful perusal of the written statement filed by the Defendant/Appellant, it is found that the Defendant in the instant case has categorically accepted the relationship of landlord- tenant with the Plaintiff. Further, the Defendant has also accepted that the Defendant was supposed to pay an initial monthly rent of Rs. 90,000/-, for the initial period from November 2020 till March 2021 and thereafter for the remaining period, on a monthly rent of Rs. 1,20,000 i.e. exceeding Rs. 3500/- which brings the tenancy out of the purview of the Delhi Rent Control Act. The Defendant has also admitted the lease deed dated 25.09.2020, which was executed between the Plaintiff and the Defendant. Furthermore, as regards the termination of tenancy, it is argued by the Plaintiff that a notice dated 08.01.2021 was issued to the Defendant terminating his tenancy. The legal notice along with postal receipt and tracking report has been filed before the learned Trial Court. Even though, the Defendant has denied receiving of the legal notice, however, it is trite law that, service of summons can be considered as service of notice as per law. Hence, all the three conditions required to be proved for deciding an application under Order XII Rule 6 CPC has been fulfilled.

46. It is further the contention of the learned counsel for the Appellant that the learned Trial court ignored the subsequent facts which were made by the Appellant in the Counter Claim which completely nullifies the admission of the Defendant with regard to the landlord-tenant relationship. With regard to the above contention, this Court is of the opinion that admittedly the Defendant is a tenant in the suit property who took the suit property on rent. It is settled law that a tenant during the continuance of the tenancy is debarred on the doctrine of estoppel from denying the title of his landlord through whom he claims tenancy, as is enshrined in Section 116 of the Indian Evidence Act, 1872. Further, even if assuming without conceding that the Plaintiff does not have a title/ownership of the suit property, if at all a real owner exists, he has the right to recover against the Plaintiff in any appropriate proceedings before the Court of law. Hence, the contention of the Defendant that the Plaintiff is not the owner of the suit property and fraudulently made the Defendant sign the lease deed is invalid and bad in law.

47. Further the Hon‟ble Supreme Court in the matter of Anar Devi v. Nathu Ram, reported as (1994) 4 SCC 250 has held as follows:

12. Indeed, the said doctrine of tenant's estoppel, finds statutory recognition in Section 116 of the Indian Evidence Act, 1872, for short „the Evidence Act‟, in that, it states that “no tenant of immovable property, or person claiming through such tenant, shall during the continuance of the tenancy, be permitted to deny that the landlord of such tenant had, at the beginning of the tenancy, a title to such immovable property”.”

48. It is also the contention of the learned counsel for the Appellant that it was the duty of the Plaintiff to provide requisite permission to run a Bed and Breakfast in the suit premises. However, the Plaintiff inspite of repeated requests also did not get the permission and as a result the Defendant was not able to run his business. Au Contraire, the learned counsel for the Plaintiff argued there is no clause in the lease deed which burdens the Plaintiff to obtain any permission for running of a hotel/Bed& Breakfast in respect of the suit property. Further, it was her submission that the Defendant has also admitted that the permission for running hotel/Bed & Breakfast in respect of his other rented premises at Tughlakabad was obtained by the Defendant himself.

49. A close reading of the lease deed dated 25.09.2020, which was executed between the Plaintiff and the Defendant is clearly and unequivocally admitted by the Defendant clearly states that the lessee/defendant should be the person to abide by the laws, rules, regulations of local authorities, RWA in respect of the suit property. Further, it is also mentioned that the lessee/defendant would be solely responsible to observe all rules and regulations with respect to the suit property and as prescribed under the laws or regulations applicable to it and in case of any violation of the said provisions and regulations, the lessee/defendant would be solely responsible for it. Hence, the contention of the Defendant in this regard cannot be accepted.

50. Alternatively, even the learned Trial Court vide its order dated 23.12.2021 has also observed that there is no recital in lease pointed out by the Defendant side to the effect that the Plaintiff was under any obligation to apply for and obtain any permission for the defendant for running hotel/Bed & Breakfast facility in the suit premises, no such objection seems to legitimately available to the Defendant and this Court is in full agreement with the same: “Defendant had been running the similar business prior to taking the suit property on lease, and admitted to have obtained the permission in respect of the another property. Having regard to the fact that there is no recital in lease pointed out by the defendant side to the effect that the plaintiff was under any obligation to apply for and obtain any permission for the defendant for running hotel/bread and breakfast facility in the suit premises, no such objection seems to legitimately available to the defendant.”

51. In view of aforesaid discussions, there are clear, unambiguous and unequivocal admissions on the part of the Defendant regarding existence of relationship of landlord and tenant between the parties, monthly rent of suit property being above Rs. 3500/- and further termination of tenancy vide legal notice dated 08.01.2021 has also been proved with the help of postal receipt and tracking report. As such, no triable issue is left to be adjudicated upon so far as the relief of possession as claimed by the Plaintiff is concerned and suit is liable to be decreed on the basis of admission made by the Defendant. Hence, the learned Trial Court rightly allowed the application moved by the Plaintiff under Order XII Rule 6 CPC and granted a decree of possession in favour of the Plaintiff and against the Defendant in respect of the suit property.

52. As discussed hereinabove in detail, the learned Trial Court rightly dismissed the Counter Claim filed by the Defendant and allowed the Application filed by the Plaintiff under Order XII Rule 6 CPC. However, the cost imposed by the learned Trial Court is reduced from Rs.1,00,000/- to Rs.3,000/-.

53. Appeal is disposed of in the above terms. All the pending applications are also dismissed.

GAURANG KANTH, J. APRIL 10, 2023