Meet Malhotra v. Union of India

13. He submits that to resolve the aforesaid perceived absurdity, the learned Single Judge has held that Section 41 of the Act takes care of the requirement of aspiring, national or international shooters by grant of exemption to such person to holds more firearms than the statutory limit of two prescribed for "normal citizen" by Section 3(2) of the Act, while, simultaneously, completely reading down, in a contrived manner, the phrase "any member of rifle club or rifle association licenses or recognised by the Central Government using a point 22 bore rifle or an air rifle for target practice" in Section 3(3) of the Arms Act to mean only permission to use firearms belonging to a rifle club or association.

14. He further submits that the learned Single Judge has fallen in clear error of fact and law in not appreciating that the exemption from the general rule of limiting firearms to two firearms, for "normal citizen" is provided by Section 3(3) of the Arms Act only and cannot be provided under Section 41 of the Arms Act. He states that though the notifications permitting sports persons of certain qualifications to hold firearms in excess of two are issued under the provision of Section 41 of the Arms Act, the same cannot, in fact, be so issued under the said section. He submits that Section 41 operates in a separate field and the only source of power permitting the Central Government to grant an exemption from the limit of two firearms prescribed in Section 3(2), is under Section 3(3) of the Arms Act. He submits that the learned Single Judge has failed to notice that all shooters, be it aspiring shooters to Arjuna awardees, need to compulsorily be members of a rifle association. The number of weapons, shooters of graded ability and qualification can hold increases, with the shooters‟ achievement in national and international arena. However, below the aspiring shooter category is the member of the rifle club who has not yet transitioned to an accomplished shooter and is therefore permitted to hold, in addition to two firearms permitted to a "normal citizen", a basic target training rifle, i.e. a.22 bore rifle or an air rifle, in order to allow such person to train, compete and go further in hierarchy of shooters. He submits that in overlooking this feature of the Arms Act, the learned Single Judge, has first generated a perceived anomaly and then proceeded to address it, and in doing so done violence to the plain language of the Act and read down the clear words therein. In that view of the matter, it becomes easy to give a natural grammatical meaning to the statutory exemption contained in Section 3(3) which does no violence to the Act, and does not render a part of Section 3(3) of the Act otiose and also completely fits into the scheme of the Act.

15. He submits that of the two interpretations possible, i.e., one taken by the learned Single Judge and the other as urged by him, the first is stretched, does violence to the words of the Act and has been made to resolve a nonexistent absurdity whilst the latter reads in harmony with the scheme and purpose of the Act and Rules made thereunder. He submits that the interpretation, as urged by him, makes the Act workable and effective and avoids rejection of the words in the Act while also avoiding any absurdity, perceived or real.

16. Per contra, Mr. Shadan Farasat, learned Additional Standing Counsel for the Government of NCT of Delhi, appearing for the Joint Commissioner of Police (Licensing), Delhi (Respondent No. 2), submitted that in order to understand the provisions of Section 3(2), it would be necessary to refer to Section 2(1)(a) of the Arms Act which defines the expression “acquisition”. The word “acquisition” is defined in the Act to include hiring, borrowing or accepting as a gift, together with all its grammatical variations and cognate expressions. Mr. Farasat contended that sub-sections (2) and (3) cannot be interpreted as placing no restrictions at all on the number of firearms that may be held or possessed by a member of a rifle club or association. It was submitted that the sole reason why members of a rifle club or association may be recognized and be permitted to be in possession of more than two firearms is an acceptance of the position that by virtue of being a member of such association or club, they are also entitled to use, hold and possess a weapon which may otherwise be licensed to that club or association. According to Mr. Farasat, the Legislature being conscious of such an eventuality has made appropriate provisions in sub-sections (2) and (3). In any case it was contended those sub-sections cannot possibly be read as conferring a right on a member of such a club or association to hold any number of firearms in an individual capacity. According to Mr. Farasat, if the contention as advocated on behalf of the Appellant and which was reiterated by the Associations were accepted, it would lead to absurd results with the members of a rifle association or club being recognized to hold any number of weapons without any limit on the total number of arms that may be held by them. Mr. Farasat contends that such an interpretation would result in doing violence to the provisions of the Arms Act and Section 3 itself.

17. Mr. Farasat further contended that Section 3(3) itself links the possession of a firearm by a member of an association to its use for target practice. It was pointed out that as per the provisions of Rule 37 of the 2016 Rules and more particularly sub-section (4) thereof, a member of a rifle club or association is granted the right to take a weapon which may otherwise be licensed to that club or association, out of its premises for various purposes including the use of that weapon at a shooting range for training or target practice or for participation in a shooting competition. It was contended that it is to this limited extent alone and to cater to a situation where an individual by virtue of being a member of an association or club may come to hold or possess firearms in excess of two temporarily, that sub-sections (2) and (3) have been incorporated into the Arms Act.

18. Insofar as the notification permitting certain categories and classes of sportspersons to hold firearms in excess of the limit prescribed in Section 3(2) is concerned, Mr. Farasat drew the attention of the Court to the provisions of Section 41 of the Act and the power of the Central Government to grant exemption to persons or a class of persons. It was thus submitted that the notification of 12.02.2020 is liable to be understood and appreciated in that light alone.

19. It was lastly urged by Mr. Farasat that no provision of the Act confers a distinct character or independent rights on members of rifle clubs or associations. He contends that the Guidelines issued by the Ministry of Home Affairs have rightly explained the provisions of Section 3 and thus urges this Court to dismiss the writ petition.

20. Learned Counsel for NRAI supports the contention of the Appellant herein.

21. Heard the parties and perused the material on record.

22. It is well settled that Courts must ordinarily give grammatical meaning to every word used by the legislature and this rule is normally avoided when the language used will lead to absurd results. This has been succinctly explained by the Apex Court in G. Narayanaswami v. G. Pannerselvam, (1972) 3 SCC 717. The relevant extract of the said judgment reads as under:

23. As a general rule, the language of a statute should be read as it is. Courts should not venture into an exercise to interpret or construe the statute when there is no obscurity or ambiguity in the intention of the legislature. The Hon‟ble Supreme Court has expounded this principle in J.P. Bansal v. State of Rajasthan, (2003) 5 SCC 134, wherein it held as under:

24. The literal rule of construction requires that the Courts must understand the words in their natural, ordinary or popular sense and phrases and sentences are construed according to their grammatical meaning. In Vijay Narayan Thatte v. State of Maharashtra, (2009) 9 SCC 92, the Apex Court has stated:- “22. In our opinion, when the language of the statute is plain and clear then the literal rule of interpretation has to be applied and there is ordinarily no scope for consideration of equity, public interest or seeking the intention of the legislature. It is only when the language of the statute is not clear or ambiguous or there is some conflict, etc. or the plain language leads to some absurdity that one can depart from the literal rule of interpretation. A perusal of the proviso to Section 6 shows that the language of the proviso is clear. Hence the literal rule of interpretation must be applied to it. When there is a conflict between the law and equity it is the law which must prevail. As stated in the Latin maxim dura lex sed lex which means “the law is hard but it is the law”.”

25. The principle of literal interpretation also requires that each word in a statute must be given effect to and there is a presumption that every word used by the legislature is intentional. In Nathi Devi v. Radha Devi Gupta, (2005) 2 SCC 271, a Constitution Bench of the Hon‟ble Supreme Court has stated that: “14. It is equally well settled that in interpreting a statute, effort should be made to give effect to each and every word used by the legislature. The courts always presume that the legislature inserted every part thereof for a purpose and the legislative intention is that every part of the statute should have effect. A construction which attributes redundancy to the legislature will not be accepted except for compelling reasons such as obvious drafting errors. (See State of U.P. v. Dr. Vijay Anand Maharaj [AIR 1963 SC 946: (1963) 1 SCR 1], Rananjaya Singh v. Baijnath Singh [AIR 1954 SC 749: (1955) 1 SCR 671], Kanai Lal Sur v. Paramnidhi Sadhukhan [AIR 1957 SC 907: 1958 SCR 360], Nyadar Singh v. Union of India [(1988) 4 SCC 170: 1988 SCC (L&S) 934: (1988) 8 ATC 226: AIR 1988 SC 1979], J.K. Cotton Spg. and Wvg. Mills Co. Ltd. v. State of U.P. [AIR 1961 SC 1170] and Ghanshyamdas v. CST [AIR 1964 SC 766: (1964) 4 SCR 436].)”

26. An aspect of the general principle that the language of the statute should be read as it is, is that Courts should avoid adding or substituting words into a statute, as that would amount to legislation by the Court. Even where there is an existence of a casus omissus, i.e., there has been an omission on the part of the legislature while enacting the statute, the Courts ought not to introduce words to the statute. There is a presumption against casus omissus and the Court should only introduce words into the legislation when it is a clear case of necessity and the reason to do so is found within the four corners of the legislation itself. This principle has been explained by a Constitution Bench of the Apex Court in Padma Sundara Rao v. State of T.N., (2002) 3 SCC 533, wherein the Court held as under: “15. Two principles of construction — one relating to casus omissus and the other in regard to reading the statute as a whole — appear to be well settled. Under the first principle a casus omissus cannot be supplied by the court except in the case of clear necessity and when reason for it is found in the four corners of the statute itself but at the same time a casus omissus should not be readily inferred and for that purpose all the parts of a statute or section must be construed together and every clause of a section should be construed with reference to the context and other clauses thereof so that the construction to be put on a particular provision makes a consistent enactment of the whole statute. This would be more so if literal construction of a particular clause leads to manifestly absurd or anomalous results which could not have been intended by the legislature. “An intention to produce an unreasonable result”, said Danckwerts, L.J., in Artemiou v. Procopiou [(1966) 1 QB 878: (1965) 3 All ER 539: (1965) 3 WLR 1011 (CA)] (at All ER p. 544-I), “is not to be imputed to a statute if there is some other construction available”. Where to apply words literally would “defeat the obvious intention of the legislation and produce a wholly unreasonable result”, we must “do some violence to the words” and so achieve that obvious intention and produce a rational construction. [Per Lord Reid in Luke v. IRC [1963 AC 557: (1963) 1 All ER 655: (1963) 2 WLR 559 (HL)] where at AC p. 577 he also observed: (All ER p. 664-I) “This is not a new problem, though our standard of drafting is such that it rarely emerges.”]”

27. Only when there are doubts regarding the meaning of words as used in a Statute, it is appropriate for the Court to look at the object and purpose of the statute. In such scenarios, the purposive rule of construction requires that the words of a statute must be understood in the sense in which they harmonise with, and help in furthering the purpose for which the legislation was enacted. It is ordinarily preferred to apply the principle of purposive construction when literal construction leads to an absurdity. In Shailesh Dhairyawan v. Mohan Balkrishna Lulla, (2016) 3 SCC 619, the Apex Court explained the principle of purposive construction as under:

32. Of the aforesaid three components, namely, language, purpose and discretion “of the court”, insofar as purposive component is concerned, this is the ratio juris, the purpose at the core of the text. This purpose is the values, goals, interests, policies and aims that the text is designed to actualise. It is the function that the text is designed to fulfil.

33. We may also emphasise that the statutory interpretation of a provision is never static but is always dynamic. Though the literal rule of interpretation, till some time ago, was treated as the “golden rule”, it is now the doctrine of purposive interpretation which is predominant, particularly in those cases where literal interpretation may not serve the purpose or may lead to absurdity. If it brings about an end which is at variance with the purpose of statute, that cannot be countenanced. Not only legal process thinkers such as Hart and Sacks rejected intentionalism as a grand strategy for statutory interpretation, and in its place they offered purposivism, this principle is now widely applied by the courts not only in this country but in many other legal systems as well.” (emphasis supplied)

28. From the aforesaid decisions, it becomes clear that the general principle for interpretation of statute is that it is expedient to give meaning to each word used in the statute, its ordinary and plain meaning. The rule of literal interpretation provides that the words used in a statute must be given the meaning they have in the natural, ordinary or popular sense. In the event that applying the literal rule of construction results in an absurdity, the Courts should rely upon the principle of purposive interpretation, which requires the Courts to construe the statute in a harmonious manner, such that it furthers the object and purpose for which the statute was enacted. Courts should not introduce, add or substitute words to a statute in the ordinary course and should only do so when there is a clear case of necessity and should be done within the four corners of the statute.

29. Coming to the interpretation of Section 3(2) of the Arms Act, prior to the amendment in 2019, a person could have acquired, possessed or carried three firearms as per Section 3(2) of the Arms Act. By way of amendment in 2019, the number of fire arms which a person could acquire, possess, or carry has been reduced to two firearms from three.

30. The contention of the Appellant herein that the purpose of bringing the amendment is only for curbing illegal arms trafficking alone and the amendment is to be seen only in this context cannot be accepted. The purpose of amendment is to bring down the number of firearms in the possession of persons holding a license. This fact is more evident from the fact that prior to 1983 a person was entitled to possess more than three fire arms which was reduced to three by way of an amendment in 1983 and by the present amendment, i.e., amendment of 2019, the figure has further been reduced to two from three. It is in this backdrop that Section 3 of the Arms Act needs to be interpreted.

31. Section 3(2) of the Arms Act deals with two categories of persons on whom embargo of Section 3(3) of the Act shall not apply. The first category being a dealer of firearms who can acquire and possess more than two firearms, however, as regards the second category, i.e. a member of rifle club or association recognized by the Central Government, is concerned, the Arms Act provides that such a member can “use” the third firearm for target practice. The short question which arises for consideration is as to whether the permission to use the third fire arm which can only be a.22 bore rifle or an air rifle for target practice would permit a member of the rifle club or association to acquire, possess and carry the third firearm at all times or not. At this juncture it is apposite to peruse Section 13 of the Arms Act which deals with grant of license. Section 13 of the Arms Act reads as under:

32. Section 13(3) provides that the licensing authority has to grant a license in respect of a firearm for the purpose of target practice by such a member. Without such a license, a firearm, including a.22 bore rifle cannot be used for target practice. Reading Section 13 and Section 3(3) of the Arms Act, the conclusion one can reach is that a member of a rifle club or rifle association also cannot acquire, possess or carry more than two firearms but they can use the third firearm only for the purpose of target practice for which they have to obtain a license under Section 13 of the Arms Act. A member of the rifle club or rifle association holding two fire arms cannot acquire, possess and carry the third firearm even for target practice as that possession would become illegal subjecting him to punishment under the Arms Act. Had it been the intention of the Central Government that a member of a rifle club or rifle association can acquire, possess and carry a.22 bore rifle or an air rifle firearm at all times, then the legislature would have not restricted the Section by inserting the word “using”. In so far as the member of a rifle club or association is concerned he is permitted to only use a.22 bore rifle or an air rifle for target practice even if he has two other firearms.

33. At this juncture, it is relevant to refer to Section 2(1)(a) of the Arms Act which defines the term „acquisition‟ and which includes hiring and borrowing a fire arm. Section 2(1)(a) of the Arms Act reads as under: "2(1) In this Act, unless the context otherwise requires,- (a) acquisition, with its grammatical variations and cognate expressions, includes hiring, borrowing, or accepting as a gift;" (emphasis supplied)

34. A reading of Section 2(1)(a), Section 3(3) and Section 13 of the Arms Act leads to only one conclusion, that a member of a rifle club or association who already possess two fire arms can hire or borrow a.22 bore rifle or an air rifle from a person or the rifle club or association or from the authority where the third firearm has been deposited for using it for the purpose of target practice or for a competition and for that limited period of its use the possession of the third fire arm becomes legal.

35. Section 41 of the Arms Act deals with the power of the Government to grant exemption to categories of persons from the provisions of Arms Act. Notifications have been issued by the Government permitting sports persons to hold fire arms more than the specified limit. A member of the rifle club or association does not fall under the exempted category under Section 41 of the Act. A special exemption for possessing a third firearm which includes a.22 bore rifle or an air rifle in addition to two fire arms cannot be read into Section 3(3) of the Arms Act as it will become contrary to the object of the Government in reducing the number of firearms which can be held by a person.

36. The word “using” has only been given its grammatical meaning and it means that a member of a rifle club or association, therefore, will have the liberty to borrow a.22 bore rifle or an air rifle from the rifle club or association or the authority where the weapon has been deposited and use the same for the purpose of target practice or for a competition and return the same to the authority from where it was borrowed otherwise the word “use” would lose its significance. This is not a case of casus omissus where the Courts have to read into a Section as there was an omission on the part of the legislature. The legislature has deliberately used the words “acquire”, “possess” and “use” in the same Section in different connotations and each word must be given its grammatical meaning while interpreting the Section. The provision must be construed in a manner to give effect to each word used by the legislature and in a manner to further the purpose for which the legislation was enacted i.e., to reduce the number of firearms that could be possessed by an individual.

37. Had the legislature intended to exempt a member of a rifle club or association to possess a.22 bore rifle or an air rifle for all times then the Section would have simply read that nothing contained in sub-section (2) shall apply to any dealer in firearms or to any member of a rifle club or rifle association licensed or recognised by the Central Government from possessing a.22 bore rifle or an air rifle for target practice. The only permission that has been granted to possess a third firearm is only for the purpose of using it for target practice for which a license is required under Section 13(3) of the Act. Other than the limited period of using a firearms for target practice or for participation in a competition, a member of rifle club or rifle association cannot possess the third fire arm. Had such a permission not been given, then the possession of a third fire arm by a member of a rifle association or rifle club even for target practice would become illegal making such a person vulnerable to the rigours under the Act.

38. This Court, therefore, does not find any infirmity in the Order passed by the learned Single Judge. Resultantly, the appeal is dismissed.

SATISH CHANDRA SHARMA, C.J. SUBRAMONIUM PRASAD, J APRIL 13, 2023