Vikas Jain v. Union of India & Ors.

31. These conditions which stood under paragraph 10 of the Scheme are reproduced hereunder:-

32. With subsequent amendments and modifications in the successive years, the Scheme ultimately provided for the following eligibility criteria for allotment of alternate plot:- Digitaaly

33. Further, a Division Bench of this Court in Government of NCT of Delhi vs. Veerwati, 2012 SCC OnLine Del 1444, and its connected LPAs, held that there are four requisite conditions for consideration while filing and adjudicating the application for allotment of alternative plot. The relevant portion of the judgment is reproduced hereunder:-

34. The same have also been reiterated by a Division Bench of this Court in Ranjeet Singh vs. Govt. (NCT of Delhi), 2017 SCC OnLine Del 10794, wherein it was observed as under:-

35. The conditions stipulated as above have stemmed from the Scheme of 1961 and its subsequent amendments and hence, have to be given foremost importance while making an application for allotment of alternative plot and while its consideration by the concerned authority. Evidently, the condition of the applicant being a recorded owner of the plot in question prior to the issuance of notification under Section 4 of the LA Act is a condition which finds mention in the first notified Scheme as well as its modified versions and has also been reiterated by the Division Benches. Therefore, there is no doubt that it is one of the crucial and indispensable condition Digitaaly which needs to be fulfilled while making/considering an application for allotment of alternative plot.

36. In the instant matter, the applicant was not found to be the recorded owner of the plot which was acquired by the respondent no. 3. On the contrary, it is the case of the petitioner that the applicant had purchased the land in question on 10th February 1959 by executing a sale deed. The eligibility criterion for allotment of alternative plot has been clarified by the Division bench of this Court in Ranjeet Singh (Supra).

37. As per the Scheme, for cases where the ancestral lands are acquired for the purposes of development, the applicant whose land is so acquired should be a recorded owner of the same. In the case at hand, admittedly, the land in question was not the ancestral property of applicant/ predecessor-in-interest of the petitioner. Therefore, to this extent the Scheme of 1961 was not applicable to the applicant.

38. The second situation which remains after ineligibility of the applicant for the reason of the land in question not being her ancestral property, is ascertaining her right, entitlement and eligibility keeping in view the rights of the individuals in cases for transferred properties. To this aspect, the Division Bench in Ranjeet Singh (Supra) noted that where the land acquired is not an ancestral land and the landowner is not the recorded owner of such property but has had the same transferred in his name, such transfer by way of regular deed, should be executed five years prior to the notification for acquisition of land and be mutated in his favour, for him to be eligible for allotment of alternative plot. The petitioner herein claims that the applicant had purchased the land in question much prior to the Notification dated 13th November 1959 was issued, however, even to his claim the same was purchased only on 10th February 1959, i.e, merely nine months prior to the issuance of the Notification. Therefore, in this expansive interpretation and difference in applicability of conditions in case of ancestral property and transferred property too, the case of the applicant did fall under the Scheme of 1961 and the conditions laid therein. Digitaaly

39. The petitioner has also contended that compensation for plot acquired was provided to the applicant which showed that she was the rightful owner of the plot so acquired, however, the background and objective of the Scheme shows that measures like providing compensation or an alternative plot in lieu of acquisition are welfare measures for those whose lands are acquired for development purposes and to ensure that they are not rendered landless, remediless or without any relief upon such acquisition. Even the Award in favour of the predecessorin-interest of the petitioner was in the nature of an interim and immediate welfare and relief measure to accommodate her sustenance till the time she was re-placed.

40. Hence, in light of the conditions laid down under the Scheme of 1961, the eligibility criteria interpreted by the larger benches of this Court and after examining the case of the petitioner, without conducting a roving inquiry into the facts and evidence of the case, it is found that the claim of the applicant for allotment of alternative plot was rightly rejected by the respondents. There is no error apparent on the face of record or any gross illegality in the order passed by the concerned authority after scrutiny of the applicant’s case on merits.

41. Furthermore, in the instant case, as is evident from the record, the petitioner approached the Court in the year 2018 after having the application for allotment of alternative plot rejected on 19th June 1998 and it is a well-known principle that delay defeats equity - “Vigilantibus non dormientibus aequitas subvenit” which means that equity assists the vigilant and not those who sleep on their rights. There is an unreasonable delay in bringing forth a claim by the petitioner which in itself is a major hurdle in granting relief to the claimant, especially when the delay is substantial, i.e, of 20 years.

42. Keeping in view the facts and circumstances, the submissions on behalf of the parties, contentions made in the pleadings, as well as observations and discussions in the foregoing paragraphs, this Court finds that the impugned rejection order dated 19th June 1998 does not warrant any Digitaaly interference from this Court since there is no cogent reason to set aside the same.

43. Accordingly, the instant petition is dismissed for being devoid of merits. Pending application, if any, also stand disposed of.

44. The order be uploaded on the website forthwith. ”

6. It is an undisputed fact that the application for allotment of an alternative plot was rejected on 19.06.1998, and after a lapse of 20 years a Writ Petition was preferred by the Petitioner. The Learned Single Judge has held the petition to be hopelessly barred by delay and laches. In the considered opinion of this Court as the Appellant was not vigilant about his right and woke up from slumber only after about 20 years, the Learned Single Judge was justified in dismissing the Writ Petition on the ground of delay and laches.

7. The Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of Basawaraj and Another Vs. Special Land Acquisition Officer, (2013) 14 SCC 81 has dealt with the issue of condonation of delay. It was a case under the Land Acquisition Act, 1894 and the Appellant land owner preferred an Appeal before the High Court after a delay of about five and a half years for enhancement of compensation. The Hon’ble Supreme Court in Paragraph Nos. 12 to 16 has held as under:

13. The statute of limitation is founded on public policy, its aim being to secure peace in the community, to suppress fraud and perjury, to quicken diligence and to prevent oppression. It seeks to bury all acts of the past which have not been agitated unexplainably and have from lapse of time become stale. According to Halsbury's Laws of England, Vol. 28, p. 266: “605. Policy of the Limitation Acts.—The courts have expressed at least three differing reasons supporting the existence of statutes of limitations namely, (1) that long dormant claims have more of cruelty than justice in them, (2) that a defendant might have lost the evidence to disprove a stale claim, and (3) that persons with good causes of actions should pursue them with reasonable diligence.” An unlimited limitation would lead to a sense of insecurity and uncertainty, and therefore, limitation prevents disturbance or deprivation of what may have been acquired in equity and justice by long enjoyment or what may have been lost by a party's own inaction, negligence or laches. (See Popat and Kotecha Property v. SBI Staff Assn. [(2005) 7 SCC 510], Rajender Singh v. Santa Singh [(1973) 2 SCC 705: AIR 1973 SC 2537] and Pundlik Jalam Patil v. Jalgaon Medium Project [(2008) 17 SCC 448: (2009) 5 SCC (Civ) 907].)

14. In P. Ramachandra Rao v. State of Karnataka [(2002) 4 SCC 578: 2002 SCC (Cri) 830: AIR 2002 SC 1856] this Court held that judicially engrafting principles of limitation amounts to legislating and would fly in the face of law laid down by the Constitution Bench in Abdul Rehman Antulay v. R.S. Digitaaly Nayak [(1992) 1 SCC 225: 1992 SCC (Cri) 93: AIR 1992 SC 1701].

15. The law on the issue can be summarised to the effect that where a case has been presented in the court beyond limitation, the applicant has to explain the court as to what was the “sufficient cause” which means an adequate and enough reason which prevented him to approach the court within limitation. In case a party is found to be negligent, or for want of bona fide on his part in the facts and circumstances of the case, or found to have not acted diligently or remained inactive, there cannot be a justified ground to condone the delay. No court could be justified in condoning such an inordinate delay by imposing any condition whatsoever. The application is to be decided only within the parameters laid down by this Court in regard to the condonation of delay. In case there was no sufficient cause to prevent a litigant to approach the court on time condoning the delay without any justification, putting any condition whatsoever, amounts to passing an order in violation of the statutory provisions and it tantamounts to showing utter disregard to the legislature.

16. In view of above, no interference is required with the impugned judgment and order [Basawaraj v. Land Acquisition Officer, MFA No. 10766 of 2007, decided on 10-6-2011 (KAR)] of the High Court. The appeals lack merit and are, accordingly, dismissed.”

8. The Hon’ble Supreme Court had dismissed the Appeal preferred against the judgment of the High Court as no sufficient cause was explained in the matter of delay and laches.

9. The Hon’ble Supreme Court again in the matter of condonation of delay in the case of University of Delhi Vs. Union of India and Others, (2020) 13 SCC 745 while dismissing the Civil Appeal on the ground of delay and laches in Paragraphs 19 to 24 and 31 to 32 has held as under: Digitaaly “19. Though we have exhaustively referred to the pleadings and the contentions of the parties, including contentions put forth on merits, the same is only for completeness and to put the matter in perspective before considering the issue relating to delay and laches. In the instant case, considering that the Division Bench [University of Delhi v. Union of India, 2018 SCC OnLine Del 12085] of the High Court has dismissed the LPA on the ground of delay of 916 days, that aspect of the matter would require consideration at the outset and the facts on merits are noted to the limited extent to find out whether in that background the public interest would suffer.

20. The learned Senior Counsel for the appellant in order to impress upon this Court the principle relating to consideration of “sufficient cause” for condonation of delay and the factors that are required to be kept in view, has relied on the decision in LAO v. Katiji [LAO v. Katiji, (1987) 2 SCC 107] wherein it is held as hereunder: (SCC pp. 108-09, para 3) “3. The legislature has conferred the power to condone delay by enacting Section 5 [ Any appeal or any application, other than an application under any of the provisions of Order XXI of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908, may be admitted after the prescribed period if the appellant or the applicant satisfies the court that he had sufficient cause for not preferring the appeal or making the application within such period.] of the Limitation Act, 1963 in order to enable the courts to do substantial justice to parties by disposing of matters on “merits”. The expression “sufficient cause” employed by the legislature is adequately elastic to enable the courts to apply the law in a meaningful manner which subserves the ends of justice—that being the life-purpose for the existence of the institution of courts. It is common knowledge that this Court has been making a justifiably liberal approach in matters instituted in this Court. But the message does not appear to have percolated down to all the other courts in the hierarchy. And such a liberal approach is adopted on principle as it is realised that: Digitaaly

1. Ordinarily a litigant does not stand to benefit by lodging an appeal late.

2. Refusing to condone delay can result in a meritorious matter being thrown out at the very threshold and cause of justice being defeated. As against this when delay is condoned the highest that can happen is that a cause would be decided on merits after hearing the parties.

3. “Every day's delay must be explained” does not mean that a pedantic approach should be made. Why not every hour's delay, every second's delay? The doctrine must be applied in a rational common sense pragmatic manner.

4. When substantial justice and technical considerations are pitted against each other, cause of substantial justice deserves to be preferred for the other side cannot claim to have vested right in injustice being done because of a non-deliberate delay.

5. There is no presumption that delay is occasioned deliberately, or on account of culpable negligence, or on account of mala fides. A litigant does not stand to benefit by resorting to delay. In fact he runs a serious risk.

6. It must be grasped that judiciary is respected not on account of its power to legalise injustice on technical grounds but because it is capable of removing injustice and is expected to do so. Making a justice-oriented approach from this perspective, there was sufficient cause for condoning the delay in the institution of the appeal. The fact that it was the “State” which was seeking condonation and not a private party was altogether irrelevant. The doctrine of equality before law demands that all litigants, including the State as a litigant, are accorded the same treatment and the law is administered in an even-handed manner. Digitaaly There is no warrant for according a step-motherly treatment when the “State” is the applicant praying for condonation of delay. In fact experience shows that on account of an impersonal machinery (no one in charge of the matter is directly hit or hurt by the judgment sought to be subjected to appeal) and the inherited bureaucratic methodology imbued with the note-making, file-pushing and passing-on-the-buck ethos, delay on its part is less difficult to understand though more difficult to approve. In any event, the State which represents the collective cause of the community, does not deserve a litigantnongrata status. The courts therefore have to be informed with the spirit and philosophy of the provision in the course of the interpretation of the expression “sufficient cause”. So also the same approach has to be evidenced in its application to matters at hand with the end in view to do even-handed justice on merits in preference to the approach which scuttles a decision on merits. Turning to the facts of the matter giving rise to the present appeal, we are satisfied that sufficient cause exists for the delay. The order of the High Court dismissing the appeal before it as time-barred, is therefore, set aside. Delay is condoned. And the matter is remitted to the High Court. The High Court will now dispose of the appeal on merits after affording reasonable opportunity of hearing to both the sides.”(emphasis in original)

21. Further the decision in Dehri Rohtas Light Railway Co. Ltd. v. District Board, Bhojpur [Dehri Rohtas Light Railway Co. Ltd. v. District Board, Bhojpur, (1992) 2 SCC 598] is relied upon, wherein this Court has indicated the real test to determine the delay is that the petitioner should come to Court before a parallel right is created and that the lapse of time is not attributable to any laches or negligence.

22. The learned Senior Counsel for Respondent 13, on the other hand, has relied upon the decision in Postmaster General v. Living Media (India) Ltd. [Postmaster General v. Living Media (India) Ltd., (2012) 3 SCC 563: (2012) 2 SCC (Civ) 327: Digitaaly (2012) 2 SCC (Cri) 580: (2012) 1 SCC (L&S) 649] wherein it is held as hereunder: (SCC p. 574, paras 28-29)

23. From a consideration of the view taken by this Court through the decisions cited supra the position is clear that, by and large, a liberal approach is to be taken in the matter of condonation of delay. The consideration for condonation of delay would not depend on the status of the party, namely, the Government or the public bodies so as to apply a different yardstick but the ultimate consideration should be to render even-handed justice to the parties. Even in such case the condonation of long delay should not be automatic since the Digitaaly accrued right or the adverse consequence to the opposite party is also to be kept in perspective. In that background while considering condonation of delay, the routine explanation would not be enough but it should be in the nature of indicating “sufficient cause” to justify the delay which will depend on the backdrop of each case and will have to be weighed carefully by the courts based on the fact situation. In Katiji [LAO v. Katiji, (1987) 2 SCC 107] the entire conspectus relating to condonation of delay has been kept in focus. However, what cannot also be lost sight of is that the consideration therein was in the background of dismissal of the application seeking condonation of delay in a case where there was delay of four days pitted against the consideration that was required to be made on merits regarding the upward revision of compensation amounting to 800%.

24. As against the same, the delay in the instant facts in filing the LPA is 916 days and as such the consideration to condone can be made only if there is reasonable explanation and the condonation cannot be merely because the appellant is public body. The entire explanation noticed above, depicts the casual approach unmindful of the law of limitation despite being aware of the position of law. That apart when there is such a long delay and there is no proper explanation, laches would also come into play while noticing as to the manner in which a party has proceeded before filing an appeal. In addition in the instant facts not only the delay and laches in filing the appeal is contended on behalf of the respondents seeking dismissal of the instant appeal but it is also contended that there was delay and laches in filing the writ petition itself at the first instance from which the present appeal had arisen. In that view, it would be necessary for us to advert to those aspects of the matter and notice the nature of consideration made in the writ petition as well as the LPA to arrive at a conclusion as to whether the High Court was justified.

XXXXXX

31. In the matter of condonation of delay and laches, the wellaccepted position is also that the accrued right of the opposite Digitaaly party cannot be lightly dealt with. In that regard, rather than taking note of the hardship that would be caused to Respondent 13 as contended by the learned Senior Counsel, what is necessary to be taken note of is the manner in which Respondent 11, DMRC has proceeded in the matter. Respondent 11, DMRC is engaged in providing the public transport and for the said purpose the Government through policy decision has granted approval to generate resources through property development and in that regard the development as earlier indicated, is taken up. Pursuant thereto Respondent 11 has received a sum of Rs 218.20 crores from Respondent 13 as far back as in the year 2008. The said amount as indicated is used for its projects providing metro rail service to the commuting public. In such circumstance, if at this stage the inordinate delay is condoned unmindful of the lackadaisical manner in which the appellant has proceeded in the matter, it would also be contrary to public interest.

32. Therefore, taking into consideration all these aspects of the matter, we are of the opinion that not only the learned Single Judge was justified in holding that the writ petition inter alia is hit by delay and laches but the decision of the Division Bench in dismissing the LPA on the ground of delay of 916 days is also justified and the orders do not call for interference.”

10. In light of the aforesaid judgment, as there was an inordinate delay of about 20 years in approaching the Court, the Learned Single Judge was justified in holding that the Petition suffers from delay and laches.

11. A similar view has been expressed by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the judgment delivered in the case of Union of India and Others Vs. N. Murugesan and Others, (2022) 2 SCC 25. Paragraph Nos. 21 to 23 and 40 of the said judgment read as under: “21. The word “laches” is derived from the French language meaning “remissness and slackness”. It thus involves Digitaaly unreasonable delay or negligence in pursuing a claim involving an equitable relief while causing prejudice to the other party. It is neglect on the part of a party to do an act which law requires while asserting a right, and therefore, must stand in the way of the party getting relief or remedy.

22. Two essential factors to be seen are the length of the delay and the nature of acts done during the interval. As stated, it would also involve acquiescence on the part of the party approaching the court apart from the change in position in the interregnum. Therefore, it would be unjustifiable for a Court of Equity to confer a remedy on a party who knocks its doors when his acts would indicate a waiver of such a right. By his conduct, he has put the other party in a particular position, and therefore, it would be unreasonable to facilitate a challenge before the court. Thus, a man responsible for his conduct on equity is not expected to be allowed to avail a remedy.

23. A defence of laches can only be allowed when there is no statutory bar. The question as to whether there exists a clear case of laches on the part of a person seeking a remedy is one of fact and so also that of prejudice. The said principle may not have any application when the existence of fraud is pleaded and proved by the other side. To determine the difference between the concept of laches and acquiescence is that, in a case involving mere laches, the principle of estoppel would apply to all the defences that are available to a party. Therefore, a defendant can succeed on the various grounds raised by the plaintiff, while an issue concerned alone would be amenable to acquiescence.

XXXXXXXX

40. We find, much water has already flown under the bridge. The private respondent has already been appointed in 2016 after following the due procedure and continues to date. The respondent is an ex-employee of the first appellant Society and, having put in 23 years of service, knows its functioning very well. Thus, in our considered view the order passed by the Digitaaly Division Bench [N. Murugesan v. Union of India, 2019 SCC OnLine Kar 514] cannot be sustained in the eye of the law.”

12. The Delhi High Court in the case of Mange Ram Vs. Delhi Development Authorit, 2010:DHC:4675-DB has again considered the issue of delay and laches. Paragraph Nos. 9 to 21 of the said judgment read as under:

11. In Smt. Sundari Bala Vs. Lt. Governor & Ors., 86 (2000) DLT 505, it has been held as under:-

6. In the present case the application of the petitioner was not rejected on the ground that she is not entitled to be considered for allotment of an alternative plot in lieu of her acquired land. The ground for rejection of her application was that her case was time barred as she was to submit her application before 15.12.1963 whereas she submitted an application in 1982, for the land acquired by award dated 20.10.1961. Thus there was no Explanation at all worth the name for the delay in filing the application. therefore, there is was inordinate delay and laches in petitioner approaching the Competent Authority for allotment of the alternative plot in lieu of her acquired land. In this connection reference may be made to a Division Bench decision of this Court in Jaswant Kaur (Supra) wherein this court dismissed a similar petition on the ground of gross delay and laches. In the said case the petitioner claimed to have made an application for allotment of an alternative plot of land on 17.4.1965, but the respondent DDA denied having received any such application. The writ petition was filed on the basis of the impugned decision communicated by letter dated 3.12.1990 which was taken on the application of the petitioner dated 19.7.1989, which was held to be highly belated. In my considered opinion the facts of the said case are similar to the case in hand and therefore, the ratio of the aforesaid decision is squarely applicable to the facts of the present case.

7. In Star Wire (India) Ltd. Vs. State of Haryana, (1996) 11 SCC 698 the Supreme Court after referring to Digitaaly the ratio laid down in various earlier decisions of the Supreme Court held that laches close the gates of the courts for a person who approaches the court belatedly. While coming to the aforesaid conclusion the Supreme Court relied upon an earlier decision of the Apex Court in Municipal Corporation of Greater Bombay Vs. Industrial Development & Investment Co. (P) Ltd., AIR 1997 SC 482. In State of Maharashtra Vs. Digambar, AIR 1995 SC 1991, it was held by the Supreme Court that when the writ petitioner was guilty of laches or undue delay in approaching the High Court, the principle of laches or undue delay disentitled the writ petitioner for discretionary relief under Article 226. Although the aforesaid two decisions were rendered in the context of delay and laches of the petitioner in approaching the High Court under Article 226, I do not see any reason why similar consideration should not be made applicable to a matter where a time limit was fixed for approaching the authority and doing the needful and the same was done after expiry of period of 13 years.”

12. In Sunder Singh (since deceased) Through his Legal Heir (supra), this Court has opined thus:

13. At this juncture, we may advert to the decisions referred to by the learned counsel for the appellant. In S.B. Kishore (supra), the Apex Court directed that the owner of the land was entitled to allotment of a plot of land under the scheme though he had approached the High Court after 19 years. Be it noted, in paragraph 6 of the said decision, their Lordships opined thus:-

14. In view of the aforesaid, the said decision cannot be treated as a precedent for absolvation of the principle of delay and laches.

15. In M/s. Dehri Rohtas Light Railway Company Limited (supra), the Apex Court distinguished the decision rendered in Tilokchand and Motichand and Ors. v. H.B. Munshi and Anr., AIR 1970 SC 898 and held as under:-

16. On a perusal of the aforesaid decision, it is perceptible that the decision is distinguishable on the facts inasmuch as in that case, circumstances did not exist justifying the conduct and illegality was so manifest that it could not be sustained on the sole ground of laches.

17. In K. Thimmappa & Ors. (supra), the Apex Court, while dealing with the doctrine of delay and laches, in paragraph 9, has held as under:- Digitaaly

18. Be it noted, in the said case, the question that arose for consideration was totally different inasmuch as the matter was related to confirmation of the State Bank employees and the fact whether classification or the determination invited the frown of Article 14 of the Constitution of India. In view of the aforesaid factual basis, we are disposed to think that the said decision is also distinguishable.

19. Having adverted to the citations which have been placed before us, we are inclined to think that the decisions rendered in Sunder Singh (since deceased) Thr. his Legal Heir (supra), Chandra Bose (supra) and Smt. Sundari Bala (supra) and Star Wire (India) Ltd. (supra) are applicable to the case at hand.

20. In view of our aforesaid analysis, we have no doubt that the writ petition has rightly been dismissed by the learned Single Judge as we perceive that the factum of delay relates back to

1958. We can only say that the appellant possibility harboured an ambition to avail the benefit which his father, during his lifetime, could not achieve. His claim for the right can possibly be in the realm of speculation but it cannot be in the sphere of reality. To elaborate, he cannot get the stale claim alive after five decades.

21. In the result, the appeal and application, being devoid of merit, are dismissed. There shall be no order as to costs in this appeal. However, regard being had to the anxiety nurtured by the appellant, the costs imposed by the learned Single Judge is made easy. ” Digitaaly

13. The aforesaid judgment was also in respect of allotment of alternative land, and in the aforesaid case also after expiry of 20 years a Writ Petition was preferred.

14. In light of the aforesaid judgments, this Court does not find any reason to interfere with the order passed by the Learned Single Judge, and the Learned Single Judge was justified in dismissing the Writ Petition on the ground of delay and laches.

15. In light of the aforesaid, this Court does not find any reason to interfere with the order passed by the Learned Single Judge, and the present LPA stands dismissed.

SATISH CHANDRA SHARMA, CJ YASHWANT VARMA, J APRIL 17, 2023 aks Digitaaly