Jangid Home Private Limited v. Slum Rehabilitation Authority

14. Mr. Sen pointed out that only grievance raised by Respondent No.5 in the said Application was based upon the letter dated 31st December, 2014 addressed by Respondent No.3 to the Petitioner, in which Respondent No.3 had merely called upon the Petitioner to take steps to mutate the Petitioner’s name in respective property cards and nothing more. He submitted that the grievance of Respondent No.5 based on the said letter was entirely misconceived, since the said letter in no manner suggested that the Petitioner was not the owner of the said lands but simply recorded that it was difficult to match the link between the holders as shown on the property card and the persons/heirs from whom the lands have been purchased for. He submitted that it was therefore the view of Respondent No.3 that once the Petitioner’s name was mutated in the property records, only then could Respondent No.3 opine on the ownership of the said land.

15. Mr. Sen submitted that the approach of Respondent No.3 was entirely wrong since Respondent No.3 instead of undertaking the exercise of verifying whether the Deeds of Conveyance submitted by the Petitioner related to the scheme lands, had merely recorded that Respondent No.3 could not match the names of the Petitioner on the land records without so much as even attempting to undertake the task or calling upon the Petitioner to explain/correlate the same. He submitted that this approach of Respondent No.3 amounted to Respondent No.3 abdicating its duty. He submitted that Respondent No.3 had simply taken a mechanical and high-handed approach instead of making a sincere attempt to match the names and/or verify the Petitioner’s title to the said lands. Learned Senior Counsel submitted that the insistence of Respondent No.3 to have the Petitioner’s name mutated on the property card for the purpose of giving an opinion was therefore completely unjustified. He submitted that out of the total scheme lands the Petitioner’s name admittedly reflected in the revenue records to the extent of 3,325 sq. mtrs. i.e., nearly 50% of the scheme lands. He submitted that the Respondent No.3 had failed to even consider this vital aspect.

16. Mr. Sen then submitted that Respondent No.6 had completely misconstrued the circulars issued by Respondent No.1 in observing that the five NOCs which were required as per the circular No.144 were conditions precedent to the acceptance of a proposal by Respondent No.1. He submitted that Respondent No.6 had also completely misconstrued the letter dated 2nd September, 2020 as being an acceptance of the said scheme when the same on the face of it was only a principal acceptance letter and nothing more. Mr. Sen then submitted that a plain reading of the principal acceptance letter made clear that Respondent No.1 had neither made nor overlooked the requirement of submission of the NOCs of Respondent No.3 or for that matter any of the authorities as required in terms of circular No. 144.

17. Mr. Sen submitted that it was only because the Petitioner had the requisite documents in support of his title/ownership, that Respondent No.1 had issued the principal acceptance letter. He submitted that the LOI would be issued subject to the Petitioner complying with the conditions set out in the said principal acceptance letter within 6 months. He therefore submitted that the practical view taken by Respondent No.1 to ensure speedy rehabilitation and development of slum lands had been wrongly interpreted and set aside by

18. Mr. Sen then submitted that Respondent No.6 had gravely erred in observing that Respondent No.1 had postponed the requirement of obtaining an NOC to a date subsequent to the “acceptance of the proposal”. He reiterated that the Petitioner’s proposal had in fact not been accepted and the sanction was only a provisional acceptance and nothing more. He therefore submitted that the Respondent No.6 had proceeded with the matter in a manner which was not only contrary to law, but also contrary to the circular issued by Respondent No.1. He submitted that the slum authorities were merely required to verify if the person/entity who submits a scheme is able to show documents in support of the ownership. He submitted that Respondent No.6 did not have jurisdiction to determine or go into the issue of ownership of the lands and/or construe/interpret documents to decide and conclude issues of title. He submitted that this jurisdiction vested only with the Civil Courts.

19. He then without prejudice submitted that, in the facts of the present case the Petitioner had in fact submitted and was able to establish that it had purchased the scheme lands from various persons. He submitted that despite the fact that the conveyance deeds were produced by the Petitioner, Respondent No.6 had concluded as follows:- “no title is created in respect of the entire slum plot in favour of Respondent No.4 M/s. Jangid Homes Pvt. Ltd. by the aforesaid twelve Registered Deeds of Conveyances & Unregistered Deed of Conveyance dated 19th November, 2019.” He submitted that the plain reading of the said conclusion would imply that Respondent No.6 had accepted that the Petitioner was the owner of part of the said lands despite which Respondent No.6 did not make any attempt to consider to what extent and how much land the Petitioner was owner in respect of.

20. Mr. Sen then submitted that Respondent No.6 had not considered the conveyance deeds produced by the Petitioner on two grounds (i) the letter dated 31st December, 2014 issued by Respondent No.3 and (ii) because the thirteenth conveyance deed dated 10th December, 2020 was unregistered. Mr. Sen submitted that with respect to the thirteenth Deed of Conveyance being unregistered, when the thirteenth Deed of Conveyance was submitted for registration, the office of the Deputy Director Town Planning recorded that CTS No.49 was not shown in the ready reckoner for 2020-2021 and accordingly requested Petitioner to confirm the zone and determine the market value of CTS No.49.

21. He therefore submitted that, despite the Petitioner being the actual owner of the scheme lands and in the absence of any challenge by a third person claiming title adverse to the title of the Petitioner, Respondent No.6 had on the basis of an untenable grievance raised by a sole member of Respondent No.4, cancelled the scheme and rendered findings in respect of title of the said land which both in fact and in law Respondent No.6 could never have. Mr. Sen submitted that the approach of Respondent No.1 in granting an principal acceptance letter by imposing conditions was the correct approach and was in accordance with the circulars issued and ought not have been displaced by

22. Mr. Sen in respect of the letter dated 25th November, 2020 which had been produced by Respondent No.5 along with its Affidavit dated 30th March, 2023 submitted that the said letter confirmed the contentions of the Petitioner that the thirteenth conveyance deed could not be registered since the area pertaining in respect of which the same was executed, was not found in the ready reckoner. He submitted that pursuant to the issuance of this letter, the Petitioner had not been called upon to pay any adjudicated amount or otherwise in respect of the said document. Mr. Sen pointed out that this letter had neither been communicated to the Petitioner nor was the Petitioner aware of the same. He submitted that it had yet to be verified that subsequent to the said letter whether the CTS No.49 has in fact been included in the ready reckoner. He submitted that regardless of the same, the basis of this letter having already been communicated to the Plaintiff, the Plaintiff was taking the necessary steps to follow up with the relevant authority seeking confirmation and to have the document stamped and registered.

23. In view of the above, Mr. Sen submitted that the principal acceptance letter dated 2nd September, 2020 was entirely legal and permissible under the scheme of the Act as well as the circulars issued by Respondent No.1. Mr. Sen submitted that even otherwise, considering that the Petitioner had been able to demonstrate/prove its title/ownership of the said land and had been given 6 months’ time to obtain the NOC pursuant to which an LOI would be granted, the procedure could not be faulted with and the summary exercise by Respondent No.6 to determine the ownership of the said land was completely illegal and impermissible.

24. Mr. Sen then submitted that the finding of Respondent No.6 qua the Application being incomplete and/or defective was also entirely misconceived and untenable since it was not the case of Respondent No.5 that the signature of the Chief Promoter was affixed on the proposal after the death of the Chief Promoter. Mr. Sen submitted that the Chief Promoter had affixed his signature during his lifetime, by the time and had passed away only after the proposal was submitted. Mr. Sen pointed out that this issue was one which could be rectified and/or ratified. He submitted that instead of according any opportunity to the Petitioner to either rectify and/or ratify the said application/proposal, Respondent No.6 had adopted the drastic step of cancelling the entire scheme. Mr. Sen then took pains to point out that Respondent No.4 society who was before the Court was in fact not raising any objection and/or opposition to the proposal submitted or appointment of Petitioner as developer. The objection was at the instance of only one slum dweller and that too someone who had consented to the appointment of the Petitioner as a developer.

25. In view of the aforesaid facts, Mr. Sen submitted that the impugned order dated 16th March, 2021 was ex-facie illegal perverse as the same effectively set aside the slum scheme on the basis of untenable contentions raised by a solitary slum dweller.

26. He therefore submitted that the impugned order dated 16th March, 2021 was liable to be quashed and set aside so that the Petitioner could in terms of the letter dated 2nd September, 2020 comply with the conditions mentioned in the said letter. He submitted that the period of 6 months has granted in the letter dated 2nd September, 2020 or to commence from the date of the order passed by this Court.

SUBMISSIONS OF MR.

CHINOY ON BEHALF OF THE RESPONDENT NO.5

27. At the outset Mr. Chinoy submitted that Respondent No.5 had locus to file the said Application since Respondent No.5 had a shop premises on the said land and was therefore directly interested and affected by any decision for the redevelopment of the said land. Mr. Chinoy submitted that Respondent No.5 would be left high and dry if the SRS was delayed or halted for any reason whatsoever. He submitted since the principal acceptance letter was patently illegal and thus would gravely prejudice the rights of Respondent No. 5.

28. Mr. Chinoy then submitted that the fact that Respondent No.5 had attended the meeting held on 21st July, 2013, in fact demonstrated that Respondent No.5 was interested in the affairs of the society and redevelopment of the said lands. Mr. Chinoy therefore submitted that Respondent No.5 was not approbating and reprobating his stand as contented but was acting in furtherance of his rights. He further submitted that the consent of Respondent No.5 in favour of the Petitioner during the meeting held on 21st July, 2013 was predicated upon the representations made by the Petitioner, that the Petitioner had clear title in respect of the subject lands. He submitted that it was only subsequently that Respondent No.5 learnt that the Petitioner’s representations were false and in view thereof Respondent No.5 had now chosen as a matter of duty to raise a grievance in respect of the false representations made by the Petitioner.

29. Mr. Chinoy then submitted that Respondent No.6 had correctly upheld the locus of Respondent No.5 in the impugned order by holding that Respondent No.5 “cannot be precluded from going into the merits of the case especially when a critical issue as to the manner in which the proposal has been submitted and the title of the owner is in issue.” Mr. Chinoy then submitted that even assuming that Respondent No.5 did not have any locus, it would be a travesty of justice to allow the principal acceptance letter dated 2nd September, 2020 to remain alive on the sole ground that Respondent No.5 had no locus when the same was ex-facie illegal. In support of his contention, he placed reliance upon a judgment of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of M. S. Jayaraj vs. Commissioner of Excise, Kerala[1].

30. Mr. Chinoy then submitted that the provisional acceptance letter was ex-facie illegal and invalid. He submitted that circular No.144 clearly stated that the NOCs of 5 departments listed therein was required before Respondent No.1 could give its approval for to a proposal for a SRS. He pointed out that one of the departments whose NOC was required was Respondent No.3 and that Respondent No.3 had vide its letter dated 31st December, 2014 clearly opined that the Petitioner did not have clear title in respect of the subject land. Mr. Chinoy submitted that despite this, the Engineering Department of Respondent No.1, in its report dated August, 2020 had made a handwritten endorsement stating, “approved as proposed subject to submission of U/T as mentioned in Para D”. He submitted that Respondent No.1 had in essence bypassed the essential requirements of obtaining the NOC from Respondent No.3 and proceeded to approve the proposal. Learned Senior Counsel submitted that pursuant to the aforesaid report, Respondent No.1 had issued the provisional letter of acceptance after 6 years from the date of the letter dated 31st December, 2014 issued by

31. Mr. Chinoy then submitted that Respondent No.6 had rightly held that in view of Respondent No.3’s report dated 31st December, 2014, that Respondent No.1 could not have postponed the requirement of obtaining the NOC from Respondent No.3 to a date after the proposal was accepted. He submitted that this was contrary to the mandatory requirement/condition precedent of the circular No.144.

32. Mr. Chinoy then submitted that Respondent No.6 had rightly observed that there had been a gross delay of about 6 years in processing the scheme i.e., from 31st December, 2014 till the grant of the provisional acceptance i.e. 2nd September, 2020. He submitted that the provisional acceptance letter effectively overturned and overrode the opinion/letter of Respondent No.3 dated 31st December, 2014. He submitted that this was impermissible and contrary to the scheme of the circular No. 144. Mr. Chinoy then submitted that if the present Writ Petition was allowed, this Court would effectively be setting aside the opinion of Respondent No.3 which was admittedly never challenged by the Petitioner. Mr. Chinoy submitted that what in law could not be done directly, cannot be done indirectly.

33. Mr. Chinoy then submitted that the Agreement for Sale dated 19th November, 2019 was a nullity. He submitted that after Respondent No.3 had refused to give its NOC to the Petitioner, the Petitioner had executed the Agreement for Sale dated 19th November, 2019 to show that the Petitioner had clear title over the subject land. Mr. Chinoy submitted that by doing so, the Petitioner sought to take advantage of the Circular dated 9th March, 2017 which eased certain conditions qua establishing title to the land in question. He submitted that under the Circular dated 9th March, 2017 a party could rely on inter alia a Registered Conveyance to establish title to the said land. Mr. Chinoy submitted that the Agreement for Sale was entered into only because the Petitioner could not evidence its title to the said land in any other way. He then, without prejudice submitted that in any event the Petitioner could not take advantage of the said Circular dated 9th March, 2017 since the Agreement for Sale was unregistered and that as per the recitals therein the vendors under the same also did not appear to have clear title to the said land mentioned in the Agreement. Mr. Chinoy then submitted that the Petitioner’s contentions that the Agreement for Sale though lodged for registration could not be registered on account of a technical problem did not detract from the fact that there was no Registered Conveyance Deed as on 2nd September, 2020 or even till date.

34. Mr. Chinoy then without prejudice to the aforesaid submitted that the Petitioner’s contention of a mismatch of the CTS numbers in the ready reckoner on account of a technical problem was also false and misleading, as the Petitioner had by the letter dated 9th November, 2020 informed the Deputy 2021 and accordingly the Deputy Registrar had requested the Deputy Director of Town Planning Assessment to determine the same. He submitted that the Deputy Director by his letter dated 25th November, 2020 had informed the Deputy Petitioners contention of there being a technical problem. He submitted that even assuming there had been any technical problem, the same had been resolved as far as the back November, 2020. He therefore submitted that that even if the Petitioner had subsequently registered the Agreement for Sale the fact remained that when the principal acceptance letter was issued, there was no registered conveyance deed.

35. He then submitted that the proposal submitted by the Petitioner was undated and bore the signature of a dead person as being promoter of Respondent No. 4. He pointed out that the proposal was submitted on 13th March, 2014 whereas Mr. Raghunath Kadam, Chief Promoter of Respondent No.4 had died on 11th February, 2014 and therefore was non est. He submitted that on the death of Mr. Raghunath Kadam, it was imperative for Respondent No. 4 to have appointed a new Chief Promoter and submitted a fresh proposal with the signature of the new Chief Promoter. Learned Senior Counsel then submitted that after the death of Mr. Raghunath Kadam, no new Chief Promoter had been appointed by Respondent No. 4 and that there was no General Body Resolution of Respondent No. 4 to evidence the appointment of a new chief promoter. He submitted that, the fact that Mr. Raghunath Kadam had passed away was not even brought to the attention of Respondent No.1 prior to the application filed by Respondent No.5. He submitted that despite this fact the NOC dated 19th June, 2014 issued by the Financial Controller of the SRA sought the name of (i) Mr. Balkrishna Phadke as Chief Promoter (ii) the Indemnity Bond cum Affidavit dated 24th July, 2020 was submitted by one Shriram Kashiram Pawar to claim to be the Chief Promoter.

36. Mr. Chinoy then submitted that Respondent No. 6 had therefore correctly held that the above facts show that the Petitioner had sought to make false statements in order to process the proposal submitted by the Petitioner to Respondent No.1. Mr. Chinoy submitted that Respondent No.1 could not have approved the proposal on the basis of incomplete documents viz., the Indemnity Bond cum Affidavit.

37. Mr. Chinoy took pains to point out that, it would be a different matter, if the proposal was filed whilst Mr. Raghunath Kadam was alive and pending the approval had passed away. However, in the instant case he submitted that the proposal itself having been filed after Mr. Raghunath Kadam had died the same was non-est. Since the same had been filed in the name of the dead person. Mr. Chinoy then submitted that the Petitioner conduct was exactly the mischief which Circular No.144 sought to defeat in support of his contention he placed reliance upon a judgment of division bench of this Court in the case of Atesham Ahmed Khan vs. Lakadawala Developers Pvt. Ltd.[2] in which this Court took notice of the prevailing situation where the acceptance of the first Application/Proposal by Respondent No.1 excluded all other Applications/Proposals from being considered until the scrutiny of the first Application/Proposal was completed. Mr. Chinoy submitted that therefore the mere submission of an Application/Proposal, however deficient would operate as a bar to all other Applications. Mr. Chinoy submitted that it was to address the said mischief that this Court had held it was the bounden duty all Applicants to ensure that the Applications/Proposals submitted were complete in all respects at the time of submission otherwise the same would lead to the undesirable result that an Application which was otherwise deficient and incomplete would progressively be improved upon over a prolonged period leading to a delay in the implementation of the Slum Rehabilitation Scheme. Learned Senior Counsel 2 [2011 3 Mah L.J 604 (DB) - WP/1977/2010] submitted that it was for this reason that this court in a said judgment in the case of Atesham Ahmed Khan (supra) held as follows:- “5.3. Hence the first applicant must act bona fide and in compliance with law by submitting an application which fulfills the requirements of a valid application. The application must fulfill the essential requirements of a valid application on the date on which it is submitted.”

38. In view of the above Mr. Chinoy submitted that Respondent No.1 had issued Circular No.144 setting out the revised procedure that an Applicant who was desirous of submitting a SRS scheme would have to comply with before the SRS submitted could be approved. He took pains to point out that the judgment of Atesham Ahmed Khan had specifically referred to Circular No.144. Basis this, Mr. Chinoy submitted that the Petitioner’s conduct of submitting an incomplete and defective Application aside from fact that it was non-est and thereafter leaving it in a state of limbo was solely with a view to block any other Application/Proposal from being submitted.

39. He then, without prejudice to the above, submitted that the Petitioner had approached this Court with unclean hands. He pointed out that the Petitioner had in paragraph 3.[4] of the Writ Petition, alleged that the Petitioners proposal submitted on 13th March, 2014 was under Circular No.144(A) of the DCR Rules. Mr. Chinoy submitted that the letter dated 15th March, 2014 issued by Respondent No. 1 to the Petitioner clearly stated that the proposal was submitted under Circular No.144 and not 144(A). He pointed out that Circular No.144(A) was issued on 9th November 2015 which was more than one and a half years after submission of the Petitioners proposal. He took pains to point out that the Petitioner had not in the Rejoinder contended that this was an inadvertent typographical error. Mr. Chinoy then, submitted that Circular No.168 dated 31st December, 2015 could not be relied upon by the Petitioner. He submitted that the Circular was not relied upon for any purpose during the proceedings before Respondent No.m[6] and that the Circular did not even from part of the Writ Petition and there was no ground in connection with the said Circular raised in the Writ Petition. He therefore submitted that the Petitioner could not be permitted to place reliance upon on the Circular.

40. Mr. Chinoy then, without prejudice to the aforesaid contentions, submitted that the provisional letter of acceptance did not make reference to Circular No.168 or state that the same was a principal acceptance letter. Learned Senior Counsel then reiterated that the Petitioner’s contention that the letter dated 2nd September, 2020 was the principal acceptance letter was itself misplaced.

SUBMISSIONS OF MR.

PUROHIT ON BEHALF OF THE RESPONDENT NO.4

41. Mr. Purohit, learned counsel for Respondent No. 4 (the Society) essentially adopted the submissions of Mr. Sen. He then reiterated that the members of Respondent No.4 supported the appointment of the Petitioner as the Developer and wanted the SRS to be implemented by the Petitioner. He submitted that Respondent No.4 had passed other resolutions to proceed with the Petitioner as developer and had decided to give common consent to the Petitioner as per the mandate of Respondent No.1. He submitted that the appointment of the Petitioner as developer was only after all the requisite procedure and formalities had been complied with. He reiterated that Respondent No.5 though having signified his consent for appointing the Petitioner as developer was now mischievously opposing the same. He submitted that the actions of the Petitioner in filing Application No. 75 of 2020 before Respondent No.6 was without consulting and/or taking into confidence the General Body of Respondent No.4 and that Respondent No.5 was in fact acting against the interest of the general body of Respondent No.4.

42. He then reiterated the submission made by Mr. Sen that Respondent No.5 was acting at the instance of a rival developer and therefore the objection of Respondent No.5 ought not to have been countenanced by the Respondent No.6 since the same was in no manner in the interest of Respondent No. 4 but was clearly motivated and self-serving.

SUBMISSIONS OF MR.

ARADWAD ON BEHALF OF THE RESPONDENT NO.6- AGRC

43. Mr. Aradwad learned counsel appearing on behalf of the Respondent No.6 supported the impugned order and essentially reiterated the submissions of Mr. Chinoy. The main thrust of the argument of Mr. Aradwad was that Respondent No.6 had relied upon the judgment of the Division Bench of this Court in the case of Atesham Ahmed Khan (supra) which held that an Applicant cannot be allowed to progressively make up a deficiency in an application submitted for an SRS scheme which ex facie does not fulfill the conditions on the date on which it is submitted. He submitted that an Applicant must act bonafide manner and in compliance with law by submitting an application which was complete in all respects. Basis this judgment he submitted that in terms of circular No.144 and 144(A) all the NOCs mentioned therein were required to be submitted along with the proposal for implementation of the Slum Rehabilitation Scheme and Respondent No.1 could not postpone the acceptance of the proposal. Basis this, he submitted that the judgment was a valid reasoned judgment, and this was not liable to any interference by this Court.

REASONS AND CONCLUSIONS

44. I have heard learned counsel for the parties, considered the rival contentions as also the case law cited and after a careful consideration of the same, find that the present Writ Petition deserves to be allowed for the following reasons; A) The real and only issue which to my mind arises for consideration in the present Writ Petition is whether the letter dated 2nd September, 2020 is in fact an acceptance/sanction of the SRS submitted by the Petitioner or whether the same is merely an in principal conditional/acceptance. The answer is to be found on a plain reading of the said letter. The said letter in terms states that the SRS submitted by the Petitioner under Section 33(10) “is principally accepted”. The said letter then sets out the conditions, based on which, the principal acceptance has been issued and specifically grants the Petitioner a limited period of six months to comply with the conditions set out therein. Thus, by no stretch of imagination can the said letter be considered as sanction granted to the scheme submitted by the Petitioner. If in fact this had been a sanction of the scheme, then all the other formalities such as grant of an LOI etc. would necessarily have followed. Admittedly, none of this has been done. B) Additionally, the fact that the letter dated 2nd September, 2020 is only an in principal acceptance is clear from circular No.168 dated 31st December, 2015. The very subject of the said circular is “Principal Acceptance letter”. The said Circular in terms provides as follows; “The Principal Acceptance letter so issued will be only for the aforesaid purpose of obtaining various approval and it shall not confer any sort of right, title, claim or interest to the developer in respect of Slum Rehabilitation Authority or proposed S.R. Scheme for which the letter will be issued.” There is no dispute that the said circular predates the letter. This being so, it is clear that the said letter has been issued pursuant to the said circular and in terms thereof. Also as more particularly stated in the said circular the said letter has been issued only for the Petitioner to obtain the various approvals more particularly set out in the said letter. The circular itself makes explicit that a principal acceptance letter issued in pursuance thereof shall not confer any right, title, claim or interest in the developer. Thus it cannot be contended or even suggested that by the letter dated 2nd September, 2020, the Petitioner’s scheme has been approved/accepted or any condition that the Petitioner was required to comply with before acceptance/approval of the Petitioner’s scheme has been postponed to a date after such acceptance. C) Another factor which is essential to note is that the opposition to the Petitioner’s scheme is at the instance of one solitary member of Respondent No.4 and no one else. Respondent No.4 has appeared and put on Affidavit its support for the Petitioner as the developer of the proposed SRS propounded by the Petitioner. Thus, barring the Petitioner there is absolutely no grievance on any ground qua the Petitioner. D) Also, the timing of the Application made by Respondent No.5. is as curious as it is telling. Respondent No.5, who claims to be aggrieved by ‘the delay’ in the sanctioning of the Petitioners proposal did not at any time prior to the issuance of the letter dated 2nd September, 2020 i.e. the in principal acceptance, raise any grievance in respect of ‘the delay’ or otherwise. It was only immediately upon the grant of the in principal acceptance that Respondent No.5 filed the said Application by contending the same was an order and inter alia seeking to set aside the same. What is indeed befuddling is that Respondent No.5’s grievance of ‘delay’ comes only after the Petitioner has been granted a finite time to obtain the various approvals and did not come at any time after the proposal was submitted and was pending approval with Respondent No.1 as it presently is. Clearly therefore Respondent No.5 does not appear to be exposing his own grievance since after the issuance of the said letter dated 2nd 2020 the question of delay has been effectively taken care of, since the Petitioner has been granted finite period of six months in which to obtain the requisite NOCs. This fact alone to my mind makes suspect the bonafides of the Petitioner. E) Additionally, even the contention that the Petitioner has submitted an incomplete Application which is premised entirely on the letter dated 31st December, 2014 issued by Respondent No.3 to the Petitioner is to my mind is untenable. The said letter nowhere concludes that the Application filed by the Petitioner is incomplete or that the Petitioner is not the owner of the said lands in questions. The said letter only directs the Petitioner to get its name transposed on the property cards after which Respondent No.3 would be in a position to issue the NOC to the Petitioner. Thus, at this juncture and in these facts to conclude that the Petitioner had submitted an incomplete Application is entirely premature. Circular No.144, 144(A) and 168 must be read together and construed harmoniously. Whether the Petitioner has submitted a complete or incomplete Application is for Respondent No.1 to decide. Respondent No.1 will no doubt do so in accordance with the relevant rules, regulations and circulars.

45. Given that, I have held that the letter dated 2nd merely an in principal acceptance and not an acceptance of the SRS submitted by the Petitioner. I find that it is not necessary to presently deal with the other contentions raised by the Petitioner since in the event the Petitioner is unable to comply with the condition set out in the principal acceptance letter the same would be wholly academic. Conversely, in the event the Petitioner is granted approval, all these contentions will be available to the Petitioner to raise at the appropriate time.

46. In view of the above findings, the Writ Petition is disposed of. The time of six months granted to the Petitioner in the letter dated 2nd 2020 is to commence from the date of this order being uploaded. (ARIF S. DOCTOR, J.)

AFTER PRONOUNCEMENT At this stage, learned counsel for Respondent No.5 requests to stay this order for a period of two weeks. Given that I have held that the letter dated 2nd only a conditional/provisional acceptance and that the Petitioner has been granted six months from the date from this order is being uploaded to comply with the said letter and also in view of the observations made in clause (D) hereinabove I find no reason to stay this order. Prayer for stay is accordingly rejected. (ARIF S. DOCTOR, J.)