Mahanand Sharma v. Central Bureau of Investigation

14. Subsequently, in terms of the directions issued by this Court in W.P.(C) No. 10066/2004, a preliminary enquiry was undertaken qua the Society and documents were seized (with seizure/handing-over memos). Upon completion of the preliminary enquiry, FIR bearing RC-09- (A)/2006/SCU-V/SCR-II/CBI/New Delhi was registered on 31.08.2006 and the chargesheet was filed on 29.09.2006.

15. The prosecution case, alleged a criminal conspiracy and allied offences attracting Section 120-B of the Indian Penal Code, 18608 read with Sections 420/468/471 of the IPC and Section 13(2) read with Section 13(1)(d) of the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988[9], besides substantive offences as alleged. Charges were framed by the learned Trial Court vide order dated 12.09.2018, including a charge under Section 120-B read with Sections 420/468/471 of the IPC and Section 13(2) read with Section 13(1)(d)(iii) of the PC Act against the present applicants. hereinafter ―IPC‖ hereinafter ―PC Act‖

16. Upon completion of trial, the learned Special Judge delivered the judgment of conviction dated 13.10.2025, followed by the order on sentence dated 31.10.2025, which form the subject matter of challenge. The operative portion of the order on sentence, insofar as it relates to the present applicants, is reproduced hereunder: Name Offences Sentence Maha Nand Sharma (i). Offences punishable under Section 120B read with 420, 468, 471 read with 468 IPC and Section 13(2) read with Section 13(1)(d)(iii) of PC Act. (i). He is sentenced to undergo rigorous imprisonment for six months and fine of Rs.1,00,000/- (Rupees One Lakh Only), for the offence punishable under Section 120B read with 420, 468, 471 read with 468 IPC and Section 13(2) read with Section 13(1)(d)(iii) of PC Act. In case of default of payment of aforesaid fine, he is sentenced to undergo simple imprisonment for a period of two months. (ii). Substantive offence punishable under Section 420 IPC (ii). He is also sentenced to undergo rigorous imprisonment for a period of five years and fine of Rs.50,000/- (Rupees Fifty Thousand Only) for the offence punishable under Section 420 IPC. In case of default of payment of aforesaid fine, he is sentenced to undergo simple imprisonment for a period of two months. (iii). Substantive offence punishable under Section 471 IPC (iii). He is also sentenced to undergo of two years and fine of Rs.50,000/- 471 IPC. In case of default of months. Pankaj Madan IPC. months. Vijay Thakur 13(1)(d)(iii) of PC Act IPC. months. Vikas Madan Section13(2) read with Section punishable under Section months. Poonam Awasthi Sections 120B read with 420, (i). She is sentenced to undergo months Rs.1,00,000/- (Rupees One Lakh Only), for the offence punishable under Section 120B read with 420, 468, 471 read with 468 IPC and Section 13(2) read with Section 13(1)(d)(iii) of PC Act. In case of default of payment of aforesaid fine, she is sentenced to undergo simple months. IPC. (ii). She is also sentenced to undergo payment of aforesaid fine, she is months.

17. Having set out the broad background, this Court considers it appropriate to deal with the role attributed to each applicant, the allegations forming the basis of conviction, and the submissions advanced on behalf of the applicants as well as the respondent/CBI in support of and in opposition to suspension of sentence. Since the applications arise from a common judgment and order on sentence, but concern distinct roles and circumstances, the Court shall, in respect of each applicant separately, record the rival submissions, undertake the corresponding analysis, and thereafter return its conclusions. Discussion qua Maha Nand Sharma

18. The learned Special Judge recorded that Maha Nand Sharma was not a primary member of the Society and had no connection with it prior to liquidation; his role commenced when the Society’s records came into his possession.

19. It was noted that he visited the RCS on 18.01.1999, handed over the Society’s records to the liquidator Karamvir Singh for revival, and that his signatures on the RCS file were confirmed by GEQD, Shimla.

20. The impugned judgment further referred to the Special GBM dated 27.01.1999, wherein his presence was recorded and he was authorised to represent the Society before the RCS for withdrawal of liquidation/cancellation of winding up. The said proceedings were held to be false/manipulated, with several persons shown as participants later denying attendance/signatures.

21. The learned Special Judge also noted that he submitted a letter dated 10.02.1999 to the RCS, projecting himself as the President, and sought approval of a freeze list of 125 members along with supporting records. It was recorded that he was not the President on that date, and that several persons shown as office-bearers and/or members denied their membership and/or signatures.

22. It was further recorded that he thereafter participated in the revivalrelated processing before the RCS, and signed audit papers as ―President‖, even though his election as President was recorded later; the audit documentation was treated as suspect in the light of findings of non-genuine signatures and the overall appreciation of the record. The judgment also notes that the freeze list of 90 members was processed/approved, and was certified by him as President, before the Society’s records were later taken over by other private persons following internal disputes.

23. On analysis, the learned Special Judge concluded that Maha Nand Sharma was instrumental in securing revival of the Society through illegal means, by projecting himself as President, furnishing documents containing false information, and relying on manipulated/forged society records (including membership/proceedings/resignation and supporting papers). It was held that such materials induced the RCS to treat the Society’s record as compliant and forward the case for processing, thereby also inducing the DDA to proceed on the basis of the said material, which ultimately resulted in allotment of land to the Society. The impugned judgment, thus, attributes to him a central role in the alleged conspiracy leading to obtaining land through the said process.

24. Mr. Hariharan, learned Senior Counsel assisted by Dr. Sushil Gupta on behalf of Maha Nand Sharma, submitted that the present appeal raises substantial legal and factual infirmities in the impugned judgment of conviction dated 13.10.2025 and the order on sentence dated 31.10.2025, and therefore, the sentence awarded to the applicant deserves to be suspended pending final adjudication of the appeal.

25. It was contended that the learned Special Judge has, while sentencing the applicant for the offence of criminal conspiracy, applied Section 120B Part II of the IPC, which carries a maximum sentence of six months. It was urged that, assuming the case falls under Section 120B Part II of the IPC, a mandatory sanction under Section 196 of the CrPC was required, and in the absence thereof, the learned Trial Court could not have taken cognizance of the conspiracy charge against private persons, resulting in a jurisdictional infirmity. It was further submitted that the impugned judgment is also silent on the specific period of the alleged conspiracy, which, according to the applicant, renders the finding of a ―meeting of minds‖ legally unsustainable.

26. It is further argued that the appreciation of evidence is perverse, inasmuch as the presumption of innocence has been diluted and the burden of proof has been wrongly shifted onto the accused. It was also urged that the treatment of expert and documentary evidence suffers from errors, including undue reliance on presumptions of regularity of official acts, and an impermissible approach of the Court undertaking self-comparison of writings beyond the limited scope of Section 73 of the Indian Evidence Act,. Additionally, it was submitted that the prosecution’s foundational documents, stated to have been procured under Search List D-53, were manipulated, and that the documents actually presented to the RCS officers (forming the basis of revival) were not placed before the Court during trial. On these premises, it was urged that the evidence requires reappreciation, and since the sentence is for a fixed term, the ends of justice warrant suspension of sentence during pendency of the appeal.

27. Learned Senior Counsel also placed reliance on the judgments of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Aasif alias Pasha v. State of U.P11. and Bhagwan Ram Shinde Gosai & Ors. v. State of Gujarat12, to submit that suspension of sentence pending appeal ought to be considered liberally in the absence of any statutory restriction and that where the Court is not inclined to hear the appeal expeditiously, the sentence may be suspended subject to appropriate conditions.

28. Mr. Ripudaman Bhardwaj, learned SPP for CBI opposes and submits that Maha Nand Sharma was a complete stranger to the defunct Society, was not a primary member, and yet illegally obtained the original Society records from the former secretary. It is contended that he personally hereinafter ―Evidence Act‖ 2025 SCC OnLine SC 1644 appeared at the office of the RCS and handed over the Society records to the liquidator, Karamvir Singh, and that his visit and participation are borne out from the noting on the relevant file, with the GEQD confirmation of his signatures on the margin.

29. It is further submitted that he acted with the liquidator in conducting a sham Special GBM dated 27.01.1999, which, according to the prosecution, constitutes a clear circumstance demonstrating conspiracy. It is also contended that he impersonated as President, and that a sham election was held on 05.06.1999 installing him as President. Additionally, he also facilitated the process of forged resignations to remove original members and to accommodate new entrants/financiers, including Pankaj Madan and Vikas Madan, and therefore the applicant does not deserve the discretionary relief of suspension of sentence.

30. To address the specific averments made by Mr. Hariharan, Mr. Bhardwaj further submits that the contention that the period and object of the conspiracy were undefined is misconceived. According to the prosecution, the conspiracy is established through a series of inter-linked and synchronised acts commencing with the steps taken towards revival of the defunct Society and extending to the processing culminating in allotment. It is submitted that the object was to fraudulently revive the Society and secure allotment of land, and that the chain of circumstances, collectively demonstrates a ―meeting of minds‖ and satisfies the ingredients of criminal conspiracy.

31. It is also submitted that the learned Special Judge’s comparison of writings/signatures was within the permissible ambit of Section 73 of the Evidence Act, as recognised by the Hon’ble Supreme Court. The plea of tampering is opposed on the ground that the core incriminating records relied upon, including the proceedings register and the RCS note-sheet, were seized from official custody and not from any private individual, and therefore the allegation of manipulation does not dislodge the presence of the applicant’s handwriting/signatures on official records.

32. Lastly, the prosecution disputed the jurisdictional objection regarding Section 120B of the IPC and Section 196 of the CrPC by submitting that the conspiracy alleged related to offences punishable with more than two years’ imprisonment, and hence the embargo under Section 196 CrPC was not attracted. For this reliance is placed on the judgment rendered by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Shiv Nandan Dixit v. State of U.P.13.

33. Having heard the learned Senior Counsel for the applicant and the learned SPP for the CBI, and having perused the material on record, this Court notes that several submissions advanced on behalf of the applicant touch upon matters which would require a detailed re-appreciation of evidence and a detailed examination of the record, which will be appropriately undertaken at the stage of final hearing of the appeal. Issues relating to the precise formulation of the alleged conspiracy, the manner of appreciation of expert evidence including the GEQD opinion and the approach adopted under Section 73 of the Evidence Act, as also the plea of tampering/manipulation of documents, fall in that category.

34. However, the jurisdictional objection raised on behalf of the applicant stands on a different footing, as it concerns the competence of the Court to take cognizance of the charge of conspiracy in the absence of prior consent under Section 196(2) of the CrPC. The question that therefore arises is whether, in a prosecution involving Section 120B of the IPC, the proceedings are vitiated merely because no consent under Section 196(2) of the CrPC was obtained. In this regard, the CBI has placed reliance on the decision of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Shiv Nandan Dixit (supra), wherein it was held that where the object of the conspiracy is to commit offences punishable with imprisonment exceeding two years, Section 196(2) of the CrPC has no application. Since the offences alleged herein, including Sections 420, 468 and 471 of the IPC and Section 13 of the PC Act, carry punishment exceeding two years, the requirement of prior consent under Section 196(2) of the CrPC is not attracted. Consequently, the objection fails at the threshold and questions of prejudice do not arise. The relevant para of the judgment is also reproduced as under: ―3. A mere perusal of Section 161 IPC and Section 5(1)(d) of the Act would make it obvious that the maximum punishment which can be imposed under Section 161 IPC (as it then stood) is imprisonment of either description which may extend to three years or with fine or with both. For the offence under Section 5(1)(d) of the Act, the punishment prescribed is imprisonment for a term which shall not be less than one year but which may extend to seven years and shall also be liable to fine. Thus, the conspiracy to commit either of the offences was punishable with imprisonment for a term exceeding two years' rigorous imprisonment and, therefore, in our view Section 196(2) of the Code had no application because in respect of both the offences, the court had jurisdiction to pass a sentence of over two years' rigorous imprisonment. The submission that it was permissible for the court to award simple imprisonment for any term subject to the maximum prescribed and, therefore, Section 196(2) of the Code was applicable, cannot be accepted. Equally without substance is the submission that the conspiracy alleged must be compulsorily punishable with rigorous imprisonment for a term exceeding two years, leaving no discretion in the court to pass a lesser sentence. The true test is whether the conspiracy alleged was punishable with a term of imprisonment exceeding two years' rigorous imprisonment and, as we have noticed earlier, it was so in the instant case having regard to the punishment prescribed for the offences under Section 5(1)(d) of the Act as well as Section 161 IPC. Therefore this argument of the appellants has to be rejected.‖ [Emphasis Supplied]

35. Accordingly, for the reasons recorded hereinabove, this Court returns a finding that the jurisdictional objection raised on behalf of the applicant does not merit acceptance, inasmuch as the alleged conspiracy relates to offences punishable with imprisonment exceeding two years and, therefore, the bar under Section 196(2) of the CrPC is not attracted and no prior consent was legally required.

36. In the overall facts and circumstances, and applying the settled parameters governing suspension of sentence, this Court is of the view that the applicant has nonetheless made out a case for suspension of sentence. Discussion qua Pankaj Madan

37. The learned Special Judge recorded that Pankaj Madan, along with his brother Vikas Madan, took over the Society’s records from Maha Nand Sharma and thereafter participated in creation/usage of forged documents that were submitted to the office of the RCS. The broad allegation noticed was that he was involved in manipulation of the Society’s records and finances in the course of the revival/allotment process.

38. In appreciating the evidence, the learned Special Judge noticed a material inconsistency regarding his membership. His membership application reflected a request to become a member in 1999, whereas other Society/RCS records reflected his membership from 1990. The Court treated this inconsistency as indicative that the membership record was not uniform and was falsely created/manipulated, and further noted that the said aspect was not satisfactorily explained by him during trial.

39. The learned Special Judge also noticed that the Society made multiple payments to him through cheques, and recorded that he did not explain during trial the basis for receipt of such amounts. The absence of any cogent explanation was treated as a circumstance pointing towards financial manipulation in the Society’s affairs, along with other accused.

40. On this reasoning, the learned Special Judge concluded that the applicant failed to explain (i) the receipt of money from the Society, and (ii) the inconsistencies regarding the timing and basis of his membership. The Court further drew an inference from the fact that his name and particulars appeared in the members’ lists submitted in the revival process, and held that the circumstances indicated only one inference, which was that he had conspired with the other accused persons in the fraudulent revival of the Society, founded on falsification and forgery of Society records.

41. Mr. Maninder Singh, learned Senior Counsel assisted by Mr. Amit Khanna on behalf of Pankaj Madan, submitted that the conviction rests on an erroneous application of the law of conspiracy, inasmuch as there is no material to show that the applicant conspired with the co-accused for revival of the Society. It was urged that the Society had gone into liquidation in 1990 and the revival process before the RCS was initiated in 1998, during which period the applicant was not involved, and that the applicant became a member only on 05.12.1999, i.e., much after the revival. It was further submitted that the applicant never became an office bearer, had no control over the managing committee or the Society’s records, and there is no evidence whatsoever of his meeting or interacting with any RCS official, much less for revival purposes.

42. Learned Senior Counsel further submitted that the trial court’s adverse inference drawn from the Society’s payments to the applicant is misplaced. According to him, the Society’s by-laws permitted such financial transactions, and the cheques received by him were relatable to legitimate dealings, including financial assistance in the nature of a loan, as reflected in the audit material/ledger. It was also contended that, in any event, the crossexamination of the Investigating Officer14 indicates that the investigation was not conducted into the alleged finances/transactions of the Society vis- à-vis the applicant, and the applicant was neither chargesheeted nor tried for misappropriation of the Society funds. It was submitted that, barring this financial aspect, no illegal act is attributed to the applicant connecting him with the alleged fabrication of records.

43. It was additionally argued that the learned Special Judge impermissibly shifted the burden of proof on the applicant, particularly by calling upon him to explain the receipt of funds. The applicant submits that he has been sentenced to five years’ imprisonment for the substantive offence under Section 420 of the IPC, despite there being no deposition establishing that he cheated or induced any member, or any official of the RCS or DDA. It was emphasised that no prosecution witness attributes any act of inducement or wrongful loss to the appellant, and even the RCS/DDA hereinafter ―IO‖ officials did not depose to knowing him, thereby rendering the conviction, at least prima facie, unsustainable for the purposes of refusing suspension of sentence.

44. Mr. Ripudaman Bhardwaj, learned SPP for CBI opposes the grant of suspension of sentence and submits that the learned Special Judge has rightly appreciated the evidence, particularly on the aspect of the amounts advanced by Pankaj Madan to the Society. It is submitted that the defence of the payments being a ―loan‖ does not, by itself, explain the material circumstances noticed by the learned Trial Court, including the source of funds and the manner in which such financing was undertaken, which, according to the prosecution, remained unanswered during trial.

45. Learned SPP further submits that the applicant placed no documentary record to demonstrate any lawful authority or basis to finance the Society in the manner suggested, and that the absence of such proof was a relevant circumstance relied upon by the learned Special Judge. On this basis, it is contended that no case for discretionary suspension of sentence is made out.

46. Having heard the learned Senior Counsel for the applicant and the Court notes that submissions advanced on behalf of the applicant would require a detailed re-appreciation of evidence and a meticulous examination of the record, which is appropriately undertaken at the stage of final hearing of the appeal. In particular, the question whether the applicant had any active role in the alleged conspiracy, or whether his involvement was confined to that of a member without any office-bearer functions, cannot be conclusively determined at this stage.

47. Likewise, the controversy regarding the financial transactions would require a closer scrutiny of the relevant record, including whether the amounts were permissible financial assistance or loan under the Society’s framework, the source from which such funds were arranged, the manner in which they were utilised, and whether the amounts ultimately remained with the Society/DDA or were released to any individual.

48. In the overall facts and circumstances, and applying the settled Discussion qua Vijay Thakur

49. The learned Special Judge recorded that the role attributed to Vijay Thakur was that he projected himself as the President of the Society and, in that capacity, signed documents for opening a bank account of the Society with Global Trust Bank Ltd. It was noted that the said account was opened on 26.02.2002, and the account opening documentation reflected him as President, alongside Vikas Madan as Secretary and Poonam Awasthi as Treasurer, with authorised signatory powers.

50. The impugned judgment further records the prosecution allegation that the said bank account was fraudulently opened in connivance with other co-accused, and that Vijay Thakur held himself out as President and an authorised signatory, despite the case of the prosecution being that he was never elected as President of the Society. On the basis of this record and the surrounding circumstances, the learned Special Judge drew the inference that Vijay Thakur had conspired with the other accused persons for the purpose of revival of the Society, founded on falsification and forgery in the Society’s records.

51. Mr. K. K. Manan, learned Senior Counsel on behalf of Vijay Thakur, submitted that the case against the applicant is narrow and confined to the allegation that he opened the Society’s bank account on 26.02.2002 by projecting himself as its President, though, according to the prosecution, he was not the President. It is urged that the prosecution case substantially hinges on the genuineness of the alleged signatures of Vijay Thakur on the bank account opening documents.

52. Learned Senior Counsel further submitted that the investigation suffered from a foundational lapse, since the IO did not conduct any signature verification exercise, did not send the disputed signatures for forensic examination, and carried out no independent verification, despite signatures having been denied. It was contended that, in the absence of expert evidence, the learned Special Judge proceeded to compare disputed signatures of the year 2002 with signatures of much later years under Section 73 of the Evidence Act, which, according to the applicant, is an unsafe basis for sustaining a conviction, particularly when the comparison involved signatures separated by 15–17 years and was not put to the applicant at the relevant stage.

53. Learned Senior Counsel relied on the judgments rendered by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Thiruvengada Pillai v. Navaneethammal & Anr.15 and Ajay Kumar Parmar v. State of Rajasthan16 cautioning that judicial comparison of handwriting is a hazardous mode of proof.

54. It was also urged that, even as per the prosecution’s own case as recorded, the Society stood revived on 26.04.1999, whereas Vijay Thakur became a member only on 26.11.1999, and therefore he could not be linked to any conspiracy relating to revival. Lastly, it is contended that no witness deposed to having seen Vijay Thakur sign the bank documents or represent himself as President, and that no witness from DDA deposed to deception or wrongful loss, besides the case being that the money remains with DDA.

55. Mr. Ripudaman Bhardwaj, learned SPP for CBI opposes the grant of suspension of sentence and submits that Vijay Thakur projected himself as the President of the Society and signed the bank account opening documents in that capacity, despite there being no record of his having contested or been elected as President. It is pointed out that the learned Special Judge rightly treated this impersonation as a material circumstance, since the applicant acted ―as President‖ for the purpose of opening the Society’s bank account and assuming authorised signatory powers.

56. Mr. Bhardwaj further submits that the applicant’s role cannot be diluted as that of a mere signatory, as the record reflects his active participation in the Society’s affairs, including documentation showing him as President and authorised signatory. It is also contended that his involvement interlinks with the acts of other accused persons, including the circumstance that his name and related entries were attested in the records by Maha Nand Sharma, thereby reinforcing the prosecution case of coordinated conduct rather than an isolated act.

57. Having heard the learned Senior Counsel for the applicant and the Court is of the view that the principal issues raised by the parties cannot be finally evaluated at this stage without a detailed scrutiny of the trial record, which is appropriately undertaken at the stage of final hearing of the appeal. In particular, whether the applicant’s act of signing and functioning as ―President‖ for opening the Society’s bank account is an isolated act or forms part of the alleged conspiracy, and the weight to be attached to the prosecution’s submission that there is no material showing his election as President, are matters that require a fuller examination of the documentary evidence.

58. Having heard the learned Senior Counsel for the applicant and the Court notes that the grounds advanced on behalf of the applicant are not capable of being conclusively adjudicated at this stage, since doing so would require this Court to undertake a detailed re-appreciation of the evidence, and to test the reasoning of the learned Trial Court on merits, which is the province of the appellate hearing. In particular, the question whether the applicant has any nexus with the alleged conspiracy, including the prosecution’s case that he projected himself as President despite there being no record of his election, cannot be determined without a careful examination of the Society’s records, election-related material, bank documents, and the circumstances in which such documents were prepared and acted upon.

59. Similarly, the challenge relating to proof of signatures and the method of proof adopted requires a detailed scrutiny of the record, including whether the disputed signatures should have been established through expert evidence and the extent to which reliance on comparison under Section 73 of the Indian Evidence Act was permissible in the facts of the case. This exercise would necessarily involve examining the relevant exhibits and the manner in which such evidence was led, tested in cross-examination, and appreciated by the learned Trial Court.

60. The applicant’s grievance regarding the scope of his examination under Section 313 of the CrPC, including whether any omission in putting particular circumstances to him has caused prejudice, also involves a factspecific inquiry into the questions put, the answers given, and the overall impact on the fairness of trial. These issues, therefore, are kept open to be examined at the stage of final hearing of the appeal.

61. In the overall facts and circumstances, and applying the settled Discussion qua Vikas Madan

62. The learned Special Judge recorded that Vikas Madan, along with Pankaj Madan, took over the Society’s records from Maha Nand Sharma after coming to know that their names did not figure in the freeze list forwarded by the RCS to the DDA. The impugned judgment notes that this led to a dispute with Maha Nand Sharma, as recorded in para 189 thereof, following which Vikas Madan and his brother assumed control of the Society and began managing its affairs.

63. It was further recorded that during this period, the Society forwarded lists of resigned members to the RCS on 21.10.1999 and 16.11.1999, and thereafter sent lists of new members in December 1999. The learned Special Judge noted that several persons shown as resigned denied having signed their resignation letters, which, as recorded, was supported by the GEQD/Shimla opinion.

64. The learned Special Judge also noted that bank accounts of the Society were opened, including in Global Trust Bank Ltd. and SBI, and that during the relevant period the Society dealt with substantial funds, including payments to the DDA. It was further recorded that certain cheques were issued from the Society’s account and were signed by Vikas Madan in favour of his brother Pankaj Madan, allegedly without approval of the Society.

65. The learned Special Judge further recorded that Vikas Madan’s defence that he and the other accused were ―victims‖ of a false prosecution was not borne out from the record. It was observed that if such a plea were true, the accused could have examined themselves in defence under Section 315 of the CrPC to explain their grievances; however, they chose not to do so. The learned Special Judge held that the documentary record and surrounding circumstances admitted of only one inference, namely the guilt of Vikas Madan acting with the co-accused.

66. It was noted that he failed to explain the taking over of the Society’s records from Maha Nand Sharma without any disclosure in the Society’s proceedings or intimation to the RCS, failed to reconcile the inconsistencies regarding his membership reflected in the Society/RCS records, and failed to explain the issuance/receipt of cheques and the manner in which the Society’s finances were handled during the period when he was running its affairs. On these circumstances, the learned Special Judge concluded that the affairs of the Society were not managed in accordance with law, and that Vikas Madan acted in furtherance of the conspiracy founded on false and forged records, resulting in the RCS and DDA being induced and land being allotted to the Society.

67. Mr. Anil Soni, learned Senior Counsel on behalf of Vikas Madan, submitted that there is no material to establish that the applicant conspired with any co-accused for the revival of the Society. It is submitted that the applicant became a member only on 05.12.1999, i.e., much after the revival process, and that he came into possession of the Society’s records thereafter. Consequently, he cannot be linked to any alleged conspiracy for illegal revival. It was further contended that there is no evidence whatsoever of the applicant having met or dealt with any RCS official, much less for revival purposes.

68. Learned Senior Counsel next addressed the allegations concerning the Society’s financial dealings, submitting that the by-laws permitted members to advance financial assistance/loan to the Society, and that the cheques issued in favour of the applicant (and Pankaj Madan) were relatable to repayment entries reflected in the audit/ledger record. It was also pointed out that the record would disclose the true nature of such transactions, and that the applicant was neither chargesheeted nor tried for misappropriation. Further, even the cross-examination of the IO was relied upon to contend that the investigation did not specifically examine the Society’s transactions qua Vikas Madan.

69. Mr. Ripudaman Bhardwaj, learned SPP for CBI opposes the grant of suspension of sentence and submits that the learned Special Judge has rightly appreciated the material on record which, according to the prosecution, contradicts the applicant’s stand on the timing of his membership. It is submitted that the Society/RCS records reflect Vikas Madan as having become a member on 15.08.1990, and his name and address also appear in the list of members which accompanied the letter dated 10.02.1999 submitted by Maha Nand Sharma while seeking approval of the membership list. On this basis, it is contended that the Trial Court was justified in questioning how the applicant, who claims to have come into the Society only after revival in 1999, was reflected in records prepared much prior thereto and was shown as known to Maha Nand Sharma since 1990.

70. Mr. Bhardwaj further submits that the learned Special Judge correctly held that the above circumstance points to falsification and forgery in the membership record, whether in whole or in part. It is argued that, in such a situation, the applicant was required to furnish a cogent explanation for the discrepancy relating to the date of his membership and to establish his bona fides, which he failed to do. On this premise, it is submitted that the learned Trial Court’s conclusion that the membership record relied upon was false/forged, and that the applicant’s conduct formed part of the larger illegal scheme, does not warrant interference at the stage of suspension of sentence.

71. Having heard the learned Senior Counsel for the applicant and the Court considers it necessary to first address the observations in the impugned judgment concerning the effect of non-examination of the accused as a defence witness under Section 315 of the CrPC. The limited question is whether the learned Trial Court was justified in treating the applicant’s choice not to depose in defence under Section 315 of the CrPC, for substantiating the plea that he was a ―victim‖ of false implication, as a circumstance operating against him. This Court feels it is pertinent to reproduce Section 315(1) of the CrPC: ―315. Accused person to be competent witness.—(1) Any person accused of an offence before a Criminal Court shall be a competent witness for the defence and may give evidence on oath in disproof of the charges made against him or any person charged together with him at the same trial: Provided that— (a) he shall not be called as a witness except on his own request in writing; (b) his failure to give evidence shall not be made the subject of any comment by any of the parties or the Court or give rise to any presumption against himself or any person charged together with him that the same trial.‖

72. Section 315 of the CrPC does make an accused a competent witness for the defence. However, the proviso to Section 315(1) expressly prohibits the Court from commenting upon the accused’s failure to depose and further provides that such failure shall not give rise to any presumption against the accused or any person tried with him. The statutory intent is clear that the option to depose is voluntary, and the choice not to enter the witness box cannot, by itself, be treated as an incriminating circumstance.

73. In the present case, the learned Trial Court appears to have reasoned that since the prosecution case rested on a chain of documentary and circumstantial material, the accused persons were best placed to explain the discrepancies and alleged manipulations in the Society’s records, and that the plea of false implication was not substantiated because they did not examine themselves under Section 315 of the CrPC.

74. This Court clarifies that while any defence plea must stand or fall on the material brought on record, the applicant’s choice not to depose under Section 315 of the CrPC cannot, in law, be treated as a circumstance strengthening the prosecution case or as a basis to draw any adverse presumption. It must also be reiterated that criminal law incorporates the rule against drawing adverse inferences from an accused’s silence at the trial stage, and the burden remains on the prosecution to prove the charges beyond reasonable doubt. The right against self-incrimination is a vital safeguard intended to ensure that the prosecution discharges this burden on the strength of its own evidence.

75. Having addressed the issue arising from the observations of the learned Trial Court concerning Section 315 of the CrPC, this Court proceeds to the remaining grounds urged on behalf of Vikas Madan. At this stage, the applicant’s contention that he became a member only on 05.12.1999 and entered the affairs of the Society thereafter, as against the material relied upon by the prosecution reflecting his name and address along with a membership date of 15.08.1990, raises a controversy which cannot be conclusively examined while deciding the present application for suspension of sentence. Determination of this aspect would necessarily require a careful re-appreciation of the documentary record, including Ex. PW 45/2 and Ex. PW 45/9, and a scrutiny of the testimonies which bear upon the preparation, custody, and authenticity of such records, which exercise is appropriately undertaken at the stage of final hearing of the appeal.

76. Likewise, the issues relating to the applicant’s alleged role in handling the Society’s records and managing its affairs, as well as the prosecution reliance on denial by several persons regarding their resignation signatures and allied allegations of record manipulation, would entail a detailed examination of the relevant exhibits and the evidentiary foundation on which such allegations rest. Further, the question whether the ingredients of the substantive offence under Section 420 of the IPC stand satisfied qua the applicant would also require a merits-based assessment of evidence and cannot be adjudicated upon while considering the present prayer for suspension of sentence.

77. In the overall facts and circumstances, and applying the settled Discussion qua Poonam Awasthi

78. The learned Special Judge recorded that the role attributed to Poonam Awasthi was primarily in relation to the financial affairs of the Society, inasmuch as she was projected as an office-bearer in the capacity of the Treasurer of the Society and, along with the other office-bearers, was involved in opening the Society’s account with Global Trust Bank Ltd. It was further noted that she signed most of the cheques issued on behalf of the Society, largely in conjunction with Vikas Madan.

79. The impugned judgment further notes that, during trial, Poonam Awasthi did not offer any satisfactory explanation regarding the inconsistency as to the timing of her membership. While her Membership Application Form pertained to the year 1999, the Society’s records, including Ex. PW45/2 and Ex. PW45/9, reflected her as a member since

1990. It was also noted that her name and address appeared in the lists furnished by Maha Nand Sharma along with the letter dated 10.02.1999, which also recorded her as having become a member in 1990. On this basis, the learned Special Judge drew the inference that she was involved in the conspiracy, observing that otherwise there was no plausible explanation for her details being reflected in the Society’s records and membership lists prior to the revival process.

80. Mr. Manish Makhija, learned Counsel on behalf of Poonam Awasthi, submits that the applicant has been roped into the alleged conspiracy on a narrow factual footing, namely that she signed certain banking documents and cheques in relation to the Society’s account. It is urged that she was neither named in the FIR nor is there any material to show her involvement in the revival process of the Society, which according to the applicant had already concluded much prior to her association. Learned counsel contends that the applicant became a member and assumed the role of Treasurer only much later, and therefore the inference of conspiracy drawn merely from her signing cheques or bank papers is prima facie unsustainable.

81. Learned counsel further submits that there is no allegation or proof of misappropriation of Society funds attributable to the applicant, and significantly, there is no charge under Section 406 of the IPC. It is argued that the bank account was opened for Society purposes, and the payments made were in furtherance of the Society’s requirements. It is also urged that even as regards the amounts stated to have been advanced by other coaccused, the record reflects that substantial sums were returned, and therefore the trial court’s approach of treating the applicant’s cheque signing as indicative of illegal financial handling is misplaced.

82. Learned counsel also emphasises that the applicant has clean antecedents, and that the applicant has also complied with directions of this Court, including surrendering after interim bail granted on 04.12.2025.

83. Mr. Ripudaman Bhardwaj, learned SPP for the CBI, opposes the grant of suspension of sentence and submits that the learned Special Judge was justified in placing reliance on the banking record showing that Poonam Awasthi signed cheques on behalf of the Society which resulted in payments being made to co-accused persons, including Pankaj Madan and Vikas Madan. It is pointed out that the applicant did not dispute her signatures on the said cheques and, therefore, her involvement in the financial dealings of the Society stands established.

84. Learned SPP further submits that the applicant did not dispute her signatures on the allied banking documents either, nor did she dispute that she functioned as the Treasurer of the Society. According to the prosecution, this reflects active participation in the Society’s affairs and, in such a position, the applicant was expected to account for the financial irregularities and the shortcomings in the Society’s record, particularly when the cheques signed by her facilitated disbursal of funds to other accused persons. On this basis, it is submitted that no case for suspension of sentence is made out.

85. Having heard the learned counsel for the applicant and the learned SPP for the CBI, and having perused the material on record, this Court notes that the grounds urged on behalf of the applicant raise questions which would necessarily require a detailed re-appreciation of the evidence and, therefore, cannot be conclusively adjudicated at the present stage. In particular, whether the applicant’s role as Treasurer was confined to routine Society functioning, or whether the material on record establishes conscious participation in the alleged illegal scheme, would depend upon a closer scrutiny of the relevant documents, the surrounding circumstances, and the evidentiary links sought to be drawn by the prosecution.

86. Likewise, the contention that there is no allegation of misappropriation and no charge under Section 406 of the IPC, as also the submission that the bank account and payments were for Society purposes, cannot be assessed without examining the transactional record, the authority under which the cheques were issued, and the manner in which such evidence was led and appreciated during trial.

87. Further, the issue regarding the membership discrepancy relied upon by the learned Trial Court would require careful examination of the documentary record, including Ex. PW 45/2 and Ex. PW 45/9, and the testimonies bearing on their preparation, custody, and authenticity, which exercise is more appropriately undertaken at the stage of final hearing of the appeal.

88. In the overall facts and circumstances, and applying the settled Conclusion

89. Learned counsel appearing for the applicants before this Court, as well as learned SPP for the CBI, have raised and rebutted multiple important issues over the course of hearing. For the sake of brevity, this Court would note that the issues raised in the applications goes beyond a prima facie appraisal and would require a detailed re-appreciation of evidence, including the documentary record relied upon by the prosecution, the connected testimonies, and the manner in which such material has been appreciated by the learned Trial Court.

90. This Court also notes that there is a degree of overlap in the issues canvassed and, to some extent, in the roles attributed to the applicants. Several contentions touching upon the nexus to conspiracy, the timing of association with the Society, the evidentiary value and proof of disputed writings and signatures, the nature of the financial transactions, and the satisfaction of ingredients of the substantive offences, are matters which are more appropriately examined at the stage of final hearing of the appeal.

91. The law on criminal conspiracy recognises that such offences are ordinarily conceived and executed in secrecy over a period of time, and it is not necessary that each conspirator must participate in every act or remain associated from inception to completion. What is material is the existence of a combination by agreement, which may be express or implied, to pursue an unlawful object or to achieve a lawful object by unlawful means. This position stands reiterated in Firozuddin Basheeruddin and others v. State of Kerala17. The relevance of the said principle in the present matter is that the applicants specifically contend that their association with the Society, even assuming the prosecution case at its highest, falls in different time periods and at distinct stages of the scheme, and that they were neither involved from the inception nor connected with every link in the chain. The legal position in Firozuddin Basheeruddin therefore bears directly on the manner in which the plea of ―different timing of entry‖ is to be appreciated, namely, that differential timing by itself is not determinative, but the question remains whether there is material to establish qua each applicant, which would be examined on merits at the stage of final hearing of the appeals.

92. In a broad sense, the prosecution narrative traces the commencement of the scheme to the point when steps towards revival were set in motion, including the decision to pursue revival in the GBM dated 29.11.1998, and carries it up to the stage when allotment of land at Dheerpur was secured in 1999, with subsequent acts relied upon as reflecting continuation and implementation of the said scheme.

93. At the same time, since the impugned judgment does not delineate one uniform period of conspiracy, the question whether the material, taken cumulatively, meets the threshold of proving an agreement qua each applicant, including whether any applicant is sought to be linked merely by association or proximity, would necessarily require a detailed reappreciation of the documentary record and the connected oral evidence, which this Court considers appropriate to be undertaken at the stage of final hearing of the appeals.

94. While the majority of issues raised in the present applications are being kept open to be raised and considered at the stage of final hearing of the appeals, this Court deems it appropriate to record findings on two specific aspects which were addressed at length during arguments. The first pertains to the jurisdictional objection raised by Mr. Hariharan, learned Senior Counsel, while arguing on behalf of Maha Nand Sharma, which has been addressed in detail in paras 34–35 of the present order. The second relates to the contention advanced by Mr. Anil Soni, learned Senior Counsel, regarding the applicant Vikas Madan’s choice not to depose in defence under Section 315 of the CrPC, in the context of the adverse observation recorded in the impugned judgment, which has been addressed in detail in paras 71–75 of the present order.

95. At the same time, this Court has borne in mind the settled parameters governing suspension of sentence pending appeal, including the nature of the offence, the role attributed to each applicant as recorded in the impugned judgment, the sentence awarded, the period of custody already undergone, and the conduct of the applicants during trial.

96. This Court has also taken note of the medical grounds urged by certain applicants in support of their respective prayers. Further, having regard to the variety of issues arising in the appeals and the consequent time likely to be taken for their final disposal, this Court is satisfied that the present applications merit favourable consideration, subject to appropriate conditions.

97. Accordingly, the sentences awarded to the applicants, namely Maha Nand Sharma, Pankaj Madan, Vijay Thakur, Vikas Madan and Poonam Awasthi, shall remain suspended during the pendency of the appeals, and they are directed to be released on bail on each of them furnishing a personal bond in the sum of ₹1,00,000/- with one surety of the like amount, to the satisfaction of Trial Court/Duty Judge, subject to the following terms and conditions: a) The applicants shall furnish their permanent addresses to the IO concerned within two weeks of their release and in case they change their addresses, they will inform the IO concerned and this Court; b) The applicants shall appear before the Court as and when the appeals are taken up for hearing; c) The applicants shall not leave the country without the prior permission of this Court; and d) The applicants shall not commit any offence during the period of their release.

98. It is clarified that nothing stated herein shall be construed as an expression on the merits of the case, and all rights and contentions of the parties are kept open to be urged at the time of final hearing.

99. The applications are allowed and disposed of in the afore-mentioned terms.

100. Copy of this order be sent to the concerned Jail Superintendent for necessary information and compliance. AJAY DIGPAUL, J DECEMBER 20, 2025 Sk/yr