M/S MIRC ELECTRONICS LIMITED v. SHASHANK GUPTA

15. On the basis of the pleadings, the learned Labour Court framed the following issues: i. Whether the present workman is not covered under the definition of “workman” a mentioned under Section 2 (s) of the ID Act, and if so to what effect? OPM ii. Whether the services of the workman have been terminated illegally and/or unjustifiably by the management if so, to what effect? OPM iii. Relief.

16. On August 03, 2013, the Labour Court passed the impugned award of 5 lakh as lump sum compensation in lieu of reinstatement and back wages holding inter alia as under:- “22. From the material placed on record as well as depositions made by the witnesses it do not find element which shows that the claimant not covered under the definition of workman' as defined u/s.[2] fsj of I.D. Act. The claimant have denied that he i/i/as working in Administrative or management cadre. He was reported to Mr S.K.Sachdev who i/i/as his immediate boss and followed his command at time to time. He do not have power to prepare Form 16 of TDS return or filled up the Annual Confidential report sanctioned the leave to any subordinate staff etc. Therefore, in view of the aforesaid discussion the issue no.1 is decided in favour of workman. xxxx xxxx xxxx

29. In view of the contention raised by the authorized representative of the parties and material placed on record as well as aforesaid discussion. The discussion previous paragraph of the award be read part &partial of this issue too and same is not repeated here for sake of brevity. It's held that the claimant is covered under the definition of workman' and while terminating the services of the workman, necessary notice/charge- sheet, domestic enquiry has to be done by the management. The management also bound to conduct the regular domestic enquiry but same is not done by management which is violation of principle of natural justice. In the facts and circumstances, the management has terminated his service on the basis of recession of the management between re-organization of the several department including taxation, however there is no ocular trustworthy evidence with respect to the recession in the management though the balance-sheet filed by the workman is contrary to the contention raised by the management which shows that the management was in those benefits on the several accounts. xxxx xxxx xxxx

31. In view of the finding on the above issues, it is a matter of record that the claimant is covered under the definition of workman' as defined w/s. 2(s) of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947. The workman has not received the full and final settlement dues and the services of the workman i/i/as terminated illegally and unjustifiably by the management. The claimant vi/as employed with the management in the year

1992. The management terminated the services of the workman vide termination letter dated 30.06.08 without assigning any reason and without holding any enquiry, by giving him one month's salary in lieu of one month's notice, stating that their services are no longer required. Though the nature of work of the workman illas clerical duties pertaining to the taxation matter assisting to the Onida Company, recorded the copy of the income tax file etc. in group taxation department (financial & account). The claimant was responsible for the management's taxation system including tax data of the management. He iilas also required to compute the taxes & file the statement account of employee. The management throughout has testified that there was no complaint whatsoever against the workman. The claimant was performing his duties honestly and sincerely. The management has alleged that the services of the workman terminated due to business exigencies including administrative reasons. But there is no verbal or written evidence brought on record to show what was the business exigencies including administrative reasons to terminate the services of the workman. The workman has served the management more than 16 years of his service. The claimant do not wish to join outside Delhi even offer was made by the management. Thus, question of reinstatement in the service at Delhi does not arise since the recession, alleged reorganization of the management department.” On January 20, 2014, instead of implementing the award, the company challenged the same by way of the captioned writ petition.

17. The employee is aggrieved by the said award to the extent that it declined the normal relief of reinstatement with continuity of service and full back wages along with all consequential benefits, which is arbitrary, unjustified, and suffers from errors apparent on the face of the record and is in violation of Articles 14, 19 and 21 of the Constitution of India. Mr. Nagarajan stated that the Labour Court has failed to appreciate and take into account the fact that the employee has been in regular service with the company for over 16 years, that there is no complaint against him and also that he has been illegally deprived of his employment.

18. It was the case of the employee before the Labour Court that he had been performing clerical duties and other duties as directed by his superiors, and as such, is covered under Section 2(s) of the ID Act. Mr. Nagarajan has submitted that there is nothing in the cross examination of the employee conducted by the company before the Labour Court to establish that the employee is not entitled to the benefits under Section 2(s) of the ID Act. The company through evidence of their HR Manager had contended that there were subordinate staff working under the employee, however they have failed to adduce any evidence in this regard. It is an admitted fact that the company has not placed any documents either regarding the roles and responsibilities of the employee or to show that he has sanctioned any leave or signed any leave application/appraisal letter / promotion letter. The Labour Court has observed in paragraphs 16 to 19 of the impugned judgment/award that the company has not discharged the burden by producing the relevant record to show that the claimant was not a workman within the meaning of Section 2(s) of the ID Act Regarding Issue No.1, Mr. Nagarajan has relied on the judgment of the Supreme Court in Anand Regional Cooperative Oil Seeds Growers Union v. Shailesh Kumar Harshad Bhai Shah, (2006) 6 SCC 548, and of this Court in the cases of Shri Muralidharan v. The Management of M/s Circle Freight International India Pvt. Ltd., WP(C) 7023/2003 decided on April 30, 2007 and Mathur Aviation v. Lt. Governor and Ors., 1977 IILLJ 255.

19. He has also submitted that the illegal and mala fide termination, apart from going against the principles of natural justice, is also in violation of Section 9A read with Schedule IV (10&11) of the ID Act. In this regard, he referred to the judgment of the Supreme Court in the case of Lokmat Newspapers Pvt. Ltd. v. Shankarprasad (1991) 6 SCC 275. He also stated that the Labour Court in its award, contradicted its own findings wherein on one hand, in paragraphs 28 and 29 of the impugned award, it was held that the termination of the employee is in total violation of Sections 25 (G), 25 (N) and 25 (0) of the ID Act leading to the conclusion that there was no recession based re-organisation of the company‟s departments and there was no closure of the unit. On the other hand, the Labour Court while denying relief to the employee recorded that the question of reinstatement of workman in the service does not arise of “recession alleged reorganization of the management‟s department”. Mr. Nagarajan has vehemently contended that once it has been held that the termination of services of the employee is in contravention of the provisions of the ID Act, the petitioner is entitled in law to reinstatement with full back wages and continuity of service with all consequential benefits as has been held in Uttaranchal Forest Development Corporation and Anr. v. Jabar Singh and Ors. 2007 (2) SCC 112. He has also relied upon the judgment in the case of Mohan Lal v. Management of Bharat Electronics, 1981 SCC (L&S) 478 to contend that when the termination itself has been held to be illegal, the termination order is void ab intio and inoperative as there is neither termination nor cessation of service and a declaration should follow that the workman continues to be in service with all consequential benefits.

20. He further stated that if the company wants to deviate from this settled position of law, it has to show that the employee was gainfully employed elsewhere, which it has clearly failed to do in the present case, as is evident from the findings of the Labour Court. In this regard he has referred to the judgment of the Supreme Court in the case of Bhuvnesh Kumar Dwivedi v. Hindalco Industries Ltd., AIR 2014 SC

2258. It is the case of the employee that the impugned award is contrary to the decision of the Supreme Court in the case of Devinder Singh v. Municipal Council, Sanaur, AIR 2011 SC 2532, wherein it was held as under-

21. Further, Mr. Nagarajan has contended that the Labour Court has failed to differentiate between the service of a daily wage worker and a permanent workman. He submitted that the Supreme Court in BSNL v. Bhurumal, 2013 (15) SCALE 131, after analysing its earlier judgments including Deepali Gundu Survase (supra) on the issue of reinstatement with full back wages, has clearly distinguished the treatment that should be given to an illegally terminated daily wage worker hand and an illegally terminated permanent /regular workman as under:-

22. That apart, it is also submitted that the impugned order does not provide any justifiable relief to the employee, but merely puts a premium on the breach of the law. As regards the offer of alterative employment provided by the company, he has stated that the same was merely a smoke screen in order to circumvent the law and prejudice the Labour Court. He stated that it is a settled legal position that the offer of appointment which is a conditional offer cannot be forced upon the workman so as to deny him his legitimate right to receive wages. The likely posting at any place other than the place where the employee was bona fide required to work would amount to writing a unilateral contract of service conditions, which cannot be in consonance with the provisions of the ID Act, and therefore such an offer, if not acceptable to the workman, cannot be foisted upon him. Lack of an offer of proper work by the company to the employee is evident from the cryptic invitation provided to him. It is the case of the employee that the same was done to defeat the provisions of law, and to „victimise‟ the employee during the pendency of the proceedings.

23. Mr. Nagarajan has also contended that the Labour Court has ignored Order XIV Rule 1 (5) of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908, which mandates that the courts after a reading of the plaint and written statement should frame the issues on which the decision of a case depends. In the present case, after the belated amendment of the written statement by the company and the rejoinder thereto of the employee, no issues were framed by the Labour Court on the following points “i. Whether closure of Noida unit where the employee was last employed was bona fidel real. ii. Whether fresh offer of employment given on account of alleged closure of Noida unit at a different factory in Maharashtra during pendency of the proceedings was bona fide under the defined provisions of the ID Act.” The Labour Court has relied upon these issues in the judgment / award, but without framing the same.

24. To buttress his arguments, Mr. Nagarajan has relied upon the judgment of the High Court of Calcutta in M/s Precious Carrying Corporation v. The Second Labour Court on October 08, 2013 in WP(C) 6303 (W) of 2012, wherein it was observed as under:- “The Court, at the time of considering an application for amendment, would confine itself to the satisfaction whether such an amendment is necessary for the purpose of adjudication of the disputes involved in a proceeding. It goes without saying that mere allowing an application for amendment cannot be construed that the facts narrated therein become sacrosanct and does not require to be proved any further as the facts. brought by way of an amendment, are required to be proved in a similar and identical manner as those made in the original proceedings.”

25. He has also relied upon the judgments of the Supreme Court in the cases of Sudarshan Rajpoot v. UP State Road Transport Corporation, Civil Appeal No. 10353/2014; Tapash Kumar Paul v. BSNL and Anr., Civil Appeal No. 4980/2014; Jasmer Singh v. State of Haryana and Anr., Civil Appeal No. 346/2015; Mackinnon Mackenzie and Company Ltd. v. Mackinnon Employees Union, Civil Appeal No. 5319/2008; M/s Hindustan Tin Works Pvt. Lt.d v. The Employees of M/s Hindustan Tin Works Pvt. Ltd. and Ors., (1979) 2 SCC 87; Surendra Kumar Verma and Ors. v. Central Government Industrial Tribunal-cum-Labour Court, New Delhi and Anr., (1980) 4 SCC 443; Bhuvnesh Kumar Dwivedi v. Hindalco Industries Pvt. Ltd., AIR 2014 SC 2258; and the judgment of this Court in Asha Verma v. CEAT India Ltd., WP(C) 7802/2008 to contend that the employee is entitled to full back wages and consequential benefits.

ANALYSIS

26. Having heard the learned counsel for the parties and perused the record. The above two writ petitions have been filed challenging the award dated August 3, 2013 of the Labour Court. The challenge insofar as by the company is concerned, the same is to the finding of the Labour Court, that the employee is a “Workman” under Section 2(s) of the ID Act and also on the award compensation of ₹5 lakh along with interest @ 9% per annum, in the eventuality, the company failed to pay the amount to the employee after 30 days of the publication of the award till realization.

27. Whereas the challenge to the award by the employee is primarily on the ground that the Labour Court has not given reinstatement with back wages to him and had awarded a compensation of ₹5 lakh.

28. At the outset, I intend to refer to the submissions made on behalf of the company through Mr. Mishra, that given the nature of appointment of the employee, he was not a “Workman” within the definition of Section 2(s) of the ID Act. The contentions, primarily are the following:-

(i) The employee was employed in a Managerial capacity and was having supervision over the staff working under him.

(ii) He was engaged in an advisory capacity in relation to Taxation and allied matters and was drawing salary equivalent to that of a Manager.

(iii) He had access to information made available to Manager and

(iv) He had access to a separate canteen on the first floor, which is exclusively for Managers and Senior Executives, whereas the other workers use the staff canteen in the basement.

29. Even on the aspect of award of compensation to the employee, the submission of Mr. Mishra were the following:

(i) The employee refused to accept the offer of employment at

(ii) The Labour Court had not invoked the principle of no work no pay.

30. The additional grounds to challenge the award are:

(i) There is no illegality or arbitrariness in the termination of the employee.

(ii) The termination was effected not because of misconduct, but because his services have become redundant due to the closure of the Noida Unit of the company.

(iii) Under the terms of appointment, the employee was entitled for one month‟s salary in lieu of notice, which was duly paid to him.

(iv) The employee has already accepted full and final settlement as well as gratuity, and as such he is estopped from challenging his alleged termination.

31. Having noted the broad submissions made by the counsel appearing for the Company, I intend to first deal with the issue whether the employee was a “Workman” within the definition of Section 2(s) of the ID Act. The issues which were framed by the Labour Court have already been reflected above.

32. The plea of Mr. Mishra was that the Labour Court has erred in putting the onus to prove that the employee is a Workman on the company instead on the employee. Though, the submission looks appealing on a first blush, but the fact of the matter is that the objection that the employee is not a Workman was taken by the company. In that sense, the onus shall be on the company to prove the objection taken by it. In support of its stand, the company through Mr. Mishra had stated that the employee was a Senior Executive in Financial and Accounts Department and the salary of Senior Executives was ₹22,981/-, 26,506/-, 19,265/- respectively. The employee was in the Executive Cadre, and had supporting clerical staff, whose salary was between ₹12,000/- to ₹16,000/-.

33. The Labour Court had primarily referred to the cross examination of MW[1], A.K. Dhingra, who has deposed as under: “….there were subordinate staff working under him and he was discharging duties of executive. In their company manager is responsible for his department such as the person of finance dept. will be responsible for all finance and accounts related activities of the company. It is denied that there was no document to show that the workman was discharging the duty of „Executive‟. The claimant was functioning as „Sr. Executive‟ in Taxation Department who works under the manager and under his there are subordinate staff and he gets work done from his subordinate. The department head used to do appraisals of Shashank Gupta. Departmental head can be Manager, AGM, DGM, GM. He do not remember who was the HOD of Shashank Gupta. Because time to time there were different people. At the time of alleged termination of the workman Sh. S.C. Rastogi was the HOD. He cannot tell without checking the record as to whether the claimant had sanctioned and leaves or signed any leave application or appraisals letter or promotion letter. Ms. Shobha, Bahukhandi, Rajinder Singh, Balmukund Shukla, S. Gosh, J.P. Sharma were his subordinate staff in accounts department. He has not filed any documents on record which show that the claimant used to give any instructions to the above named persons. Form 16 and TDS returns of all the employees working in the counter were issued from Mumbai office……” (emphasis supplied)

34. The case of the employee was that he was assisting the General Manager-Taxation, S.K. Sachdev. S.K. Sachdev and one S.C. Rustagi were responsible for taking care of all Taxation and Accounts related matters. They were solely responsible for taking independent decisions and give advises on all taxation, accounting and incidental matters. He was entrusted to do his job inter alia taking details from payroll and account department of the Group Company, feed them in computer as per the fixed format for necessary actions and for finalization of the I.T. Returns and TDS Certificates. His last pay drawn salary was ₹2,94,692/- per annum.

35. I have already reproduced the conclusion of the Labour Court on issue No.1, whether the employee is a “Workman” in paragraph 16 above. The same is a finding of fact of the Labour Court that the management has not produced any documentary evidence to show that the claimant was working in the capacity of administrator, managerial or supervisory. The Labour Court has also relied upon the judgment of the Supreme Court in the case of Sharad Kumar v. Government of NCT of Delhi & Ors., 2002 LLR 545, wherein it is held that the nature of duties and not the designation that will determine whether an employee is a “Workman” or not. The Labour Court had also relied upon the judgment of this Court in the case of LKP Merchant Financing Ltd. v. Government of NCT of Delhi & Ors., 2003 LLR 367 (Del HC) wherein it was reiterated that the designation or salary of an employee is not the criteria to determine whether an employee is a Workman or not.

36. The plea that the onus to prove that he is Workman on the employee and not on the management, the Labour Court had rightly relied upon the judgment in the case of Shankerbhai Mathalal Prajapat v. Maize Products, (2003) 96 FLR 829, wherein the following has been stated as under: “Moreover, the Labour Court has totally shut its eyes to the fact that issue with regard to the maintainability of the reference was agitated by the respondent and it was the respondent's duty by placing adequate and reliable evidence before the Labour Court to establish that the petitioner was not a workman. For that purpose, the respondent was required to place before the Labour Court the nature of duties assigned to the petitioner while he worked as a Junior Shift Chemist in the starch department. Neither oral nor any documentary evidence has been produced. The respondent has neither placed on record the duty manual nor a copy of the advertisement that might have been issued inviting the applications to fill up the post of Junior Chemist. If that be so it can well be said that the respondent has totally failed to discharge its duty and the Labour Court has committed grave error in not deciding the issue in favour of the petifioner. Needless to say that it is the respondent's duty to produce cogent and reliable evidence to substantiate its say. It may be noted that the nature of objection that has been raised by the respondent goes to the very root of this proceedings, and therefore, it is for the respondent to establish the fact that the petitioner is not a workman within the meaning of Section 2(o) of the I.D. Act.”

37. Similarly, the Labour Court has also relied upon the judgment in the case of Burmah Shell Oil Storage & Distribution Co. of India v. Burmah Shell Management Staff Association & Ors., (1971 2 SCR 758, wherein it has been held as under: “……..a workman must be held to be employed to do that work which is the main work he is required to do, even though he may be incidentally doing other types of work. Therefore, in determining which of the employees in various categories are covered by the definition of „workman‟ one has to see what is the main or substantial work which they are employed to do.”

38. The Labour Court has in paragraphs 21 and 22 summed up its reasoning in holding the employee as a Workman, which I reproduce as under:

39. From the above, it is clear that the finding of fact of the Labour Court is that: (1) The determinative factor is the main duties of the concerned employee and not some incidentally done. (2) A person cannot be said to be working in a managerial or administrative capacity merely because he was to supervise persons who help him in doing the work he himself has to perform. (3) The employee was looking after taxation matters of the company, he also used to get clerical work from his supporting staff. (4) His initial designation was Clerk-cum-Typist as he used to type letters before he was promoted. The nature of work given to the employee was never been supervisory. (5) He used to take advice from S.K. Sachdev as and when required by him pertaining the taxation matters. (6) He used to get clerical work done from his subordinate staff. (7) He was not the leave sanctioning authority or any kind of power assigned to sanction any amount of fund and as such he cannot be said to be covered under the definition of Workman under Section 2(s) of the ID Act.

40. I agree with the aforesaid conclusion of the Labour Court merely because the employee has a designation of Senior Executive would not mean that he was working in a Managerial / Supervisory capacity. The designation would not be only criteria to determine whether a person is a Workman or not. It is the nature of duties which are performed become relevant in that regard.

41. Mr. Mishra had relied upon the judgments in the case of Workmen Nilgiri Co-operative Society Ltd. (supra), Kirloskar Brothers Ltd. (supra), Burmah Shell Oil Storage (supra) and HR Adyanthaya (supra) in support of his contention that the onus to prove that the employee was a Workman was on the employee and not on the management. This proposition has to be seen in the context that it was the objection of the company that the employee is not a Workman. So, in that context, surely the company was required to show to the Court as to why the employee was not a Workman. In that sense, the onus was on the company. It is a well settled law that the person who sets up a plea, in this case of Workman, the burden would be upon him.

42. Having said, I find that the Labour Court has on the basis of evidence including the stand taken by the employee has come to a conclusion that the employee is a Workman. The relevant aspects considered by the Labour Court have already been reflected by me in the above paragraphs.

43. If that be so, I am of the view that the said finding of fact cannot be disturbed by this Court, more so, in exercise of jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution of India. A Coordinate Bench of this Court in the case of V[2] Retail Limited v. Vijay Singh, 2020 SCC OnLine Del 280, while considering an award passed by the Industrial Adjudicator has held that a finding of fact of the Labour Court cannot be interfered with in a proceeding under Article 226 of the Constitution of India. In paragraph 5 the Court has held as under:-

44. The reliance placed by Mr. Mishra on the judgment of the Supreme Court in the case of Haryana Financial Corporation and Anr. (supra) is concerned, there is no dispute on the proposition of law which has been laid down in the said judgment. The said judgment has no applicability in the facts of this case.

45. Having said that the next issue which arises for consideration is whether the termination of the employee was justified. In this regard, the findings of the Labour Court in paragraph 29 are as under:

46. From the above, it is noted that the primary grounds for the Labour Court to hold that the termination was not justified are the following:-

(i) The requirement of Sections 25(G), 25N and 25(O) of the ID

(ii) The principles of natural justice have not been followed.

(iii) The case of the company was that his services was terminated in view of recession in the management leading to re-organization of several departments including the Taxation but no trustworthy evidence with regard to the recession in the management could be proved as the balance sheet filed by the employee was contrary to the contention raised by the company which shows that the company was in profit in several accounts.

47. The Labour Court has also concluded discrimination, inasmuch as it had retained services of one Rajbir Singh, who was also working in the same department and in that sense there is a violation of Section 25(G) of the ID Act and in any case, the Labour Court held that the provisions of Section 25N and O of the ID Act were required to be followed which have not been followed. The aforesaid finding is not a perverse finding and as such, cannot be faulted. In this regard, the judgment of the Coordinate Bench of this Court in the case of V[2] Retail Limited (supra) is squarely applicable to this issue as well.

48. Now coming to the third issue whether the Labour Court was justified in grating the compensation to the employee. The plea of Mr. Mishra is that during the pendency of the proceedings before the Labour Court the company had offered to appoint the employee at Thane, which offer was not accepted by the employee and hence, the principle of no work no pay, would be attracted and the employee could not have been given compensation. Though, the submission looks appealing on a first blush, but on a deeper consideration, it is noted that the offer of employment was not in Noida, the place of work of the employee but at a place in Thane District, i.e., Maharashtra, which is surely different from Noida. The offer was not accepted by the employee, the same is not unjustified as he could not have been appointed at a place different from Noida in view of Section 9A of the ID Act and hence, the principle of no work no pay sought to be invoked by Mr. Mishra is not applicable. The judgments as noted in paragraph 8 above are not applicable to the facts of this case and are clearly distinguishable. That apart, if the termination is bad, the consequence shall be grant of monetary benefits.

49. Now, the issue which arises for consideration as urged by Mr. Atul Nagarajan is whether the employee was required to be reinstated in service instead of granting compensation of ₹5 lakh. The law in this regard is well settled by the Supreme Court in its latest judgment wherein it has held that in every case of termination even if illegal, it is not necessary that reinstatement with back wages must follow automatically. The Supreme Court / this Court has clearly held that the compensation in lieu of reinstatement with back wages is an appropriate relief that can be granted in a case where there is an illegal termination. In this regard, I may refer to the judgment in the case of Ranbir Singh v. Executive Eng. P.W.D., 2021 SCC OnLine SC 670, wherein the Supreme Court in paragraphs 5 & 6 has held as under:

6. In the light of the state of the law, which we take note of, we notice certain facts which are not in dispute. This is a case where it is found that, though the appellant had worked for 240 days, appellant's service was terminated, violating the mandatory provisions of Section 25F of the Act. The authority involved in this case, apparently, is a public authority. At the same time, it is common case that the appellant was a daily wager and the appellant was not a permanent employee. It is relevant to note that, in the award answering Issue No. 1, which was, whether the termination of the appellant's service was justified and in order, and if not, what was the amount of back wages he was entitled to, it was found, inter alia, that the appellant could not adduce convincing evidence to establish retention of junior workers. There is no finding of unfair trade practice, as such. In such circumstances, we think that the principle, which is enunciated by this Court, in the decision, which is referred to in Raj Kumar (supra), which we have referred to, would be more appropriate to follow. In other words, we find that reinstatement cannot be automatic, and the transgression of Section 25F being established, suitable compensation would be the appropriate remedy.”

50. Having said that, it is not a case of the employee that the amount of ₹5 lakh which otherwise has been granted to him is on the lower side.

51. Even otherwise, it is the case of the employee that his total annual emoluments were ₹2,94,692/- on the date when he was terminated. He has worked between the years 1992 to 2008. In other words, he has put in 16 years of service with the Company. If it is his plea that Section 25F of the ID Act has been violated, the same contemplates a notice period of one month or pay in lieu thereof and he shall be paid 15 days of average salary for each completed year.

52. Noting the above condition in Section 25F of the ID Act, it is not disputed that the employee was given the notice of one month before effecting his retrenchment / termination. It is the case of the company that he has been paid all the benefits in full and final settlement including Gratuity. It is not the case that compensation as contemplated under Section 25(F) has been paid.

53. If that be so, the payment of 15 days of average salary for the 16 years of service put in by him, shall work out to approximately ₹1,96,461/-. In other words, on the date of retrenchment, the Company should have paid the employee an amount of ₹1,96,461/-, as a condition precedent under Section 25F of the ID Act. In the present case, not only ₹1,96,461/-, the employee has been directed to be paid compensation of ₹5 lakh, that too with interest to be payable after the award becomes implementable. In that sense, the compensation which has been granted to the employee is just and proper. I am of the view that even the Award cannot be interfered with on this ground. Insofar as the judgments referred by Mr. Atul Nagarajan in support of his submission that the petitioner is entitled to the reinstatement with full back wages and consequential benefits are concerned, they have no applicability in view of the latest position of law of the Supreme Court in the case of Ranbir Singh (supra).

54. In view of my above conclusion, both the writ petitions are dismissed. CM APPL. 43718/2021 in W.P.(C) 279/2014 CM APPL. 43489/2021 in W.P.(C) 2410/2015 Dismissed as infructuous.

V. KAMESWAR RAO, J

MAY 04, 2023