Harish Kumar v. MD Tufail @ Rahees

15. The Hon’ble Apex Court in Union of India v. Prafulla Kumar Samal: (1979) 3 SCC 4, dealt with the scope of enquiry a judge is required to make with regard to the question of framing of charges. Inter alia, the following principles were laid down by the Court:

16. The Hon’ble Apex Court, in the case of Sajjan Kumar v. CBI: (2010) 9 SCC 368, has culled out the following principles in respect of the scope of Sections 227 and 228 of the CrPC while observing that a prima facie case would depend on the facts and circumstances of each case. The relevant paragraphs read as under:

framing a charge and proceeding with the trial.

(iii) The court cannot act merely as a post office or a mouthpiece of the prosecution but has to consider the broad probabilities of the case, the total effect of the evidence and the documents produced before the court, any basic infirmities, etc. However, at this stage, there cannot be a roving enquiry into the pros and cons of the matter and weigh the evidence as if he was conducting a trial.

(iv) If on the basis of the material on record, the court could form an opinion that the accused might have committed offence, it can frame the charge, though for conviction the conclusion is required to be proved beyond reasonable doubt that the accused has committed the offence.

(v) At the time of framing of the charges, the probative value of the material on record cannot be gone into but before framing a charge the court must apply its judicial mind on the material placed on record and must be satisfied that the commission of offence by the accused was possible.

(vi) At the stage of Sections 227 and 228, the court is required to evaluate the material and documents on record with a view to find out if the facts emerging therefrom taken at their face value disclose the existence of all the ingredients constituting the alleged offence. For this limited purpose, sift the evidence as it cannot be expected even at that initial stage to accept all that the prosecution states as gospel truth even if it is opposed to common sense or the broad probabilities of the case.

(vii) If two views are possible and one of them gives rise to suspicion only, as distinguished from grave suspicion, the trial Judge will be empowered to discharge the accused and at this stage, he is not to see whether the trial will end in conviction or acquittal.” (emphasis supplied)

17. In State of Gujarat v. Dilipsinh Kishorsinh Rao: (2023) 17 SCC 688, the Hon’ble Apex Court has discussed the parameters that would be appropriate to keep in mind at the stage of framing of charge/discharge, as under:

for discharge is filed. At that stage, the trial judge has to merely examine the evidence placed by the prosecution in order to determine whether or not the grounds are sufficient to proceed against the accused on basis of charge sheet material. The nature of the evidence recorded or collected by the investigating agency or the documents produced in which prima facie it reveals that there are suspicious circumstances against the accused, so as to frame a charge would suffice and such material would be taken into account for the purposes of framing the charge. If there is no sufficient ground for proceeding against the accused necessarily, the accused would be discharged, but if the court is of the opinion, after such consideration of the material there are grounds for presuming that accused has committed the offence which is triable, then necessarily charge has to be framed. xxx xxx xxx

12. The primary consideration at the stage of framing of charge is the test of existence of a prima-facie case, and at this stage, the probative value of materials on record need not be gone into. This Court by referring to its earlier decisions in the State of Maharashtra v. Som Nath Thapa, (1996) 4 SCC 659 and the State of MP v. Mohan Lal Soni, (2000) 6 SCC 338 has held the nature of evaluation to be made by the court at the stage of framing of the charge is to test the existence of prima-facie case. It is also held at the stage of framing of charge, the court has to form a presumptive opinion to the existence of factual ingredients constituting the offence alleged and it is not expected to go deep into probative value of the material on record and to check whether the material on record would certainly lead to conviction at the conclusion of trial.”

18. The Court at the stage of framing of charge is to evaluate the material only for the purpose of finding out if the facts constitute the alleged offence, given the ingredients of the offence. Thus, while framing of charges, the Court ought to look at the limited aspect of whether, given the material placed before it, there is grave suspicion against the accused which is not properly explained. Though, for the purpose of conviction, the same must be proved beyond reasonable doubt.

19. The limited question for the determination of this Court is thus whether the learned ASJ rightly discharged the respondents of the alleged offences.

20. The learned ASJ discharged the accused persons after observing that there is no reliable evidence on record to frame charges against the accused persons. It was also observed that the ingredients of the offences were not made out from the facts of the case and all the material aspects of the story of the prosecutrix had been falsified by police investigation. The learned ASJ was particularly weighed by the absence of medical evidence as well.

21. Although it is argued by the prosecution that the learned ASJ has erred in not appreciating the specific allegations made by the prosecution in her statement under Section 164 of the CrPC, in a matter such as this one which is bereft of any corroborating material and is helmed only on the statement of the victim, the Court has to be more circumspect while sifting the evidence on record at the stage of framing of charges, especially when there is significant delay in reporting the incident as well. The version of the victim should at least prima facie inspire some confidence. Even though the statement of a victim is to be given predominant consideration and the same can cast grave suspicion, where such a statement is riddled with inconsistencies or improbabilities, the Court is not expected to act as a mouthpiece of the prosecution and to frame charges by turning a blind eye to any apparent infirmities.

22. In the present case, as also noted by the learned ASJ, there is undue delay in reporting of the incident. While the alleged incident of rape is stated to have taken place on 08.11.2023, the prosecutrix only made a PCR call in relation to the same on 14.05.2024 after a period of more than six months. No explanation was given by the prosecutrix for lodging the FIR at such a belated stage.

23. Furthermore, the present case is not one where the prosecutrix has claimed that no one else was aware of the incident. The prosecutrix has maintained that she had told about the incident. She has also stated that other people also advised her against initiating action and getting involved in Court matters. In the statement recorded of the owner of the factory under Section 161 of the CrPC, he stated that the prosecutrix had only worked in his factory for a period of 20 days and she had left her job in October, 2023. He stated that on 08.11.2023, the prosecutrix had come to his factory and told him that she was having certain money transactions with Respondent No. 1, however, she did not inform him regarding any incident of sexual assault. As also appreciated by the learned ASJ, no workers who had allegedly advised the prosecutrix to not lodge a complaint against Respondent No. 1 have been enquired or made witnesses in the present case. The absence of any corroboration in this regard further weakens the case of the prosecution.

24. As also noted by the learned ASJ, the prosecutrix repeatedly changed her version of the alleged incident during the course of investigation. It is evident from a perusal of the material on record that the prosecutrix has never been consistent with her version of the alleged incident. As per the complaint, the alleged incident took place on 08.11.2023, however, no specific time has been mentioned. On the other hand, in her PCR call, the prosecutrix alleged that the alleged incident of rape had happened on 09.11.2023. In her statement under Section 164 of the CrPC, the prosecutrix failed to give any specific date or time and stated that the alleged incident took place prior to Diwali. The said discrepancies and lack of particulars further dilute any suspicion that is cast from the statement of the prosecutrix. The learned ASJ also rightly noted that the main grievance of the prosecutrix appears to be that Respondent No.1 did not return her money.

25. It is pertinent to note that there is no scientific or forensic evidence regarding the alleged offence either. It is noted by the learned ASJ that although the medical examination of the prosecutrix was conducted, however, none of the exhibits were seized and sent to FSL as she refused internal examination. Even otherwise, considering the significant delay in reporting of the offence, no corroborative medical evidence can be unearthed in the present case to lend credence to the case of the prosecution.

26. It is well-settled that the accused can be convicted solely on the basis of evidence of the prosecutrix as long as same inspires confidence and corroboration is not necessary for the same [Ref. Moti Lal v. State of M.P.: (2008) 11 SCC 20], however, in a case such as this one where the testimony of the prosecutrix is riddled with discrepancies and plagued with significant delay, no grave suspicion is attracted so as to warrant framing of charges, especially since the owner of the factory has also not supported the prosecution’s case and there was a persisting money dispute between the parties as well.

27. Insofar as the charge under Section 506 of the IPC is concerned, the only allegation levelled is that the respondents used to threaten the prosecutrix that they would kill her. A bare perusal of Section 506 of the IPC makes it clear that before an offence of criminal intimidation is made out, it must be established that an accused had an intention to cause harm to the complainant. Mere threats given by the accused not with an intention to cause alarm to the complainant would not constitute an offence of criminal intimidation. Even otherwise, as noted by the learned ASJ, although the prosecutrix had initially alleged that she had gone to the home of Respondent No.1 on 16.04.2024 where she was threatened by Respondent No.2, however, she made no mention of the incident in her statement under Section 164 of the CrPC and alleged that Respondent No.1 had come to her house on 17.05.2024 to threaten her. Pertinently, in her statement under Section 164 of the CrPC, the prosecutrix made no specific allegation qua threats from Respondent No.2. The bald allegations made by the prosecutrix only casts suspicion as against grave suspicion owing to the manifest discrepancies in the prosecution’s case as noted above. It is well-settled that in such a case, the Court has the discretion of discharging the accused.

28. In view of the aforesaid discussion, this Court is of the opinion that there is no grave suspicion for framing charges against the respondents for the offences under Sections 376/506 of the IPC.

29. There is no infirmity with the impugned order passed by the learned ASJ to warrant any interference by this Court.

30. The present petition is accordingly dismissed. Pending Application(s), if any, also stand disposed of. AMIT MAHAJAN, J DECEMBER 1, 2025 “SK”