Col. Laxmi Narayan (Retd.) & Ors. v. Coal India Limited & Ors.

(iv) The above examples indicate inclination of ESM companies towards business motive only that defeats the very purpose of welfare to the Ex-Army community for which they were given preferences,

(v) Some of the ESM companies have gone to the court and halted company’s operation thereby affecting the production and difficulty in meeting target. This have created a lot of embarrassment especially given the fact that ESM companies are given preferential normative rates which are much higher than the rates received through tender route. This has also attracted the attention of parliamentarians. Pressure has started building up and it is now time to bring some rationality.

(vi) DGR shall take steps for Institutional strengthening and introduce a system of comprehensive audit as to whether ESM companies are obeying the terms or not.” c) Minutes of Meeting held at New Delhi between the Central Vigilance Commission, respondent no. 1 and respondent no. 2 included the following: “ …However, in recent past there have been several representations and complaints relating to the functioning of ESM transportation companies received by CIL. Chairman, CIL also explained that it is not possible for CIL to verify bonafide of ESM companies and the responsibility has to be exclusively taken by DGR. Vigilance Commissioner, while appreciating services of ESM transportation companies in CIL said that larger number of complaints from various quarters have been received relating to functioning of ERSM companies. These complaints basically point out that ESM companies have gradually lapsed into the control of private individuals, also there is theft of coal during transportation and non-payment of CMPF to the employees of ESM transportation companies. Vigilance Commissioner requested DGR to submit details of number of actual ex-servicemen benefitted by this scheme” xviii) According to Clause 9 of the MoU dated 12.12.2013, normative rates to be paid to the ESM Cos. had to be worked out by a professional consultancy firm nominated and approved by the respondent no. 1 Board and views of respondent no. 2 had to be taken by the respondent no. 1 while finalizing such normative rates. In compliance of the same, the said work was allotted to IIT Kharagpur and revised rate were submitted by them on 14.07.2019. On 10.09.2019, IIT Report was forwarded to the respondent no. 2 for their views before obtaining approval of respondent no. 1 Board. Subsequently, a meeting was held on 14.11.2019 between respondent no. 2 and respondent no. 1, in presence of the representatives of IIT Kharagpur in which it was confirmed by the respondent no. 1 that the views and suggestion of respondent no.1 have already been incorporated in the Draft Report. Notably, IIT report never advised respondent no. 1 to engage ESM Cos. in all its subsidiaries. Thereafter, more than six months passed and in spite of nine reminders, no action has been taken by respondent no. 2 to resolve this critical issue. In view of the same, huge amount of provisional payment is being made to the ESM Cos. against the work done for the period of about two years which is subject to adjustment on finalization of rate. xix) In December 2018, due to delay in response from respondent no. 2 and without finding any other remedies to continue the ESM Contracts, respondent no.1 agreed to continue with the ongoing MoU, till the new one comes into force with the consent of respondent no. 2. Notably, even after the issuance of the Impugned Letter dated 30.06.2020, stating no requirement for revision of MoU, respondent no. 2 did not respond to the request of respondent no. 1 regarding finalization of MoU.

7. Learned counsel for the respondent no. 2/ DGR has made the following submissions: - Maintainability i) Instant petition arises out of a policy matter and thus, it does not come within purview of the Writ Jurisdiction of this Court. Moreover, the claim of the petitioners under the Doctrine of Legitimate Expectation do not hold good, as such expectations must yield to cornerstone of policy frameworks and the Coal Scheme is just a welfare measure, which isn’t mandatory of any ESM to avail. Therefore the petitioners do not have any vested right to demand inclusion in the Coal Scheme or seek specific benefits thereunder. DGR scheme ii) Respondent no. 2 facilitates resettlement of ESM through various resettlement schemes and upskilling programs, providing employment avenues due to their early retirement from service. The salient features of such schemes are as follows: a) An individual can avail only one scheme from the respondent NO. 2. b) Schemes are voluntary in nature and ESM register as per their requirement, subject to eligibility criteria. c) It is not guaranteed that all registered individuals will receive the benefits Scheme as the waiting period for all schemes is different and officers register in these schemes at different intervals after their retirement. Officers who become overage while being in the waiting list are removed from the waiting list as a matter of policy. Cessation of Coal Scheme iii) Pursuant to Impugned letter dated 30.06.2020, the respondent no. 2 halted new registration of the officers under the Coal Scheme to the immediate effect. Subsequently, vide letter dated 15.07.2020, officers in the waiting list were given an opportunity to shift to other Schemes without seniority or age relaxation or any other benefit on registration. iv) The decision to shift the officers in the waiting list to other Schemes, was transparently communicated to the ESMs individually and displayed on the respondent no. 2 website for a considerable period, enabling 138 ESM to opt for other Schemes of respondent no. 2. Age eligibility criterion v) Age eligibility criterion merely prescribes the eligibility conditions for participation in a welfare program, ensuring fairness and consistency in resettlement policies and the same doesn’t amount to an infringement of fundamental rights under Article 21 of the Constitution of India. vi) Claim of the petitioner to protect seniority and relax age eligibility is untenable due to the following:a) The wait-listed officers in the Coal Scheme were given an option to shift to other running Schemes immediately on intimation by the respondent no. 1 that no further requisitions will be made for ESM Cos. b) Guidelines promulgated by the respondent no. 2, applicable in 2020, clearly stated that the age criteria for the Coal Scheme was 60 years for officers upto the rank to Brigadier and equivalent and 62 years for the ranks of Maj General, above and equivalent officers. The officers who voluntarily opted for continuation in the wait-list of the Coal Scheme, even after being intimated that no new ESM Cos. will be requisitioned, were aware of the age eligibility criteria and did so on their own volition. c) Between 2011 and 2020 a total of 652 Officers registered for the Coal Scheme but only 222 were sponsored as per the requisition of ESM Cos. by CIL Subsidiaries. Rest of the 430 Officers either opted for other Schemes or got overage while being in the waiting list and were removed from the waiting list. No such Officer was given age relaxation by respondent no. 2. d) After, 30.06.2020, the Officers who shifted to other Schemes from the Coal Scheme, were not given any benefit of age relaxation or seniority. Hence, no age relaxation can be given to the officers who opted to stay in the waiting list of the Coal Scheme and became overage in due course. e) The issue of the wait-listed officers needs to be viewed holistically for all Schemes of the respondent no. 2 and not confined to the Coal Scheme. There is already a long waiting list of 1262 age eligible officers in the Security Agency Scheme and 161 officers in the CNG scheme of the respondent no. 2, who have the option to shift to the Coal Scheme in case of its revival, thus reducing the waiting list in other schemes. f) Age criteria is a basic eligibility criteria and sanctity of all schemes of the respondent no. 2. Granting age relaxation in the Coal Scheme will lead to disqualification of age eligible officers and the same will lead to further such litigations seeking age relaxation. vii) Following is the data with respect to the officers registrations in the Coal Scheme:- S.No. Particulars No. of Officers

1. Officers registered from 01.01.2011 to 30.06.2020

2. Officers allotted the sponsorship in last 10 years

3. Average sponsorship 22 officers/ year (4 to 5 Companies)

4. Waiting list as on 30.06.2020 361

5. Officers who shifted to other schemes 138

6. Present waiting list 223

7. Overage officers in the waiting list 158

8. Eligible officers as of today 65 viii) As per the aforementioned data, average sponsorship in an year is about 22 officers per year. Therefore, to accommodate 158 overage officers, it may take about 7 years. During this period the officers who are eligible in the age criteria will become overage and the same will result into further litigations. ix) Reliance is placed on following data to show that the officers who naturally cross the eligibility age while awaiting sponsorship from the respondent no. 2 are consequently removed from the waiting list. 2022 2023 2024 Overage Availed Overage Availed Overage Availed Security Agency Scheme 39 995 60 1171 70 651 CNG Scheme 06 26 13 55 12 10 Revival of the MoU and consequences of granting ante-dated seniority x) Permitting age relaxation to the petitioners will disrupt the structured resettlement policies, creating an unsustainable precedent for age relaxation across all respondent no. 2 Schemes and in that case, the respondent no. 2 will not be in a position to continue with the MoU. xi) The seniority of those originally registered under the respondent no. 2 Schemes would be unfairly impacted by granting ante-dated seniority to the petitioners, potentially depriving them of benefits due to the age limit of 60 years for availing scheme benefits. It would result into the following:a) Permanent loss of employment opportunities to the eligible officers and the originally wait listed officers in the other welfare schemes, who are still age eligible. b) Increased burden on other resettlement Schemes, potentially leading to longer wait times. c) Disruption of structured resettlement policies, making future negotiations with corporate entities difficult. d) The ESMs were given an option to shift to other Schemes, but they voluntarily chose to continue. Therefore, they cannot seek benefit as that would prejudice others who complied with the established rules. e) The petitioners have no overriding rights over other ESM who are also waiting for their turn. The ESM who are in the waiting list have also given their youth and have tirelessly served the nation by defending its territorial integrity and sovereignty. f) The ESMs who chose to shift to other Schemes, will approach this Court, seeking ante-dated seniority. g) Such relaxation would lead to additional litigation and compromise the objectives of these welfare measures. h) The respondent no. 2 will not be in a position to continue with the revised MoU, in case any age relaxation for seniority is granted to the petitioners. Respondent no. 2 has to look after welfare of all the ESMs registered in various Schemes. Grant of such age relaxation will affect the rights and opportunities of the other eligible ESMs. xiii) Additionally, it is pertinent to mention that the petitioners have alleged that ESMs lost an opportunity of employment by registering to the Coal Scheme and while waiting through these years. The same is incorrect, they had an option to move to another Scheme, reliance is placed upon the Clause 2(a)(iii) read with Clause 22(a) of the Guidelines, which clearly stipulate that ESMs must be unemployed and not self-employed at the time of sponsorship and not at the time of registration as alleged.

8. Learned counsel for the respondent no. 2 in response to submission made by the counsel for the respondent no. 1, submits as follows:i) The respondent no. 1 unilaterally issued Impugned Letters dated 26.06.2020 and 30.06.2020 and consequently, rescinded from the MoU dated 12.12.2013, the Coal Scheme and the ESM resettlement policy. The respondent no. 1 issued the Impugned Letters in complete defiance of the terms of the MoU dated 12.12.2013 and the ESM resettlement policy, thereby impacted the role and mandate of respondent no. 2 in discharging its duties of ensuring Self-employment to the ESM through the Schemes. ii) Respondent no. 1 is only delegates of Government of India entrusted for execution and implementation of the policy decision of the Government of India. Therefore, even for the purpose of execution and implementation of the MoU, the respondent no. 1 is required to act in co-ordination with the respondent no.2. iii) Respondent no. 2 had initiated letters, requesting the respondent no. 1 to come forward for discussion to iron out the issues and pave a way for signing of a new MoU, which would ensure continuation of the ESM Coal Transporation Scheme. However, vide communication dated 16.09.2020, the respondent no. 1 stated that they are not desirous of signing any new MoU and is firm in its decision for terminating the said Scheme. iv) According to the Clause 18 of the MoU, a joint meeting betweeen the respondent no. 1 and 2 is mandated to resolve any issue regarding the working of ESM Cos.. However, the respondent no. 1 in violation to the said Clause, straight away issued the Impugned Letters dated 26.06.2020 and 30.06.2020. v) It is false to state that the petitioner deviated from implementation of the 75% of its workforce from ESM category. The said allegation of the respondent no. 1 have emerged from an unilateral assumption and wrong interpretation of the provisions of MoU. MoU clearly states that the tipper drivers will not be considered, while calculating 75% of the ESM Cos.. Therefore, the contentions of the respondent no. 1 regarding 23% and less number of ESM is completely false. vi) Any such purported irregularity in compliance with the terms of the MoU, is subject to ongoing oversight by the vigilance, DGR and CAG. Thus, such irregularities cannot be made a ground for seeking exit from the ESM Resettlement Policy under the garb of exiting from the MoU. Moreover, agencies never detected any irregularities in relation to the petitioners, as alleged by the respondent no. 1. vii) It is denied that any kind of irregularity was noticed with regard to the petitioners. In letter initiated by the then Defence Minister in April 2003 and July 2003, he strongly recommended ESM Cos. to be governed by the provisions of the MoU. He further recommended that certain assured percentage of Coal Transportation work be allotted to the ESM Cos. and new ESM Cos. be raised with rise in production of coal. viii) In another instance, while answering parliamentary questions on 19.12.2004, the then Defence Minister, categorically stated that all complaints were examined by the respondent no. 2 and it was found that the ESM Cos. are functioning in accordance with the provisions of the MoU and no violation of MoU by any ESM Cos. was reported by any of the CIL Subsidiaries. ix) In a correspondence dated 21.09.2010, the then DGR stated that CBI inquiries in the year 2004 and 2008 could not substantiate any of the allegation and exonerated the ESM Cos. of all the allegations levied against them. x) Further, the allegation of the respondent no. 1 that the ESM Cos. did not come up for work during strikes is false. As the performance matrix of the ESM Cos. is much higher than the civilian contracts and PAPs, as admitted vide appeal made by the ESM to the respondent no. 2, which gives a consolidated analysis of excellent performance of ESM Cos.

9. Learned counsel for the respondent no. 3, supporting the stand taken by the respondent no. 1, submitted that any extension/ renewal of the contract for another term of four years is not a mandate and it is fully in the discretion of the respondent no. 1 subject to ESM requirement and availability of work.

10. It is further submitted by the learned counsel for the respondent no. 3 that the Impugned Letters only states that no new contracts/ extension of running contracts shall be given by any CIL Subsidiaries on the basis of MoU dated 12.12.2013. The said decision neither violated the running contract with ESM Cos. nor insisted upon any premature termination of a contract. He further submits that request for new contracts by the CIL subsidiaries is not a mandate of MoU and it is totally at the discretion of the respondent no. 1.

11. Additionally, it is submitted by the learned counsel for the respondent no. 3 that the respondent no. 1 being a State-Owned Commercial Organization is free to take decisions for outsourcing various works, exit from the MoU on completion of the existing contracts has no bearing on the ongoing contracts and respondent no. 1 is free to take such decisions. Thus, the respondent no. 1 decision as indicated in the Impugned Letters is not illegal and it is in best interest of the respondent no. 1 company. W.P.(C) 11005/2025 and W.P.(C) 11676/2025

12. These writ petitions have been filed seeking similar prayer as in the W.P.(C) 4384/2020. Moreover, the factual background and submissions raised by the petitioners in these petitions are similar as in the W.P.(C) 4384/2020. Thus, for the sake of brevity, the same are not being again reiterated.

13. However, with respect to the revised MoU filed in W.P.(C) 4384/2020 by the CIL on 03.07.2025 in terms of the directions of this Court vide order dated 09.04.2025, the petitioners in these petitions submits that the said MoU fails to provide any mechanism for inclusion of wait-listed ESMs, whose seniority was maintained vide interim order dated 21.07.2020. W.P.(C) 16002/2022

14. Instant petition under Article 226 of the Constitution of India, has been filed seeking the following prayers:- “a) Direct the Respondents to consider the Petitioners for allotment, under Coal Loading and Transportation Scheme in a time bound manner while maintaining the seniority and the eligibility of the Petitioners during the pendency of the issue of withdrawal of Coal Transport Scheme by Coal India Ltd, pending before this Hon’ble Court; In the alternative: b) Consider the Petitioners for any other Scheme by giving them ante-date seniority and eligibility from the date of their application under the Coal Loading Scheme. c) Pass any other and/or further order(s) as this Hon’ble Court may deem fit and proper in the facts and circumstances of the present case and in the interest of justice.”

15. In addition to the brief background stated in W.P.(C) 4384/2020, following facts are necessary for disposal of the instant petition:i) In 2017 and 2018, all the petitioners in the age bracket of 54 to 56 years registered in the Coal Scheme. ii) In February/ March 2022, to know the status of petitioner’s allotment in the Coal Scheme, they made various representations to the DGR. Vide letter dated 03.03.2022, DGR replied to these representation by stating that “Currently the scheme is frozen and the matter is subjudice”. iii) As the Coal Scheme postulates that the eligibility for allotment would cease to exist on the ESM attaining the age of 60 years. The petitioner again on 21.03.2022 sent a letter to the DGR, seeking clarification that whether the period spent in the litigation would be added to the age eligibility of the petitioners or not. Vide letter dated 20.06.2022, DGR replied to the said letter and the same reads as under:-

iv) After various visits at the office of DGR and meeting with other ESMs, the petitioners was made aware that the CIL had issued Impugned Letters and the said letters had been challenged before this Court in various petitions. v) Hence, the present petition.

16. Learned counsel for the petitioners, made following submissions in support of the instant petition: i) The petitioners had a legitimate expectation of timely allotment in the Coal Scheme because the petitioners registered under the said Scheme, four years prior to the age of eligibility, while the waiting period was at about 2- 2.[5] years. Pertinently, waiting list dated 06.01.2020 prepared by the DGR was last updated and frozen on 30.06.2020, where the names of all the petitioners herein were mentioned. ii) As per DGR letter dated 20.06.2022, if the petitioners would have shifted to any other Scheme, they would have been placed way down below the waiting list and the chances of getting any allotment would have been negligible, as the maximum age of eligibility was 60 years. iii) By way of the following, it was repeatedly assured to the petitioners that their seniority would be protected: a) DGR letter dated 20.06.2022 stated that the seniority/ eligibility of all the wait-listed officers would be maintained w.e.f. 30.06.2020 till final resolution. b) Interim order dated 21.07.2020 in W.P.(C) 4384/2020 records that the eligibility and seniority is to be maintained during the litigation period. c) The stand of the DGR was that the wait-listed candidates needs to be accommodated. The same is evident from the “Proposal from DGR for revision of Entry & Exit Rules for DGR’s Schemes”. The relevant portion of the same reads as under:- “(b) Exit Policy- The benfits of DGR schemes will be extended to officers for a period of 5 years or 60 years of age whichever is earlier except for ‘Coal Loading & Transportation Scheme’, where a company must run for 5 years irrespective of the age of directors. This is so because the scheme is not viable if run for a lesser duration.”

17. Refuting the submissions made on behalf of the petitioners, learned counsel for the respondents reiterated the submissions made on behalf of the respondents in W.P.(C) 4384/2020, which are as under:i) CIL unilaterally discontinued the Coal Scheme because of its administrative priorities, economic imperatives and shift in operational policies. ii) Resettlement in the Coal Scheme is a welfare measure (not mandatory to avail) and the same cannot be claimed as a matter of right. iii) The petitioners consciously chose to remain registered under the Coal Scheme, despite being given an option to transfer their registration to other DGR’s Scheme. iv) Granting ante-dated seniority to the petitioners would have impacted the seniority of those originally registered under these Schemes, potentially depriving them of benefits due to the age limit of 60 years. v) The petitioners do not posses any overriding rights over other ESMs and their request for an enhancement of their age limit would prejudice the interest of other wait-listed ESMs, who are equally entitled to the benefits of the Coal Schemes. vi) The rule limiting ESM to one Scheme within the prescribed age limit of 60 years ensures equitable resource distribution among all eligible ESMs. Granting special consideration to the petitioners, while maintaining seniority would create an unfair precedent, disadvantaging other wait-listed ESMs.

18. Additionally, learned counsel for the respondents refuting the submissions made on behalf of the petitioners, submitted that the interim order dated 21.07.2020 in W.P.(C) 4384/2020, directed maintaining eligibility/ seniority of the petitioners therein during the pendency of that case and there had been no directions for the same towards all other ESMs.

19. Refuting the stand taken by the respondents, learned counsel for the petitioner reiterated that:i) The petitioners had an legitimate expectation for allotment under the Coal Scheme, since, the petitioners registered under said Scheme after considering their residual age eligibility (4 or more years at the time of joining) and the average waiting period for allotment ( 2 to 2.[5] years). ii) The petitioners were assured vide letter dated 20.06.2022 that their seniority would be maintained w.e.f. 30.06.2020 and upon this assurance, coupled with the fact that the ante-date seniority was not being given if the petitioners shifted to any other scheme, the petitioners chose to wait for the final decision of this Court.

20. Additionally, learned counsel for the petitioners submitted that the:i) DGR being the nodal agency for welfare and resettlement of the ESMs, cannot wash away its hands by placing the blame solely on the CIL for withdrawing from the Coal Scheme. DGR is duty bound to protect the interest of the ESMs, who are registered under the Coal Scheme. ii) Option to shift to other DGR’s scheme (without carrying seniority) was not a special concession but merely an existing provision that is allowed to all the registrants. It would have been a bonafide offer if it had included the benefit of ante-date seniority on shifting to other Schemes. iii) The present case is exceptional and deserves special considerations. Granting ante-date seniority to wait-listed ESMs would only benefit those who had registered earlier than others, thus preserving the principle of seniority while providing fair relief. iv) Respondent’s interpretation of "freezing of the scheme" is misleading. Freezing a scheme implies a temporary suspension that will be lifted once the underlying issues are resolved. Thus, it does not mean cancellation or discontinuation. This interpretation is supported by the DGR’s own letter dated 20.06.2022, wherein he stated that seniority/eligibility is being maintained for all wait-listed ESMs w.e.f. 30.06.2020 till the final resolution of the case. iv) The respondents had again reaffirmed the maintenance of seniority of those in the wait list as on 30.06.2020 vide email dated 06.12.2024 and the same reads as under:- "As you are aware that the Coal Loading and Transportation Scheme has been stalled since Jun 2020. The officers who were in waitlist in the Coal Scheme as on 30 Jun 2020 were given the option to shift to any other scheme of DGR for officers. Many officers shifted to the other schemes of DGR but some officers opted to continue in the waitlist for the Coal Scheme.” v) By the time the respondents informed about the freezing of the Coal Scheme in June 2022, most of the petitioners had barely 2-4 months of age eligibility left. Thus, it made the option to shift to other schemes with fresh seniority practically meaningless. W.P.(C) 10136/2025 and W.P.(C) 11011/25

21. These writ petitions have been filed under similar factual background as in W.P.(C) 4384/2020, seeking following prayers:- “i. Issue a Writ of Certiorari, or any other Writ/Order/Direction in the nature thereof quashing the impugned letters dated 26.06.2020 and 30.06.2020 and any unilateral action by Respondent No.1 to discontinue the Scheme; ii. Issue a Writ of Mandamus directing the Respondents to restore and continue the Scheme by finalization and execution of the relevant MOU between Respondent no. 1 and Respondent no. 2, with appropriate work allocation to eligible and wait listed ESMs, including the Petitioner. iii. Issue a writ of Mandamus directing the Respondents to implement and give effect to the object and purpose of the Ex- Servicemen (ESM) Coal Loading and Transportation Scheme, and continue making allocation of coal transportation work to the ESMs in waiting list, including Petitioner; iv. Issue a Writ of Mandamus directing for maintenance of eligibility and preserving the seniority of the Petitioner in the present case, enabling him to avail the benefits and opportunities of re-settlement and rehabilitation Scheme; v. Issue a Writ of Mandamus directing the Respondents to expeditiously formulate and implement a policy for allocation of coal transportation work to various classes of Ex- Servicemen, including the Petitioner, by giving due consideration to their rights and eligibility under the Scheme, and to take immediate steps towards execution of a revised Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) to give effect to such allocation. vi. Award the costs of the present Petition in favour of the Petitioner and against the Respondents; Grant any such further reliefs and/or pass any such further orders in favour of the Petitioner and against the Respondents as this Hon'ble Court may deem fit and proper in the present facts and circumstances.”

22. Learned counsel for the petitioners, in addition to the submission made on behalf of the petitioners in W.P.(C) 4384/2020, submitted as follows:i) There is no impediment in granting age-relaxation to the petitioners as a one-time measure. The same finds support from the precedent set by this Court in order dated 20.07.2017 in W.P.(C) 1530/2016 titled as ‘Brig. (Retd.) Rakesh Katyal v. UOI & Anr.’ wherein, the DGR agreed to grant age relaxation to the petitioner therein. ii) DGR took a stand by acknowledging that a number of ESMs have superannuated while waiting for their turn and the same had adversely impacted their lives. Further, DGR vide letter dated 20.06.2022, stated that the eligibility of all the wait-listed ESMs is being maintained w.e.f. 30.6.2020 till the final adjudication of the cases. iii) However, in 2025, DGR started taking contradictory stand on the aspect of eligibility by filing an application for vacation of stay vide order dated 21.07.2020 in W.P.(C) 4384/2020. Further, DGR vehemently argued against grant of reliefs in W.P.(C) 4384/ 2020. Per contra, its counter affidavit dated 11.08.2020 in the said writ petition reveals that he supports the case of the petitioner and in fact, he supports the grant of reliefs and interim reliefs to the petitioners. W.P.(C) 5237/2020

23. Instant writ petition has been filed seeking similar prayers as in the W.P.(C) 4384/2020. Moreover, the factual background and submissions raised by the parties in the instant petition are similar as in the W.P.(C) 4384/2020. Thus, for the sake of brevity, the same are not being again reiterated.

24. However, in addition to the submissions raised on behalf of the petitioners in W.P.(C) 4384/2020, learned counsel for the petitioners herein submits that the CIL has no power to rescind from the MoU, 2013 as:i) The contractual decision can never be unilaterally rescinded even by the competent authority which is party to the contract by any executive order. ii) In the said MoU, though a provision for termination of an ESM Cos. contract exists but there is no provision of termination of the Scheme neither unilaterally nor by mutual agreement as that was considered beyond the purview of CIL as well as DGR. iii) The historical background of Coal Scheme shows that the Scheme was launched as a policy decision by Government of India, hence such policy decisions can only be altered, modified, amended or withdrawn by the Government of India and not by the CIL. The CIL is merely an agency to enforce the Coal Scheme launched by the Government on India. W.P.(C) 10830/2025

25. Instant petition under Article 226 of the Constitution of India, 1950 has been filed seeking the following prayers:- “(a) Issue a writ of mandamus or appropriate direction to Respondents to allot a suitable Ex-Servicemen Coal Company under the next available vacancy in Coal India Limited subsidiary; (b) Issue a writ of mandamus or appropriate direction to Respondent No. 1 to include the name of the Petitioner in the revised Waiting List of Ex-Servicemen Officers who are eligible for sponsorship in the Scheme;

(c) Restrain the Respondent No. 1 from striking the name off the

Waiting List of Ex-Servicemen Officers eligible for sponsorship under the revised MOU filed before the Hon’ble Court Pass any other or further order(s) as it may deem appropriate in the facts and circumstances of the case and in the interest of justice.”

26. In addition to the brief background stated in W.P.(C) 4384/2020, following facts are necessary for disposal of the instant petition:i) The petitioner superannuated on 31.05.2016 and he submitted his application under the Coal Scheme on 22.07.2016. Vide DGR’s communication dated 01.10.2018, petitioner was informed that based on his seniority in the waiting list, he was likely to be selected for sponsorship as a Director of an ESM Cos. proposed to be formed under Mahanadi Coalfields Limited. Thus, DGR requested the petitioner to confirm his willingness to be considered for such sponsorship and subsequently, the same was confirmed by the petitioner. ii) Further, vide communication dated 09.10.2018, DGR requested the petitioner to submit documents listed in the said communication for initial screening by the board of officers and the petitioner duly complied by the same by submitting all the requisite documents. Subsequently, DGR vide letter dated 23.10.2018, informed the petitioner that he has been selected to undertake Coal Loading and Transportation work at the Talcher Coalfields in Odisha, under Mahanadi Coalfields Limited. Later, petitioner, along with four other selected ESMs- Col. S.S. Randhawa (Retd.), Col. Kuldeep Singh (Retd.), Col. Aseem Atrey (Retd.), and Maj. Gurtej Singh (Retd.), were directed to conduct a feasibility study at the project site. iii) The petitioner along with other selected ESM officers, conducted a field visit to the Talcher Coalfields from 09.11.2018 to 10.11.2018 and submitted their feasibility report dated 10.11.2018 to the DGR. Subsequently, DGR vide communication dated 15.1.2019 requested the petitioner along with other ESM Officers to be present before the board of officers for final sponsorship on 18.01.2019 with all of their documents in original and subsequently, same was duly complied by the petitioner. iv) At the last stage of final sponsorship, DGR issued a letter dated 31.01.2019, through which one of the selected ESM Officer i.e. Major Gurtej Singh (Retd.), was dis-empaneled from the Coal Scheme and in place of the said officer, DGR inducted Col. Yogendra Sharma (Retd.). Major Gurtej Singh (Retd.) filed a CWP No. 5225/2019 before the Punjab and Haryana High Court challenging the letter dated 31.01.2019. Vide order dated 27.02.2019, the Punjab and Haryana High Court stayed the operations of the said letter and the matter is still sub-judice before the said Court. v) DGR vide communication dated 20.03.2019 intimated the petitioner that the petitioner’s company group has been placed as “Held in Abeyance” till the finalization of the aforesaid Court Case. Col. Aseem Atrey (Retd.) and Col. Kuldeep Singh (Retd.) resigned as Directors from the Coal Company on 04.03.2019 and 23.08.2019 respectively. vi) Vide E-mail dated 17.06.2019, the petitioner informed DGR that the issue of dis-empanelment between Major Gurtej Singh (Retd.) and DGR was causing undue hardship to petitioner as the same caused to put him in “Held in Abeyance”. The petitioner further requested the DGR to consider him eligible to participate in the next vacancy that arises under the Coal Scheme. vii) On 06.01.2020, DGR published a waiting list of eligible officers under the Coal Scheme, wherein the petitioner has been placed at serial no. 3 and Col. Yogendra Mohan Sharma, who had crossed the age of 60 years had been placed at serial no. 8. It is the case of the petitioner that Col. Yogendra Mohan Sharma had been placed solely on the basis of “Held in Abeyance” status. viii) However, DGR vide Impugned Letters dated 26.06.2020 and 30.06.2020 unilaterally exited from the MoU dated 12.12.2013. These Impugned Letters were challenged in various Writ Petitions, some of which are presently being dealt with. In these Writ Petitions, this Court had directed to maintain status quo with respect to the subsisting contracts of the ESM Cos. and directed the DGR and CIL to make efforts for renewal of the MoU. Subsequently, the respondents held series of joint meetings to facilitate the renewal of the MoU dated 12.12.2013. ix) Vide letter dated 20.06.2022, DGR took a stand that the seniority/ eligibility of the wait-listed ESM would be protected till the final resolution of the matters. Subsequently, the petitioner had various meetings with officers of DGR, who assured him that deliberations were ongoing regarding the finalization of a revised MOU and that his age and eligibility would be duly protected in the revised MOU. x) Vide Email dated 06.12.2024, DGR invited the petitioner, along with other ESMs on the waiting list to attend a meeting scheduled for 10.12.2024, The petitioner in the said meeting drew attention to the assurances given by the DGR earlier that the eligibility and seniority of the waitlisted ESM officers would be protected. xi) Petitioner vide email dated 02.06.2025, sought clarification from the DGR regarding his continues status as “Held in Abeyance”. The petitioner also had a meeting with the DGR on 16.07.2025, wherein, the petitioner was informed that the matter is pending consideration before this Court and they are not inclined to allot any company to ESMs who had crossed the age eligibility limit. xii) Pursuant to the directions of this Court vide order dated 09.04.2025, CIL placed on record the revised MOU in July 2025, wherein, it was specifically recorded that the waitlisted ESMs who have crossed the age eligibility limit will be struck off from the waiting list and will not be sponsored for the formation of the ESM Cos. by the DGR. xiii) Hence, the present petition.

27. Learned counsel for the petitioner, made following submissions in support of the present petition: i) Unilateral termination of the MoU 2013 by CIL and its prolonged negotiations with DGR for revival of MOU, created waitlisted ESMs as a distinct class in itself, who during the period from 2020 to 2025, crossed the prescribed age limits of 60/ 62 years (depending on rank), thereby rendering them ineligible under the Coal Scheme, which remained under consideration throughout this time. ii) Unlike other petitioners, the present petitioner had already been found eligible. He had conducted and submitted the feasibility report, incorporated the ESM Company, and had complied with every condition of the Coal Scheme prior to the final sponsorship stage. iii) The revised MoU entirely disregarded the category of ESMs like the petitioner, thereby invalidating their genuine efforts and investments. Thus, this exclusion, extinguishes the petitioner’s accrued rights and legitimate expectations without due process. iv) The Petitioner’s “Held in Abeyance” designation was a direct consequence of third-party litigation to which he was not even a party and not due to any ineligibility. Thus, his application was rejected for no fault of his own. v) Senior officials of DGR had on multiple occasions assured the petitioner that his seniority and eligibility will be protected.

28. Learned counsel for the respondents, refuting the submissions made on behalf of the petitioner, submitted that:i) In terms of the prevailing Guidelines, the petitioner became overage on 16.05.2020 i.e. even before the CIL’s decision dated 30.06.2020. Thus he ceased to be entitled to sponsorship under the Coal Scheme. ii) Mere registration under the Coal Scheme does not confer any vested right, sponsorship is a separate stage in itself which is dependent on fulfillment of the eligibility criteria. iii) No exception/ relaxation was ever promised or extended to the petitioner by the DGR. iv) Maj. Gurtej Singh, who was empanelled as one of the Directors with the petitioner, was dis-empanelled on receipt of complaints for non-payment of the initial capital amount from the other Directors, including the petitioner. v) Clause 30(c) of the Guidelines specifically provides that only upon completion of all requisite formalities, the Directors of the ESM Company are called by the DGR for final briefing, after which the ESM Company is sponsored to the designated CIL Subsidiary. In the case of the petitioner, the petitioner’s company failed to furnish the requisite documents along with the mandated capital contribution. Therefore, it could not be sponsored by the DGR. vi) Eligibility is reckoned at the time of sponsorship, not at the time of registration or after completion of Feasibility Study. Also, as per clause 2 of the Guidelines, the concerned ESM must meet the age eligibility criteria i.e. 60/ 62 years (as per rank). vii) The petitioner remained silent for over 5 years before filing the present petition for reasons best known to the petitioner himself. He did not raise any objections at the relevant time i.e. when Maj. Gurtej Singh moved to the Court or at the time when he became overage on 16.05.2020. viii) Notably, the petitioner has already availed re-employment with the army.

29. Learned counsel for the petitioner, objecting to the submissions made on behalf of the respondents, submits as follows:i) That one, Maj. Gen. (Retd.) Bhupinder Singh was allotted Bhaskar Earthmover Pvt. Ltd. (Mahanadi Coalfields Limited) despite having crossed the eligibility age (as applicable) of 62 years on the date of sponsorship. Name Maj. Gen. (Retd.) Bhupinder Singh Date of birth 21.01.1957 Date of becoming overage (62 years) 21.01.2019 Date of sponsorship 31.01.2019 (after 10 days of becoming overage) Thus, once the sponsorship is initiated, there is no bar on allotment of a company to the concerned candidate despite crossing the age of 60/62 years (as applicable). ii) If the case of the DGR is accepted, it would produce absurd results whereby an ESM Officer, such as the petitioner, who has completed all stages of sponsorship, submitted feasibility report, incorporated/ registered the ESM Company, deposited his contribution of Rs. 12 lakhs, and taken all necessary steps to commence operations, would be rendered ineligible for having crossed the eligibility age by a single day, merely because the final approval of the DGR remained pending. iii) The petitioner continues to be placed “held in abeyance”, which means that his seniority/ eligibility and the stage at which he was held in abeyance is frozen. The same is corroborated from the fact that Col. Yogendra Mohan Sharma, had already crossed the age of 60 years, when he was placed in the waiting list of January, 2020. iv) The petitioner has been repeatedly assured that he will be allotted an ESM Cos. It was only in July, 2025 on filing of the revised MoU that the DGR reversed its stand and the petitioner was held ineligible under the Coal Scheme, constraining him to approach before this Court.

ANALYSIS AND FINDINGS W.P.(C) 4834/2020, W.P.(C) 11005/2025, W.P.(C) 11676/2025, W.P.(C) 16002/2022, W.P.(C) 10136/2025, W.P.(C)11011/2025 and W.P.(C) 5237/2020

30. It is noted that during the pendency of the present petitions, CIL on 03.07.2025placed on record a finalized draft of new MoU and vide order dated 05.08.2025, this Court directed that the CIL and DGR shall execute the said MoU subject to the outcome of the present petitions. As has been noted herein-before, the present petitions have been filed on the account of an alleged unilateral decision taken by CIL to not renew MoU dated 12.12.2013 with DGR. An interim order dated 21.07.2020 was passed by the learned Predecessor Bench of this Court directing that the seniority of the petitioners in W.P (C) 4384/2020 needs to be maintained. Although these petition have been filed challenging the validity of the unilateral decision taken by CIL to not renew its MoU with DGR, however after filing of the revised MoU, the thrust of the arguments on behalf of petitioners have been that their seniority in the waiting list of the Coal Scheme needs to be maintained despite they having attained the age of more than 59 years, which disqualifies these petitioners as per the policy framed by the DGR. The issue before this Court is- “Whether the petitioners in the present writ petitions should be allowed to retain their seniority in the new list which would be introduced in pursuance of the new MoU executed between CIL and DGR?”.

31. The present writ petitions, as noted hereinbefore, revolves around the allocation of coal transportation work under the Coal Scheme. The said Scheme provided for re-employment and rehabilitation of ESMs, War Widows, Dependents of War Veterans and disabled ESM (and their Widows). The Coal Scheme has been in existence since 1979 till it was rescinded by the CIL vide impugned letters dated 26.06.2020 and 30.06.2020. The Coal Scheme is one of the various Schemes introduced by the DGR for rehabilitation of ESMs. Attention of this Court was drawn to the information brochure of the DGR and the introduction therein, which reads as under:- “INTRODUCTION The role of DGR is to empower retiring/retired service personnel with additional skills and assist them in choosing a second career. Nearly 60,000 Armed Forces personnel retire or are released from active service every year. Most of them are in the comparatively younger age bracket of 35 to 45 years and require a second career. These personnel constitute a valuable disciplined, trained and dedicated pool which must be utilized for nation building. This is achieved through the following modalities:- (a) Seeking suitable employment for ex-servicemen as also upgrading their skills by imparting necessary training, to prepare them to take on new jobs. (b) Provide employment opportunities in government/ quasi government/public sector organizations.

(c) Employment of the ESM in the Corporate Sector.

(d) Providing jobs through schemes for self-employment.

32. Further, the registration and eligibility criteria provided for the Coal Scheme has further been explained in the said brochure in the following manner:- “REGISTRATION Registration in DGR is a onetime procedure and is common to all schemes managed by DGR. There is a simple single page form available for downloading on DGR website under the pane of ‘Download DGR forms’ on home screen. Ex-Servicemen desirous of availing resettlement benefits through DGR are requested to download the form, fill it (the reverse page of the form contains the various codes and instructions) and mail it along with supporting documents, preferably in a PDF format to regndgr@desw.gov.in. The registration number for the selected scheme shall be communicated within 2 working days of receipt of mail by electronic means. Eligibility Criteria (a) The Ex-Servicemen should be covered under the definition of ‘Ex-Servicemen' as la1d down by the Government of India, (Department of Personnel and Training) vide their letter No. GSR757(E) dated 04 Oct 2012. (b) Age of Registration for DGR:- Maximum age for seeking any benefit from DGR to be 59 years i.e. ESM must not be more than 59 years old when he applies for resettlement. (MoD/DESW ID NO. 29(120)2018/D(Res-1) dated 31 July 2018.

(c) All Ex-Servicemen invalided out due to medical reasons may register only in receipt of disability pension and certified fit for civil employment.

(d) Short Service Commissioned Officers (SSCO) should have completed specified terms of engagement and retired with a gratuity. SSCO should not have retired at own request or by way of dismissal or on administrative grounds or on account of misconduct or inefficiency. (emphasis supplied)”

33. As noted above, the maximum age of registration under the Coal Scheme as per the said brochure is 59 years. The renewal of registration and change of scheme as per the said brochure is as under:- “Renewal of Registration: Employment registration should be renewed once in two years by quoting the Registration Number through an application. Once an officer attains the age of 60 years, his name will be permanently placed in the 'Inactive List'. Change of Scheme (Only one time): Registered Officers can submit an application to the concerned Directorate with a copy to Emp-11 in case he/she feels to go for change of scheme.”

34. Further, the DGR has also published Guidelines in pursuance of the MoU dated 12.12.2013. The eligibility criteria of various categories of ESMs associated with the Coal transport companies are given in para 2 thereof which reads as under:-

age (Brig and below) and 62 years of age (General Officers) from the three services are eligible to get their names registered for ESM Coal Transport Company Scheme. No Director is to be above 60/62 years at time of sponsorship

(ii) The retired officer is eligible to be director of only one ESM

(iii) At the time of sponsorship of the ESM Company and there after all through the tenure as Director of the company the Director is not to be employed/self employed or hold any position of profit in any institution other than that of the ESM Company.

(iv) The officer should have registered for the scheme with DGR within five years of release/retirement. The common registration form, including for the Coal Loading and Transport Scheme is attached as Appendix 'B'.

(v) To ensure complete transparency and avoid undesirable influence in implementation of the Scheme, it has been decided that no ex-officer/official of DGR shall be permitted to avail of Coal Loading and Transportation Scheme. (b) ESM Tipper owners

(i) ESM should not be above the age of 60 years at the time of attachment in any ESM (O) Company.

(ii) Only one tipper can be attached by an ESM.

(c) Beneficiaries under the Tipper Attachment Scheme: Refer

(d) Office/ Supervisory Staff: ESM should not be above the age of 60 years at any time.

35. Further, formation of ESM Cos. is provided from para 3 thereof which reads as under:- “Formation of ESM Company:

3. On receipt of a demand from Coal Subsidiary for a Coal Transport Company, the DGR will initiate steps to select eligible retired officers as per the seniority, which are willing to undertake the work after completion of mandatory documentation, to form an ESM ·Coal Company. The related terms and conditions are as under:- (a) On receipt of request from the Coal Subsidiary, the DGR will ·take following action:-.

(i) In case demand is more than one ESM Company, the DGR will seek willingness of ESM (O) from the seniority roaster of prospective Directors maintained by DGR. The willingness will be sought in multiple of five for the number of companies to be sponsored as each ESM Company will have five ESM (O) Directors. The willing Directors falling in seniority within that number will be allowed to form the ESM Company with five directors in each.

(ii) ln case of demand of only one company the DGR will seek willingness of five ESM (O)s as per the seniority roaster of prospective Directors maintained by DGR. In case any ESM (O), whose turn has come up for sponsorship is unwilling to join in a company with others in that seniority, he will be provided with one more opportunity for sponsorship when next demand of ESM Company is received from the Coal subsidiary. If the ESM (O) is still unwilling his name will be struck off from the seniority roaster of this scheme. In case of any ESM (O) is unwilling the next ESM (O) in seniority roaster will be asked to join to form the ESM Company. (b) The ESM Company will have a minimum of five directors at all times. However under certain circumstances "such as death of an incumbent director, insanity, voluntary withdrawal as approved by the board of directors, removal of a director by DGR or by the board of directors, the share of the director so becoming ineffective will be transferred to the other directors or to the widow of the ineffective director as the case may be. Under these circumstances the company may continue to function with less than five directors but not less than three directors at any time. In case the strength of directors is reduced to less than three, then within six months ESM Company will induct new directors.

(c) Any induction/de-induction of director (s) in an ESM Company will be done only on prior approval of the DGR. Copy of the Form 32, reflecting the change in the constitution of the board of the directors of the ESM Company, will be submitted to the DGR and to the concerned Coal Subsidiary by the ESM Company.

(d) An ESM (O) who withdraws voluntarily from the scheme or is removed from the scheme in case of unwillingness to be sponsored as a director and has not been debarred from participating in the scheme, by DGR could, in case he so desires, register himself in any other scheme of the DGR in case fulfilling the scheme criteria. His seniority in that scheme will count from the date of such new registration.”

36. The tenure is provided in para 8 thereof, which reads as under:- “8. Period of Tenure:- The tenure of the ESM Company will be for five years extendable for another four years from the date of commencement of work. The concerned Coal Subsidiary and ESM Company will sign the work agreement within a fortnight of commencement of work. One copy of the same will be forwarded by the Coal Subsidiary to the DGR for record. Renewal of the contract for another term of four years may be considered by the Coal Subsidiary and DGR jointly provided the past performance and functioning of the ESM Company has been satisfactory and employment of Ex-servicemen has been as per the laid down policy for which the Coal Subsidiary should sent the proposal to the DGR three months before the tenure of the ESM Company is going to complete.

37. Subsequently, miscellaneous instructions are provided in para 22 thereof which reads as under:-

Directors will be required to produce the proof of the same.to DGR at the time of final sponsorship.

(d) It is desirable that Directors should have the knowledge of labour laws/Companies Act and Accounts. (e) All ESMs associated with ESM Company must have exemplary character. (f) The ESM (O) should not have been dis-qualified/debarred in the past from employment/self employment assistance from DGR (g) The ESM (O) is not to be employed/self employed at any time while he is holding the position of director with the ESM Company.

38. Reading of the aforesaid provisions would demonstrate that the upper age limit for registration of the Eligible Persons is 59 years with respect to the Coal Scheme, after reaching the age of 60 years the name of ESM is placed in the ‘Inactive list’. On a requisition made by the CIL, DGR on the basis of seniority selects five ESMs for the purpose of formation of a company, whose tenure would be for 5 years. It is the case of the petitioners that these guidelines itself permits relaxation of age of more than 60 years in cases where sponsorship has been given. For the purposes of the aforesaid submission, attention of this Court has been drawn to the following letter:- “ Department of Ex-Servicemen Welfare D(Res-I) Subject: Proposal from DGR for revision of Entry & Exit Rules for DGR’s Schemes. Reference DGRs Note No. PC to MF-0049/Policy/DGR/Adm dated 11.5.2018, 31.5.2018 and 26.6.2018 on the subject mentioned above.

2. The matter has been examined and to inform that following proposal of DGR has been approved:- (a) Entry to DR schemes to be based upon the following priorities:- Priority-I- Officers who retire after completion of their full tenure of service including SSC officers who have served their full term. This will include medically boarded out officers who are fit to undertake DGR Schemes. Priority-II - Officers who have sought Pre Mature Retirement (PMR). Note: The sponsorship between Priority-I and Priority-II will be in the ratio of 80:20 (b) Exit Policy - The benefits of DGR schemes will be extended to officers for a period of 5 years or 60 years of age whichever is earlier except for ‘Coal Loading & Transportation Scheme’, where a company must run for 5 years irrespective of the age of directors. This is so because the scheme is not viable if run for a lesser duration.

(c) Age of Registration for DGR - Maximum age for seeking any benefit from DGR to be 59 years i.e. ESM must not be more than 59 Years old when he applies for resettlement.

(d) Running of Coal Loading and Transportation Scheme- The scheme will be allotted for a period of 5 years. This may be extended by another 4 years in case no waiting list exists. The following is also recommended to be included into the existing guidelines:-

(i) Day 1-ESM(O)s in the seniority list to be approached via email to form a grouping of five ESMO)s

(ii) Day 7- An ESM(O) rep from each group shall report to the office of DGR for

(iii) Day 21 - Submission of Feasibility Report by the group

(iv) Day 49 - Submission of ROC documents under Company's Registration Act

Final checking of Bank Accounts of the company and prospective ESM(O) directors of the company and issue of Sponsorship Letter

(v) Company must report to the subsidiary within 30 days of Issue of LOI from the subsidiary and Commence Operations.

3. This issues with the approval of competent authority (Jitender Kumar) Under Secretary (Res-I)”

39. It was pointed out that after the alleged withdrawal of CIL, option was given to the persons who had been waitlisted to opt for other Schemes, without any ante-date seniority. However, after passing of the interim order dated 21.07.2020, DGR further issued a communication dated 20.06.2022 which reads as under:-

for all waitlisted ESM(O)/ESMs w.e.f 30 Jun 2020 till the final resolution is achieved in the case.

3. The ESM (O) is being given an option to shift to another scheme (if they have a remaining chance) within the ambit of the provisions of the of the ambit of the provisions of the Guidelines i.e. they shall not be given any antedate seniority on shifting to another scheme.

4. Your address has been updated for further correspondence.

4. For your info please.”

40. It is thus argued that on the basis of this communication, that the petitioners in W.P.(C) 4384/2020 and other petitioners in the present batch of writ petitions were in bonafide impression that their seniority list would be maintained in any future arrangement between CIL and DGR. This, as per the case of the petitioners, is further fortified by response of DGR to the averments made by the petitioners in their writ petitions. It is pointed out that by way of para 40 of the present writ petition, it was averred that:-

Response to the same by the DGR is as under:-

superannuated as they will become overage. This will be huge injustice rendered out to them as while waiting for their turn, they have missed out on availing any other benefits which they could have. This office has initiated a lot of correspondence to CIL to raise demand for ESM Companies as mentioned in Para 8 (a), however, no reply, has been received from CIL.”

41. Similarly, attention of this Court was drawn to the prayer made on behalf of DGR which reads as under:- “It is therefore, respectfully prayed that the present Writ Petition may kindly be considered sympathetically as it involves welfare and livelihood of retired Defence Personnel (ESM), Widows and Disabled Soldiers who have given the prime of their lives in the service of the nation. It is, therefore, requested that all issues related to ESM Companies be looked into, with profound promptness. In the present case, CIL has unilaterally exited the MoU and discontinued the ESM Coal Transportation and Tipper Attachment Scheme without any reasons and consultations with DGR. This step has been taken in spite of excellent performance of ESM Companies for the last 41 years and their huge contribution towards various CIL Subsidiaries meeting their coal transportation targets. It is important to mention that this step has impacted thousands of ESM and their families who are simultaneously and persistently fighting odds like age, health and other challenges after having dedicated major portion of their lives for the service of the nation. It is prayed that ESM Coal Transportation and Tipper Attachment Scheme be re-instituted with certain assured percentage of transportation work as mandated in MCL letter referred to at Para 5 and attached at Annexure-R[9]. It is also prayed that decisions taken in 367th Board Meeting of Director's of CIL attached at Annexure-R12 which recommends employment of ESM Companies in all Subsidiaries of CIL may be implemented.”

42. It is also a matter of record that there has been no registration with respect to Coal Scheme after 30.06.2020.

43. It is also the case of the petitioners that CIL had forwarded a draft MoU to the DGR vide letter dated 31.10.2018, incorporating certain suggestions and comments from CIL Subsidiaries for revision of the existing MoU. However, DGR neither responded to the same nor put the petitioners on notice. It is further submitted that as per the preliminary reply by the CIL, they kept sending reminders to DGR, but it went in vain. Learned counsel for the petitioners have vehemently argued that DGR has been changing its stand from earlier supporting the petitioners to now opposing their request for not being considered in the seniority list, which would be published after fresh registration post execution of new MoU.

44. It is in these circumstances, learned counsel for the petitioners vehemently argued that by applying the rules of promissory estoppel and legitimate expectation, CIL and DGR ought to give the petitioners their seniority despite they having attained the age beyond 59 years.

45. Learned counsel for the petitioners relied upon Hon’ble Supreme Court judgment in High Court of Delhi v. Devina Sharma11, and particularly on the following paragraphs:

last examination for recruitment to the DJS in 2019. It is common ground that no examination was held in 2020 for institutional reasons and in 2021 due to the onset of the Covid-19 Pandemic.

4. The grievance of the petitioners before the High Court is that candidates who would have qualified in terms of the upper age limit of 32 years for DJS, as stipulated in Rule 14(c), would now cease to be eligible by virtue of the fact that the examination is being held in March 2022. In terms of amended Rule 14(c) they would have crossed the age of 32 years on the 1st day of January of the year in which the applications for appointment are invited. In other words, it has been urged that if the High Court had conducted the examination on schedule in 2020 and 2021, such candidates would have qualified for the examination since they were within the age limit of 32 years for the relevant year.

5. When the petition was moved before the High Court, the Division Bench by its interim order dated 8-3-2022 [Devina Sharma v. High Court of Delhi, 2022 SCC OnLine Del 841] directed that the date for receiving applications shall be rescheduled to a date after the next date of hearing and the date of holding the examination shall also be postponed. The proceedings were directed to be listed on 7-4-2022 before the same Bench which was seized of an earlier writ petition, Writ Petition (Civil) No. 3636 of 2022 after obtaining the orders of the Chief Justice. Effectively therefore, by the interim order of the High Court, the examination for DJS which was scheduled to take place on 27-3-2022 would stand postponed.

6. Aggrieved by the interim order of the High Court, the jurisdiction of this Court under Article 136 of the Constitution has been invoked by the High Court of Delhi on the administrative side. xxx xxx xxx

27. In the circumstances, we are of the view that there is no merit in the submission which has been urged on behalf of the petitioners before the High Court and the intervenors who have not fulfilled the age requirement of 35 years. Though for a short period of about a year, the High Court had deleted the requirement of a minimum age of 35 years for entry into the Higher Judicial Service, the High Court has set right the rule so as to bring it into conformity with the recommendations of the Shetty Commission. The deletion of the minimum age requirement of 35 years in 2019 may have been guided by the need to attract a larger pool of applicants to DHJS. But the reinstatement of a minimum age requirement of 35 years is a matter of policy. This conforms to the recommendation of the Shetty Commission. Hence, there is no valid basis for this Court to hold that the requirement that a candidate for the DHJS should be at least thirty-five years of age is invalid. We do not find any merit in the challenge which has been urged on behalf of the appellants to that extent.

29. In order to obviate any further litigation and uncertainty, we permit the High Court as a one-time measure to allow those candidates who were within the age cut-off of 45 years during the recruitment years 2020 and 2021 to participate in the ensuing DHJS examinations.

30. For the Delhi Higher Judicial Service, the last date for the receipt of applications shall stand extended to 26-3-2022 while the examination shall be held on 3-4-2022, in those terms as stated before this Court by Senior Counsel representing the High Court.” Relying on the aforesaid, it has been contended that in the present case as well, the respondents can give one time relaxation with respect to the age eligibility to the petitioners, especially keeping in view the aforesaid stand taken by them as pointed out herein-before.

46. Reliance was also placed on the following paragraph of judgment in Najma v. State (NCT of Delhi)12:

(2021) 4 HCC (Del) 584 down of these establishments. Various facilities, schemes and ex gratia payments were announced by governmental authorities, both at the Centre and the State level, during this period. These included provision of free food, shelter and transportation, ex gratia payments, etc. It is in this context that the promise was made by the CM that there would be reimbursement to the landlords, if the tenants do not pay the rent. The speech, which was under the premise that Covid-19 may be over within two-three months, shows that the words used were आश्वासन (assurance or promise) and भुगतान (reimbursement) for the landlords, on behalf of the tenants.

99. The effect of the above assurance and promise made by the CM in curbing the movement of migrants/labourers, etc. cannot be estimated at this point. However, the question is as to whether the said promise is a legally enforceable one, and if so, in what manner.

100. The principles governing the doctrines of legitimate expectation and promissory estoppel are well settled. Both these doctrines primarily recognise the role of the State or the governmental authorities vis-à-vis the public. They are a reflection of the legal recognition being accorded to the trust that citizens repose on promises/assurances/representations which are made by constitutional functionaries and governmental authorities, especially in times of distress. The raison d'être for granting recognition to such assurances/promises/representations, is that such functionaries and authorities, who are either elected to public positions or who hold positions of power, are answerable to the people, especially once they undertake or agree to do or not to do a particular thing.

109. In the present case, in the backdrop of the commitment made, it is not the positive decision-making which is arbitrary, but the lack of decision-making or indecision, which this Court holds to be contrary to law. Once the CM had made a solemn assurance, there was a duty cast on the Gnctd to take a stand as to whether to enforce the said promise or not, and if so on what grounds or on the basis of what reasons. The Supreme Court has recognised and granted relief in the context of commercial matters such as tax exemptions, grant of incentives, etc. In the present case, the nature of rights are of even greater importance as they relate to the right to shelter during a pandemic. In the context of upholding fundamental rights, the principles of legitimate expectation have to be accorded a higher pedestal and the burden on the authority concerned not to honour the same, is even higher.

120. In this background, this Court is of the opinion that the promise/assurance/representation given by the CM clearly amounts to an enforceable promise, the implementation of which ought to be considered by the Government. Good governance requires that promises made to citizens, by those who govern, are not broken, without valid and justifiable reasons.

121. While holding that the assurance/promise given by the CM is enforceable, both on the basis of the doctrines of promissory estoppel and legitimate expectation, the relief would have to be moulded keeping in mind the various factors as set out below: • Firstly, the assurance given by the CM has to be considered by the Government and a decision has to be taken whether to implement or not implement the same; • Secondly, the bona fides of the said petitioners need to be verified. The material particulars in respect of each of the petitioners, the premises which they have either rented out or have taken on rent, the amounts which they had paid during the lockdown period, the loans which have been taken, etc. would need to be verified. Further, owing to the decision of the learned Division Bench in Gaurav Jain case [Gaurav Jain v. Union of India, 2020 SCC OnLine Del 652] this Court is also concerned about the bona fides of the petitioners themselves owing to the lack of material particulars. • The pleadings in the present case, especially the rejoinder, also gives an impression to this Court that the intention is to sensationalise the issue rather than to actually seek redressal of a grievance.” On the basis of the aforesaid it was argued that the respondents in their communication have time and again maintained their stand that the waiting list in pursuance of the interim order dated 21.07.2020 passed by this court stands frozen and the same would be subject to the outcome of the present proceedings. Further, in the aforesaid communication it was a promise held out to the petitioners that seniority would be maintained and on the basis of such holding out to them, the petitioners had not availed of any other opportunity of resettlement under any other Scheme provided by the DGR.

47. Reliance was also placed on Pasupuleti Venkateswarlu v. Motor and General Traders13:-

and events which have come into existence after the decree appealed against.”

6. The High Court, in this case, in the concluding stages slightly selfcontradicted itself and observed: “the civil revision petition cannot be entertained” and proceeded further to state: “it will not be desirable that I should exercise my discretion in directing an amendment of the petition”. In conclusion, the Court did interfere in revision by setting aside the order of remittal to the Rent Controller and dismissing the eviction petition, leaving the near decade-old litigation to be reopened in a fresh unending chapter of forensic fight. The learned Judge gave little comfort to the litigant who had come with a proved case of bona fide requirement to start his own business by his obscure observation: “If so advised the petitioner may seek to obtain such relief as may be open to him by filing a fresh petition under the appropriate provision of the Act, in view of the subsequent event of his having come into possession of a portion of the building.” We think it unfair to drive parties to a new litigation of unknown duration but direct, in the special circumstances of the case (which are peculiar) that: (a) the revision before the High Court shall stand dismissed; (b) the Rent Controller will take note of the subsequent development disabling the landlord from seeking eviction on which there is already an adverse finding by the High Court; (c) the landlord be allowed to amend his petition if he has a case for eviction on any other legally permissible ground; and (d) the parties be given fair and full opportunity to file additional pleadings and lead evidence thereon. But we make it clear that the subsequent event that the petitioner had come by a non-residential accommodation of his own in the same town having been found by the High Court, cannot be canvassed over again. That finding of legal disability cannot be reopened. We keep open for enquiry only grounds, if any, which may reasonably be permitted by amendment if they are of any relevance or use for eviction.” Relying on the aforesaid judgment, it was argued on behalf of the petitioners that this Court can mould the reliefs on account of supervening event i.e. execution of fresh MoU between CIL and DGR in the present case.

48. Further, reliance is also placed on Nitesh Kumar and Ors. v. Union of India and Anr.14 and in particular on the following paragraphs:- “3. According to petitioners, the last drive to fill up the post of Sepoy Pharma was undertaken by the respondents in the year 2019 and appointments were made. Thereafter, an advertisement was notified on 01.02.2021 for the year 2020-2021 for recruitment to the said post for different zones and many of the petitioners had applied for the same. However, thereafter an Addendum for cancellation of the recruitment process under the said advertisement was issued by the respondents. Thereafter, another advertisement dated 14.07.2021 was notified by the respondents, however, vide their notifications dated 26.08.2021 and 07.09.2021, the said recruitment process was postponed and thereafter, nothing was notified in respect of the advertisement dated 14.07.2021.

4. The petitioners claim that after a period of three years, the advertisement dated 16.02.2023 has been notified inviting applications to the post of Sepoy Pharma and the upper age limit prescribed for the said post is 19 to 25 years. The petitioners have averred that arbitrarily no recruitment drive has been conducted by the respondents and by now, petitioners have become over aged and turned ineligible to apply for the post of Sepoy Pharma.

12. Upon hearing learned counsel for the parties and on perusal of the material on record we find that the undisputed position is that the appointment to the post of Sepoy Pharma in Indian Army was last made in the year 2019 and thereafter, an advertisement dated 01.02.2021 for the year 2020-2021 was notified, however, the same was cancelled by the respondents. Thereafter, another advertisement dated 14.07.2021 was also notified by the respondents but the said recruitment process was postponed vide notifications dated 26.08.2021 and 07.09.2021. But the fact remains that appointments to the post of Sepoy Pharma in Indian Army for the years 2020, 2021 and 2022 have not been made and even the respondents have failed to post these vacancies on the National Career Services in a timely manner, as has been mandated by the DoPT vide Office Memorandums dated dated 13.06.2016; 23.06.2016; 02.11.2016 and 2023 SCC OnLine Del 1542 23.12.2016. The reason putforth by the respondents for not carrying out the recruitment process during the years 2020 till 2021 is due to Covid-19 pandemic.

14. This Bench while relying upon the aforesaid judgment of the Supreme Court in High Court of Delhi v. Devina Sharma (Supra), in W.P.(C) No. 90/2023, titled as Sachin v. Central Reserve Police Force, decided on 20.01.2023, has relaxed the upper age limit of candidates to appear in the examination for the post of Head Constable (Ministerial) conducted by the CRPF after a lapse of approximately six years.

15. Having no difference of opinion than the one rendered earlier in Sachin (Supra) in the light of the fact that candidates, such like petitioners herein, who have been aspiring to join Indian Army on the post of Sepoy Pharma, but have not been able to pursue their dreams due to non-advertisement of the vacancies and have turned over aged, in the interest of justice cannot be deprived to appear in the examination if they fulfill other eligibility criteria.”

49. Reliance is also placed on Motilal Padampat Sugar Mills Co. Ltd. v. State of U.P.15 and in particular on the following paragraphs:-

the Government in a case subsequently decided by the Bombay High Court in Municipal Corporation of Bombay v. Secretary of State [(1905) ILR 29 Bom 580: 7 Bom LR 27].

24. This Court finally, after referring to the decision in the Ganges Manufacturing Co. v. Sourujmull, Municipal Corporation of the City of Bombay v. Secretary of State for India and Collector of Bombay v. Municipal Corporation of the City of Bombay summed up the position as follows: “Under our jurisprudence the Government is not exempt from liability to carry out the representation made by it as to its future conduct and it cannot on some undefined and undisclosed ground of necessity or expediency fail to carry out the promise solemnly made by it, nor claim to be the Judge of its own obligation to the citizen on an ex parte appraisement of the circumstances in which the obligation has arisen.” The law may, therefore, now be taken to be settled as a result of this decision, that where the Government makes a promise knowing or intending that it would be acted on by the promisee and, in fact, the promisee, acting in reliance on it, alters his position, the Government would be held bound by the promise and the promise would be enforceable against the Government at the instance of the promisee, notwithstanding that there is no consideration for the promise and the promise is not recorded in the form of a formal contract as required by Article 299 of the Constitution. It is elementary that in a republic governed by the rule of law, no one, howsoever high or low, is above the law. Everyone is subject to the law as fully and completely as any other and the Government is no exception. It is indeed the pride of constitutional democracy and rule of law that the Government stands on the same footing as a private individual so far as the obligation of the law is concerned: the former is equally bound as the latter. It is indeed difficult to see on what principle can a Government, committed to the rule of law, claim immunity from the doctrine of promissory estoppel. Can the Government say that it is under no obligation to act in a manner that is fair and just or that it is not bound by considerations of “honesty and good faith”? Why should the Government not be held to a high “standard of rectangular rectitude while dealing with its citizens”? There was a time when the doctrine of executive necessity was regarded as sufficient justification for the Government to repudiate even its contractual obligations; but, let it be said to the eternal glory of this Court, this doctrine was emphatically negatived in the Indo-Afghan Agencies case and the supremacy of the rule of law was established. It was laid down by this Court that the Government cannot claim to be immune from the applicability of the rule of promissory estoppel and repudiate a promise made by it on the ground that such promise may fetter its future executive action. If the Government does not want its freedom of executive action to be hampered or restricted, the Government need not make a promise knowing or intending that it would be acted on by the promisee and the promisee would alter his position relying upon it. But if the Government makes such a promise and the promisee acts in reliance upon it and alters his position, there is no reason why the Government should not be compelled to make good such promise like any other private individual. The law cannot acquire legitimacy and gain social acceptance unless it accords with the moral values of the society and the constant endeavour of the Courts and the legislature, must, therefore, be to close the gap between law and morality and bring about as near an approximation between the two as possible. The doctrine of promissory estoppel is a significant judicial contribution in that direction. But it is necessary to point out that since the docrine of promissory estoppel is an equitable doctrine, it must yield when the equity so requires. If it can be shown by the Government that having regard to the facts as they have transpired, it would be inequitable to hold the Government to the promise made by it, the Court would not raise an equity in favour of the promisee and enforce the promise against the Government. The doctrine of promissory estoppel would be displaced in such a case because, on the facts, equity would not require that the Government should be held bound by the promise made by it. When the Government is able to show that in view of the facts as have transpired since the making of the promise, public interest would be prejudiced if the Government were required to carry out the promise, the Court would have to balance the public interest in the Government carrying out a promise made to a citizen which has induced the citizen to act upon it and alter his position and the public interest likely to suffer if the promise were required to be carried out by the Government and determine which way the equity lies. It would not be enough for the Government just to say that public interest requires that the Government should not be compelled to carry out the promise or that the public interest would suffer if the Government were required to honour it. The Government cannot, as Shah, J., pointed out in the Indo-Afghan Agencies case, claim to be exempt from the liability to carry out the promise “on some indefinite and undisclosed ground of necessity or expediency”, nor can the Government claim to be the sole Judge of its liability and repudiate it “on an ex parte appraisement of the circumstances”. If the Government wants to resist the liability, it will have to disclose to the Court what are the facts and circumstances on account of which the Government claims to be exempt from the liability and it would be for the Court to decide whether those facts and circumstances are such as to render it inequitable to enforce the liability against the Government. Mere claim of change of policy would not be sufficient to exonerate the Government from the liability: the Government would have to show what precisely is the changed policy and also its reason and justification so that the Court can judge for itself which way the public interest lies and what the equity of the case demands. It is only if the Court is satisfied, on proper and adequate material placed by the Government, that overriding public interest requires that the Government should not be held bound by the promise but should be free to act unfettered by it, that the Court would refuse to enforce the promise against the Government. The Court would not act on the mere ipse dixit of the Government, for it is the Court which has to decide and not the Government whether the Government should be held exempt from liability. This is the essence of the rule of law. The burden would be upon the Government to show that the public interest in the Government acting otherwise than in accordance with the promise is so overwhelming that it would be inequitable to hold the Government bound by the promise and the Court would insist on a highly rigorous standard of proof in the discharge of this burden. But even where there is no such overriding public interest, it may still be competent to the Government to resile from the promise “on giving reasonable notice, which need not be a formal notice, giving the promisee a reasonable opportunity of resuming his position” provided of course it is possible for the promisee to restore status quo ante. If, however, the promisee cannot resume his position, the promise would become final and irrevocable. Vide Emmanuel Avodeji Ajaye v. Briscoe [(1964) 3 All ER 556: (1964) 1 WLR 1326].”

50. Reliance was also placed upon the judgment of this Court in W.P.(C) 1530/2016 titled as Brig. (Retd.) Rakesh Katyal vs. UOI and Anr., wherein, the learned Single Judge vide order 20.07.2017, in the peculiar circumstances of the case and on the concession given by the respondents therein, allowed the petitioners therein to be appointed as a Director of ESM Cos. even after becoming overage i.e. after 60 years of age.

51. During the course of arguments, this Court vide order dated 10.09.2025 directed DGR to obtain instructions with respect to their stand that irrespective of the process being initiated after the allotment, the sponsorship will not be given if the concerned candidate who has crossed the age of 60 years (becomes overage). In pursuance thereof, DGR had taken a categorical stand that sponsorship by DGR takes place only after successful completion of all 5 stages (Clauses 27 to 35 of the guideline). It was also submitted that the eligibility is reckoned only at the time of sponsorship and not at the time of registration or after the completion of feasible studies. It was reiterated that at the time of sponsorship the concerned ESM officer must meet the age eligibility criteria i.e. for the officer at the rank of brigadier and equivalent at the age of 60 years and for officers of Major General and equivalent and above is 62 years. Thus, as per the policy, even if the officer becomes overage, during any of the 5 stages i.e. prior to the stage of sponsorship, he cannot be sponsored by DGR to the CIL Subsidiaries. So far as the tenure period of 5 year is concerned, it was pointed out that the same is only with respect to the ESM Cos. and not the individual ESMs, who applied by way of registration. Thus, in other words, only if the company has been sponsored by the DGR to the CIL Subsidiaries, the tenure of the said company would be 5 years extendable by 4 years and not the individual ESMs, who are on the waitlist.

52. Learned counsel for the DGR relied upon the Hon’ble Supreme Court judgment in Indian Oil Corpn. Ltd. v. Kerala SRTC16, and in particular on the following paragraph:

It is submitted by the learned counsel for DGR that eligibility age of the ESMs are as per the policy guidelines drafted by the competent authority and therefore the same are not open to the petitioner for review.

53. Reliance is also placed on Census Commr. v. R. Krishnamurthy17, and on the following paragraphs of the said judgment:-

carried out and the Central Government has issued notifications, and the competent authority has issued directions. It is not within the domain of the court to legislate. The courts do interpret the law and in such interpretation certain creative process is involved. The courts have the jurisdiction to declare the law as unconstitutional. That too, where it is called for. The court may also fill up the gaps in certain spheres applying the doctrine of constitutional silence or abeyance. But, the courts are not to plunge into policy-making by adding something to the policy by way of issuing a writ of mandamus. There the judicial restraint is called for remembering what we have stated in the beginning. The courts are required to understand the policy decisions framed by the executive. If a policy decision or a notification is arbitrary, it may invite the frown of Article 14 of the Constitution. But when the notification was not under assail and the same is in consonance with the Act, it is really unfathomable how the High Court could issue directions as to the manner in which a census would be carried out by adding certain aspects. It is, in fact, issuance of a direction for framing a policy in a specific manner.”

54. Further, reliance is placed on the judgment of the Hon’ble Division Bench of this Court in W.P.(C) 3683/2022 dated 21.12.2023 tiled Aakash Goel v. Department of Social Welfare Delhi Govt.:

application of eligibility criteria reinforces lack of arbitrariness.

GNCTD has adopted a first-come first-serve approach, which maintains fairness and uniformity in the selection process, ensuring that the assistance is distributed to as many eligible individuals as possible within the established ceiling limit, without any partiality or bias. The uniform application of eligibility criteria, while unable to accommodate all, nonetheless, ensures a methodical and equitable distribution of available resources to a significant number of beneficiaries.

11. We also understand that any limitation on the number of beneficiaries would naturally lead to the exclusion of some individuals who are in need. However, such exclusions, while unfortunate, do not automatically translate to arbitrariness or unconstitutionality. The policy decisions are often set by assessing various factors such as the available resources, financial constraints, equitable distribution of aid etc. Governments operate on limited budgets. Allocating funds to one scheme might mean diverting them from another equally crucial project. The cap could be an attempt to balance multiple needs with finite resources. In view of these considerations, we are not inclined to interfere in this policy decision and quash the cap on the number of beneficiaries.”

55. Reliance is placed on Hon’ble High Court of Orissa: Cuttack judgment dated 02.05.2018 in W.P.(C) 2005[2] of 2016 titled Col. Amulya Kumar Panda v. Union of India and Ors. and on the following paragraphs:- “It is settled position of law that the terms and conditions of a contract is binding upon the parties and after accepting it the same cannot be assailed. The petitioner’s case is not that the terms of contract is against any statutory provision and it cannot be for the reason that the work to provide security services is by way of compassion shown to the ex-servicemen and it is settled that compassion cannot be taken as a matter of right. This court, has come across the fact that due to nonsponsorship of the agencies by the DGR the petitioner was allowed to provide service even after completion of the period of two years but it is evident from Annexure-B/3 that the other security agencies have been sponsored by DGR to provide security services before the Power Grid Corporation Ltd., as such the petitioner now cannot seek direction from this court to extend the terms of the contract by rewriting the terms of contract, reference in this regard may be made to the judgment rendered by Hon’ble Apex Court in the case of Life Insurance Corporation of India and Another Vrs. Smt. S. Sindhu, reported in (2006) 5 SCC 258 (para-8)”

56. Reliance was also placed on the judgment of Hon’ble High Court of Madras in S. Rajendiran V. Chief Secretary to Government and Others18 and particularly on the following paragraph:

57. Further, reliance is placed on the judgment of High Court of Chhattisgarh in W.P.(C) 2208/2021 dated 23.07.2021 titled as “Surinder Kumar Rana Security Agency v. Union of India and Ors.” and in particular on the following paragraph:

58. The aforesaid issue, i.e., whether the petitioners in the present writ petitions should be allowed to retain their seniority in the new list which 2021 SCC OnLine Mad 10 would be introduced in pursuance of the new MoU executed between CIL and DGR, would also include directions to DGR to extend the eligibility of these petitioners for a certain period despite them attaining the age of 60 or 62 as the case may be. As pointed out hereinbefore, the petitioners, in terms of policy formulated by DGR, had to register themselves on the portal for consideration of their possible allocation. It is duly noted that registration itself does not guarantee allocation of any coal transportation work. As per the data placed on record by DGR, the last allocation of work in terms of the seniority rules was done on 27.12.2018. In these circumstances, there is nothing on record that the petitioners at the time when the MoU was rescinded by CIL on 26.06.2020, there was any identifiable project which would be allocated to the persons on the wait list. It is also come on record that as per the policy of DGR, even if, an eligible ESM is awarded the coal transportation work and at the time of final sponsorship, said ESM has crossed the age limit then also, he shall not be eligible. Admittedly, the policy has not been challenged. Learned counsel for the petitioners have strenuously argued that, even if the policy is not being challenged, on account of supervening circumstances during the pendency of the present petition, this Court under writ jurisdiction can mould the reliefs of the petitioners by relaxing the eligibility criteria for certain period and maintain their seniority in the waiting list. Learned counsel for the petitioners have strenuously argued on the principle of promissory estoppel and legitimate expectation in order to buttress their arguments with respect to the aforesaid relief.

59. The allocation of coal transportation work, as pointed out hereinbefore, is governed by the guidelines of DGR. The petitioners or such other ESM by registering with DGR, as per eligibility criteria, do not achieve a vested right for such allocation. The entire process is dependent upon requisition being made by CIL with no role of DGR with regard to the same. Thus, in order words, registration of petitioners or such other persons does not create any right for any allocation. It is only when a decision in commercial interest is taken by CIL or its subsidiaries, then, the process of allocation in terms of the rules would be initiated.

60. At this stage, it will be apposite to refer to the judgment of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in State of Rajasthan and Others v. Sharwan Kumar Kumawat and others19. In the said judgment, Hon’ble Supreme Court while dealing with the question of vested right and legitimate expectation in case of application invited for leasing out minor minerals by the State of Rajasthan, had observed and held as under: - “Vested right

17. It is far too settled that there is no right vested over an application made which is pending seeking lease of a government land or over the minerals beneath the soil in any type of land over which the government has a vested right and regulatory control. In other words, a mere filing of an application ipso facto does not create any right. The power of the Government to amend, being an independent one, pending applications do not come in the way. For a right to be vested there has to be a statutory recognition. Such a right has to accrue and any decision will have to create the resultant injury. When a decision is taken by a competent authority in public interest by evolving a better process such as auction, a right, if any, to an applicant seeking lease over a government land evaporates on its own. An applicant cannot have an exclusive right in seeking a grant of licence of a mineral unless facilitated accordingly by a statute: (Hind Stone [State of T.N. v. Hind Stone, (1981) 2 SCC 205], SCC pp. 219-20, para 13)

Fundamental right

18. The question of applicants not having fundamental right in mining is no longer res integra, Monnet Ispat & Energy Ltd. v. Union of India [Monnet Ispat & Energy Ltd. v. Union of India, (2012) 11 SCC 1] may shed some light: (SCC pp. 81-82, para 133) “No fundamental right in mining

133. The appellants have applied for mining leases in a land belonging to the Government of Jharkhand (erstwhile Bihar) and it is for iron ore which is a mineral included in Schedule I to the 1957 Act in respect of which no mining lease can be granted without the prior approval of the Central Government. It goes without saying that no person can claim any right in any land belonging to the Government or in any mines in any land belonging to the Government except under the 1957 Act and the 1960 Rules. No person has any fundamental right to claim that he should be granted mining lease or prospecting licence or permitted reconnaissance operation in any land belonging to the Government. It is apt to quote the following statement of O. Chinnappa Reddy, J. inHind Stone [State of T.N. v. Hind Stone, (1981) 2 SCC 205] (SCC p. 213, para 6) albeit in the context of minor mineral, ‘6. … The public interest which induced Parliament to make the declaration contained in Section 2 … has naturally to be the paramount consideration in all matters concerning the regulation of mines and the development of minerals.’ He went on to say: (Hind Stone case [State of T.N. v. Hind Stone,

‘10. … The statute with which we are concerned, the Mines and Minerals (Development and Regulation) Act, is aimed … at the conservation and the prudent and discriminating exploitation of minerals. Surely, in the case of a scarce mineral, to permit exploitation by the State or its agency and to prohibit exploitation by private agencies is the most effective method of conservation and prudent exploitation. If you want to conserve for the future, you must prohibit in the present.’ ” Legitimate expectation

19. Legitimate expectation is a weak and sober right as ordained by a statute. When the Government decides to introduce fair play by way of auction facilitating all eligible persons to contest on equal terms, certainly one cannot contend that he is entitled for a lease merely on the basis of a pending application. The right being not legal, apart from being nonexistent, it can certainly not be enforceable. The principle of law on these aspects, as settled decades ago in State of T.N. v. Hind Stone [State of T.N. v. Hind Stone, (1981) 2 SCC 205], is being reiterated from time to time. (Monnet Ispat & Energy [Monnet Ispat & Energy Ltd. v. Union of India, (2012) 11 SCC 1], SCC pp. 106 & 110, paras 183 & 188) “Principles of legitimate expectation

183. As there are parallels between the doctrines of promissory estoppel and legitimate expectation because both these doctrines are founded on the concept of fairness and arise out of natural justice, it is appropriate that the principles of legitimate expectation are also noticed here only to appreciate the case of the appellants founded on the basis of the doctrines of promissory estoppel and legitimate expectation. * * *

188. It is not necessary to multiply the decisions of this Court. Suffice it to observe that the following principles in relation to the doctrine of legitimate expectation are now well established: * * *

188.3. Where the decision of an authority is founded in public interest as per executive policy or law, the court would be reluctant to interfere with such decision by invoking the doctrine of legitimate expectation. The legitimate expectation doctrine cannot be invoked to fetter changes in administrative policy if it is in the public interest to do so.

188.4. The legitimate expectation is different from anticipation and an anticipation cannot amount to an assertable expectation. Such expectation should be justifiable, legitimate and protectable.

188.5. The protection of legitimate expectation does not require the fulfilment of the expectation where an overriding public interest requires otherwise. In other words, personal benefit must give way to public interest and the doctrine of legitimate expectation would not be invoked which could block public interest for private benefit.”

20. Kerala State Beverages (M&M) Corpn. Ltd. v. P.P. Suresh [Kerala State Beverages (M&M) Corpn. Ltd. v. P.P. Suresh, (2019) 9 SCC 710: (2019) 2 SCC (L&S) 821]: (SCC pp. 719-20, paras 14-20)

14. The main argument on behalf of the respondents was that the Government was bound by its promise and could not have resiled from it. They had an indefeasible legitimate expectation of continued employment, stemming from the Government Order dated 20-2-2002 which could not have been withdrawn. It was further submitted on behalf of the respondents that they were not given an opportunity before the benefit that was promised, was taken away. To appreciate this contention of the respondents, it is necessary to understand the concept of legitimate expectation.

15. The principle of legitimate expectation has been recognised by this Court in Union of India v. Hindustan Development Corpn. [Union of India v. Hindustan Development Corpn., (1993) 3 SCC 499] If the promise made by an authority is clear, unequivocal and unambiguous, a person can claim that the authority in all fairness should not act contrary to the promise.

16. M. Jagannadha Rao, J. elaborately elucidated on legitimate expectation inPunjab Communications Ltd. v. Union of India [Punjab Communications Ltd. v. Union of India, (1999) 4 SCC 727]. He referred (at SCC pp. 741-42, para 27) to the judgment inCouncil of Civil Service Unions v. Minister for the Civil Service [Council of Civil Service Unions v. Minister for the Civil Service, 1985 AC 374: (1984) 3 WLR 1174 (HL)] in which Lord Diplock had observed that for a legitimate expectation to arise, the decisions of the administrative authority must affect the person by depriving him of some benefit or advantage which: (Punjab Communications case [Punjab Communications Ltd. v. Union of India, (1999) 4 SCC 727], SCC p. 742, para 27) ‘27. … (i) he had in the past been permitted by the decision-maker to enjoy and which he can legitimately expect to be permitted to continue to do until there have been communicated to him some rational grounds for withdrawing it on which he has been given an opportunity to comment; or

(ii) he has received assurance from the decision-maker that they will not be withdrawn without giving him first an opportunity of advancing reasons for contending that they should not be withdrawn.’ (AC p. 408)

17. Rao, J. observed in this case, that the procedural part of legitimate expectation relates to a representation that a hearing or other appropriate procedure will be afforded before the decision is made. The substantive part of the principle is that if a representation is made that a benefit of a substantive nature will be granted or if the person is already in receipt of the benefit, that it will be continued and not be substantially varied, then the same could be enforced.

18. It has been held by R.V. Raveendran, J. inRam Pravesh Singh v. State of Bihar [Ram Pravesh Singh v. State of Bihar, (2006) 8 SCC 381: 2006 SCC (L&S) 1986] that legitimate expectation is not a legal right. Not being a right, it is not enforceable as such. It may entitle an expectant: (SCC p. 391, para 15) ‘15. … (a) to an opportunity to show cause before the expectation is dashed; or (b) to an explanation as to the cause for denial. In appropriate cases, the courts may grant a direction requiring the authority to follow the promised procedure or established practice.’ Substantive Legitimate Expectation

19. An expectation entertained by a person may not be found to be legitimate due to the existence of some countervailing consideration of policy or law. [ H.W.R. Wade & C.F. Forsyth: Administrative Law (Eleventh Edn., Oxford University Press, 2014).] Administrative policies may change with changing circumstances, including changes in the political complexion of Governments. The liberty to make such changes is something that is inherent in our constitutional form of Government. [Hughes v. Deptt. of Health & Social Security, 1985 AC 776, 788: (1985) 2 WLR 866 (HL).]

20. The decision-makers’ freedom to change the policy in public interest cannot be fettered by applying the principle of substantive legitimate expectation. [Findlay, In re, 1985 AC 318: (1984) 3 WLR 1159 (HL).] So long as the Government does not act in an arbitrary or in an unreasonable manner, the change in policy does not call for interference by judicial review on the ground of a legitimate expectation of an individual or a group of individuals being defeated.” (emphasis in original and supplied) Legal malice

21. Though it is contended by the learned advocates appearing for the respondents that the impugned Rules have been brought forth only to nullify the effect of the judgments, as discussed, we do not think so. The appellants have duly complied with the orders passed. Even otherwise, law is quite settled that basis of a judgment can be removed and a decision of the court cannot be treated like a statute, particularly when power is available to act and it is accordingly exercised in public interest. In such view of the matter, we do not find any legal malice in the amendments. We wish to quote Kalabharati Advertising v. Hemant Vimalnath Narichania [Kalabharati Advertising v. Hemant Vimalnath Narichania, (2010) 9 SCC 437: (2010) 3 SCC (Civ) 808]: (SCC pp. 448-49, para 25) “Legal malice

25. The State is under obligation to act fairly without ill will or malice— in fact or in law. “Legal malice” or “malice in law” means something done without lawful excuse. It is an act done wrongfully and wilfully without reasonable or probable cause, and not necessarily an act done from ill feeling and spite. It is a deliberate act in disregard to the rights of others. Where malice is attributed to the State, it can never be a case of personal ill will or spite on the part of the State. It is an act which is taken with an oblique or indirect object. It means exercise of statutory power for ‘purposes foreign to those for which it is in law intended’. It means conscious violation of the law to the prejudice of another, a depraved inclination on the part of the authority to disregard the rights of others, which intent is manifested by its injurious acts. (Vide ADM, Jabalpur v. Shivakant Shukla [ADM, Jabalpur v. Shivakant Shukla, (1976) 2 SCC 521]; S.R. Venkataraman v. Union of India [S.R. Venkataraman v. Union of India, (1979) 2 SCC 491: 1979 SCC (L&S) 216]; State of A.P. v. Goverdhanlal Pitti [State of A.P. v. Goverdhanlal Pitti, (2003) 4 SCC 739]; BPL Ltd. v. S.P. Gururaja [BPL Ltd. v. S.P. Gururaja, (2003) 8 SCC 567] and W.B. SEB v. Dilip Kumar Ray [W.B. SEB v. Dilip Kumar Ray, (2007) 14 SCC 568: (2009) 1 SCC (L&S) 860].)”

61. It is also well settled law that the Court in exercise of powers under Article 226 of the Constitution of India would not interfere with the policies of authorities, unless, it is found that the said policy is palpably arbitrary, malafide, irrational or violative of the statutory provisions. Hon’ble Supreme Court in Yamuna Expressway Industrial Development Authority and Ors. v. Shakuntla Education and Welfare Society and Others20 observed that:-

62. Learned counsels for the petitioners have placed reliance on communication dated 20.06.2022 issued by DGR to the effect that the seniority list in terms of the interim order dated 21.07.2020 passed in W.P.(C) 4380/2020 had been frozen. The interpretation of the aforesaid communication on behalf of the petitioners is that this would be taken as assurance given by DGR with regard to the maintainability of their seniority in the future allocation of the coal transportation work.

63. In the considered opinion of this Court, the aforesaid submission cannot be accepted. All that the DGR had stated in the said communication was that there is no registration happening after 30.06.2020 i.e., the date when the MoU was rescinded by CIL. The said communication can in no way be interpreted to assume that the petitioners will continue to have their seniority despite being overage in terms of the eligibility criteria of the policy. It is trite law that the Doctrine of Promissory Estoppel cannot be invoked to compel an authority to give effect to representation or promise which is beyond its authority or power or against a statute. If something is impermissible by way of a policy or statute than the same cannot be validated by the authority. Hon’ble Supreme Court of India in Ashok Kumar Maheshwari (Dr) v. State of U.P.21 observed as under:-

64. Learned counsels for the petitioners have also relied upon the principle of legitimate expectation on the ground that the policy in which they had registered was in existence for 40 years and the allocation work which was being awarded on the basis of seniority now cannot be unilaterally altered and in view of the interim order dated 21.07.2020 passed in W.P.(C) 4380/2020, DGR cannot be permitted to deny them their legitimate seniority. The Hon’ble Supreme Court in Army Welfare Education Society, New Delhi v. Sunil Kumar Sharma and Others22, while discussing the law on the subject of legitimate expectation, had observed and held as under: - “(ii) Doctrine of legitimate expectation

58. During the course of the arguments, a submission was canvassed that the respondents were under a legitimate expectation that their service conditions and salary would not be unilaterally altered by the appellant Society to their disadvantage. Thus, as the respondents were neither consulted with nor taken in confidence by the appellant Society before effecting the changes in their service conditions, it amounted to a breach of their legitimate expectation, thereby making it a fit case for the exercise of writ jurisdiction by the High Court.

59. The doctrine of legitimate expectation was also referred to and relied upon by the Single Judge of the High Court as one of the reasons to allow the writ petition filed by the respondents. The relevant observations made by the Single Judge in the judgment and order dated 5-8-2014 [Sunil Kumar Sharma v. Union of India, 2014 SCC OnLine Utt 1865] are reproduced hereinbelow: (Sunil Kumar Sharma case [Sunil Kumar Sharma v. Union of India, 2014 SCC OnLine Utt 1865], SCC OnLine Utt para 28) “28. We also have to appreciate the “legitimate expectations” of the petitioners who expect equity, fair play and justice, from a public authority which Respondents 2, 3 and 7 indeed are and, therefore, they must meet such standards as a public authority ought to have. The new management of the School, including

Respondents 2, 3 and 7 are hereby directed not to change or vary the conditions of the petitioners to their disadvantage.”

60. Before parting with the matter, we deem it necessary to answer the aforesaid submission of the respondents. This Court in Union of India v. Hindustan Development Corpn. [Union of India v. Hindustan Development Corpn., (1993) 3 SCC 499] enunciated that the doctrine of legitimate expectation is a creature of public law aimed at combating arbitrariness in executive action by public authorities. It held thus: (SCC p. 540, para 28)

enforceable as such. It is a concept fashioned by the courts, for judicial review of administrative action. It is procedural in character based on the requirement of a higher degree of fairness in administrative action, as a consequence of the promise made, or practice established. In short, a person can be said to have a “legitimate expectation” of a particular treatment, if any representation or promise is made by an authority, either expressly or impliedly, or if the regular and consistent past practice of the authority gives room for such expectation in the normal course. As a ground for relief, the efficacy of the doctrine is rather weak as its

┌──────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────┐
│                              slot is just above “fairness in action” but far below “promissory       │
│                              estoppel”. It may only entitle an expectant: (a) to an opportunity to   │
│                              show cause before the expectation is dashed; or (b) to an               │
│                              explanation as to the cause for denial. In appropriate cases, the       │
│                              courts may grant a direction requiring the authority to follow the      │
│                              promised procedure or established practice. A legitimate                │
│                              expectation, even when made out, does not always entitle the            │
│                              expectant to a relief. Public interest, change in policy, conduct of    │
│                              the expectant or any other valid or bona fide reason given by the       │
│                              decision-maker, may be sufficient to negative the “legitimate           │
│                              expectation”. The doctrine of legitimate expectation based on           │
│                              established practice (as contrasted from legitimate expectation         │
│                              based on a promise), can be invoked only by someone who has             │
│                              dealings or transactions or negotiations with an authority, on which    │
│                              such established practice has a bearing, or by someone who has a        │
│                              recognised legal relationship with the authority. A total stranger      │
│                              unconnected with the authority or a person who had no previous          │
│                              dealings with the authority and who has not entered into any            │
│                              transaction or negotiations with the authority, cannot invoke the       │
│                              doctrine of legitimate expectation, merely on the ground that the       │
│                              authority has a general obligation to act fairly.”                      │
└──────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────┘

62. In Jitendra Kumar v. State of Haryana [Jitendra Kumar v. State of Haryana, (2008) 2 SCC 161: (2008) 1 SCC (L&S) 428], this Court, while differentiating between legitimate expectation on the one hand and anticipation, wishes and desire on the other, observed thus: (SCC p. 183, para 58)

485: 2003 SCC (L&S) 322] and Union of India v. Hindustan Development Corpn. [Union of India v. Hindustan Development Corpn., (1993) 3 SCC 499] It is grounded in the rule of law as requiring regularity, predictability and certainty in the Government's dealings with the public. We have no doubt that the doctrine of legitimate expectation operates both in procedural and substantive matters.”

63. A reading of the aforesaid decisions brings forth the following features regarding the doctrine of legitimate expectation:

63.1. First, legitimate expectation must be based on a right as opposed to a mere hope, wish or anticipation;

63.2. Secondly, legitimate expectation must arise either from an express or implied promise; or a consistent past practice or custom followed by an authority in its dealings;

63.3. Thirdly, expectation which is based on sporadic or casual or random acts, or which is unreasonable, illogical or invalid cannot be treated as a legitimate expectation;

63.4. Fourthly, legitimate expectation operates in relation to both substantive and procedural matters;

63.5. Fifthly, legitimate expectation operates in the realm of public law, that is, a plea of legitimate action can be taken only when a public authority breaches a promise or deviates from a consistent past practice, without any reasonable basis.

63.6. Sixthly, a plea of legitimate expectation based on past practice can only be taken by someone who has dealings, or negotiations with a public authority. It cannot be invoked by a total stranger to the authority merely on the ground that the authority has a duty to act fairly generally.

64. The aforesaid features, although not exhaustive in nature, are sufficient to help us in deciding the applicability of the doctrine of legitimate expectation to the facts of the case at hand. It is clear that legitimate expectation, jurisprudentially, was a device created in order to maintain a check on arbitrariness in State action. It does not extend to and cannot govern the operation of contracts between private parties, wherein the doctrine of promissory estoppel holds the field.”

65. In the present case, it has already been observed by this Court that by simply registering under the Coal Scheme there can be no vested right accrued in favour of the petitioners to be awarded a coal transport work. Neither it is the case of the petitioners that, at the time when the MoU was cancelled by CIL, there was any tangible or identifiable work which was to be allocated to the ESMs in the waiting list. It has also come on record that by mere registration on the list, the petitioners or such other persons were not barred from seeking any other employment. The relevant affidavit states that a shortlisted candidate should not be employed in any other employment or self employment only at the stage of actual sponsorship being issued by the DGR. Thus, there was neither any promise nor assurance given by respondent that a person who is registered would get allocation at a particular point of time. Admittedly, the people who reached the age of 60 years were automatically put in a ‘Inactive’ list. It is not a case, where a specific agreement has to be awarded and executed in a certain timeline and eligible persons apply for securing the said agreement. The registration is, at best, done with a hope that, if any, requisition is made by any of the CIL Subsidiaries, the work would be allotted to the ESMs by way of seniority.

66. It is also pertinent to note that at the time of filing of the present petition and passing of the interim award, some of the petitioners had anyway become ineligible on account of them passing the age of 59 and the same is evident from the table reproduced below:-

67. Thus, while holding that the petitioners had no vested right for allocation of the coal transportation work by simply registering themselves, this Court cannot interfere with a policy formulated by DGR which is being in existence for past many years. Judgments relied upon by the learned counsel for the petitioners were in the different factual context and in the considered opinion of this Court would not be applicable to the facts of the present case.

68. In High Court of Delhi v. Devina Sharma (supra), the Hon’ble Supreme Court while considering the cases of candidates therein, as a one time measure, allowed those candidates to sit in the exam as they lost their eligibility criteria on account of the fact that the relevant examinations did not take place for two years. It is pertinent to note that in the present case, if the relief as sought by the present petitioners is granted then they would disturb the seniority of eligible ESMs. Per contra, in High Court of Delhi v. Devina Sharma (supra), by giving one time relief to those candidates no prejudice was caused to the rights of any other candidates.

69. Similarly, the learned Division Bench of this Court in Nitesh Kumar and Ors. v. Union of India and Anr. (supra) following Devina Sharma case granted the petitioners therein to sit for the examination as a one-time measure. In Najma v. State (NCT of Delhi) (supra), the learned Single Judge of this Court applied principle of promissory estoppel with respect to the express promise given by the then Hon’ble Chief Minister. As pointed out hereinbefore, there was no express promise or assurance given by DGR at any stage.

70. Insofar as the submission of the learned counsel for the petitioners is considered that the DGR during the pendency of the present petition has changed its stand, it would be suffice to note that the averments in the counter affidavit of DGR relied upon by the petitioners were made when CIL had not extended the MoU. In any case, the DGR cannot go against its own policy and agree to something which is otherwise not permissible under the said policy.

71. In view of the aforesaid discussion, this Court is of the considered opinion that the reliefs as sought by the petitioners cannot be granted and the present writ petitions are thus dismissed and disposed of. W.P.(C) 10830/2025

72. The facts herein are distinct, the petitioner in present case was actually given the offer of coal transportation work, however, at the time of final sponsorship, on account of ineligibility of one other ESM, the project was shelved. In this petition, the petitioner on the basis of his seniority in the waiting list was shortlisted for sponsorship as a director of an ESM Company proposed to be formed under Mahanadi Coal Fields Limited. On requisition from DGR, the petitioner had complied with all formalities and vide a letter dated 23.10.2018, he was informed about his selection to undertake coal loading and transportation work at Talcher Coalfields in Odisha under Mahanadi Coal Fields Limited. Further, as has been pointed out hereinbefore, the petitioner had completed all the four steps required towards the final sponsorship, however, at the penultimate stage, he was informed that one of the selected ESM Officers in the company had been disempanelled from the Coal Scheme and another ESM has been inducted in his place. The concerned ESM had challenged the aforesaid decision before the Hon’ble Punjab and Haryana High Court and vide order dated 27.02.2019, the Hon’ble Punjab and Haryana High Court had stayed the operation of the aforesaid decision and the matter is still sub judice before the said Court.

73. For the purpose of present petition, following list of dates are relevant:- Date Particulars 16.05.1960 Date of birth of petitioner i.e. Brig. (Retd.) Sandeep Kala. 31.05.2016 Petitioner retired from the Indian Army. 22.07.2016 Petitioner submitted his application under the Coal Scheme (date of registration). 01.10.2018 DGR issued a letter indicating petitioner’s likely selection for sponsorship with MCL and sought confirmation of petitioner’s willingness. 09.10.2018 Pursuant to the petitioner giving confirmation, DGR directed the petitioner to submit documents for screening before the Board of Officers. 23.10.2018 Pursuant to the petitioner submitting the documents, DGR informed the petitioner of final selection and directed the petitioner and 4 other ESM Officers (Col. S.S. Randhawa (Retd.), Col. Kuldeep Singh (Retd.), Col. Aseem Atrey (Retd.), and Maj. Gurtej Singh (Retd.)) to conduct feasibility study at Talcher Coalfields, MCL. 09.11.2018 10.11.2018 Petitioner with his fellow ESM Officers conducted site visit and feasibility study at Talcher, Odisha. 10.11.2018 The Petitioner submitted Feasibility Study Report to DGR. 09.01.2019 ESM Company ‘Salute India Logistics Pvt. Ltd.’ was formally incorporated with MCA. 15.01.2019 DGR called the Petitioner for final sponsorship and original document verification. 18.01.2019 Petitioner appeared before Board of Officers and completed final step before award of work. 31.01.2019 Major Gurtej Singh (Retd.) was dis-empaneled by DGR. 07.02.2019 DGR inducted Col. Yogendra Sharma (Retd.) to replace Maj. Gurtej Singh (Retd.). 27.02.2019 Major Gurtej Singh filed a CWP 5225/2019 challenging letter dated 31.01.2019 before the Punjab & Haryana High Court. Vide order dated 27.02.2019, operation of letter dated 31.01.2019 was stayed. 04.03.2019 Col. Aseem Atrey (Retd.) resigned as a directors from the Coal Company. 20.03.2019 DGR placed the petitioner’s company group under ‘Held in Abeyance’. 23.08.2019 Col. Kuldeep Singh (Retd.) resigned as a directors from the Coal Company. 17.06.2019 Petitioner protested against the HIA status and requested allocation in next available vacancy. 06.01.2020 DGR published the Waiting List with the Petitioner at Serial No. 3. 26.06.2020 30.06.2020 CIL exited the MoU 2013.

74. Perusal of the aforesaid list of dates would reflect that when CIL withdrew from the MoU i.e. 26.06.2020, the present petitioner i.e. Brig. (Retd.) Sandeep Kala, had already been selected for Coal transportation work and on account of factors beyond his control, he was not able to get his complete sponsorship. He was kept in the group of ‘Held in Abeyance’ from 20.03.2019 till 26.06.2020 i.e. till CIL exited the MoU. As on 20.06.2020, he was of more than 60 years (Date of Birth- 16.05.1960). In these circumstances, it is noted that during the period, the petitioner’s company group was “Held in Abeyance” i.e. 20.03.2019 till the date CIL exited the MoU i.e. 26.06.2020, admittedly, there was no work allocated to any of the ESMs. As already pointed out that last allocation in terms of the seniority rules was done on 27.12.2018, in these circumstances, it is noted that even if the CIL had not withdrawn from the MoU, the petitioner would have anyway become ineligible in terms of the Coal Scheme on account of the fact that he attained the age of more than 60 years prior to the date of rescindment of MoU by CIL i.e. on 26.06.2020. In these circumstances, no relief as prayed for can be granted to the petitioner.

75. The present petition is also dismissed and disposed of.

76. Pending application(s), if any, also stands disposed of.

77. Judgment be uploaded on the website of this Court forthwith.

AMIT SHARMA (JUDGE) DECEMBER 23, 2025/nk/bsr/sg