Full Text
HIGH COURT OF DELHI
LAXMI ELECTRIC COMPANY .....Petitioner
Through: Mr. Ashutosh Lohia, Ms. Shraddha Bhargava, Ms. Rishika Jain and Mr. Varun Kumar, Advocates.
Through: Mr. Achal Gupta and Mr. Ujjwal Jain, Advocates.
JUDGMENT
1. The respondent/ landlord[1] filed an Eviction Petition being E.P. No.757/ 2017 under Section 14(1)(e) read with Section 25(B) of the Delhi Rent Control Act, 1958[2] against the petitioner/ tenant[3] before the learned CCJ cum ARC, Pilot Court (Central District) Tis Hazari Courts, Delhi[4], seeking eviction from Shop no.1820 admeasuring 889 sq. ft., ground floor, Bisso Mai Colony, Chandni Chowk, Delhi-110 006.[5] Hereinafter referred to as “landlord” Hereinafter referred to as “DRC Act” Hereinafter referred to as “tenants” Hereinafter referred to as “learned ARC” Hereinafter referred to as “subject premises”
2. Succinctly put, it was the case of the landlord therein that after the demise of his mother, late Smt. Dropadi Devi, by virtue of the Will dated 15.09.2003, the entire property where the subject premises is situated came to his share along with his two brothers. Thus, he and his brothers became the joint owners thereof. Prior thereto, since the subject premises had already been let out to the tenant for commercial purposes vide a Rent Deed dated 25.06.1971, the tenant which was a Partnership Firm, paying rent first to the late father of the landlord, Sh. Mangal Lal Vaidya and then after his death, to his late mother. Thus, since the landlord became a joint owner of the entire property wherein the subject premises is situated after the demise of his mother, he, by operation of law, assumed the capacity/ status of the landlord qua the tenant.
3. As per landlord, since he had already retired and was getting a paltry sum towards pension, and as his two sons were earning meagre amounts with their own families to support, it was insufficient. Moreover, since he was interested in commencing his own business, for which he was learning business of electrical parts, and since the subject premises was in the hub of electric parts market it was the best location, and since it was the biggest Shop amongst others with other tenants, as per the landlord, these were all sufficient to satisfy his bona fide requirement. Lastly, there were no suitable alternative accommodations available with him for satisfying his bona fide requirement.
4. After service, the tenant filed an application under Section(s) 25B(4) and 25B(5) of the DRC Act seeking leave to defend wherein it was primarily its case that it was operating from Shop no.1819 and not from the Shop no.1820 as alleged by the landlord, as it was under occupation of one M/s. Super Power Controls. In support thereof, the tenant produced the Member’s Directory, 2017 of the Delhi Electric Traders Association, Electricity bill of May 2017, and Sales Tax Registration Certificate dated 13.05.1954[6].
5. The tenant also disputed the Site Plan filed by the landlord, and that the landlord deliberately omitted to disclose all the Shop(s) in the property where the subject premises is situated. The tenant, by filing a separate Site Plan depicted all the Shop(s) and to demonstrate that it was operating from Shop no.1819 and not from Shop no.1820. Further, the landlord did not take consent from the other two brothers i.e., joint owners of the entire property where the subject premises is situated even whence there were serious disputes inter se the three brothers. Lastly, the landlord was misleading qua the ways/ manner, the other properties were being used/ occupied. Even otherwise, there were suitable alternative accommodations available in the same property where the subject premises is situated.
6. In his reply thereto, to prove that the tenant operated from Shop no.1820, the landlord filed the affidavit dated 15.09.1987 and an address form dated 07.09.1987 duly signed by all the partners of the firm, i.e., tenant, in Suit no. 481/ 1987 entitled Mangilal Vaidya vs. M/s. Laxmi Electric Co.; the order dated 12.12.1995 passed by the competent authority under Section 19 of the Slums Area Act, 1956 in the matter being CA II/ 7231/91 entitled Hereinafter referred to as “tenant’s document(s)” Mangilal Vaidya vs. M/s. Laxmi Electric Co.; the Will dated 15.09.2003 executed by late mother of the landlord; as also the Will dated 04.08.1996[7] executed by late father of the landlord.
7. Additionally, the late parents as also thereafter the landlord himself was occupying the Shop no.1819 which is also incontrovertible based on the landlord’s document(s) especially the said Will(s). Further, admittedly all the three brothers were joint owners, and none of the other two brothers had any objection to the filing of the Eviction Petition. Lastly, the landlord also controverted all allegations raised by the tenant regarding the usage/ occupation of the alleged alternative accommodations.
8. Pursuant thereto, the tenant filed a rejoinder to the reply of the landlord reiterating the contentions raised in the application seeking leave to defend.
9. Thereafter, the learned ARC vide a reasoned order dated 06.04.2018[8] held that the tenant was operating from Shop no.1820 and since there was a bona fide requirement as also there were/ was no alternative accommodation(s) available, an order of eviction was passed in favour of the landlord and against the tenant.
10. Being aggrieved thereby, the tenant has approached this Court by way of the present revision petition seeking setting aside of the impugned order dated 06.04.2018 passed by the learned ARC. Hereinafter referred to as “landlord’s document(s)” Hereinafter referred to as “impugned order”
11. In the proceedings before this Court, after a stay was granted qua the impugned order vide order dated 04.10.2018, vide order dated 12.03.2019, the tenant was directed to pay the monthly user and occupation charges @ Rs.72,000/- w.e.f. 06.10.2018 till the pendency of the present revision petition.
12. Though the tenant has raised various grounds, however, Mr. Ashutosh Lohia, learned counsel for the tenant, has restricted his submissions to the fact that the learned ARC, has not considered multiple document(s) on record, which, according to the learned counsel, were sufficient to raise a triable issue, especially the one qua the discrepancy in Shop no(s). The learned counsel also submitted that the (correct) counter Site Plan filed by the tenant giving the details of the exact Shop numbers and about the 1st and 2nd floor of the property where the subject premises is situated, were also not considered. The learned counsel then submitted that though, as per landlord, the tenant was inducted on 25.06.1971 in Shop no.1820, however, as per documents issued by government authorities filed by the tenant, it was clear that the tenant was in possession of Shop no.1819 since the year 1958.
13. Mr. Ashutosh Lohia, learned counsel lastly submitted that the bona fide requirement of the landlord is a mere desire as the certificate of experience dated 08.07.2017 filed by the landlord was a fabricated document as also since the landlord is a retired senior citizen who cannot be expected to run a shop of electrical parts. The learned counsel drew attention of this Court to the CD recording wherein one of the brothers of the landlord was demanding to enhance the rent.
14. No other issue has been raised by the learned counsel for the tenant other than the ones noted above.
15. Per contra, Mr. Achal Gupta, learned counsel appearing for the landlord whilst controverting the aforesaid contentions of the learned counsel for the tenant, submitted that since the tenant is reagitating the very same contentions which have already been dealt with by the learned ARC in the impugned order in a meticulous manner, the same is beyond the purview of the revisionary jurisdiction, where the scope of interference is very narrow and limited. Thus, the learned counsel, supporting the findings rendered by the learned ARC in the impugned order, submitted that this Court is not required to interfere with the impugned order.
16. This Court has heard the learned counsel for the parties and gone through the documents and pleadings on record as also taken due note of the case laws regarding the issues involved.
17. As borne out from the aforesaid, the primary, if not solitary, issue is regarding the discrepancy in the Shop numbers, since, as per landlord, the tenant was/ is operating from Shop no.1820, whereas as per tenant it was/ is operating from Shop no.1819.
18. Since the landlord had filed the affidavit dated 15.09.1987 as also an address form dated 07.09.1987 bearing the signatures of all the partners of the tenant’s firm in Suit no.481/ 1987 entitled Mangilal Vaidya vs. M/s. Laxmi Electric Co. wherein they admittedly deposed that the said firm operates from the Shop no.1820; the order dated 12.12.1995 passed by the competent authority under Section 19 of the Slums Area Act, 1956 in the matter being CA II/ 7231/91 entitled Mangilal Vaidya vs. M/s. Laxmi Electric Co.; the Will dated 15.09.2003 executed by late mother of the landlord; the Will dated 04.08.1996[9] executed by late father of the landlord; as also the telephone bill(s) from the year 1990, the landlord was able to convincingly show that the tenant was indeed in possession of Shop no.1820.
19. Once the partners of tenant firm, in an earlier lis between the tenant and the late father of the landlord qua the very same subject premises had admitted that the place from where the tenant operates is indeed Shop no.1820, the tenant cannot be allowed to blow hot and cold by trying to build up a new case based on subsequent self-serving document.
20. In view thereof, the same needs no further adjudication, primarily, as the learned ARC has very meticulously, and, in fact, in great detail dealt with the aforesaid issue in the impugned order which reads as under:-
Hereinafter referred to as “landlord’s document(s)” mentioned as resident of 1819, Bissomal Colony. The said Wills pertain to the year 1996 and 2003. The death certificate of Smt. Dropadi Devi also mentions the place of death as 1819, Bhagirath Place. The house Tax receipt issued by MCD also shows the number of property as 1819 (1817 to 1821). The rent receipt issued by the erstwhile landlord/owner Dropadi Devi also mentions her address as 1819, Bissomal Colony. The petitioner has also placed on record the telephone bills of the year 1990, 2011 as well as gas bills in the name of Mahesh Chand Vaidya on the address 1819, Bissomal Colony. The document shows that it is the petitioners who are using the premises bearing no. 1819, Bissomal Colony. Further the petitioner has relied upon the copy of written statement filed on behalf of respondent herein in the matter of Mangi Lai Vaidya v. M/s Laxmi Electric Company Ltd to show that the address of the shop mentioned in the written statement by the respondent is ground floor forming part of property bearing municipal no. 1820 situated at Bissomal Colony, Chandni Chowk, Delhi in para -2 of reply on merits. The said written statement is not denied by the respondents and the same is dated 07.09.1987. The order dated 12.12.1995 of competent authority under Section 19 of the Slums Area Act also mentions the address of the tenanted premises as 1820. The affidavit of Shri Balkishan Rohtagi and Kamla Devi dated 15.09.1987 filed before the Court of Shri Pawan Kumar, Ld. Sub Judge, Delhi in suit NO. 481/1987 also mentions the respondents as tenants of suit shop bearing no. 1820. The address form filed before the same Court on 07.09.1987 by the partners including the respondent Rajeev Kumar Rohtagi shows the address of the tenanted premises as 1820, Bissomal Colony. The site plan annexed with the said suit also shows the number of the tenanted premises mentioned on it as 1820. The petitioner has also relied upon the affidavit dated 24.08.1993 Shri Rajeev Kumar Rohtagi before the competent authority Slums Area Delhi showing the address of the tenanted premises in para 3 as 1820. Moreover, the application under Section 19 Slums Area Act dated 15.01.1991 also contains the address of the tenanted premises as 1820, Bissomal Colony and the residential address of the father of the petitioner is 1819, Bissomal Colony. Similarly the reply dated 04.07.1991 filed by the respondent/ tenant mentions the address as 1820. The above the documents pertain to the year 1991 to 2015 which show the address of the tenanted premises as 1820 and not
1819. The documents relied upon by the respondent mostly pertains to the year 2017 except the letter from Kotak Mahindra Bank for loan account and the sale tax registration certificate. It is pertinent to mention that the sales tax registration certificate seems to have some over writing / illegible address mentioned. The remaining documents produced by the respondent being of recent origin, the respondent has nowhere clarified whether he had obtained the permission of the petitioner before mentioning the address to the sale tax department or to the bank. It is not the case of the respondent that he had even informed the petitioner that he is giving the address as 1819 to the said departments. Moreover, the Directory of the Delhi Electric Traders Association is not the conclusive proof of the address of the rented premises.
29. The Counsel for the respondent has himself referred to the Section 31 of the Evidence Act at the time of arguments to submit that admissions are not conclusive proof of the matters admitted but they may operate as estoppel. Once it is admitted by the respondent that he is a tenant with respect to property no. 1820, then, it does not lie in the mouth of the respondent to state that he is not in possession of shop NO. 1820 or that he is a tenant with respect to shop no. 1819, Bissolmal Colony, Chandni Chowk, Delhi. The respondent is estopped under Section 116 of the Evidence Act from denying that the shop number of the tenanted premises is 1820, Bissomal Colony as the same has been already admitted by the respondent through its partner Rajeev Rohtagi in the affidavit dated 24.08.1993.”
21. Based on the above, this Court is agreeable with the aforesaid findings rendered by the learned ARC in the impugned order and need not to delve into the same.
22. Regarding bona fide requirement expressed by the landlord being a mere desire, age, dependency, disability, medical ailment, retirement, not being able-bodied, educational qualification, work experience, financial status, and/ or other alike condition(s)/ factor(s) do not/ cannot debar a landlord from seeking eviction of a tenant from the subject premises under Section 14(1)(e) of the DRC Act. Thus, merely because the landlord herein was a senior citizen, it cannot be held that he could not run a shop of electrical parts.
23. Once again, the learned ARC has meticulously dealt with the aforesaid issue as under:-
36. Further, as far as the contention of the respondent with regard to existence of Chanakya Electrical is concerned, the petitioner has placed on record the original cash invoice issued by Chanakya Electrical as Annexure A-8, wherein its GST number is duly mentioned and thus, it cannot be said that the said company is not even in existence. Moreover, even if the contention of the respondent is believed to be true that the certificate of experience issued by Chankaya Electrical in favour of the petitioner is false, then also, it is a well established fact that a person is not required to have prior experience to start his own business. Reliance in this regard is placed upon the case-law titled as Aero Traders Pvt. Ltd. V. Mohan Singh & Anr., 2014 (140) DRJ 560, wherein it has been held by the Hon'ble Delhi High Court that no experience is required to start a new business and if a landlord wants to start his own business in the premises owned by him then by no stretch of imagination, it can be said that the requirement of the landlord for the premises is neither bonafide nor genuine. Moreover, in Sarla Ahuja v. United India Insurance Company Ltd. (1998) 8 SCC 119 it has been held that Rent Controller shall not proceed on the presumption that the requirement of the landlord is not bona fide and that when the landlord shows Prima facie case, a presumption that the requirement is bona fide is to be drawn. Thus, the bonafide requirement of the petitioner to start his own independent business from the premises in question stands duly proved.”
24. This Court is also agreeable with the aforesaid findings rendered by the learned ARC in the impugned order.
25. In the present case, the need of the landlord’s bona fide requirement for the subject premises was honest, sincere, and genuine, and not a mere whimsical desire, as also they were duly supported by cogent and satisfactory reasons and as held in Deena Nath vs. Pooran Lal10 and Prativa Devi vs. T.V. Krishnan11, were sufficient for the landlord to secure an order of eviction against the tenant.
26. Similarly, the tenant cannot rely upon a CD recording to overcome the same. Even otherwise, the recourse thereto is always available with the tenant, if at all.
27. In any event, the tenant was to come up with a substantive case for inspiring some confidence for the learned ARC to conclude that they were indeed able to raise a triable issue. Alas! the tenant was unable to do so as the overall defence lacked the necessary gravity to persuade the learned ARC that a substantial issue warranting a full-fledged trial was made out. Reference in this regard be made to Precision Steel & Engineering Works & Anr. vs. Prem Devi Niranjan Deva Tayal12.
28. In any case, as per settled law, once a landlord can establish that the subject premises wherefrom the landlord is seeking eviction is required bona fidely by him, then the issue of availability of alternative accommodation becomes merely incidental. Moreover, it is the prerogative of the landlord, based on his subjective assessment, to choose an accommodation that reasonably satisfy his requirement. As held in Anil Bajaj & Anr. vs. Vinod Ahuja13 and Akhileshwar Kumar vs. Mustaqim14, a landlord being the best judge of his needs cannot be thrusted with the opinion of the tenant or the Court.
29. Lastly, in the present proceedings this Court cannot re-appreciate the evidence recorded before the learned ARC. Moreover, considering that learned counsel for the tenant, once again, seeks to agitate the very same arguments which have been duly negated by the learned ARC by way of the well-reasoned impugned order and particularly, as held in Sarla Ahuja vs. United India Insurance Co. Ltd.15 and Abid-Ul-Islam vs. Inder Sain Dua16, there is no requirement for any kind of interference by this Court qua the impugned order.
30. Accordingly, in view of the aforesaid analysis and discussions, there is no merit in the present revision petition and the same is dismissed and the impugned order dated 06.04.2018 passed by the learned ARC is upheld.
31. As such, the order dated 04.10.2018, granting stay by this Court, is vacated. Also, considering the passage of time and the financial changes since then, it is deemed fit, appropriate and proper to call upon the tenant to continue to pay the user and occupation charges fixed by this Court vide order dated 12.03.2019 @ Rs.72,000/- per month w.e.f. 06.10.2018 till December, 2025 and the tenant shall be liable to pay user and occupation charges at an enhanced rate of 10% thereon i.e. @ Rs.79,200/- per month w.e.f. January, 2026 till vacation of the subject premises.
32. Consequently, the tenant is liable to vacate and hand over peaceful physical possession of the subject premises i.e. Shop on the ground floor, admeasuring 889 sq. ft. bearing No. 1820, Bisso Mai Colony, Chandni Chowk, Delhi-110 006 in compliance with the impugned order dated 06.04.2018 to the landlord, albeit, after the expiry of the statutory period of six months as available to the tenant as per Section 14(7) of the DRC Act.
SAURABH BANERJEE, J DECEMBER 23, 2025/NA/AKS