FIITJEE Limited v. ALLEN Education and Management Services Pvt. Ltd & Ors.

15. Therefore, it is submitted that the instant application is liable to dismissed for being devoid of merit since the plaintiff has failed to show that any relief of injunction duly accrues in its favour.

16. Heard the learned counsel for the parties and perused the record.

17. The application which is before this Court is for the limited purposes of adjudication of temporary injunction by way of which the applicant/plaintiff is seeking two sets of reliefs. One from defendants NO. 1 to 5, that is, seeking restrain from claiming the credit for success of defendant no. 6 in clearing JEE Mains and the other from defendant no. 7 to 15 from reporting that defendant no. 1 to 5 are responsible for the success of defendant no. 6.

18. The relevant provisions which have been invoked by the plaintiff read as under: “ORDER XXXIX TEMPORARY INJUNCTIONS AND INTERLOCUTORY ORDERS Temporary injunctions

1. Cases in which temporary injunction may be granted.— Where in any suit it is proved by affidavit or otherwise— (a) that any property in dispute in a suit is in danger of being wasted, damaged or alienated by any party to the suit, or wrongfully sold in execution of a decree, or (b) that the defendant threatens, or intends, to remove or dispose of his property with a view to [defrauding] his creditors, [(c) that the defendant threatens to dispossess, the plaintiff or otherwise cause injury to the plaintiff in relation to any property in dispute in the suit,] the Court may by order grant a temporary injunction to restrain such act, or make such other order for the purpose of staying and preventing the wasting, damaging, alienation, sale, removal or disposition of the property [or dispossession of the plaintiff, or otherwise causing injury to the plaintiff in relation to any property in dispute in the suit] as the Court thinks fit, until the disposal of the suit or until further orders.

2. Injunction to restrain repetition or continuance of breach.—(1) In any suit for restraining the defendant from committing a breach of contract or other injury of any kind, whether compensation is claimed in the suit or not, the plaintiff may, at any time after the commencement of the suit, and either before or after judgment, apply to the Court for a temporary injunction to restrain the defendant from committing the breach of contract or injury complained, of, or any breach of contract or injury of a like kind arising out of the same contract or relating to the same property or right. (2) The Court may by order grant such injunction, on such terms as to the duration of the injunction, keeping an account, giving security, or otherwise, as the Court thinks fit. [2A. Consequence of disobedience or breach of injunction.— (1) In the case of disobedience of any injunction granted or other order made under rule 1 or rule 2 or breach of any of the terms on which the injunction was granted or the order made, the Court granting the injunction or making the order, or any Court to which the suit or proceeding is transferred, may order the property of the person guilty of such disobedience or breach to be attached, and may also order such person to be detained in the civil prison for a term not exceeding three months, unless in the meantime the Court directs his release. (2) No attachment made under this rule shall remain in force for more than one year, at the end of which time, if the disobedience or breach continues, the property attached may be sold and out of the proceeds, the Court may award such compensation as it thinks fit to the injured party and shall pay the balance, if any, to the party entitled thereto.]

19. There is no doubt to the fact that the relief under the provision has been provided for and is often sought when the subject matter of a dispute is in the threat of being disrupted in some manner. The primary object is to protect the subject matter from being breached, destructed, wasted or alienated, in any form. While adjudicating upon a claim regarding temporary injunction under Order XXXIX of the CPC, the Court is to be satisfied of the three well settled tests of strong prima facie and balance of convenience in favour of the applicant and irreparable injury likely to be caused to him. The Hon‟ble Supreme Court in Makers Development Services (P) Ltd. v. M. Visvesvaraya Industrial Research & Development Centre, (2012) 1 SCC 735, reiterated the test and tested the order passed by the Bombay High Court as under:

19. The learned Single Judge as well as the Division Bench on appreciation of entire materials rendered the factual finding that the balance of convenience is not in favour of granting such mandatory interim order as claimed in Prayer Clauses (a) to (f). It is relevant to point out that though the appellant had stated that it had started construction in the year 1996, even after the information by the defendant to the appellant in 2002 that BEST had given their “no objection” for the demolition of temporary receiving station and the appellant can proceed with the demolition, however, the fact remains, the height of the construction was only 80 ft which shows that from the year 2001 to 2007, the appellant had not carried on construction and there was no obstruction from the side of the defendant. In view of all these factual aspects and in the light of the stand of the defendant disputing the existence of the agreement, as rightly observed by the learned Single Judge as well as the Division Bench, further permission for construction or ancillary works cannot be granted during the pendency of the suit.”

20. It is evident that the interest of the parties must be protected while considering and adjudicating upon a dispute which is before the Court especially when the nature of the claims and subject matter sought to be protected is such that the grant or refusal of injunction may have serious consequences. In such circumstances, the court must make all endeavours to do the same.

21. The test as aforesaid is, however, rigorous and requires a stricter scrutiny on the claims as to protect the interest of the parties as well as the subject matter involved. While arguing a strong prima facie, the party seeking relief of temporary injunction is not only to show a prima facie case in its favour but shall satisfy the test of a „strong‟ prima facie case. The keyword „strong‟ cannot be ignored while testing the merit of the claim.

22. The Hon‟ble Supreme Court in the landmark judgment passed in Dorab Cawasji Warden v. Coomi Sorab Warden, (1990) 2 SCC 117, while discussing the strict applicability of the test held as under:

23. The said observations have been referred to and reiterated by the Hon‟ble Supreme Court on several occasions including the recent judgment passed in K. Palaniswamy v. M. Shanmugam, 2023 SCC OnLine SC 177.

24. Applying the principles applicable to the test of strong prima facie case, the test of irreparable injury likely to be caused is also to be considered with greater rigour. The Hon‟ble Supreme Court in Best Sellers (India) (P) Ltd. v. Aditya Birla Nuvo Ltd., (2012) 6 SCC 792, to this effect, observed as under:

36. To quote the words of Alderson, B. in Attorney General v. Hallett [(1857) 16 M & W 569: 153 ER 1316]: (ER p. 1321) “… I take the meaning of irreparable injury to be that which, if not prevented by injunction, cannot be afterwards compensated by any decree which the court can pronounce in the result of the cause.”

25. Therefore, while convincing this Court that an injury that may be irreparable will be caused if the temporary injunction sought is not granted, the applicant shall consider that aforesaid principle.

26. Thirdly, the test of balance of convenience is also to be satisfied to the same extent as the tests of prima facie and irreparable injury. The Court is duty bound to consider the convenience of the applicant against the convenience of the non-applicant. The relief sought may be granted when the court is satisfied that greater inconvenience may be caused to the applicant if the injunction is not granted. Therefore, while keeping the well-established principles of the law pertaining to the grant of temporary injunction this Court shall apply the test to the instant matter.

27. The petitioner is essentially seeking the temporary injunction on the ground that there is an apprehension that the defendants no. 1 to 5 will claim the credit of success of defendant no. 6. To support its arguments, the plaintiff has produced several documents, print pieces, emails and other communications. However, the print news does not show in any manner that the defendant no. 1 Institute on its own accord has attempted to make commercial profits from the success of the defendant no. 6. As such, the news articles reproduced are the interviews given by defendant no. 6 Student discussing his success story and not attributing his success to either of the parties.

28. It is apparent that the entire case of the plaintiff in the instant application is based on apprehension that the defendant no. 1 to 5 will claim the credit of the training actually imparted by the plaintiff. Admittedly, defendant no. 6 is no longer enrolled with the plaintiff. In fact, he ceased to be their Student prior to even appearing for the JEE Mains on his own accord and, being a minor, with the consent of his parents. Therefore, any interview or statement that may be given by him qua his examinations or the results thereto will anyways not include the history of his studies and will not in any manner prejudice, injure or affect the plaintiff irreparably.

29. As discussed above, the plaintiff was to show that there is a strong prima facie case in its favour, however, this Court does not find any of the submissions made on behalf of the plaintiff strong enough to satisfy that an irreparable injury would be caused to the plaintiff in case the injunction is not granted. The institutions like the plaintiff intake thousands of students every year who appear for competitive examinations and often the students may decide to drop or discontinue with the coaching. There is no reason strong enough in favour of the plaintiff which would invite the grant of an injunction by Court under Order XXXIX Rules 1 and 2 of the CPC, when the plaintiff has failed to satisfy the tests settled in law. Moreover, the learned counsel for the plaintiff has failed to show that the balance of convenience lies in the favour of the plaintiff and against the defendant.

30. The success of any student is the result of his hard labour and the infinite efforts he puts into the goal he has set to achieve. Therefore, dragging a child in a litigation driven by commercial interest between two competing coaching institutions claiming credit for the success of a child is an insult to his endless efforts and cannot be permitted.

31. In the instant case, there is nothing to show that a renowned institute like the plaintiff has to be apprehensive about which shall bring any kind of bad name to it. The institute is only apprehensive that certain time that the student has spent in with them will not be rewarded by way of commercial accreditation and validation, which in my considered view does not at all warrant a relief from temporary injunction as stipulated under Order XXXIX of the CPC.

32. Therefore, keeping in view the spirit and purpose of the provision, the fact and circumstances, the contentions raised and arguments made, this Court is of the view that at this stage no relief accrues to the plaintiff under Order XXXIX Rules 1 and 2 of the CPC as there is only an apprehension that the defendants may claim credit without any substantial and strong case presented on behalf of the plaintiff.

33. Accordingly, the instant application stands dismissed for being devoid of merit.

34. It is made clear that the observations made herein are only for the purposes of adjudicating and deciding the instant application and are not a reflection of the opinion in the suit on merits. The same shall have no bearing on the final outcome of the suit.

35. The order be uploaded on the website forthwith. CS (COMM.) 331/2023 List on 27th July 2023.

CHANDRA DHARI SINGH (VACATION JUDGE) JUNE 12, 2023 gs/ms