Pawan & Ors. v. Mange Ram Gupta & Ors.

5.3. He states that a separate eviction petition was similarly filed for recovery of possession of other portions of the subject property from other tenants and the landlords have succeeded in the said eviction petitions as well, wherein, the ownership of the landlords as well as their bona fide need has already been tested and upheld by this Court.

5.4. He states that the plea of alternate accommodation at Masjid Road Basement property is without any merit. He states that the said plea was raised for the first time in the rejoinder to the application seeking leave to defend and cannot be considered on this ground alone. Without prejudice, he states that the said property is in the basement and therefore, cannot be considered as an alternate to the tenanted premises, which is located on the ground floor and faces the prominent main road known as ‘Central Road Bhogal’. He states that the said basement is even otherwise being used by the landlords for storage purposes and is therefore, neither vacant nor available. He has also placed reliance on the order dated 27.08.2014 passed by a Coordinate Bench of this Court in RC. REV. 73/2014, wherein with respect to another tenant in the subject property, this Court considered and rejected the plea of alternate accommodation based on the Masjid Road Basement property. He states that the SLP filed against the said order dated 27.08.2014 was dismissed by the Supreme Court on 19.11.2014. He states that therefore, the said issue is no more res integra.

5.5. He states that fourteen (14) years have passed by since the institution of the eviction petition in 2009. He states that the record of the Court would show that the Petitioners have successfully scuttled adjudication of this petition and delayed the hearings to the prejudice of the landlords. Analysis and findings

6. This Court has perused the paper book and heard the learned counsels for both the parties.

7. The Petitioners i.e., tenants have not disputed that they are tendering rent to the Respondents i.e., landlords. Therefore, there is no dispute with respect to the existence of the relationship of landlord-tenant.

7.1. In the eviction petition, the landlords have stated that the tenanted premises were let out to late Mr. Agarsen on 16.02.1952 on the basis of a written agreement. The Petitioners i.e., tenants have not disputed the fact of letting in favour of late Mr. Agarsen by the father of the Respondents i.e., late Mr. Chhagan Mal. This admission also evidences that there is no dispute about the existence of landlord-tenant relationship. Further, in view of the said admission, the tenants are estopped under Section 116 of the Indian Evidence Act, 1872 from denying the title of the landlords to the subject property.

7.2. The objection raised by the Petitioners i.e., tenants to the ownership of the landlords is inadmissible in view of Section 116 of Act, 1872 as noted above. Even otherwise, a perusal of the judgment dated 19.12.2022 passed by the Division Bench in FAO (OS) 137/2022 sufficiently evidences the proprietary rights of the Respondents in the subject property.

7.3. The objection raised by the Petitioners challenging the ownership of the landlords is therefore, without any substance and as correctly held by the Trial Court does not give rise to any triable issue. A Coordinate Bench of this Court in Ramesh Chand v. Uganti Devi, 2008 SCC OnLine Del 1187 has held that a tenant, who denies the title of the landlord, qua the premises, to whom he is paying rent acts dishonestly and the challenge to the ownership does not give rise to a triable issue.

8. The Petitioners have challenged the bona fide need of the landlords by disputing that the adult sons of the landlords are not dependent on their father for commercial accommodation. However, the Respondents at paragraphs 3 to 7 of the Annexure to the eviction petition have set out in detail the large size of their family and the paucity of commercial accommodation available to them for the family members. The said paragraphs read as under:

8.1. The Petitioners have not disputed the size of the family or the facts set out therein except to state that since the sons of the landlords are already gainfully employed in the same business as the landlords there is no further requirement for the sons to set up an independent business separate from their father. This Court is unable to appreciate the submissions of the Petitioners and is in agreement with the findings of the Trial Court that the need of the adult sons for the tenanted premises, to start independent business separate from their father, is genuine. The relevant findings of the Trial Court are as under:

8.2. The Respondents have stated that during the pendency of the revision petition, the married grandson, Mr. Aman and a daughter, Ms. Sapna additionally has need for the tenanted premises.

8.3. In a metropolitan city like Delhi, where the prices of the real estate have skyrocketed, the need of the adult children for accommodation and their dependency for the said need on their parents, who own immovable property, is genuine and stands to reason. The provision of Section 14(1)(e) of DRC Act itself statutorily recognises that the need for the premises could be for the self or for any member of the family dependent on the landlord. The dependency of adult children for the purpose of accommodation on their parents is well recognised. The following decisions passed by the Supreme Court and this court are relevant in this regard: i. In Joginder Pal Singh v. Naval Kishore Behal (2002) 5 SCC 397, the Supreme Court at paragraph 24 had recognised the need of the adult children of the landlord as bona fide and observed as under:

24. We are of the opinion that the expression “for his own use” as occurring in Section 13(3)(a)(ii) of the Act cannot be narrowly construed. The expression must be assigned a wider, liberal and practical meaning. The requirement is not the requirement of the landlord alone in the sense that the landlord must for himself require the accommodation and to fulfil the requirement he must himself physically occupy the premises. The requirement of a member of the family or of a person on whom the landlord is dependent or who is dependent on the landlord can be considered to be the requirement of the landlord for his own use. In the several decided cases referred to hereinabove, we have found the pari materia provisions being interpreted so as to include the requirement of the wife, husband, sister, children including son, daughter, a widowed daughter and her son, nephew, coparceners, members of family and dependants and kith and kin in the requirement of landlord as “his” or “his own” requirement and user. Keeping in view the social or socio-religious milieu and practices prevalent in a particular section of society or a particular region, to which the landlord belongs, it may be the obligation of the landlord to settle a person closely connected with him to make him economically independent so as to support himself and/or the landlord. To discharge such obligation the landlord may require the tenancy premises and such requirement would be the requirement of the landlord. If the requirement is of actual user of the premises by a person other than the landlord himself the court shall with circumspection inquire:

(i) whether the requirement of such person can be considered to be the requirement of the landlord, and (ii) whether there is a close interrelation or identity nexus between such person and the landlord so as to satisfy the requirement of the first query. Applying the abovesaid tests to the facts of the present case it is clear that the tenancy premises are required for the office of the landlord's son who is a chartered accountant. It is the moral obligation of the landlord to settle his son well in his life and to contribute his best to see him economically independent. The landlord is not going to let out the premises to his son and though the son would run his office in the premises the possession would continue with the landlord and in a sense the actual occupation by the son would be the occupation by the landlord himself. It is the landlord who requires the premises for his son and in substance the user would be by the landlord for his son's office. The case squarely falls within the scope of Section 13(3)(a)(ii) of the Act. (Emphasis supplied) ii. Similarly, a Coordinate Bench of this Court in Labhu Lal v. Sandhya Gupta 2010 SCC Online Del 3423 held that requirement of adult family members, for the purpose of setting up their business, falls withing the ambit of bona fide need of the landlord. iii. So also, another Coordinate Bench in Om Prakash Bajaj v. Chander Shekhar (2003) SCC OnLine Del 97 at paragraph 11 had observed as under:

8.4. This Court is, therefore, of the view that the need of the landlords for the tenanted premises for providing commercial accommodation to their adult sons for starting independent business is genuine and the finding of the Trial Court does not suffer from any infirmity.

9. The Petitioners i.e., tenants have raised a plea that sufficient alternate accommodation is available to the landlords in the ‘subject property’ itself and at the Masjid Road Basement property.

9.1. The Trial Court has examined the said issue in detail and with respect to the ‘subject property’ rightly concluded that the upper floors (i.e., first floor and second floor) of the said property, which are being used for the residence of the landlords and their family cannot be construed as alternate available accommodation. The Petitioners have not disputed that the Respondents reside in the upper floors and therefore, this Court fails to appreciate on what basis the said accommodation is being contended as an alternate accommodation for commercial purposes. The findings of the Trial Court with respect to this contention of the Petitioners reads as under:

Petitioners that this gives rise to a triable issue.

9.2. The Petitioners next contended that the Masjid Road Basement property is an alternate accommodation. The Trial Court has dealt with this issue in detail and concluded that the said premises is neither suitable nor available as it is already occupied and being used. The relevant findings of the Trial Court read as under:

9.3. The Petitioners have not disputed that the basement can be used only for storage purposes and in any event the basement is already being used by the landlords and their family members. This Court, therefore, finds no infirmity in the said finding of the Trial Court as well.

10. The Petitioners have lastly contended that prior to the filing of the eviction petition two (2) shops were sold by the landlord. The Trial Court held that no details of the alleged shops or the sale have been placed on record and therefore, the Trial Court opined that these are bald assertions. Even before this Court no details have been shown from the record in support of the said contentions. Therefore, in the opinion of this Court, the Trial Court rightly rejected the said contention as being bereft of any merit and shorn of any details.

11. In revision, the powers of this Court are supervisory and one of superintendence and this aspect has been reiterated by the Supreme Court in the case of Abid-Ul-Islam v. Inder Sain Dua, 2022 6 SCC 30 and more specifically in paragraph 23 therein, which reads as under:

the Trial Court, which would merit interference by this Court.

12. This Court finds merit in the submission of the learned counsel for the Respondent that the Petitioner has deliberately delayed the adjudication of these proceedings by consistently seeking adjournments. In fact, a perusal of the orders dated 23.11.2022, 08.12.2022 and 13.01.2023 shows that the Petitioners unilaterally stopped making payments of use and occupation charges w.e.f., July, 2020 contrary to the directions issued by this Court on 03.08.2016 and 12.04.2018 while continuing to enjoy the stay on the eviction order.

13. In these facts and circumstances, this Court is of the opinion that there is no infirmity in the order of the Trial Court in rejecting the application seeking leave to defend. This Court also finds that the pleas raised in the revision petition are frivolous and without any merit accordingly, the present revision petition is dismissed with costs of Rs. 1 lakh payable to the Respondents within a period of two (2) weeks, failing which the Respondents shall be entitled to recover the same in the execution proceedings. Pending applications, if any, are disposed of.

MANMEET PRITAM SINGH ARORA, J JULY 04, 2023/sk/ms