Full Text
HIGH COURT OF DELHI
Date of Decision: 25.07.2023
SHEENA ..... Petitioner
Through: Mr.Sunil Mittal, Sr. Advocate with Ms.Seema Seth, Ms.Shreya Maggu, Advs.
Through: Dr.Aman Hingorani, Mr.Himanshu Yadav, Advs.
JUDGMENT
1. The present petition has been filed by the petitioner, who is also the petitioner in HMA No. 5862223/2016 titled Sheena v. Chirag Nath (hereinafter referred to as the ‘said petition’), pending before the learned Principal Judge, Family Court, Central District, Tis Hazari Courts, Delhi (hereinafter referred to as the ‘Family Court’), challenging the order dated 02.07.2022 (hereinafter referred to as the ‘Impugned Order’) passed by the learned Family Court in said petition, allowing the application filed by the respondent herein under Order VI Rule 17 of the Code of Civil Procedure (in short ‘CPC’) seeking amendment of his written statement, subject to payment of costs of Rs.25,000/-.
2. The learned senior counsel for the petitioner submits that in the present case, the petitioner had filed the petition under Section 12(1)(A) and Section 13(1)(i)(a) of the Hindu Marriage Act, 1955 against the respondent on 07.08.2014. The respondent filed his written statement to the said petition on 06.09.2016. Thereafter, the petitioner tendered her examination-in-chief and was cross-examined from 15.01.2018 to 09.03.2018. The petitioner also produced her father as PW-2, whose evidence was recorded on 29.11.2019. It was only on 01.12.2020 that the respondent herein filed an application seeking an amendment to his written statement, thereby now seeking to raise a fresh allegation that the petitioner herein was having an extra-marital affair with a gentleman mentioned in the application even prior to their marital discord taking place, that is, in 2014. The respondent further alleged that he became aware of the said affair only on 10.01.2020 when he, coincidently, met the said gentleman at Mumbai Airport.
3. Drawing reference to the averments made in the said application filed by the respondent herein under VI Rule 17 of the CPC, the learned senior counsel for the petitioner submits that the said assertions do not show any due diligence on the part of the respondent and, therefore, the amendment should not have been allowed by the learned Family Court.
4. He submits that in the present case, the evidence of the petitioner already stands concluded. Allowing the amendment at such a belated stage would, therefore, put the clock back and cause further delay in the adjudication of the said petition. He submits that the learned Family Court has not considered the issue of due diligence at all in its Impugned Order.
5. Placing reliance on the judgment of the Supreme Court in Pandit Malhari Mahale v. Monika Pandit Mahale & Ors. (2020) 11 SCC 549, he submits that in the absence of consideration of the issue of due diligence, the Impugned Order deserves to be set aside by this Court.
6. He further submits that the averments that have been made in the application are mala fide and only intended to delay the adjudication of the said petition.
7. On the other hand, the learned counsel for the respondent submits that no case for interference with the Impugned Order, in the exercise of powers of this Court under Article 227 of the Constitution of India, has been made out by the petitioner herein. Placing reliance on the judgment of the Supreme Court in Raj Kumar Bhatia v. Subhash Chander Bhatia, (2018) 2 SCC 87, he submits that the Court in the exercise of its powers under Article 227 of the Constitution of India does not act as an Appellate Court or Tribunal and it is not open for the Court to review or re-assess the evidence upon which the Family Court has passed the Impugned Order; the power of this Court is confined only to see whether a subordinate Court or Tribunal has proceeded within the parameters of its jurisdiction. He submits that in the present case, the learned Family Court has acted well within its jurisdiction and, therefore, the Impugned Order does not deserve any interference of this Court.
8. On merits, he submits that the respondent, in his application, has clearly brought out the facts that led to the filing of the amendment application. He has stated that he came to gain the knowledge of the affair of the petitioner herein only pursuant to a chance meeting with the said gentleman at the Mumbai Airport on 10.01.2020. The facts subsequent thereto, as have also been enumerated in the said application, gave rise to this belief in the respondent. The respondent, therefore, cannot be found guilty of having delayed the moving of the application in question.
9. Placing reliance on the judgments of this Court in National Small Industries Corpn. Ltd. v. Gaajra International, 2009 SCC OnLine Del 135; BDR Developers Pvt. Ltd. v. Narsingh Shah & Ors., 2021 SCC OnLine Del 3889; and Sunita Rekhi & Ors. v. Y.D.Puri and Ors., 2015 SCC OnLine Del 13841; and of the Supreme Court in Usha Balashaheb Swami & Ors. v. Kiran Appaso Swami & Ors., (2007) 5 SCC 602, he submits that while considering an application seeking an amendment to the written statement, the Court has to be liberal and even addition of a new ground of defence or substituting or altering the defence or taking inconsistent pleas in the written statement would not be objectionable. He submits that the Court cannot go into the merits of the averments sought to be added by way of the amendment application.
10. On the issue of delay, he further submits that the petitioner, after the passing of the Impugned Order, has herself delayed the further adjudication of the divorce petition, with the amended written statement having been filed on 04.08.2022.
11. I have considered the submissions made by the learned counsels for the parties.
12. Order VI Rule 17 of the CPC, and specifically the proviso thereto, reads as under: “ Order VI
17. Amendment of Pleadings: The Court may at any stage of the proceedings allow either party to alter or amend his pleadings in such manner and on such terms as may be just, and all such amendments shall be made as may be necessary for the purpose of determining the real questions in controversy between the parties: Provided that no application for amendment shall be allowed after the trial has commenced, unless the Court comes to the conclusion that in spite of due diligence, the party could not have raised the matter before the commencement of trial.”
13. A reading of the above provision would show that while the Court may ‘at any stage of the proceedings’ allow the other party to alter or amend the pleadings, as may be necessary for the purpose of determining the real question in controversy between the parties, however, such power is circumscribed by the proviso which provides that no such application shall be allowed ‘after the trial has commenced’ and ‘unless the Court comes to the conclusion that in spite of due diligence, the party could not have raised the matter before the commencement of the trial’.
14. The Supreme Court in Ajendraprasadji N. Pandey and Another v. Swami Keshavprakeshdasji N. and Others, (2006) 12 SCC 1, has held as under:
42. It is to be noted that the provisions of Order 6 Rule 17 CPC have been substantially amended by the CPC (Amendment) Act, 2002.
43. Under the proviso no application for amendment shall be allowed after the trial has commenced, unless in spite of due diligence, the matter could not be raised before the commencement of trial. It is submitted, that after the trial of the case has commenced, no application of pleading shall be allowed unless the above requirement is satisfied. The amended Order 6 Rule 17 was due to the recommendation of the Law Commission since Order (sic Rule) 17, as it existed prior to the amendment, was invoked by parties interested in delaying the trial. That to shorten the litigation and speed up disposal of suits, amendment was made by the amending Act, 1999, deleting Rule 17 from the Code. This evoked much controversy/hesitation all over the country and also leading to boycott of courts and, therefore, by the Civil Procedure Code (Amendment) Act, 2002, provision has been restored by recognising the power of the court to grant amendment, however, with certain limitation which is contained in the new proviso added to the rule. The details furnished below will go to show as to how the facts of the present case show that the matters which are sought to be raised by way of amendment by the appellants were well within their knowledge on their court case, and manifests the absence of due diligence on the part of the appellants disentitling them to relief.”
15. In Smt. Kailash Sharma v. Jagdish Lal Sharma & Ors., 2010 SCC OnLine Del 4225, while interpreting the amendment to Order VI Rule 17 of the CPC, the Supreme Court has held that:
16. Therefore, once the trial has commenced, the party who seeks to amend its pleadings has an added obligation to show to the Court that, in spite of due diligence, such party could not have raised the matter sought to be brought on record by way of the amendment, before the commencement of trial.
17. In the present case, the trial commenced on 15.01.2018. The amendment application has been filed on 01.12.2020.
18. As far as the due diligence of the respondent is concerned, the application states as under:
19. Clearly, the above does not satisfy the test of due diligence.
20. The amendment in the written statement which is sought to be carried out in the written statement is as under:
21. The learned senior counsel for the petitioner, drawing reference to the cross-examination of the petitioner recorded by the learned Family Court on 08.03.2018, submits that the petitioner had been extensively cross-examined by the respondent herein on basis of the air-tickets that now form the basis of the application filed by the respondent under Order VI Rule 17 of the CPC. He submits that even the email from Indigo Airlines, giving the history of the air-tickets, was available with the respondent since early February 2018, as is evident from the emails itself. The respondent has also asserted that he met the other gentleman on 10.01.2020. Apart from the fact, that this is only a false excuse generated to file the application under Order VI Rule 17 of the CPC, the application was filed only on 01.12.2020, that is, almost eleven months thereafter. I find merit in these objections. It is apparent from the reading of the application, the respondent is seeking to add allegations which relate to the period prior to 2014 and on basis of certain air bookings, which were in the knowledge of the respondent, as is evident from the crossexamination of the petitioner to which attention of this Court has been drawn by the learned senior counsel for the petitioner. Apart from the vague allegations of having met with the gentleman in question at Mumbai Airport on 10.01.2020, which is alleged to have raised certain suspicion in the mind of the respondent, there is nothing on record to show any subsequent fact which would justify the delay of eleven months even thereafter. Even otherwise, the amendment appears to be a means to delay the trial of the divorce petition filed by the petitioner herein, and appears to be mala fide.
22. The learned Family Court in the Impugned Order has been influenced by the fact that an amendment can be allowed at ‘any stage of the proceedings’, however, at the same time, ignoring the mandate of the proviso to Rule 17 of Order VI of the CPC. The finding of the learned Family Court on the said aspect is reproduced hereinbelow:
23. The learned Family Court has not adverted to the issue of due diligence of the respondent at all in the Impugned Order, thereby committing a jurisdictional error.
24. In Pandit Malhari Mahale (supra), the Supreme Court has observed as under:
25. The above judgment of the Supreme Court would squarely apply to the facts of the present case as well. Though, there is no doubt that a Court should be more liberal in allowing an amendment to the pleadings, especially the written statement, at the same time, the legislative intent of preventing delays in the adjudication of the proceedings by way of adding proviso to Order VI Rule 17 of the CPC cannot be ignored or negated.
26. In view of the above, I find that the learned Family Court has erred in allowing the amendment application filed by the respondent under Order VI Rule 17 of the CPC. The Impugned Order is accordingly set aside.
27. The petition is allowed. The pending application also stands disposed of.
28. The parties shall bear their own costs.
NAVIN CHAWLA, J JULY 25, 2023 RN/AS