Full Text
HIGH COURT OF DELHI
Date of order : 24th July, 2023
SH. RAM PAL ..... Petitioner
Through: Appearance not given
Through: Mr. Manu Chaturvedi, Standing Counsel (Through VC) for R-1/MCD
CHANDRA DHARI SINGH, J (Oral)
JUDGMENT
1. The instant petition under Article 226 of the Constitution of India has been filed on behalf of the petitioner seeking the following reliefs: “a. Issue appropriate Writ/directions against the Respondent No. 1 & 2 to pay whole of the arrears of capitalized value of Pension amount of Rs. 7,31,561/- (Rupees Seven Lakhs Thirty One Thousands Five Hundred and Sixty One Only) w.e.f. 01.04.2020 with interest on the late payment. b. Issue appropriate Writ/directions against the Respondent NO. 1 & 2 to pay whole of the arrears of capitalized value of the whole value of Gratuity amount w.e.f. 01.04.2020 with interest on the late payment since 01.04.2020. c. Issue appropriate Writ/directions against the Respondent NO. 1 & 2 to pay whole of the arrears of leave encashment w.e.f. 13.03.1960 to 01.04.2020 with interest on the late payment since 01.04.2020. d. Issue appropriate Writ/directions against the Respondent NO. 1 & 2 to pay Group Insurance Scheme (GSLI) and to provide Medical Benefit Card whole of the arrears of leave encashment w.e.f. 13.03.1960 to 01.04.2020, with interest on the late payment. e. Issue appropriate Writ/directions against the Respondent NO. 1 & 2 to provide Medical Benefit Card for which some amount already deducted by the respondent. f. Issue appropriate Writ/direction against the Respondent NO. 1 & 2 to pay an amount approximate amount of Rs. 25 Lakhs with interest w.e.f. 01.04.2020 to till its realization on the payable outstanding arrears of the petitioner to the petitioner. g. Issue direction to the Respondent No. 1 & 2 not to harass the petitioner in future by holding his monthly pension amount due to filing the present petition. h. Allow costs of litigation to the petitioner.”
2. Learned counsel appearing on behalf of the petitioner submitted that the respondent‟s action for withholding the statutory due of the petitioner causes severe hardship in getting the marriage of his daughter on the schedule date. It is submitted that the petitioner is legally entitled for the payment of all the dues which have been arbitrarily withheld by the respondents. The entire service record of the petitioner was satisfactory and there was no complaint against the petitioner during his service period.
3. Learned counsel appearing on behalf of the petitioner submitted that after the retirement, the retiral dues which has not been paid by the respondents is arbitrary, illegal, unjust and contrary to the law.
4. Learned counsel appearing on behalf of the petitioner further submitted that this Court may pass an order or direction to the respondents no. 1 and 2 to pay the arrears of the pension amount of Rs. 7,31,561/- (Rupees Seven Lakhs Thirty One Thousand Five Hundred and Sixty One Only) with effect from 1st April, 2020 with interest on the late payment.
5. Per contra, learned counsel appearing on behalf of the respondent NO. 1 vehemently opposed the instant petition and submitted that the instant petition is not maintainable as per Section 14 read with Section 3(q) of the Administrative Tribunals Act, 1985 (hereinafter “the Act”). It is further submitted that the instant petition is maintainable to the jurisdiction of the Central Administrative Tribunal; therefore, the instant petition may be dismissed on the ground of maintainability.
6. Heard learned counsel appearing on behalf of the parties and perused the record.
7. The petitioner in the present petition is seeking directions to the Municipal Corporation to allow him to pay whole of the arrears of pension, gratuity, arrears of leave encashment, pay Group Insurance Scheme (GSLI) and to provide Medical Benefit Card. Reliefs sought fall under the definition of „service matters‟ and therefore, by way of Section 14 read with Section 3(q) of the Act, the petitioner is amenable to the jurisdiction of the Central Administrative Tribunal.
8. Section 3(q) of the Act defines „service matters‟. The Section explicitly contains the matters of pension, retirement benefits, and leaves under its ambit. The Section 3(q) reads as under: “(q) “service matters”, in relation to a person, means all matters relating to the conditions of his service in connection with the affairs of the Union or of any State or of any local or other authority within the territory of India or under the control of the Government of India, or, as the case may be, of any corporation 5 [or society] owned or controlled by the Government, as respects—
(i) remuneration (including allowances), pension and other retirement benefits;
(ii) tenure including confirmation, seniority, promotion, reversion, premature retirement and superannuation;
(iii) leave of any kind;
(iv) disciplinary matters; or
(v) any other matter whatsoever;”
9. Section 14 of the Act mandates that the Central Administrative Tribunal is to have exclusive jurisdiction for all service matters. Section 14 reads as under:
10. It is relevant for this Court to peruse the judgment of Hon‟ble Supreme Court in L. Chandra Kumar v. Union of India and Ors., (1997) 3 SCC 261, wherein the Court has explained that how a Tribunal must not be less efficacious than a High Court and should render confidence and public esteem. The Court also held that the tribunals cannot act as the substitutes for the High Courts and the Supreme Court, which have been established under specific obligation. Furthermore, the court held that the function of the tribunal is supplementary in nature which can be challenged/scrutinized before a division bench of the High Court. At the same time, it was also held that the tribunals also have powers to test vires of the subordinate legislations and rules except testing the legitimacy of their parent statute. The relevant paragraphs are reproduced herein: “8.65 A Tribunal which substitutes the High Court as an alternative institutional mechanism for judicial review must be no less efficacious than the High Court. Such a tribunal must inspire confidence and public esteem that it is a highly competent and expert mechanism with judicial approach and objectivity. What is needed in a tribunal, which is intended to supplant the High Court, is legal training and experience, and judicial acumen, equipment and approach. When such a tribunal is composed of personnel drawn from the judiciary as well as from services or from amongst experts in the field, any weightage in favour of the service members or expert members and value- discounting the judicial members would render the tribunal less effective and efficacious than the High Court. The Act setting up such a tribunal would itself have to be declared as void under such circumstances. The same would not at all be conducive to judicial independence and may even tend, directly or indirectly, to influence their decision-making process, especially when the Government is a litigant in most of the cases coming before such tribunal. See S.P. Sampath Kumar v. Union of India reported in: (1987)ILLJ128SC. The protagonists of specialist tribunals, who simultaneously with their establishment want exclusion of the Writ jurisdiction of the High Courts in regard to matters entrusted for adjudication to such tribunals, ought not to overlook these vital and important aspects. It must not be forgotten that what is permissible to be supplant by another equally effective and efficacious institutional mechanism is the High Courts and not the judicial review itself. Tribunals are not an end in themselves but a means to an end; even if the laudable objectives of speedy justice, uniformity of approach, predictability of decisions and specialist justice are to be achieved, the frame work of the tribunal intended to be set up to attain them must still retain its basic judicial character and inspire public confidence. Any scheme of decentralisation of administration of justice providing for an alternative institutional mechanism in substitution of the High Courts must pass the aforesaid test in order to be constitutionally valid. xxx xxx xxx
93. Before moving on to other aspects, we may summarise our conclusions on the jurisdictional powers of these Tribunals. The Tribunals are competent to hear matters where the vires of statutory provisions are questioned. However, in discharging this duty, they cannot act as substitutes for the High Courts and the Supreme Court which have, under our constitutional setup, been specifically entrusted with such an obligation. Their function in this respect is only supplementary and all such decisions of the Tribunals will be subject to scrutiny before a Division Bench of the respective High Courts. The Tribunals will consequently also have the power to test the vires of subordinate legislations and rules. However, this power of the Tribunals will be subject to one important exception. The Tribunals shall not entertain any question regarding the vires of their parent statutes following the settled principle that a Tribunal which is a creature of an Act cannot declare that very Act to be unconstitutional. In such cases alone, the concerned High Court may be approached directly. All other decisions of these Tribunals, rendered in cases that they are specifically empowered to adjudicate upon by virtue of their parent statutes, will also be subject to scrutiny before a Division Bench of their respective High Courts. We may add that the Tribunals will, however, continue to act as the only courts of first instance in respect of the areas of law for which they have been constituted. By this, we mean that it will not be open for litigants to directly approach the High Courts even in cases where they question the vires of statutory legislations (except, as mentioned, where the legislation which creates the particular Tribunal is challenged) by overlooking the jurisdiction of the concerned Tribunal.”
11. Hence, in view of the judgment of L. Chandra Kumar v. Union of India and Ors. (Supra) and the mandates of Sections 3(q) and 14 of the Act, this Court is of the view that the Tribunal is an efficacious alternative remedy, excluding the jurisdiction of this Court. Hence, the writ petition is not maintainable before this Court and cannot be entertained.
12. Accordingly, the instant petition stands dismissed along with pending applications, if any.
13. The order be uploaded on the website forthwith.