Ram Lallan v. Management Shankar Tin Ind

16. Learned counsel placed further reliance on Parshuram Shah v. Govt. of NCT of Delhi, 2007 SCC OnLine Del 1186, wherein it was held by this Court that the law is well settled with respect to the fact that the Labour Court is the final court of facts and it is not appropriate for a writ Court while exercising jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution of India, to re-appreciate evidence or to interfere with the findings of facts as arrived at by the Labour Court.

17. It is submitted that the jurisdiction exercised by a writ court under Article 226 is supervisory in nature and not appellate. Re-appraisal of evidence to arrive at finding of facts contrary to those arrived at by the learned Labour Court without sufficient reasons in law, is not the intent of exercising the powers of a writ court.

18. It is further submitted that the services of the petitioner were not terminated by the respondent management and therefore issuing of any notice and payment of service compensation as per Section 25- F of the Act, does not arise. This very contention has also been rightly observed by the learned Labour Court in the impugned Award.

19. Hence, in view of the foregoing submissions, the respondent seeks that this Court be pleased to dismiss this petition thereby upholding the February 2004.

20. Heard the learned counsel appearing on behalf of the petitioner and perused the materials on record including the pleadings, and judicial precedents cited.

21. At this juncture, this Court finds it necessary to adjudicate upon the present petition by framing the following issue: - Whether there is any error on the part of the learned Labour Court in appraising the evidence placed before it, while passing the impugned Award?

22. In order to appreciate the issues involved in this petition, it is necessary to set out the relevant facts here.

23. Aggrieved by the termination of his service, the petitioner’s dispute was referred to the learned Labour Court in I.D No. 192/96. In the said reference, the issue referred was, „whether the services of Shri Ram Lallan have been terminated illegally and/or unjustifiably by the management and if so, to what relief is he entitled and what directions are necessary in this respect?‟.

24. The learned Court proceeded to pass an ex-parte Award dated 25th May 1998, in favour of the petitioner as the respondent management had failed to file their written statement. The learned Court in the ex-parte Award observed the following:

25. On a bare perusal of the above ex-parte Award dated 25th May 1998, it seems that the learned Labour Court passed the said Award on the basis of evidence adduced before it. It was observed by the learned Court that after rendering continuous employment, the petitioner was terminated from the services for no cause, without notice and without following the procedure prescribed under Section 2 (oo) and Section 25 F of the Act. Hence, the prayer of the petitioner for reinstatement was allowed and the termination was held to be illegal.

26. It is noted that, after the passing of the ex-parte Award dated 25th May 1998, the respondent management filed an application dated 2nd September 1998, for setting aside of the ex-parte Award and the same was allowed by the learned Court on 19th March 1999, subject to the cost of Rs. 3,000/-. Fresh proceedings were conducted, wherein the written statement and rejoinder were filed by the parties and evidence was led, and examination of the witnesses were held. Thereafter the learned Court reframed the issues vide order dated 22nd September 1999, the said issues are reproduced herein: “(A) Whether the workman tendered the resignation on 6,2,1995, which was accepted by the management on 7,3.1995, and workman received full and final dues from the management on 9.4.95? (B) To what relief, if any, is the workman entitled against the management in terms reference?”

27. After setting aside of the ex-parte Award dated 25th May 1998, the parties led the evidence before the learned Labour Court. On the basis of evidence such as the resignation letter dated 6th March 1995, the voucher and the receipt dated 9th April 1995, showing full and final settlement amount of Rs. 11,996/- received by the petitioner etc., and cross examinations, the learned Court passed the impugned Award dated 5th February 2004, thereby, deciding the dispute in favour of the management and against the petitioner. The relevant paragraphs of the impugned Award are reproduced below: “7. Issue No. 1: The issue is framed on the basis of objections taken by management in the written statement and also reply on merit by the management Hence, the onus to prove this issue rest upon the management. The management examined Shri Tejender Singh who proved his affidavit Ex. MW1/A and documents Ex. WW1/1 to M[3], In the affidavit, it is specifically and categorically stated by MW[1] that workman worked with management from 1.10.79 to 7.3.95 and on 6.3.95 he had tendered his resignation and requested for settlement of his accounts in full and final for getting employment. It is stated that on 9.4.95 matter was settled and full and final dues of Rs. of Rs. 11996/- given to the workman. The witness subjected to cross—examination. The witness denied the suggestion that workman did not take full and final account and settled the dispute. The witness further explained how the documents WW1/M[1] to M[3] were executed. The witness further proved attendance register MX[1] pertaining to period March, April, 1995.

8. Now burden shifts to workman who himself appeared in witness box and proved his affidavit Ex. WW1/A. In crossexamination he states that Ex. WW1/M[1] bears his signatures. The payment register bears his signatures for the month Feb and March, 1995. He further states that his signatures were taken by the management on Ex WW1/M[1] to M[3], 5-6 days before the termination of his services, may be in the month of February and March. He further states that after signatures on M[1] to M[3], he did not work with the management. He further states that he had received Rs, 11,996/- from management on 9.4.95 as full and final settlement amount.

9. I have considered respective submissions of both the Ld, ARs, Ld. AR for the workman submits that Ex. WW1/M[1] to M[3] are false, fabricated documents and workman never resigned or received full and final payment. On the other hand, Ld. AR for management states that the workman has concealed the true facts from the court and framed a false case. He submits that the workman already admitted Ex. WW1/M[1] to M[3] which were signed by him and also admitted the receiving of the amount. He further submits that in crossexamination, he admitted these facts. Therefore, it is a false and wrong dispute raised by workman.

10. I have carefully considered submissions of both the Ld. ARs and gone through the record. The management has proved three documents which are vital and throw V light on the Issue. These documents are Ex, WW1/M[1], It is signed by workman, is a resignation letter. Ex, WW1/M[2] is a voucher of receiving full and final settlement amount of Rs, 11996/and Ex, WW1/M[3] is the receipt dated 9.4.95, The workman admitted his signatures on these documents as well as receiving of the amount. The workman alleged in the statement of claim that management got signatures on blank papers, false vouchers. Further in the demand notice Ex, WW1/3, he has not mentioned such facts. The workman at no point of time raised any objection regarding t3ie Ex, W1/M[1] to M[3]. He has not made any complaint to the Labour Department or to the ' police. Therefore, the authenticity and genuineness of these documents cannot be surrounded by clouds of suspicion. The workman also not alleged at any point of time that these three documents were forged by the management. In my opinion, the management successfully proved these three documents. On the basis of these three documents, it is crystal clear that workman has resigned from the job and received his full and final settlement amount. On the basis of above observations & discussions, the issue is decided in favour of the management, against the workman,

11. Issue No. 2:- The onus of this issue is on the workman. As I have already discussed the relevant findings while deciding issue no. 1. The remaining facts and material is discussed here-inafter. The workman has framed his case that since 1.10.79 till 14.9.95, he worked with the management and then on 15.9.95, his services were terminated illegally. The workman is guilty for suppressing of true facts which are caught by the management. The workman who has received the amount in the month of April and admitted by him. Therefore, there is no question of continuing with the management. In the demand notice, the date mentioned is totally wrong and his alleged termination of the services. The workman at no point of time agitated regarding preparation of Ex. WW1/M[1] to M[3]. In the cross-examination he admitted all these documents and also admitted the factum of receiving of the money of Rs» 11,996/- as full and final payment for his dues. The workman has also concealed the fact of his resignation. Hence, in my opinion, the workman tried to take advantage of his own wrong and misuses the process of law. The workman failed to prove that his services were terminated by the management illegally on 15.9.95. Whereas as I have already held that workman resigned and thereafter, settled the dispute and received full and final payment of his dues. Hence, in these circumstances, issue no. 2 is also decided in favour of the management against the workman.

12. On the basis of findings on issue no. 1 and 2, the workman failed to prove that his services were terminated illegally and/or unjustifiably by the management. Award is passed accordingly. Reference is answered in these terms….”

28. It is perceptible from the findings of the learned Labour Court that it had gone in depth into the evidences and examination of the witnesses. The same is apparent because, first, the learned Labour Court passed the ex-parte Award dated 25th May 1998, only on the basis of the evidence and witness adduced by the petitioner in the absence of the respondent management. Secondly, after the ex-parte Award was set aside on 19th March 1999, the respondent was allowed to file its written statement. Evidences were perused (Ex. WW1/M[1] to M[3] which are the cross examination of the petitioner by the respondent management, the resignation dated 7th March 1995, voucher and receipt dated 9th April 1995 respectively) and the witnesses were examined, thereafter, the learned Labour Court arrived at a finding different than the earlier finding of the learned Court.

29. The learned Labour Court had recorded the reasons for determining such findings whereby, it was held that the petitioner had failed to prove that his services were illegally terminated by the management on 15th September 1995. It also held that the petitioner had admitted to his March 1995 (Ex. WW1/M[1]), in his cross examination which was tendered by the petitioner to the respondent management on 6th March 1995, and settled his dispute by receiving a settlement amount, as is evident from the receipt dated 9th April 1995 (Ex WW1/M[3]), which bears the petitioner’s signature.

30. The basis of the aforementioned findings by the learned Labour Court were that despite the petitioner has contended that he had sent a demand notice to the respondent after his alleged termination but the said allegations raised by him are nowhere mentioned in his demand notice. The learned Court also observed that the petitioner never made any complaint to the Labour Department or to the police authorities, with regard to his grievances for alleged fabrication of documents or illegal termination. The evidences (Ex WW1/M[1] to M[3]), i.e., the signed March 1995, the signed voucher and the receipt dated 9th April 1995, for receiving the full and final settlement amount of Rs.11,996/-, were found to be authentic by the learned Labour Court.

31. The question at this stage is, whether in view of such categorical findings of the fact arrived at by the learned Labour Court, this Court can exercise jurisdiction under Article 226 to re-appreciate the evidence and come to a different conclusion.

32. At this stage, it is imperative to understand the scope of a writ court’s jurisdiction in interference with labour or workman disputes.

33. The Labour Court is the final court of facts in the disputes between a labour or a workman and employer or an industry. The Hon’ble Supreme Court in the matter of Hindustan Tin Works v. Employees, (1979) 2 SCC 80, examined the aspect of perversity by the Labour Court in appreciation of facts, and observed that if prima facie, it is visible that the findings arrived at by the Labour Court is not based on some legal evidence, the High Court can go into the question of fact adjudicated and concluded by the Labour Court by exercising its power under Article 226 of the Constitution of India. In the event that there is no such error in the decision that was passed by the Labour Court, the Writ Court will not go into the issue of factual disagreements and the findings that were based on those disputes. The relevant paragraphs are reproduced below:

34. Further, in the judgment of Indian Overseas Bank v. I.O.B. Staff Canteen Workers' Union, (2000) 4 SCC 245, the Hon’ble Supreme Court on the aspect of finding of the facts without evidence, observed as follows: “21… If on the facts proved, the findings recorded by the Tribunal are justified and could not be considered to be based upon “no evidence”, there is no justification for the High Court in exercising writ jurisdiction to interfere with the same…”

35. In the matter of Kitab Singh v. Presiding Officer, Labour Court, 2008 SCC OnLine P&H 1704, the High Court of Punjab & Haryana observed as follows:

The said judgment was further reaffirmed by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Atlas Cycle v. Kitab Singh, (2013) 12 SCC 573.

36. As per the recent judgment by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Atlas Cycle (Supra), it is a well-established principle of law that a Labour Court cannot arrive at a finding by overlooking the materials on its record, as the same would amount to perversity and a writ court would be fully justified in interfering with the said conclusion. The High Court exercising writ of certiorari jurisdiction shall not assume the role of the appellate court. However, if it can be proved that, in the process of recording the finding, the Labour Court erroneously declined to decide upon allowing the admissible and material evidence, or if it can be shown that the Labour Court admitted any inadmissible evidence which is not permissible in law and has influenced the impugned finding, then the Court will be well within its power to interfere and overturn the impugned finding. In such a situation, the writ court would be justified in exercising its remedy. In other words, if finding of a fact is based on no evidence, that would be regarded as an error of law which can be corrected by a writ of certiorari. The relevant paragraphs of the abovementioned judgment are reproduced below:

37. This Court while relying on the judgment of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in K.V.S. Ram v. Bangalore Metropolitan Transport Corpn., (2015) 12 SCC 39, is of the view that once it is realized and ascertained that the Labour Court has exercised its discretion judicially, the High Court cannot interfere with the impugned award of the Labour Court, otherwise it will vitiate the fundamental purpose of the forums established for adjudicating upon industrial disputes. The High Court is strictly required to exercise its power within the parameters laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme Court. In the said judgment, it was held as follows: “13. Emphasising that while exercising jurisdiction under Articles 226 and/or 227 of the Constitution of India, the courts are to keep in view the goals set out in the Preamble and in Part IV of the Constitution while construing social welfare legislations, in Harjinder Singh v. Punjab State Warehousing Corpn. [Harjinder Singh v. Punjab State Warehousing Corpn., (2010) 3 SCC 192: (2010) 1 SCC (L&S) 1146], this Court has held as under: (SCC p. 205, para 21) “21. Before concluding, we consider it necessary to observe that while exercising jurisdiction under Articles 226 and/or 227 of the Constitution in matters like the present one, the High Courts are duty-bound to keep in mind that the Industrial Disputes Act and other similar legislative instruments are social welfare legislations and the same are required to be interpreted keeping in view the goals set out in the Preamble of the Constitution and the provisions contained in Part IV thereof in general and Articles 38, 39(a) to (e), 43 and 43-A in particular, which mandate that the State should secure a social order for the promotion of welfare of the people, ensure equality between men and women and equitable distribution of material resources of the community to subserve the common good and also ensure that the workers get their dues. More than 41 years ago, Gajendragadkar, J. opined that: „10. … The concept of social and economic justice is a living concept of revolutionary import; it gives sustenance to the rule of law and meaning and significance to the ideal of welfare State.‟ (State of Mysore v. Workers of Gold Mines [State of Mysore v. Workers of Gold Mines, AIR 1958 SC 923], AIR p. 928, para 10.)””

38. Similar findings have also been asserted in Iswarlal Mohanlal Thakkar v. Paschim Gujarat Vij Co. Ltd., (2014) 6 SCC 434 by the Hon’ble Supreme Court, whereby, the following was observed:

39. In view of the aforementioned judgments, it is evident that the Labour Court exercises its discretion keeping in view all the relevant circumstances. But the said discretion must be exercised in a judicious manner. The reasons for exercising such discretion must be cogent and convincing, and must appear on the face of the record. It is further observed that when it is said that something is to be done within the discretion of the authority, that something is to be done according to the law. It is not to be arbitrary, vague and fanciful but legal and regular.

40. The learned Labour Court being a fact finding body is entitled to reappraise the evidence. However, a writ court is not entitled to sit in appeal over such fact finding by the learned Court unless, it is shown as perverse or based on no evidence.

41. In view of the above, the only course open to this Court is to find out the satisfaction or otherwise the relevant criteria laid down in catena of judgments, before sustaining the claim of the petitioner, on the facts found and recorded by the fact finding authority i.e., the learned Labour Court. Further, the Court should not embark upon an exercise of reassessing the evidence and arriving at findings of one’s own, altogether giving a complete go-by.

42. As per the law settled by the Hon’ble Supreme Court, this Court cannot undertake an exercise, impermissible for this Court in exercising the writ jurisdiction, by liberally re-appreciating the evidence and drawing conclusions on pure questions of fact, as this Court does not sit in an appellate jurisdiction over the awards passed by the Labour Court.

43. The Labour Court is a fact finding authority, duly constituted for the purpose of adjudicating upon the labour disputes. The findings of fact recorded by it is considered to have become final and cannot be disturbed for the mere reason of having been based on the materials or evidence, not sufficient or credible in the opinion of the writ court.

44. This Court is of the view that from the bare perusal of the ex-parte Award dated 25th May 1998, it is clear that the findings arrived by the learned Labour Court was only on the basis of the petitioner’s evidence. No such evidence was placed before it to arrive at a different view, as it did in the impugned Award dated 5th February 2004.

45. In regard to the above paragraph, it is prudent to rely on the judgment of Hindustan Tin Works (Supra), wherein it was further held that the relief of reinstatement with continuity of service can only be granted where termination of a service is found to be invalid or illegal. As the same would mean that the employer has taken away the right to work of the workman illegally which is in breach of the contract and is in contravention to the relevant law, simultaneously depriving the workman of his earnings.

46. This Court is further of the view that the learned Labour Court while passing the impugned Award, has rightly considered the cross examination of the petitioner by the respondent management, the March 1995, the voucher and the receipt dated 9th April 1995 which are marked as Ex. WW1/M[1] to M[3]. All the evidences, as rightly observed by the learned Labour Court bears the petitioner’s signature and hence, the same cannot be denied to be true and fabricated. The same has been done by following the due process laid down under the law.

47. In view of the aforementioned discussion and judgments cited, it is held that sufficient material is on the record and the learned Labour Court has rightly arrived at the finding that the petitioner indeed furnished his resignation and has received all the settlement amount, as also recorded in the payment register and deduced during the cross examination.

48. It is also observed that the learned Labour Court had granted sufficient opportunity to the petitioner in justifying the illegality of his termination. But the finding of the facts narrated a completely different view than that alleged by the petitioner.

49. Accordingly, the issue framed has been decided.

50. On perusal of the findings of the learned Labour Court, this Court is of the view that the learned Court had overwhelming material which constituted sufficient basis for recording its findings and this Court is satisfied with the findings recorded.

51. This Court discerns no material to establish the proposition put forth by the petitioner. There is no material to characterise the award of the learned Labour Court as perverse. It is held that the learned Labour Court is well justified in passing the impugned Award.

52. In view of the above discussion of facts and law, this Court finds no infirmity in the impugned Award dated 5th February 2004 passed by Sh. Sanjay Kumar, Presiding Officer, Labour Court – II, Karkardooma Courts, New Delhi.

53. Based on the aforementioned arguments, this writ petition is accordingly dismissed.

54. Pending applications, if any, also stand disposed of.

55. The order be uploaded on the website forthwith.

CHANDRA DHARI SINGH, J AUGUST 3, 2023 Pa/Ryp