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HIGH COURT OF DELHI
JUDGMENT
NATIONAL PROJECTS CONSTRUCTIONS CORPORATION LTD ..... Appellant
Through: Mr. Dhruv Mehta, Sr. Adv. Mr. Rajat Arora, Mr. Shyam Agarwal and Ms. Mariya Shahab, Advs.
Through: Mr. M. Lall, Mr. Rahul Yadav and Mr. Rajat Sharma, Advs. for R-1.
HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE DHARMESH SHARMA
1. The present appeal under Section 37 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996[1] impugns the judgment dated 02 August 2021 rendered by a learned Single Judge on the petition under Section 34 of the Act preferred by the appellant. The appellant also seeks partial setting aside of the impugned Award dated 28 October 2020. However, Mr. Mehta learned senior counsel appearing in support of the Act the appeal clarified that the challenge stands restricted to the directions framed by the Arbitral Tribunal[2] insofar as the issue of interest is concerned.
2. In order to appreciate the nature of the challenge which stands raised, Mr. Mehta drew our attention to the following operative directions as framed by the AT while considering the issue of interest:-
3. The challenge, Mr. Mehta explained, is not with respect to either the rate at which interest has been awarded nor does it extend to the award of interest for the pre-reference/past period. The grievance of the appellant appears to essentially stem from the directions as contained in sub-paragraph (b) (i) of Para 58 and to the extent of the AT stipulating that interest for the period aforenoted would be leviable not merely on the principal amount as awarded but also upon the said amount inclusive of the amount of interest relating to the “prereference/past period”. Mr. Mehta further pointed out that similarly in sub-paragraph (b) (ii) of Para 58, the AT has proceeded to award interest on identical terms.
4. The AT in the Award, which ultimately came to be rendered had while dealing with the question of interest observed as under: -
5. As is evident from the aforesaid extracts of the award, the AT had identified the pre-reference/past period to commence from July 1987 and to run upto 19 January 1998. The pendente-lite period was bifurcated into two parts - the first period commencing from 20 January 1998 upto 31 December 2008 and the second period running from 01 January 2017 till the date of the award.
6. It was, however, noted that the respondent was disentitled for any interest for a period of eight years starting from 01 January 2009 till 31 December 2016. This since, and as was noted by the AT, the respondent had virtually abandoned their claim and had taken no steps for the reconstitution of the AT consequent to Shri. L. R. Gupta having resigned from that office on 26 June 2008 and ultimately passing away in the year 2013. These facts have also been noticed by the Court while considering the Section 34 challenge to the interim award and in its judgment of 30 January 2017 passed upon OMP NO. 537/2007.
7. The AT has consequently awarded interest for the prereference/past period @ 18% from July 1987 up to 19 January 1998. However, it awarded pendente-lite interest in terms of Para 58(b) extracted hereinabove. It is here that the appellant assert that the AT has committed a manifest illegality and awarded interest contrary to the provisions of Section 31(7) of the Act.
8. Insofar as the question of interest is concerned, the learned Single Judge has in paragraphs 38 to 42 of the impugned judgment rendered the following observations: -
9. The Court ultimately proceeded to set aside the impugned Award to the extent that it stipulated interest being paid @ 18% per annum for the future period and observed in paragraph 46 that future interest would stand pegged @ 9% per annum.
10. For the purposes of evaluating the merits of the submissions addressed on this appeal and noticed above, it would be apposite to extract Section 31 of the Act hereunder: - “31. Form and contents of arbitral award.—(1) An arbitral award shall be made in writing and shall be signed by the members of the arbitral tribunal. (2) For the purposes of sub-section (1), in arbitral proceedings with more than one arbitrator, the signatures of the majority of all the members of the arbitral tribunal shall be sufficient so long as the reason for any omitted signature is stated. (3) The arbitral award shall state the reasons upon which it is based, unless— (a) the parties have agreed that no reasons are to be given, or (b) the award is an arbitral award on agreed terms under section
30. (4) The arbitral award shall state its date and the place of arbitration as determined in accordance with section 20 and the award shall be deemed to have been made at that place. (5) After the arbitral award is made, a signed copy shall be delivered to each party. (6) The arbitral tribunal may, at any time during the arbitral proceedings, make an interim arbitral award on any matter with respect to which it may make a final arbitral award. (7) (a) Unless otherwise agreed by the parties, where and in so far as an arbitral award is for the payment of money, the arbitral tribunal may include in the sum for which the award is made interest, at such rate as it deems reasonable, on the whole or any part of the money, for the whole or any part of the period between the date on which the cause of action arose and the date on which the award is made. (b) A sum directed to be paid by an arbitral award shall, unless the award otherwise directs, carry interest at the rate of two per cent. higher than the current rate of interest prevalent on the date of award, from the date of award to the date of payment. Explanation.—The expression “current rate of interest” shall have the same meaning as assigned to it under clause (b) of section 2 of the Interest Act, 1978 (14 of 1978). (8) The costs of an arbitration shall be fixed by the arbitral tribunal in accordance with section 31A.”
11. As is manifest from a conjoint reading of Clauses (a) and (b) of Section 31(7) of the Act, the AT now stands empowered to award interest at such rate as it may deem reasonable for the period between the date on which the cause of action arose upto the date when an Award ultimately comes to be rendered. In terms of Clause (b), the AT is additionally empowered to direct payment of interest for the period between the date of the Award till the amounts specified therein are paid.
12. Section 31(7) of the Act thus in unequivocal terms recognizes only two periods for which interest may be awarded. These have been spelt out to be the period falling between the date on which the cause of action arose till the Award is made and the second comprising of the period starting from the date of the Award till the actual payment of the sums that the AT may have found the respondent liable to pay. This thus constitutes a clear departure from the interest regime which prevailed under the Arbitration Act, 1940 and where three distinct periods- pre-reference/past period, pendente lite and future period were recognized to exist.
13. The shift in the statutory position has been succinctly recognised and explained in Sayeed Ahmed and Company vs. State of Uttar Pradesh and Others[3] in the following terms: -
14. Sayeed Ahmed clearly holds that the distinction between the pre-reference/past period and pendente-lite period has clearly vanished and is inapplicable to arbitrations governed by the Act. It was thus not open for the AT to have framed the directions for payment of interest in the manner as specified in Para 58(b). The period falling between July 1987 till the date of Award would have constituted the period contemplated under Section 31(7)(a) of the Act and the period commencing from the date of Award till the amounts were actually paid by the appellant being the period which would fall within the net of Section 31(7)(b) of the Act.
15. Not only has the AT erred in this respect, it has committed a further illegality in forging the principal amount with interest as per Para 58(b). The pre-reference/past period had been duly identified by the AT to be from July 1987 up to 19 January 1998. The interest awarded for that period clearly could not have been subjected to a further levy of interest running through the period during which proceedings remained pending before the AT or for that matter being merged with the principal amount awarded. This clearly amounted to the AT levying interest on a compounded basis quite apart from having bifurcated the period over which interest could run contrary to the express command of Section 31(7) of the Act. The AT has committed a similar fallacy in framing directions for payment of interest for the period from 01 January 2017 till the date of the Award on what it has chosen to describe to be the total amount and which again is explained to comprise of the principal amount as well as interest for the pre-reference/past period.
16. Not only are the aforenoted directions contrary to the plain and unambiguous language of Section 31(7) of the Act, they are in evident violation of the principles laid down by the Supreme Court in Sayeed Ahmed. The AT has thus clearly committed a manifest illegality in proceeding to include the amount of interest determined as payable for the pre-reference/past period to be added to the principal amount. In terms of the statutory scheme underlying Section 31(7) of the Act, the principal amount remains static and as determined by the AT. Interest on the same is thereafter open to be prescribed to be payable in terms of Clauses (a) and (b) of Section 31(7) of the Act. That interest, as we have held above, would commence from the date when the cause of action arose and would run up to the date when the AT rendered the Award.
17. Undisputedly and in the facts of the present case, that period would comprise of a starting point commencing from July 1987 and running up to 28 October 2020 excluding the period between 01 January 2009 and 31 December 2016. The AT thus clearly appears to have committed a patent illegality while framing directions for payment of interest.
18. However, it would be apposite at this juncture to briefly take note of some of the steps taken by parties during the pendency of the present appeal. Pursuant to the order dated 18 February 2022, the appellant is stated to have deposited a total sum of Rs. 3,01,56,088/as representing the amount payable under the Award. The issue with respect to the erroneous application of Section 31(7) of the Act and the award of interest as per Para 58(b) came to be raised before the Court on 23 May 2022. The respondent here was in terms of that order called upon to submit a computation sheet indicating the admitted amount which would be payable if the contention of the appellant were to be accepted. In light of the aforesaid, the respondent filed an affidavit dated 28 May 2022 indicating that the admitted and undisputed amount would work out to be Rs. 1,92,82,710/-. Accepting the aforesaid computation, the Court by its order of 31 May 2022, directed the release of the aforesaid amount in favour of the respondent.
19. We were informed that the amount of Rs. 1,92,82,710/represents interest payable on the principal sum @ 12% for the period 20 January 1998 till 31 December 2008 and thereafter from 01 January 2017 till the date when Award was delivered. In our considered opinion, this would be a computation in accord with Section 31(7) of the Act.
20. We are thus of the considered view that the directions as contained in Para 58(b) would be liable to be set aside. However no further directions need be framed or issued since the respondent has already received interest when computed in terms of Section 31(7) of the Act and in accord with the findings recorded by us hereinabove.
21. Accordingly, the appeal shall stand allowed in the aforesaid terms. Since the respondent has already received the amount towards interest, the balance held in deposit with this Court shall stand released in favour of the appellant.
YASHWANT VARMA, J. DHARMESH SHARMA, J. AUGUST 01, 2023 neha/bh