Institute of Town Planners, India v. All India Council for Technical Education & Ors.

16.

AICTE is a Regulatory Body of Technical Education in the country and in order to perform its functions and prepare the students to compete in different technical subjects, Board of Studies are constituted with great care and caution. For each Committee, there is a Chairman and some members are appointed to formulate educational, training and research programs for consideration of the Executive Committee of AICTE, keeping in view the qualitative and quantitative requirements to evolve overall educational plans to meet the future demands of the country, to identify courses in existence, to design and develop model curricula and to formulate appropriate guidelines for grants and funding of institutions etc. Keeping this goal in mind, Board of Studies include educationists/academicians from reputed institutions such as IITs/NITs/IIM/SPAs or Government Institutions of National importance.

17. Town and Country Planning is an inter-disciplinary field and not restricted to a specific area. Experts with vast experience in areas of Architecture, Planning, Civil Engineering, Electrical, Sanitation, Computer Science etc. are necessary as the Board Members are required to take care of curricula updation, formulate programs for research and development and consultancy and industry-institute interactions. With the advancement in technology and requirement of modern town planning, if the contention of the Petitioner is accepted, it would curtail the growth because today town planning does not merely involve issues related to water, sewage, roads but also covers a wider ambit of internet connectivity, sensors, cameras, security and lots of work related to automation in the context of smart cities, green cities, industry belt, SEZs, education zones and other related activities.

18. Petitioner is wrong in arguing that the Board can only comprise of experts in town planning. The word ‘Experts’ is very generic in nature and nominations have to take colour from Section 13(3) of AICTE Act, which provides that ‘Every Board of Studies shall advise the Executive Committee on academic matters falling in its area of concern including norms, standards, model curricula, model facilities and structure of courses’. The ‘area of concern’ in the statute cannot mean or connote that members of the Board have to be restricted to the subject of town and country planning and instead is of a wide amplitude to include all inter-disciplinary activities connected to the curricula of town and country planning in the context of the need of the day. Regulation 3(3)(ii) of 1995 Regulations have to be seen and read in the context of Section 13 of the AICTE Act and moreover, it nowhere provides that the required experts/ representatives have to be qualified only in a particular subject. Wherever only a ‘subject expert’, was required, the same was specifically stipulated, as in Regulation 9(v), which reads “ALL INDIA BOARD OF COMPUTER SCIENCES, ENGINEERING AND APPLICATIONS.

MEMBERS 6-8. Three Subject Experts are to be nominated by the Chairman, All India Council for Technical Education.” The objection raised by the Petitioner with respect to Prof. Rohit Shinkre was duly examined and finding merit in the same, his name was removed from the Board Members with immediate effect and the communication addressed to him on 12.07.2022 has been filed in the Court.

19. I have heard the learned Senior Counsel for the Petitioner and learned Additional Solicitor General for the Respondents.

20. The challenge in the present petition is to a Notification dated 03.01.2020 issued by AICTE primarily on the ground that the constitution and composition of the Board is not in conformity with the AICTE Act and 1995 Regulations. Before embarking on the journey of considering this challenge, it would be important to understand the scope and ambit of the powers of judicial review of this Court under Article 226 of the Constitution of India to interfere in matters relating to selections, appointments and nominations. The fetters and restrictions on the powers of the Courts to review actions of appointment etc. made by the Government or other Statutory Bodies etc. are well defined and the settled law that a very narrow window is available for judicial review cannot be ignored or glossed over. The strict parameters within which powers of judicial review in matters relating to selections and appointments can be exercised have been laid down and affirmed and reaffirmed in various judicial pronouncements of the Supreme Court and various High Courts. In All India Council for Technical Education v. Surinder Kumar Dhawan and Others, (2009) 11 SCC 726, the Supreme Court observed that the Courts are neither equipped nor have the academic or technical background to substitute themselves in place of statutory professional technical bodies and take decision in academic matters involving standards and quality of technical education. If the Courts start entertaining petitions from individual institutions or students to permit courses of their choice for whatever reasons, it will lead to chaos in education and deterioration in standards of education. The role of statutory expert bodies and the role of the Courts are well-defined by a simple rule. If a question of education policy or an issue involving academic matters arises, the Courts keep their hands off. If any provision of law has to be interpreted, applied or enforced, the Courts will step in.

AICTE consists of professionals and technical experts in the field of education, duly qualified and equipped to decide issues pertaining to constitution of Boards, appointments, nominations, prescribe course content in the model curriculum, set norms and standards of minimum qualifications etc.

21. In Dr. J.P. Kulshrestha (Dr.) and Others v. Chancellor, Allahabad University and Others, (1980) 3 SCC 418, the Supreme Court held that Judges must not rush in where even educationists fear to tread and while there is no absolute ban, it is a rule of prudence that Courts should hesitate to dislodge decisions of academic bodies. In 1984, the Supreme Court in Maharashtra State Board of Secondary and Higher Secondary Education and Another v. Paritosh Bhupeshkumar Sheth and Others, (1984) 4 SCC 27, observed that Court should be extremely reluctant to substitute its own views as to what is wise, prudent and proper in relation to academic matters in preference to those formulated by professional men possessing technical expertise and rich experience of actual day-to-day working of educational institutions and the departments controlling them.

22. Significantly and relevant to this case are the observations of the Supreme Court in State of T.N. and Another v. Adhiyaman Educational & Research Institute and Others, (1995) 4 SCC 104, where the Supreme Court while dealing with AICTE Act explained the scope of duties and responsibilities of AICTE and held as follows:- “22. The aforesaid provisions of the Act including its preamble make it abundantly clear that the Council has been established under the Act for coordinated and integrated development of the technical education system at all levels throughout the country and is enjoined to promote qualitative improvement of such education in relation to planned quantitative growth. The Council is also required to regulate and ensure proper maintenance of norms and standards in the technical education system. The Council is further to evolve suitable performance appraisal system incorporating such norms and mechanisms in enforcing their accountability. It is also required to provide guidelines for admission of students and has power to withhold or discontinue grants and to de-recognise the institutions where norms and standards laid down by it and directions given by it from time to time are not followed. This duty and responsibility cast on the Council implies that the norms and standards to be set should be such as would prevent a lopsided or an isolated development of technical education in the country. For this purpose, the norms and standards to be prescribed for the technical education have to be such as would on the one hand ensure development of technical educational system in all parts of the country uniformly; that there will be a coordination in the technical education and the education imparted in various parts of the country and will be capable of being integrated in one system; that there will be sufficient number of technically educated individuals and that their growth would be in a planned manner; and that all institutions in the country are in a position to properly maintain the norms and standards that may be prescribed by the Council. The norms and standards have, therefore, to be reasonable and ideal and at the same time, adaptable, attainable and maintainable by institutions throughout the country to ensure both quantitative and qualitative growth of the technically qualified personnel to meet the needs of the country. Since the standards have to be laid down on a national level, they have necessarily to be uniform throughout the country without which the coordinated and integrated development of the technical education all over the country will not be possible which will defeat one of the main objects of the statute.......”

23. Relying on the judgment of the Supreme Court in Directorate of Film Festivals and Others v. Gaurav Ashwin Jain and Others, (2007) 4 SCC 737, wherein the Supreme Court had held that Courts do not and cannot act as appellate authorities examining the correctness and appropriateness of policies nor are Courts advisors to the Executive on such matters and the scope of judicial review is to check whether it violates Fundamental Rights of citizens or is opposed to provisions of the Constitution or statutory provisions or manifestly arbitrary, the Supreme Court in Surinder Kumar Dhawan and Others (supra), held that these observations will apply with added vigour to the field of education. The Supreme Court also held that matters relating to technical educational is the domain of AICTE and cannot be interfered with, merely because the Court thinks that a decision should have been otherwise.

24. It is trite that where a decision under challenge has been taken by a Committee of Experts, normally, Courts should be slow to interfere with the opinion expressed by the Experts, unless there are allegations of malafide against any member of the Expert Committee. In University of Mysore v. C.D. Govinda Rao and Another, (1964) 4 SCR 575 the Supreme Court observed ‘….it would normally be wise and safe for the Courts to leave the decision of academic matters to experts who are more familiar with the problem they face than Courts’. Similar view was taken by the Supreme Court in State of Bihar and Others v. Asis Kumar Mukherjee (Dr) and Others, (1975) 3 SCC 602 and Dr. Uma Kant v. Dr. BhikaLal Jain, (1992) 1 SCC 105.

25. In Basavaiah (Dr.) v. Dr. H.L. Ramesh and Others, (2010) 8 SCC 372, the Supreme Court observed that it is settled legal position that Courts have to show deference and consideration to the recommendations of Expert Committees consisting of distinguished experts in the field. Where the experts have evaluated the qualifications, experience etc. and recommended appointments, Courts ought not to sit as appellate bodies on recommendations made by the experts. In Jose Meleth v. Union of India and Others, 2013 SCC OnLine Del 5168, the Division Bench of this Court held as under:-

27. It is thus clear that in the absence of allegations of malafides, it is not for this Court to interfere in the wisdom of the experts and I would only echo the observations of the Division Bench in Jai Singh Chauhan (supra,) that Courts have a limited role to play while examining the recommendations of expert bodies and it is prudent and safe to leave the decisions to academicians and experts in the field.

28. With these principles in the backdrop as a guiding light, I may now advert to the facts of the present case. It is undisputed that the impugned Notification has been issued by AICTE in exercise of powers conferred by Section 13(2) and 13(4) read with Section 23 of AICTE Act. Petitioner questions the qualifications of the members of the Board on the ground that they lack the educational qualifications or work experience in the field of Town and Country Planning and are incompetent to be appointed as Experts. The concern expressed by the Petitioner in the writ petition is that the Board is required to advise the Executive Committee on academic matters falling in its area of concern and with the constitution under the impugned Notification it will be unable to discharge the functions effectively, which would be detrimental to the field of Town and Country Planning, since the curriculum of Town and Country Planning for the entire country is framed on the recommendations of the Board. Emphasis was laid on 1995 Regulations to bring home the point that the composition has been laid in the 1995 Regulations and nominations cannot be made by AICTE in contravention of the laid down composition.

29. Section 2(b) of AICTE Act defines ‘Council’ to mean the All India Council for Technical Education established under Section 3. Section 12(1) provides for constitution of Executive Committee by the Council for discharging such functions as may be assigned to it by the Council. Section 13(1) empowers the Council to establish various Board of Studies and Section 13(2) enables the Council, if it considers necessary, to establish such other Board of Studies as it may think fit. Sub-section (3) of Section 13 provides that every Board of Studies shall advise the Executive Committee on academic matters falling in its ‘area of concern’ including norms, standards, model curricula, model facilities and structure of courses. Section 23 of AICTE Act deals with power to make Regulations and provides that the Council may, by Notification in the official Gazette make Regulations not inconsistent with the provisions of the Act to carry out the purposes of the Act. Section 13(1) to (4) of AICTE Act is extracted hereunder, for ready reference:-

30. It is clear from a reading of Section 13 of AICTE Act that the Boards of Studies are established by the Council and are required to advise the Executive Committee on academic matters ‘falling in its area of concern’. This includes setting norms, standards etc. and the expression ‘area of concern’ cannot be given a restricted meaning or interpretation to mean that the role of the Board is restricted to any particular subject and therefore, its members must hold qualifications only in that subject.

AICTE is an expert body which has been in existence since November, 1945 as a National level Apex Advisory Body with the objective of developing and promoting quality technical education in the country. All India Board of Town and Country Planning is constituted by the Council which in turn comprises of the following, under Section 3(4) of AICTE Act:-

31. The composition of AICTE shows that it comprises of experts from diverse fields and is an expert body of long standing. The rich experience and expertise of the members of the Council goes into making the conscious decisions of nominating members of the Board of Studies, taking into consideration all relevant factors including qualifications, experience and expertise of the persons to be nominated as members. In the present case also the Council has nominated the members of the Board after due deliberations, looking into their qualifications, field of expertise and vast experience and it goes without saying that the Council with its experienced and expert members was not oblivious of the 1995 Regulations. In the counter affidavit, AICTE has explained that Town and Country Planning covers vast areas of subjects namely civil/electric/ electronic/ communication engineering, architecture, designing, horticulture, water conservation etc. It is also explained that in today’s times, Town Planning is no longer understood in the conservative or traditional sense as understood by the Petitioner. With the advancement of technology in all fields and modern day’s challenges of environment pollution, traffic monitoring etc., it has become essential and imperative to involve experts from inter-disciplinary fields. Keeping in view the Government policy for establishing Smart Cities/Smart Villages, the members of the Board cannot be restricted to those who possess qualifications only in the subject of Town and Country Planning. Therefore, looking at the need of the hour, the Council took a conscious decision to appoint members having expertise in different fields and working in different Universities and Technical Institutes. It was also pointed out by the learned Additional Solicitor General and rightly so, that the New National Education Policy advocates flexibility in all disciplines and AICTE has to evolve a holistic and integrated approach in the technical education system consistently endeavouring to update and revise the model curriculum keeping in pace with time and the requirements of the urban areas and smart cities’ projects etc.

32. Learned ASG highlighted that the nominations have been duly approved and endorsed by the Executive Committee which comprises of Vice-Chancellor of University, Secretary/Joint Secretary level officers in-charge of Technical Education Departments of State Governments and Directors/Principals of Technical Institutes. Furthermore, the Board of Studies are not permanent Bodies and are re-constituted on completion of prescribed tenure by AICTE.

33. It is also pertinent to point out that the members of the Board in respect of which objections have been raised by the Petitioner are highly qualified and experienced persons in their respective fields. Respondent No. 2 holds the qualification of M.Tech. and Ph.D. in VLSI Design and is an expert in the process of creating integrated circuit by combining millions of transistors into Single Chip. He has extensive experience in teaching, research, industry and administration in the field of Technology in some of Karnataka’s most reputed high technology institutions. Respondent No. 3 holds the qualification of Ph.D., M.Arch. and B.Arch. She specialises in Landscape Architecture and Sustainable Development having an experience of almost 26 years in both Academics and Industry. Respondent No. 4 is a person holding qualifications of BE Civil (Hons.), M. Tech. (Hons.) and Ph.D. He has an experience of almost 16 years in teaching, research etc., his field of interest being Concrete Technology and Analysis and Design of Structures. Respondent No. 6 holds the qualification of Ph.D., M.Arch. and B.Arch. and specialises in Environmental Design, Energy, ECBC and Education. Wherever AICTE found substance in the objection of the Petitioner, it has taken remedial action as in the case of Respondent No. 5 who has been removed from the membership of the Board. Therefore, looking at the nature of the activities the Board is required to carry out and undertake as also keeping in mind that the decision to nominate Board members has been taken by an expert body such as AICTE constituted by senior, well qualified professionals, Government officials and senior officials from the field of education, it is not for this Court to substitute its wisdom to hold that the Board has not been properly constituted, sans allegations of malafides. This would be clearly beyond the scope and ambit of judicial review under Article 226 of Constitution of India.

34. Learned ASG also raised an objection to the locus standi of the Petitioner to challenge the impugned Notification. Present petition has been filed by the Petitioner invoking the jurisdiction of this Court to issue a writ of certiorari under Article 226 of the Constitution, which empowers the High Court to issue to any person or authority, including the Government, within its territorial jurisdiction, directions, orders or writs including writs of habeas corpus, mandamus, prohibition, quo warranto and certiorari for enforcement of fundamental rights and for any other purpose.

35. In order to invoke the certiorari jurisdiction of a High Court under Article 226 of the Constitution of India, Petitioner should be an ‘aggrieved person’. This clearly flows from most of the English decision and to avoid prolixity, I may only refer to In Re Sidebotham Ex p. Sidebotham, [L.R.] 14 Ch. 458 (CA), wherein it was held “A ‘person aggrieved’ must be a man who had suffered a legal grievance, a man against whom a decision has been pronounced which had wrongfully deprived him of something; or wrongfully refused him of something, or wrongfully affected his title to something.” The Supreme Court in the decision in Jasbhai Motibhai Desai v. Roshan Kumar, Haji Bashir Ahmed, (1976) 1 SCC 671, elaborately dealt with the expression ‘aggrieved person’ and held as follows:

36. In the aforesaid judgments, the Supreme Court observed that to invoke the extraordinary jurisdiction under Article 226, an applicant should ordinarily be one who has a personal or individual right in the subject matter, though in writs of habeas corpus and quo warranto, the rule is relaxed. The expression ‘ordinarily’ was also explained by the Supreme Court, as follows:

37. In the said judgment, the Supreme Court laid down the principles to determine the locus standi of an applicant to file a writ of certiorari and in that light examined the locus of the Appellant therein and held that the Appellant was not deprived of a legal right and had sustained no legal injury to be entitled to a legal protection of his interest. Appellant had suffered no legal grievance and was not a person ‘aggrieved’. Relevant paragraphs are as follows:

48. In the light of the above discussion, it is demonstrably clear that the appellant has not been denied or deprived of a legal right. He has not sustained injury to any legally protected interest. In fact, the impugned order does not operate as a decision against him, much less does it wrongfully affect his title to something. He has not been subjected to a legal wrong. He has suffered no legal grievance. He has no legal peg for a justiciable claim to hang on. Therefore he is not a “person aggrieved” and has no locus standi to challenge the grant of the no-objection certificate.

49. It is true that in the ultimate analysis, the jurisdiction under Article 226 in general, and certiorari in particular is discretionary. But in a country like India where writ petitions are instituted in the High Courts by the thousand, many of them frivolous, a strict ascertainment, at the outset, of the standing of the petitioner to invoke this extraordinary jurisdiction, must be insisted upon. The broad guidelines indicated by us, coupled with other wellestablished self-devised rules of practice, such as the availability of an alternative remedy, the conduct of the petitioner etc. can go a long way to help the courts in weeding out a large number of writ petitions at the initial stage with consequent saving of public time and money.”

38. In Tirupati Buildings and Offices Pvt. Ltd. v. Reserve Bank of India, 2019 SCC OnLine Del 8990, this Court had the occasion to examine the locus standi of the petitioner as also delve on the expression ‘person aggrieved’ and I may allude to a few passages from the judgement, which are extracted hereunder:- “53. Admittedly, no petition has been filed by the respondent No. 3 Edelweiss Asset Reconstruction Company Limited; who had submitted the bid which was held to be highest. If the stand of the petition is that the said bid of the respondent No. 3 has not been decided, then it shall be grievance of the respondent No. 3 to raise an issue. Merely because the bid is for taking over of the loan given by the Dena Bank to the petitioner even though would suggest some interest of the petitioner but that would not show locus of the petitioner to maintain the writ petition for a prayer as noted above, as it is settled law to maintain a writ under Article 226 of the Constitution of India it should be shown by the petitioner that its right has been infringed by the inaction on the part of the respondent No. 2 to decide the bid submitted by the respondent No. 3 Edelweiss Asset Reconstruction Company Limited, which according to Mr. Aggarwal it has failed. Further it is not the case of the petitioner that the present petition has been filed in public interest. Surely such cases are exception to the locus standi rule as held by the Supreme Court in various judgments including Bandhua Mukti Morcha v. Union of India, (1984) 3 SCC 161: AIR 1984 SC 802. Further, the submission of Mr. Tripathi that the Edelweiss and the petitioner have been writing to the Dena Bank for consummation of sale is concerned; the same can be a ground for Edelweiss but not the petitioner, who is not the bidder to approach the Court with relief as prayed for. So, the relief to the respondent No. 3 cannot be given at the asking of the petitioner. In other words, the cause of action is the submission of bid which has not been decided. It is surely a cause for the respondent No. 3 to approach the Court against Dena Bank and not the petitioner. So, it follows the judicial review of the inaction on the part of the Dena Bank to decide the bid on any ground at the behest of any party other than Edelweiss is impermissible. Hence, this plea of Mr. Aggarwal needs to be accepted and it must be held that the petitioner has no locus standi to seek prayer(s) as stated above in this writ petition. In support of my aforesaid conclusion, I may refer to the following judgments of the Supreme Court on the issue of maintainability of the writ petition by a person who has no locus standi to file a petition:

54. In Calcutta Gas Company (Proprietary) Ltd. v. State of West Bengal, AIR 1962 SC 1044, in para 5 the Supreme Court has held as under: “…Article 226 confers a very wide power on the High Court to issue directions and writs of the nature mentioned therein for the enforcement of any of the rights conferred by Part III or for any other purpose. It is, therefore, clear that persons other than those claiming fundamental rights can also approach the court seeking a relief thereunder. The Article in terms does not describe the classes of persons entitled to apply thereunder; but it is implicit in the exercise of the extraordinary jurisdiction that the relief asked for must be one to enforce a legal right. In State of Orissa v. Madan Gopal, 1952 SCR 28: (1951 SCC 1024: AIR 1952 SC 12) this Court has ruled that the existence of the right is the foundation of the exercise of jurisdiction of the Court under Art. 226 of the Constitution. In Charanjit Lal Chowdhuri v. Union of India, 1950 SCR 869: (1950 SCC 833: AIR 1951 SC 41), it has been held by this Court that the legal right that can be enforced under Art. 32 must ordinarily be the right of the petitioner himself who complains of infraction of such right and approaches the Court for relief. We do not see any reason why a different principle should apply in the case of a petitioner under Art. 226 of the Constitution. The right that can be enforced under Art. 226 also shall ordinarily be the personal or individual right of the petitioner himself, though in the case of some of the writs like habeas corpus or quo warranto this rule may have to be relaxed or modified…” (emphasis supplied)

55. In Mani Subrat Jain v. State of Haryana, (1977) 1 SCC 486: AIR 1977 SC 276, in para 9 the Supreme Court has held as under: “..It is elementary though it is to be restated that no one can ask for a mandamus without a legal right. There must be a judicially enforceable right as well as a legally protected right before one suffering a legal grievance can ask for a mandamus. A person can be said to be aggrieved only when a person is denied a legal right by some one who has a legal duty to do something or to abstain from doing something. (See Halsbury's Laws of England 4th Ed. Vol. I, paragraph 122); State of Haryana v. Subash Chander, (1974) 1 SCR 165 = ((1974) 3 SCC 220: AIR 1973 SC 2216); Jasbhai Motibhai Desai v. Roshan Kumar Haji Bashir Ahmed, (1976) 3 SCR 58 = ((1976) 1 SCC 671: AIR 1976 SC 578) and Ferris Extraordinary Legal Remedies paragraph 198.”

56. In Ghulam Qadir v. Special Tribunal, (2002) 1 SCC 33, in para 38 the Supreme Court has held as under:

57. Further the expression “aggrieved person” has come up for consideration before the Supreme Court on many occasions wherein the Supreme Court has held, aggrieved person would mean who has suffered legal injury. In this regard reference can be made to its opinion in Babua Ram v. State of U.P., (1995) 2 SCC 689 wherein, in paragraph 17, it observed as under:

60. In a recent pronouncement the Supreme Court in Ayaaubkhan Noorkhan Pathan v. State of Maharashtra, (2013) 4 SCC 465, while dealing with the expression “person aggrieved” in paragraph 9 observed thus:

61. The Supreme Court in M.S. Jayaraj v. Commissioner of Excise, Kerala, (2000) 7 SCC 552, examined the issue of “locus standi” and held that the person should be asked to disclose the legal injury suffered by him and if he cannot, then, obviously, the person has no locus standi to file a writ petition under Article 226 of the Constitution of India.”

39. Reference to a recent judgment of the High Court of Karnataka deciding a batch of writ appeals being W.A. No.2872/2013 and others on 26.02.2021 titled Syndicate Bank v. M/s Manyatha Residents Association, represented by its Secretary and others, would be relevant and useful. One of the writ petitions was filed before the learned Single Judge by an Association registered under the Karnataka Societies Registration Act, 1961, comprising of owners of houses or sites in the residential layout, formed by the promoters in about 82 acres of land and the other writ petitions were by individual Petitioners. Objection was taken by the Respondent with respect to the locus standi of the Petitioner to challenge the allotment made in favour of the Respondent, which was decided in favour of the writ Petitioners. This judgment was challenged before the Division Bench. The stand of the State can be captured in paragraph 37, which is as follows:

40. Dealing with the objection of locus standi, the Karnataka High Court observed that the writ petition was not in the nature of Public Interest Litigation and it was not the case of the Association that members of the said Association were site owners. Dealing with Article 226 of the Constitution, the Karnataka High Court observed as under:

38. To distinguish such applicants from ‘strangers’, among them, some board tests may be deduced from the conspectus made above. These tests are not absolute and ultimate. Their efficacy varies according to the circumstances of the case, including the statutory context in which the matter falls to be considered. These are: Whether the applicant is a person whose legal right has been infringed? Has he suffered a legal wrong or injury, in the sense, that his interest, recognized by law, has been prejudicially and directly affected by the act or omission of the authority, complained of? Is he a person who has suffered a legal grievance, a person “against whom a decision has been pronounced which has wrongfully deprived him of something or wrongfully refused him something or wrongfully affected his title to something? Has he a special and substantial grievance of his own beyond some grievance or inconvenience suffered by him in common with the rest of the public? Was he entitled to object and be heard by the authority before it took the impugned action? If so, was he prejudicially affected in the exercise of that right by the act of usurpation of jurisdiction on the part of the authority? Is the statute, in the context of which the scope of the words “person aggrieved” is being considered, a social welfare measure designed to lay down ethical or professional standards of conduct for the community? Or is it a statute dealing with private rights of particular individuals?

39. Now let us apply these tests to the case in hand. The Act and the Rules to which we are concerned, are not designed to set norms of moral or professional conduct for the community at large or even a section thereof. They only regulate the exercise of private rights of an individual to carry on a particular business on his property. In this context, “person aggrieved” must receive a strict construction.

40. Did the appellant have a legal right under the statutory provisions or under the general law which has been subjected to or threatened with injury? The answer in the circumstances of the case must necessarily be in the negative. 41. The Act and the Rules do not confer any substantive justiciable right on a rival in cinema trade, apart from the option, in common with the rest of the public, to lodge an objection in response to the notice published under Rule 4. The appellants did not avail of this option. He did not lodge any objection in response to the notice, the due publication of which was not denied. No explanation has been given as to why he did not prefer any objection to the grant of the No-Objection-Certificate before the District Magistrate or the Government. Even if he had objected before the District Magistrate, and failed, the Act would not give him a right of appeal. Section 8A of the Act confers a right of appeal to the State Government, only on any person aggrieved by an order of a licensing authority refusing to grant a license, or revoking or suspending any license under Section 8. Obviously, the appellant was not a “person aggrieved” within the contemplation of Section 8A.” (underlining by us) Thus, a person who is not aggrieved by any discrimination complained of, cannot maintain a writ petition. [D.Nagaraja vs. State of Karnataka, AIR 1977 SC 876] (D.Nagaraja).

47. It is further observed that in India, there are four categories of persons for locus standi: first category is individual standing; second category is statutory standing or in other words, when statute has provided standing to a person or a class of persons and on the strength of the standing conferred by the statute, one may move the Court; third category is public interest litigation; fourth category of locus standi is representative action or class action.

48. The principle of standing or locus standi in all public interest litigation if applied to individual standing, it would result in destroying the time-tested concept of "standing" which has authority in India from the Anglo Saxon Jurisprudence as well as American Law Jurisprudence. This means that, the requirement of injury is a test to be applied for having locus standi to file a petition under Article 226 of Constitution unless it is a public interest litigation. Thus, there is a need to regulate in the context of individual standing and a careful consideration of the case must be made in order to examine and appreciate as to whether the person is aggrieved. Such an examination is required in order to avoid frivolous litigation being flooded to the High Court, thereby driving away genuine litigations.

49. However, over a period of time, there may have been a lowering of the barrier imposed by the standing requirement or taking a liberal approach in the matter. But, it is necessary to follow certain principles having regard to the law. Thus, the doors of the court could be made open at the instance of the persons or authorities under certain categories and every other person cannot move a writ petition challenging actions of the State Government or its authorities when not individually or personally aggrieved, unless it is in the nature of public interest litigation. Otherwise, the doctrine of locus standi or a standing requirement would be rendered meaningless and thereby introduce a procedure which is not judicially recognised.

50. However, the above must be contrasted to public interest litigation. In case of a public interest litigation, the person or an authority concerned who move such a petition is not enforcing his/its personal or legal right. Such a litigation is filed by public spirited persons to espouse the cause of large number of people who are suffering under some legal wrong or injury or such person or determinate class of persons is by reason of poverty, helplessness or disability, or social, economical, disadvantaged position, unable to approach the Court for relief and in such case, any number of the public can file a writ petition for securing justice to them. In this context also, it has been observed that the Court should not be indirectly used as an instrumentality by anyone to attain or obtain any beneficial achievement, which one cannot get through normal legal process. If anyone approaches the Court with ulterior motive, design to wrench some personal benefit by putting another within the clutches of law and using the Court as a device only for that end, but not to get any legal remedy, then in such a situation the Court should heavily come upon such a person and see that the authority of Court is not misused. [Sampat Singh vs. State of Haryana, (1993) 1 SCC 561, (Sampat Singh)]. Thus, only a person acting bona fide and having sufficient interest in the proceeding of public interest litigation alone have locus standi and can approach the Court for the poor and needy. But, a person for personal gain or private profit or political motive or in oblique consideration has no locus standi. Similarly, a vexatious petition in the guise of a public interest litigation brought before the Court for vindicating any personal grievance deserves rejection on the threshold. The Court should not allow its process to be abused by mere busy bodies, meddlesome interlopers, wayfarers or officious interveners having absolutely no public interest except for personal gain or private profit either for themselves or as proxy of others or for any other extraneous motivations or for glare of publicity. [Janata Dal vs. H.S.Chowdhary (1992) 4 SCC 305, (Janata Dal)]. xxxx xxxx xxxx

53. But, in India, such statutory provision is absent. In fact, the "person aggrieved" concept is the foundation for a writ petition being filed in a personal or individual capacity. That means a person who has suffered legal grievance who has right under a statute and he would thus be a person aggrieved. xxxx xxxx xxxx

69. In paragraph 35, per Sahai, J., it was further observed that locus standi to approach by way of writ petition and refusal to grant relief in equity jurisdiction are two different aspects, may be with same result. One, relates to maintainability of the petition and the other, to exercise of discretion. The restricted meaning of aggrieved person and narrow outlook of specific injury had yielded in favour of broad and wide construction in the wake of public interest litigation. Even in a private challenge to executive or administrative action having extensive fall out, the dividing line between personal injury or loss and injury of a public nature is fast vanishing. According to Sahai J., it was too late in the day, therefore, to claim that petition filed by inhabitants of a locality whose park was converted into a nursing home had no cause to invoke the equity jurisdiction of the High Court. The residents of locality seeking protection and maintenance of environment of their locality cannot be said to be busybodies or interlopers. That when there was cause of action either for the individual or community in general to approach by way of writ petition, the authorities cannot be permitted to seek shelter under cover of technicalities of locus standi nor can they be heard to plead for restraint in exercise of discretion, as grave issues of public concern would outweigh such considerations. Discussing on the importance of public parks and playgrounds in a locality and holding that exercise of power by the State Government was vitiated and ultra vires as the Government could not convert the site reserved for public parks to a civic amenity site and to allot it for private nursing home i.e., to the Medical Trust and the Resolution of the BDA in compliance of it, being null and void and without jurisdiction, the appeal of the Medical Trust was dismissed.”

41. Examining the facts of the present case, in light of the ratio of aforementioned judgments, the only conclusion that can be drawn is that Petitioner has no locus standi to file the present petition seeking a writ of certiorari as Petitioner had been unable to demonstrate that any legal right of the Petitioner has been violated and/or it has suffered a legal injury. In Black’s Law Dictionary, Sixth Edn. ‘aggrieved’ has been defined to mean “having suffered loss or injury; damnified; injured”. ‘Aggrieved person’ has been defined to mean: “one whose legal right is invaded by an act complained of or whose pecuniary interest is directly and adversely affected by a decree or judgment……. The word ‘aggrieved’ refers to a substantial grievance, a denial of some personal, pecuniary or property right or the imposition upon a party of a burden or obligation”. Quite clearly none of these parameters are met by the Petitioner in the present petition.

42. It is the case of the Petitioner in response to the objection of locus standi that Petitioner is a premiere institute actively functioning in the field of town and country planning for 70 years and has made contribution in starting four schools of Planning and Architecture in country. Reliance is also placed on a Memorandum of Understanding entered into between the Petitioner and AICTE in 1996. Insofar as the MoU is concerned, a bare perusal of the same, which is filed on record would indicate that it had a life span of three years and expired in 1999 and it is not the case of the Petitioner that it was renewed and/or any fresh MoU was entered into between the parties. The mere fact that Petitioner is actively functioning in the field of town and planning is not the same thing as saying that it has suffered any legal injury on account of the composition of the Board, quashing of which is sought in the present writ petition. No right of the institute is alleged to have been violated or infringed entitling the Petitioner to issuance of a writ of certiorari. Therefore, in view of the judgments referred to above, this Court cannot agree with the Petitioner that it has locus standi to seek a certiorari quashing the impugned Notification dated 03.01.2020 issued by AICTE.

43. Reliance on R. Gandhi, President, Madras Bar Association (supra), by the Petitioner is misplaced as the Supreme Court in the said judgment was considering dilution of expertise of Administrative/ Technical Members of the Tribunals which were deciding disputes between or amongst parties whose rights or liabilities were to be decided by the Tribunals which had all the trappings of Court of law. In the present case, the Board is rather a transient entity, the role of which is not at all adjudicatory. Therefore, the ratio in R. Gandhi, President, Madras Bar Association (supra) cannot be applied in the present case. The reliance on Ramesh Chandra Agrawal (supra), is of no help to the Petitioner since the issue therein was about the expert opinion for the purpose of adjudicating a lis by a judicial body. The judgment would also not inure to the benefit of the Petitioner as the same is in context of a particular fact situation and the Board’s role in the present case is entirely different from that of an adjudicating body. Reliance on the judgment on Suvina B. Redkar (supra) also does not aid the Petitioner as the two Boards referred in the judgment and the present case need to be seen in their own perspective. The difference in role of the Board in the said judgment is evident from paragraph 67 of the judgment which is being reproduced below for ready reference:-

44. A perusal of the paragraph quoted above shows that the Board constituted therein had a permanent character which had a direct role in shaping the town, cities and their development. On the other hand, the functions of the Board in the present context are advisory in nature, as mentioned in Regulation 6 of 1995 Regulations. Importantly, the Board in the Scheme of Town Planning and Development is a transient Board, the currency of which is three years and is constituted periodically, keeping in view its functions to take care of emerging areas and keeping in pace with time and advancement in technology as well as ever changing needs of urban areas.

AICTE in its own wisdom with its expertise has nominated the members of the Board and this Court finds no reason to interfere.

45. For all the aforesaid reasons, the writ petition along with pending applications, is hereby dismissed.