Arun Sood v. Hardit Kaur & Ors.

6.2. He states that a perusal of the sale deed dated 31.03.2022 shows that Respondent Nos. 1 and 2 had entered into an agreement for sale of the tenantedpremises as early as on 07.10.2021, however, thesaid fact was not disclosed to theTrialCourt,which misled intopassingtheimpugned eviction order. He states that Respondent Nos. 1 and 2 have thus obtained the impugned eviction order by withholding material facts.

6.3. He states that Respondent Nos. 1 and 2 in the eviction petition have duly admitted that the Petitioner herein is a tenant in the tenanted premises and therefore, no reliancecan be placed on thepleadings andthejudgement of the Civil Judge in the suit for permanent injunction filed by Respondent Nos. 3 and 4 with respect to the status of physical possession.

6.4. He states admittedlyPetitionerherein has not executed anydocument of handing over/surrendering the possession of the tenanted premises in favour ofthe RespondentNos. 1-2 or 5-6. He statesthatRespondentNos. 5 and 6 i.e., the subsequent purchasers are disentitled from taking possession of thetenantedpremises for a period offive(5) years as perSection 14(6)of the DRC Act.

6.5. He statesthatthough the subject propertyis in a dilapidated condition, it can be repairedand made habitable;and thePetitioner herein is willing to restore the property by repairing it. He states in any event, the eviction petitionwas notfiled under Section 14(1)(f)or Section 14(1)(g)of the DRC Act and therefore, the facts that the property is currently in a dilapidated condition and incapable of habitation, is of no effect.

6.6. He states that Section 19 of the DRC Act is not attracted since the possession of the premises continues with the Petitioner and in this regard, he relies upon the judgement passed by the Coordinate Bench of this Court titled as Kuldeep Singh v. Sanjay Aggarwal; 2018 SCC Online Del 8562. He relies upon thecontinuing existenceoftheelectric meter, standingin the name of Respondent No. 4 at the tenanted premises and the payment of the monthly charge of Rs. 320/- per month by the said Respondent No. 3, as a proof of the continuing physical possession of the Petitioner.

6.7. He statesthata civil suit no. 1776/2022 was filed in theyear 2022 by Respondent Nos. 5 and 6 against Municipal Corporation of Delhi (‘MCD’) seekingpermissiontoreconstructthesubject property. Hestates that thesaid civil suit was unconditionally withdrawn by the said Respondents and therefore, they are estopped from raising the said pleas. Arguments of Respondent 3 and 4

7. No oral submissions were addressed on behalf of Respondent Nos. 3 and 4, however, written submissions have been filed by Respondent Nos. 3 and 4 on 20.03.2023, which have been verbatim copied by the Petitioner in his written submissions filed on 21.03.2023. The material stand taken by Respondent Nos. 3 and 4 in the written submissions is as follows: -

7.1. Respondent No. 3 admits the joint possession of Petitioner in the tenanted premises.

7.2. RespondentNo. 3 denies handingover/surrenderingthepossessionto Respondent Nos. 5 and 6. It is stated that Respondent Nos. 3 and 4 are regularly paying the bill for the electricity meter installed in the tenanted premises, standing in the name of Respondent No. 4, till date. Findings and analysis

8. This Court has perused the paper-book and considered the submissions of learned counsel for the parties.

9. Thesum and substanceofthechallengeraised in this revisionpetition to the assail the impugned eviction order is based upon the singular fact of thesubsequentsaleofthe tenanted premises by RespondentNos. 1 and 2 on 31.03.2022 in favour of Respondent Nos. 5 and 6, which has come to the knowledgeof the Petitionerin April, 2022 when hefiled a police complaint alleging dispossession from the tenanted premises on 04.04.2022.

9.1. It is averred in this revision petition thattheintent to sell thetenanted premises was withheld from the Trial Court during the pendency of the eviction petition and therefore, the eviction order has been obtained by suppression of material facts. It is stated that the Respondent Nos. 1 and 2 agreed to sell the tenanted premises as early as 07.10.2021, when part sale consideration was received by them.

9.2. There is no challenge raised to the findings in the impugned eviction order on the ground that any ‘error’has been committed by the TrialCourt, which is apparent on the face of the record or there has been any ‘error’ in the decision-making process or there has been an ‘error’ in the procedural compliance by the said Court. There is no averment in the revision petition that the eviction order of the Trial Court does not confirm to law or the finding of the fact is given on wrong premise of law.

9.3. In fact, the groundsstatethatRespondentNos. 1 and 2 playeda fraud on theTrialCourtby withholding theagreementtosellthetenantedpremises to Respondent Nos. 5 and 6.

9.4. In theopinion ofthisCourt, thegroundsonwhichthis revision petition has been filed arenot maintainablefor assailingtheimpugnedevictionorder; as thesaid grounds do not fall within thescopeof the provisoto Section 25 (B)(8) of the DRC Act. The grounds, which are raised in this revision petition are statutorily recognised as grounds for maintaining a substantive petition under Section 19 of the DRC Act, which provision reads as under: -

10.2. The status report filed on behalf of MCD in terms of order dated 29.07.2022passed in Suit No. 1776/2022, titled as ShaliniArora & Anr. v. MCD, records thatan inspection ofthetenantedpremises wasfacilitated by Respondent Nos. 5 and 6. The report of MCD reads as under:- “STATUS REPORT REGARDING PROPERTY BEARING NO. 777 IN WARD NO. 1 (AS KNOWN AS 1/777)

NICHOLSON ROAD KASHMERE GATE, DELHI-110006 ON BEHALF OF DEFENDANT/MCD

RESPECTFULLY SHOWETH: It is submitted that in compliance of order dated 29.07.2022, the property bearing no. 777 in ward no. 1 (As known as 1/777) Nicholson Road Kashmere Gate, Delhi-06 was inspected on 08.08.2022 in the presence of plaintiffs and their Advocate-Mohd. Raziq. The plaintiffs have provided coloured photographs and site plan of the suit property in question as directed. During inspection on 08.08.2022, it was noticed that the property comprises of ground floor only which is lying abandoned and it seems that the property has not been repaired since long time. Upon inspection, it was noticed that halls/ rooms inside the property needs immediate repairs. Whereas the tin sheds at front portion and rear portion are in dangerous condition of the suit property and need to be removed/replaced. The entire boundary wall appears to be dangerous and need immediate repair to strengthen the same as per UBBL-2016. During inspection photographs of the property were taken from different angles which are annexed herewith. Report is submitted please. (Sanjay Kumar) (K.K. Kaushik) Assistant Engineer (Bldg.) Junior Engineer (Bldg.) City SP Zone, MCD City SP Zone, MCD”

10.3. The police reportrecordsthattheRespondentNos. 5 and 6 havealso deployed security guards at the tenanted premises, who are regulating the control over the tenanted premises.

10.4. The letter dated 21.10.2022 issued by GST Division, confirming that they have visited the tenanted premises for verification of existence of exporter firm M/s CSKN Trading Co. and found that the said firm exists at the given address. It is a matter of record that Respondent No. 5 is the proprietor of M/s CSKN Trading Co. The relevant text of the letter dated 21.10.2022 reads as under:- “Please refer to your office letter C.No. VIII(SB)10/Cus. Prev/Group- III/1722/2022/18087 dated 04.10.2022 on the subject cited above.

2. In this regard, it is to inform that no refund application has been filed by the Exporter M/s CSKN TRADING CO. regarding above said Shipping bills, further it is also submitted that the Physical verification of business premises of the Exporter M/s CSKN TRADING CO. (IE CODE AFRPA0422N), Plot no. 777 Kashmere Gate, 777, Nicholson Road, New Delhi, Central Delhi, Delhi, 110006 (GSTIN 07AFRPA0422NIZH) has been conducted and the firm is found existent at the given address. Copy of Physical Verification Report (Form REG-30) is enclosed. This is for information and necessary action at your end.”

10.5. The Respondent Nos. 5 and 6 have taken steps to have an electric meter installed in the premises and are bearing the cost of the electricity drawn from said electric meter. The monthly invoice placed on record for the said meter shows a high monthly consumption of electricity.

10.6. Each of the aforesaid facts and documents show that the physical possessionofthetenanted premises is presently withRespondent Nos. 5 and 6 and the tenanted premises are under their control and lock & key. Respondent No. 3’s categorical denial of Petitioner’s physical possession of the tenanted premises

11. It is a matterofjudicialrecordthatRespondentNo. 3 hascategorically denied that Petitioner has ever been in physical possession of the tenanted premises. On 21.04.2008, Respondent No. 3 had filed a suit for perpetual injunction (Suit No. 184/2007) against Respondent Nos. 1 and 2 herein. In thesaid suit, RespondentNo. 3 hadcategoricallyasserted that after thedeath of lateSh. C.P. Sood i.e., thefather ofthePetitioner herein, RespondentNo. 3 has been in exclusive possession of the tenanted premises. The relevant extract of the plaint reads as under: - “1. That M/s Scientific Equipment Works, a partnership firm, constituted of the plaintiff and his elder brother Shri C.P. Sood had occupied the ground floor of property No. 1/777, Nicholson Road, Kashmere Gate, Delhi as along red in the annexed plan as a tenant of Shri Anwar Khan S/o Shri Mehboob Khan in May 1955. Later on, 73 //True Typed Copy// the property was purchased by the defendants and the said firm became the tenant under the defendants.

2. That the plaintiff and his brother were joint tenants in the aforesaid property as partners of M/s Scientific Equipment Works.

3. That Shri C.P. Sood died on 22.01.1994 and the plaintiff came into exclusive possession of the aforesaid premises and became the tenant under the defendants.”

11.1. In the said civil suit, the Petitioner herein had filed an application seeking impleadment; however, the said application was opposed vehemently by Respondent No. 3 and he categorically stated that the Petitioner is not in possessionofany partofthe premises. Theextract ofthe reply of Respondent No. 3 reads as under: - “3. it is submitted that the Plaintiff is in exclusive possession of the premises in dispute and the applicant is not in possession of any part of the premises in dispute.”

11.2. In the said civil suit, a final judgment dated 05.10.2013 was passed relying upon theassertionsmadeby RespondentNo. 3 in the plaintand the relief for perpetual injunction was granted in favour of Respondent No. 3 herein and against Respondent Nos. 1 and 2 restraining the landlords from dispossessing Respondent No. 3 from the tenanted premises. The relevant portion of the judgement reads as under: - “2. Brief stated relevant facts of the case as per the plaintiff are that M/s. Scientific Equipment Words, a partnership firm, constituted of the Plaintiff and his elder brother shri CP. Sood had occupied the ground floor of property No. 1777, Nicholson Road, Kashmere Gate, Delhi as shown ___to the annexed plan as a tenant of Shri Anwar Khan S/o Shri Mehboob Khan in May

1955. Later on, the property was purchased by the defendants and the said firm became the tenant under the defendants. The plaintiff and his brother were joint tenants in the aforesaid property as partners of M/s Scientific Equipment Works. Shri C.P. Sood died on 22.1.1994 and the plaintiff came into exclusive possession of the aforesaid premises and become the tenant under the defendants. It is further submitted that the last agreed rate of rent was Rs. 305/ per month. The Plaintiff had been tendering the rent to the defendants by money orders but the defendants refused to accept the money orders with the result that the defendants have not accepted the rent from the plaintiff for the last more than twelve years. The defendant No. 2 alongwith 3-4 persons come to the aforesaid premises on 26.3.2007 and called upon the plaintiff to hand over actual and physical possession of the property to the defendants as the defendants intend to sell the said property with vacant possession. The plaintiff refused to vacate the premises as he was the tenant in the said premises and the defendants had no right to call upon him to vacate the premises. At that juncture the defendant no. 2 left the spot alongwith his associates after extending a threat that they will take possession of the premises at any time in odd hours after breaking open the looks of the plaintiff and after removing the entire stocks of the plaintiff. It is further submitted that the defendants have no right to take forcible and illegal possession of the premises from the plaintiff during the continuance of the tenancy of the plaintiff. Hence the present suit is filed by the plaintiff.”

XXX XXX XXX “9. In view of the foregoing discussion, the plaintiff is entitled to the relief of perpetual injunction prayed for accordingly a decree of perpetual injunction is passed in favour of the plaintiff and against the defendants and the defendants are restrained from forcibly and illegally dispossessing the plaintiff form the property bearing no. 1/777, Nicholson Road, Kashmere gate, Delhi as shown in red colour in the site plan. Costs of the suit is also awarded to the plaintiff. Decree sheet be prepared accordingly. File be consigned to the record room after due compliance.”

11.3. The application filed by thePetitioner seekinghis impleadmentin the aforesaidsuit for perpetualinjunction filed by RespondentNo. 3 herein, was taken up for hearingon 03.07.2007,28.07.2007, 08.10.2009and 29.04.2013. The Petitioner failed to pursue his application despite opportunities and therefore, the said application was dismissed in default on 29.04.2013. The order dated28.07.2007, which waspassed in thepresenceof thecounselfor the Petitioner is relevant and reads as under:- “Written Statement filed along with reply to the interim application. Copy supplied. Ld. Counsel for the defendant submit that as per the knowledge of defendant a firm is in possession of the suit property as tenant on the other hand, Ld. Counsel for plaintiff submits that the plaintiff alone is in the exclusive possession of the suit property as tenant. An application under order 1 rule 10 CPC has been moved by one Sh. Arun Sood who is the son of the brother of the plaintiff and claim to be a partner of the said firm which is stated to have been dissolved. In the fact and circumstance one thing which emerges out is clear that the plaintiff is in possession of the suit property. In the circumstance interim application stands disposed of with a direction to the defendants not to dispossess the plaintiff forcible and illegally from the ground floor of property bearing No. 1/777, Nicholson Road, Kashmere Gate, Delhi till further orders. The above direction has been made without deciding the application under order 1 rule 10 CPC. By way of application under order 1 rule 10 CPC the applicant claims to be in co-possession of the suit property. Ld. Counsel for the plaintiff prays for the appointments of Local Commissioner to ascertain the factual position. At this stage I deem it neither necessary nor proper to issue such direction. The application is directed to supply copy of the application under order 1 rule 10 CPC to the Ld. Counsel for defendants today itself. To come up for arguments on application under order 1 rule 10 CPC on 16/10/07.”

11.4. The subsequent order dated 29.04.2013, dismissing the impleadment application, reads as under:- “It is 4.30 PM now, none has appeared on behalf of the application on the last date of hearing last opportunity was given to the applicant for arguing on the application under order 1 rule 10 CPC today. Considering that despite repeated called none has appeared on behalf of the applicant, application under order 1 rule 10 CPC is dismissed for none prosecution as well as for in default Put up on 22.05.2013 for arguments on application under order 39 rule 1&2 CPC as well as for framing of issues.”

11.5. The aforesaid judicial record of Suit no. 184/2007 shows that RespondentNo. 3 hadcategoricallyasserted that heis in physicalpossession of the tenanted premises to the exclusion of the Petitioner herein. In the eviction proceedings, the Respondent No. 3 in his affidavit filed alongwith application seeking leave to defend dated 23.12.2019 has categorically placed relianceupontherecord oftheaforesaid suitfor perpetualinjunction at paragraph 7 and affirmed the same.

11.6. The plea now taken by RespondentNo. 3 thatthePetitioner is in joint possession of the tenanted premises along with Respondent No. 3 is therefore, contrary to the judicial record and the stand taken in the leave to defend filed in the eviction proceedings. Thesaid submission ofRespondent No. 3 is false and withoutanymerit. In this regard, it wouldbeinstructiveto refer to thejudgmentoftheSupremeCourtin AmarSingh v. UnionofIndia, (2011) 7 SCC 69. The relevant extract of the judgment read as under: - “50. This Court wants to make it clear that an action at law is not a game of chess. A litigant who comes to Court and invokes its writ jurisdiction must come with clean hands. He cannot prevaricate and take inconsistent positions.” A similar view was taken in Joint Action Committee of Air Line Pilots’ Assn. of India v. DG of Civil Aviation, (2011)5 SCC 435, which reads as under: -

12. Respondent Nos. 5 and 6 have stated that the physical possession of the tenanted premise was handed over to them on 12.03.2022 by Mr. AmitabhSood,thesonofRespondentNo.3 for andon behalfofRespondent No. 3, who is himself 94 years old.

12.1. In the affidavit filed with applicationfor leaveto defend, Respondent No. 3 had categorically asserted that he is using the tenanted premises as a godown. The relevant portion of the affidavit reads as under: -

13. Respondent No. 3 has not filed an independent revision petition assailing the eviction order. Respondent No. 3 entered appearance in the present proceedings on 28.07.2022, when he filed a short affidavit supporting the claims of the Petitioner. However, in this affidavit, the RespondentNo. 3 has raised no plea thathis materialor goods are presently lyingstored atthegodownin thetenanted premises,as a proofofhis physical possession.

13.1. Respondent No. 3 has not disputed the contents of the report of the SHO, PS KashmiriGatenor thestatus reportfiled by theMCD,which shows RespondentNos.[5] and 6 in controlandfullaccess of the tenanted premises.

13.2. In thesefacts, it is evident that RespondentNo. 3 vacatedthegodown, removed his articles, if any, after passing of the impugned eviction order. This lends force to the assertion of Respondent Nos. 1, 2, 5 and 6 that Respondent No. 3 handed over the physical possession as contended by Respondent Nos. 1, 2, 5 and 6.

13.3. In thewritten submissions, RespondentNo.3has onlyplaced reliance on the fact that an electric meter standing in the name of Respondent No. 4 continues toremaininstalled atthetenantedpremises, which generates fixed chargeofRs. 320/-per monthandis beingpaidby Respondent No. 3 toshow his physical possession. The meagre amount of Rs. 320/- evidences that no electricity is being drawn from the said electric meter.

13.4. The presence of the said electric meter even after Respondent No. 3 has handed overpossessionis naturalin thecourseofthings, consideringthe fact that Respondent No. 3 in past was in possession; however, it does not evidence Respondent No. 3’s continuingphysicalpossession and useof the tenanted premises. The existence of the electric meter does not prove or indicateactualphysicalpossessionofthetenantedpremises as on thedateof filing of this revision petition. Petitioner is not in physical possession of the tenanted premises

14. ThePetitioner hasrelied upon theaverments madeby thelandlords in theeviction petition, wherein,RespondentNos.[1] and 2 haveacknowledged the Petitioner as a tenant in common with Respondent No. 3. He states that in view of the said acknowledgement, the Petitioner’s possession of the tenantedpremises standsadmitted.Hestates thatsincethePetitioner hasnot surrenderedthepossession of thetenanted premises to theRespondentNos. 1-2 or 5-6, the possession has not been lawfully recovered by the said Respondents.

15. This Court has already extracted above facts which evidence that the Petitioner was never in physical possession of the tenanted premises. This was also the stand of Respondent No. 3 consistently in the judicial record that Petitioner has never been in possession of the tenanted premises.

16. The Petitioner has not placed on record any document which would substantiate his plea that he was/is in physical possession of the tenanted premises. As noted above, he has merely relied upon the electricity bills standing in the name of Respondent No. 4, which bills are paid by Respondent No. 3. The said bills and payment thereof do not prove the physical possession of the Petitioner herein.

17. In the opinion of this Court, the effect of the averments made by the landlords in the eviction petition is thatthePetitioner herein was entitled to possessionofthetenanted premises beingthesonoflateSh. C.P. Sood upon his demise. However, the record of civil suit no. 184/2007 records that the Petitioner wasnever permitted to occupyandobtain the physicalpossession by Respondent No. 3 i.e., Mr. P. N. Sood.

18. Thefact thatthePetitioneris notin physicalpossession ofthetenanted premisesassumessignificance on theissueofmaintainabilityofthis revision petition;especially in view ofthefact that in contrast RespondentNos. 5 and 6 are in actual physical possession of the tenanted premises, as on date of filing of this revision petition.

19. Theassertionmadeby thePetitionerin thelist of dates (in thepresent revision petition)and beforethisCourtduringtheproceeding on 26.04.2022 to the effect that he has the lock-keys to the tenanted premises are false to his knowledge and are not borne out from the record. The said averment of physicalpossessionhas been madeby thePetitionerto maintain therevision petition; as he as well is aware that this is the essential requirement for maintaining this revision petition.

20. The significance of physicalpossession is well recognised in Section 25 of the DRC Act. The said provision contemplates that the landlord is entitled to vacant possession ofthepremises, afterthe‘interest’ ofthetenant has been determined. Section 25 of the DRC Act reads as under: -

25. Vacant possession to landlord - “Notwithstanding anything contained in any other law, where the interest of a tenant in any premises is determined for any reason whatsoever and any order is made by the Controller under this Act for the recovery of possession of such premises the order shall, subject to the provisions of section 18, be binding on all persons who may be in occupation of the premises and vacant possession thereof shall be given to the landlord by evicting all such person therefrom: Provided that nothing in this section shall apply to any persons who has an independent title to such premises.” In the facts of the present case, the ‘interest’, if any, of the Petitioner in the tenantedpremises was determined i.e., it came to an end with thepassingof the eviction order dated 23.10.2021. The Petitioner was not in physical possession even prior to 23.10.2021. By filing this revision petition the Petitioner is infact seekinga relief, which will havetheeffect of puttinghim in physical possession of the tenanted premises for the first time ever. The relief of possession sought by the Petitioner in this revision petition cannot be granted in the facts of this case. The statute requires handing over of the vacant possession to the landlord i.e., the physical possession after passing of the eviction order. Therefore, the tenant who has physical possession of the tenanted premises has to hand-overthesame to the landlord under thestatute. This distinction between handover ofphysicalpossessionand surrender ofinterest has been succinctly explained by the Division Bench of this Court in Vidyawanti v. Taken Dass, 1973 SCC OnLine Del 18, which reads as under: “Section 25 is divided into two parts. The substantive part of the section describes the persons on whom the order for the recovery of possession of the premises is binding and who are, therefore liable to be evicted in execution of this order. These are “all persons who may be in occupation of the premises” The word “occupation” is neutral. It only signifies the physical occupation of the premises. It does not indicate or imply any interest in or title to the promises or C the lack of it in the occupant. It seems to be used in contradistinction with the words “where the interest of a tenant in any premises is determined.” The interest in the premises had been of the tenant and that has been determined. The implication is that such an interest is not possessed by the persons in occupation Similarly, the words “vacant possession thereof shall be given to the landlord by evicting all such persons therefrom” also show that the landlord is entitled to possession because of the termination of the interest of the tenant. The occupants were not in legal possession of the premises and they have, therefore, to be evicted, The word “occupation” does not, therefore, apparently amount to legal possession of the premises. Since the order for possession is binding only on the tenant whose interest has been determined and against whom it has been passed it follows that it is not binding on a person who claims a title to the premises independent of the tenant.”

21. A tenant who has handed over physical possession as per Section 25 of the DRC Act cannot maintain a revision petition on account of a subsequent sale by the landlord during the statutory period; but he can maintain a petition under Section 19 of the DRC Act before the Rent Controller for the relief of restitution of physical possession.

22. In the facts of this case, uponpassingof the impugned eviction order, the ‘interest’ ofthePetitioner in the tenanted premises came to an end. The Petitioner asrecorded abovewasnever in physicalpossession ofthetenanted premises. The Respondent Nos. 1-2 and 5-6 obtained the vacant possession of the tenanted premises from Respondent No. 3 as per the mandate of Section 25 of the DRC Act. ThePetitioner herein is thereforenot entitled to maintainthis revision petition and in garb thereofseek physicalpossession, which he never had.

23. In thejudgment of Kuldeep Singhv. Sanjay Aggarwal(supra), relied upon by the Petitioner, there was no dispute that the tenant remained and continued in physical possession of the tenanted premises even after the eviction order dated 05.11.2015 was passed therein. However, during the pendency of the revision petition, the landlord had sold the property on 24.05.2016toa third-party. It wasin thesecircumstances that theCoordinate Bench of this Court in the facts of that case after taking note of Section 19 of the DRC Act held as under:-

1. This revision petition is filed by the petitioner/tenant under Section 25B (8) of the Delhi Rent Control Act, 1958 (hereinafter referred to as the ‘DRC Act’) seeking to impugn the eviction order dated 05.11.2015 passed by the court of Rent Controller.

2. The landlord/respondent let out the property i.e. a shop part of Khasra No. 642, Village Chandrawali, Shahdara, Delhi to the petitioner/tenant. The respondent filed an eviction petition under section 14(1)(e) of the DRC Act. It was stated in the eviction petition that the premises was required by the respondent bona fide for his wife who is completely dependent on him for the purpose of her livelihood. It was pleaded that the respondent/his wife had no other reasonable or suitable commercial premises available except the said tenanted shop for carrying out her work.

12. Hence, where a landlord acquires any premises by transfer, he cannot move an eviction petition under Section 14(1)(e) of the DRC Act unless a period of 5 years have lapsed from the date of acquisition of the property. Admittedly, the respondent herein has already sold his rights in the property on 24.05.2016 and handed over the rights to a fresh landlord. The new landlord, if he were to file an eviction petition today, the same would not be maintainable under Section 14(6) of the DRC Act. New landlord cannot be permitted to circumvent provisions of Section 14(6) of the DRC Act and take possession of the suit property contrary to the provisions of the DRC Act.

13. There is another factor which persuades me to hold that on account of the subsequent facts which have developed after passing of the eviction order, the plea of the petitioner has to be accepted. I may refer Section 19 of the DRC Act which reads as follows:— “19. Recovery of possession for occupation and re-entry.- (1) Where a landlord recovers possession of any premises from the tenant in pursuance of an order made under clause (e) of the proviso to subsection (1) of section 14 [or under sections 14A, 14B, 14C, 148 and 21, the landlord shall not, except with the permission of the Controller, obtained in the prescribed manner, re-let the whole or any part of the premises within three years from the date of obtaining such possession, and in granting such permission, the Controller may direct the landlord to put such evicted tenant in possession of the premises. (2) Where a landlord recovers possession of any premises as aforesaid and the premises are not occupied by the landlord or by the person for whose benefit the premises are held, within two months of obtaining such possession, or the premises having been so occupied are, at any time within three years from the date of obtaining possession, re-let to any person other than the evicted tenant without obtaining the permission of the Controller under subsection (1) or the possession of such premises is transferred to another person for reasons which do not appear to the Controller to be bona fide, the Controller may, on an application made on him in this behalf by such evicted tenant within such time as may be prescribed, direct the landlord to put the tenant in possession of the premises or to pay him such compensation as the Controller thinks fit.”

15. Hence, where a landlord seeks eviction under Section 14(1)(e) of the DRC Act and thereafter parts with premises within three years from the date of obtaining the possession without permission of the Rent Controller, the Controller may, on an application made on behalf of the evicted tenant, direct the landlord to put the tenant in possession. In the present case the landlord/respondent has already parted with possession of the premises in question without permission of the Rent Controller, even prior to having executed the eviction order. It is manifest that in the eventuality that the landlord was to get possession of the premises, the petitioners/tenant would in law be entitled to approach the Rent Controller seeking back to possession of the tenanted premises.

16. Taking into account the subsequent events, it is manifest that the facts which gave rise to passing of an eviction order by the Rent Controller, no longer exist. Further there is a bar on the new landlord seeking eviction of the premises and DRC Act.

24. However, in the facts of this case, the Petitioner is presently not in physical possession of the tenanted premises. The Petitioner was not in physicalpossessionon thedateoffilingtherevision petition andhis remedy, if any, is therefore, to approach the Rent Controller under Section 19 of the DRC Act for determination of his rights in accordance with law. Infact, as per the record the Petitioner never had physical possession of the tenanted premises.

25. The Trial Court in the eviction order has specifically dealt with the Petitioner’scontentionwith respect to theconsequenceofa potentialsaleof thetenantedpremises bythelandlords after passingoftheeviction orderand within the statutory period; and held as under:- “17. As far as plea of the respondents qua non-starting of the business in the tenanted premises by Sh. Swarndeep and selling the tenanted premises after eviction is concerned, this plea of the respondents is baseless as Section-19 of DRC Act takes care of the tenants if such an act is submitted by the petitioner/landlord. The tenants/respondents can always approach the Rent Controller concerned immediately for redressal of their grievances and re-entry in the tenanted premises.”

26. The effect of the averment of the Petitioner that the Respondent NO. 1-2 possibly entered into an agreement to sell during the pendency of the eviction proceedings would also be dealt with by the Rent Controller if an application under Section 19 of the DRC Act is filed by the Petitioner. However, the present revision petition is not maintainable at the behest of the Petitioner. Maintaining a Section 19 DRC Act petition

27. Thefact that thePetitioneris not in physicalpossession ofthetenanted premisesis significant and has a materialbearingon therelief sought in this revision petition. In the eviction petition filed by Respondent Nos. 1 and 2, the averments made by the landlord at paragraph 9 with respect to the premises lying vacant and unused and the reply of the Petitioner and Respondent No. 3 thereto is significant. The relevant pleadings read as under: - Eviction Petition Reply of Respondent No. 3 in affidavit of leave to defend Reply of Petitioner in affidavit of leave to defend In and around 1955 the premises in suit was let out by the previous/ the then owners/ landlords namely Smt. Rajeshwari Anwar wife of Sh. Anwar Khan and St. Anwar Khan son of Sh Mahboob Khan, to M/s. Scientific Equipment's Works, a partnership firm, consisting of two partners Sh. Parma Nand Sood (P.N.Sood) and Sh. C.P.Sood. Later on one of the above named partners Sh. C.P.Sood, died on 22.01.1994 leaving behind Will dated 30.11.1989, whereby, he bequeathing his tenancy rights qua the suit property in favor his son Arun Sood Accordingly both Mr. Parma Nand Sood and Mr. Arun Sood, being partners of Scientific Equipment's Works Bre tenants in common possessing the premises in suit, though, at present, as stated above, the suit premises is lying locked, vacant, unused in dilapidated condition requiring extensive repairs, as matter of fact That the petitioners have falsely alleged in the petition that the tenanted premises is lying locked and unused for the last more than fifteen years. It is submitted that the tenanted premises are being used by the answering respondent as a godown for the reason that it cannot be used for any commercial activity as it is lying in a dilapidated condition since prior to 1979. The premises in dispute cannot be utilized for commercial purposes as it is lying in a dilapidated condition. Neither the earlier landlord or the present petitioners ever allowed the answering respondents to carry on the repairs to the tenanted premises. A portion of the tenanted premises is lying in a collapsed condition. No response lying abandoned. The respondents have failed to pay the monthly rent for the last more than 25 years. No response That the petitioners have stated wrong that the respondent have not paid and or tendered the rent of the tenanted premises. As a matter of fact it is the petitioner have been refusing to receive the rent. The respondent is ready and willing to pay the legally recoverable rent.

28. The Respondent Nos. 1-2 and 5-6 have also placed on record an Architect’s inspection report dated 01.06.2022 and 12.08.2022, which records that the property is dilapidated, damaged and is in collapsing condition. The Architect’s have declared the building as dangerous and notified that it may causedanger to human life. The photographs,placed on record, evidencethe completestateofdisrepair,which is also evident to the naked eye. The Petitioner has not disputed the photographs and the state of the building seen therein.

29. The aforesaid averments in the pleadings and the report of Architect as well as of MCD evidence that thetenantedpremisesarein completestate of disrepair.

30. The object of the DRC Act as recognised by the Courts is to grant protection to the possession of the tenant, his use of tenanted premises and save him from harassment by the landlord. It is a beneficial legislation for thetenant. Thechecks andbalances envisaged under Section 14(e)read with Section 25 (B) and Section 19, are intended for a tenant, who is actually occupying the tenanted premises and needs to be protected against the avarices of the landlord. In this regard, it would be appropriate to refer the judgment of SupremeCourt in AmarjitSingh vs. SmtKhatoonQuamarain, (1986) 4 SCC 736, wherein the Court highlighting the object of Rent laws, observed as under:

17. …...Rent restriction laws are both beneficial and restrictive, beneficial for those who want protection from eviction and rack renting but restrictive so far as the landlord's right or claim for eviction is concerned. Rent restriction laws would provide a habitat for the landlord or landlady if need be, but not to seek comforts other than habitat — that right the landlord must seek elsewhere.

20. The Act in question has the authority of law. There is no denial of equality nor any arbitrariness in the second limb of Section 14(1)(e) of the Act, read in the manner contended for by the appellant. Article 21 is not violated so far as the landlord is concerned. The rent restricting Acts are beneficial legislations for the protection of the weaker party in the bargains of letting very often. These must be so read that these balance harmoniously the rights of the landlords and the obligations of the tenants. The Rent Restriction Acts deal with the problem of rack renting and shortage of accommodation. It is in consonance with the recognition of the right of both the landlord and the tenant that a harmony is sought to be struck whereby the bona fide requirements of the landlords and the tenants in the expanding explosion of need and population and shortage of accommodation are sought to be harmonised and the conditions imposed to evict a tenant are that the landlord must have bona fide need. That is satisfied in this case. That position is not disputed. The second condition is that landlord should not have in his or her possession any other reasonably suitable accommodation. This does not violate either Article 14 or Article 21 of the Constitution. Further, recently the Supreme Court in Abid-Ul-Islam v. Inder Sain Dua, (2022) 6 SCC 30 observed the object of Section 14(1)(e) vis-a-vis Section 25-B which reads as under:

31. The Petitioner has admittedly never paid any rent for the tenanted premises to Respondent Nos. 1 and 2 and has never actually occupied the said premises. The present petition seeking to invoke this beneficial legislation perfunctorily, in light of the averments made in the eviction petition, is a text book illustration ofthetyrannyunleashed by litigants like the Petitioner herein.

32. The present revision petition is premised solely on account of the subsequent event of the sale of tenanted premises qua the sale deed dated 31.03.2022. It is the statutory mandate that this subsequent event of sale would give rise to a cause of action to the tenant, who is not in physical possession, to file an appropriate application before the Rent Controller under Section 19oftheDRC Act.However,thissubsequentevent wouldnot entitle the tenant to maintain a revision petition. The Petitioner in this case was never in physicalpossessionofthe tenanted premises andtherefore, the Petitioner cannotmaintainthis revisionpetition for seekingpossession. The maintainabilityofthepetition undersection 19 ofDRC Act by a tenant who was never in physical possession will be decided by the Rent Controller, if such a petition is filed by the Petitioner herein.

33. In view of thefindings of this Court thatthePetitionerhas never been in physicalpossessionofthetenantedpremises, thepresent revision petition filed as on 12.04.2022 is not maintainable and is hereby dismissed. All interim orders stand vacated.

34. Pending applications, if any, stand disposed of.

MANMEET PRITAM SINGH ARORA (JUDGE) AUGUST 10, 2023/ms/sk/rhc