Brij Lal v. Union of India

4. DELHI DEVELOPMENT AUTHORITY THROUGH ITS VICE CHAIRMAN VIKAS SADAN, I.N.A. NEW DELHI;.....RESPONDENT NO. 4

5. DELHI METRO RAIL CORPORATION LTD.

THROUGH ITS CHIEF PROJECT MANAGER (AP) METRO BHAWAN, FIRE BRIGADE LANE, BARAKHAMBA ROAD, NEW DELHI-110001.....RESPONDENT NO. 5 Through: Mr. Mukul Singh, Mr. Aryan Dhaka, Ms. Nandini Aggarwal, Advocates for UOI. Mr. Sanjay Kumar Pathak, Standing Counsel for Respondent Nos.[2] & 3 with Mrs. K. Kaomudi Kiran Pathak, Mr. Sunil Kumar Jha, Mr. M.S. Akhtar, and Mr. Divakar Kapil, Advocates for Respondent Nos.[2] & 3 Ms. Mehak Nakra, Ms. Bhavya Nakra, Ms. Gunjan Suyal, Advocate for DDA. Mr. Pushkar Sood, Sr. Penal Counsel with Mr. Samrath Sood, Advocate for R- 5/DMRC. CORAM: HON’BLE MR.

JUSTICE NITIN WASUDEO SAMBRE HON’BLE MR.

JUSTICE ANISH DAYAL JUDGMENT (ORAL)

NITIN WASUDEO SAMBRE, J.

1. The petitioners, who are claiming to be owner of land admeasuring 2 Bigha and 11 Biswa out of Khasra no.15/1/2/1, Village Aali, Tehsil Kalkaji, New Delhi (hereinafter referred to as the ‘suit land’), have approached this Court seeking issuance of appropriate directions, thereby quashing and setting aside the Land Acquisition Award dated 30th December 2013, passed in relation to the aforesaid land by respondent no.3/Land Acquisition Collector. Petitioners have further sought a declaration that in view of petitioners’ continued possession of the land in question and the fact that compensation is still not paid to them, they are entitled to claim lapsing of the acquisition. It is also claimed that they are entitled for the compensation in terms of first proviso to Sub-Section (2) of Section 24 of the Right to Fair Compensation and Transparency in Land Acquisition, Re-habilitation and Re-settlement Act, 2013 (hereinafter referred to as the ‘Act of 2013’).

2. The facts necessary for deciding the present petition are as under: a. The land ad-measuring 2 Bigha and 11 Biswa, details of which are narrated in the foregoing para, is claimed to be owned and possessed by the petitioners since the year 1963. It is claimed that from the aforesaid land, land admeasuring 2 Bigha and 1 Biswa was acquired by the respondents in the year 1986 for public purpose “An Integrated Freight Complex or any other project”. b. The said acquisition has resulted into leaving of 10 Biswa land with the petitioners. It is claimed that the petitioners are in possession of the said land to the extent of 10 Biswa. c. It is claimed that the Delhi Development Authority and Government of NCT of Delhi acquired large chunk of land from the very same village. d. The Sub Divisional Magistrate initiated proceedings under Section 81 of the Delhi Land Reforms Act 1954, on 11th April 1997, against one Smt. Sumitra Devi, thereby asserting that the land referred above i.e. 10 Biswa, be used for agriculture purpose, failing which, same was to be vested in Gram Sabha. e. Smt. Sumitra Devi executed a Will dated 24th March 2009, bequeathing the land to the extent of 10 Biswa referred above, to her husband, namely, Brij Lal and four sons with a declaration that they shall have equal share in the property. f. The respondent no.1 i.e. Union of India issued a notification under Section 4 of the Land Acquisition Act 1894 (hereinafter referred to as ‘Act of 1894’), on 25th November 2009, proposing to acquire the total area of 4533.74 sq. mtrs, which included 10 Biswas land of the petitioners.

3. Being aggrieved, writ petition bearing W.P.(C) No.863 of 2010 came to be preferred by Smt. Sumitra Devi on 28th January 2010, which was disposed of vide order dated 2nd May 2011, with directions to landowners to file objections under Section 5A of Act of 1894.

4. The order dated 2nd May 2011 passed in the writ petition [W.P.

(C) No.863/2010] attained finality before the Hon’ble Apex Court on

5. Consequently, a notification under Section 6 of the Act of 1894, came to be issued on 16th February 2012.

6. It appears that after the death of Smt Sumitra Devi, by virtue of the Will dated 24th March 2009, the land in question stood dwelled upon Brij Lal, who, in turn, filed a second writ petition being W.P.(C) No.3095/2012- Brij Lal & Ors. Vs. Union of India & Ors, questioning the aforesaid notification under Section 6 of the Act of 1894 dated 16th

7. In the said writ petition, a status quo was ordered on 22nd May 2012, which was in relation to the possession.

8. The respondent, as such, has passed an Award being Award No.6 of 2013 on 30th December 2013 under the Act of 1894.

9. Since the said Award was served on the petitioner post the Act of 2013, which came into effect on 1st January 2014, the petitioners, by amending the petition, challenged the said Award dated 30th December 2013. The amendment application was allowed vide order dated 21st August 2014.

10. The Division Bench of this Court, vide reasoned order dated 13th July 2017, dismissed the said petition, which was questioned before the Hon’ble Apex Court in an SLP, which also got dismissed on 9th October 2017.

11. The petitioners, claiming to have right in the land acquired to the extent of 10 Biswa referred above by virtue of Will executed by Smt. Sumitra Devi on 24th March 2009, have approached this Court questioning not only the act of acquisition pursuant to Award dated 30th December 2013, but have also sought the relief consequent to proviso to Sub-Section (2) of Section 24 of the Act of 2013 seeking compensation under the Act of 2013.

12. Learned counsel appearing for the petitioners, in support of the aforesaid prayer, has urged that the land in question to the extent of 10 Biswas referred above, in which they acquired interest by virtue of the Will dated 24th March 2009, was subjected to acquisition vide Award dated 30th December 2013.

13. According to him, the said Award delivered by the Land Acquisition Collector was ante-dated. A fraud is being practiced so as to victimize the petitioners by denying them benefit of fair compensation under the Act of 2013. So also, to substantiate his contention, he would claim that the Award came to be passed when the writ petition being W.P.(C) No.3095/2012 was pending, wherein status quo was ordered on 22nd May 2012.

14. It is claimed that the copy of Award was never placed on record of the above petition by the respondents, whereas same was served upon the petitioners through speed post which the petitioners have brought to the notice of the High Court.

15. According to him, while bringing the Award to the notice of the High Court in W.P.(C) No.3095/2012, the petitioners have reserved their right to question the said Award by specifically raising a plea of victimization and fraud being practiced by the Land Acquisition Collector by ante-dating the said Award so as to deny the benefit of fair compensation to the petitioners under the Act of 2013. So as to substantiate the said contention, he has invited our attention to the order of this Court, wherein the issue as regards amendment to be carried out in the said petition is dealt with and also to the fact that the legality of the Award, pursuant to the alleged fraud being ante-dated, was not looked into and decided by the Court in the said proceedings.

16. He would claim that through the pleadings in the application for Amendment, the liberty was claimed to prefer a fresh petition. As such, this writ petition in spite of dismissal of W.P.(C) No.3095/2012 is very much maintainable.

17. According to him, the possession of the land in question under the Award to the extent of 421.53 sq. mtrs was taken by the respondents on 3rd May 2018 i.e. post filing of (third) this writ petition.

18. In such an eventuality, it is the claim of the petitioners that since neither the compensation is paid, nor the possession was taken by the respondents, as a legal consequence, Sub-Section (2) of Section 24 shall entitle the petitioners either to higher compensation, or for declaration to the effect of lapsing, under the Act of 2013.

19. In the aforesaid background, it is urged that the petition is liable to be allowed by directing that not only the Award delivered on 30th December 2013 is quashed, but also in case, if the land is required by the respondents, the petitioners are entitled for compensation pursuant to proviso to Sub-Section (2) of Section 24 of Act of 2013 by taking recourse to fresh acquisition.

20. As against above, learned counsel appearing for the respondents would urge that the petitioners are repeatedly questioning the acquisition proceedings before this Court and have time and again remained unsuccessful in their attempts.

21. According to them, not only the first writ petition preferred by Smt. Sumitra Devi, the then holder/owner of the land, bearing W.P.(C) No.863/2010, was dismissed, which order was upheld upto the Hon’ble Apex Court, the second writ petition being W.P.(C) No.3095/2012 was also dismissed, wherein status quo was in operation.

22. It is claimed that after dismissal of the second writ petition [W.P.(C) No.3095/2012] on 13th July 2017 and the SLP against the said order on 9th October 2017, the physical possession of the land was taken by the respondents on 3rd May 2018, which was stalled by order of status quo on 22nd May 2012 in the said writ petition.

23. In such an eventuality, it is not only claimed that the provisions of Section 24 will not be attracted, but also that the petitioners are trying to take undue advantage of their own conduct viz. taking benefit of order of status quo dated 22nd May 2012, though same was never confirmed, as the writ petition, in which the said order was passed, was itself dismissed.

24. It is claimed that the challenge to the Award, which is raised again in the present petition, was very much canvassed in the earlier writ petition, as the amendment to the said petition questioning the legality of the Award was allowed, and therefore, the petition of the petitioners questioning the Award, and consequently their claim for benefit of Section 24, is at all not maintainable.

25. Learned counsel appearing for the respondents has drawn support from the order of the Division Bench of this Court, wherein the writ petition preferred by the petitioners bearing W.P.(C) No.3095/2012 came to be dismissed on 13th July 2017, as well as to the order dated 21st August 2014, wherein the prayer for amendment, questioning the legality of the Award dated 30th December 2013 came to be allowed.

26. According to learned counsel for the respondents, even though Order II Rule 2 of CPC is not directly applicable to writ proceedings, the issue of constructive res judicata is required to be appreciated based on the principles enshrined therein.

27. So as to substantiate the said contentions, reliance is placed on the following judgments: a. Puja Ferro Alloys P. Ltd. Vs. State of Goa & Ors 2025 SCC OnLine SC 326. b. Delhi Development Authority Vs. Corporation Bank & Ors 2025 SCC OnLine SC 2071 c. S.C. Gupta vs. Union of India & Anr. 2025: DHC:3273- DB

28. We have considered the aforesaid submissions.

29. It appears that the claim in the petition is restricted only to the extent of 10 Biswa land, out of Khasra No.15/1/2/1, Village Aali, Tehsil Kalkaji, New Delhi. The said land was owned by one Smt. Sumitra Devi, who was wife of petitioner no.1, whereas rest of the petitioners appear to be her legal heirs.

30. The petitioners are claiming their right over the land in question under the Will dated 24th March 2009.

31. Smt. Sumitra Devi initially questioned the acquisition, particularly, Section 4 notification, through writ petition bearing W.P.(C) No.863/2010, which was dismissed on 2nd May 2011, resulting into issuance of Section 6 notification on 16th

32. The petitioners thereafter preferred another writ petition being W.P.(C) No.3095/2012, questioning Section 6 notification dated 16th February 2012. In the said writ petition, this Court has directed status quo to be maintained in regard to the possession as on 22nd May 2012. The said writ petition, by a reasoned order, came to be dismissed on 13th July 2017.

33. Thereafter, Section 6 Notification dated 16th February 2012 was questioned by the petitioners in the aforesaid petition, in which, an Award came to be passed on 30th December 2013 as there was status quo as regards possession only.

34. The said Award came to be questioned by the petitioners in W.P.(C) No.3095/2012 and the Division Bench of this Court has allowed the application for amendment vide order dated 21st August 2014, wherein the Award dated 30th December 2013 was sought to be questioned.

35. The order passed by the Division Bench of this Court in W.P.(C) No.3095/2012 allowing the application for amendment reads thus: - “CM 4061/2014 This is an application seeking amendment of the writ petition in view of the fact that in the meanwhile as award has been made. We allow this application. The amended writ petition is taken on record. The application stands disposed of. WP(C) 3095/2012 The learned counsel for the respondents may file their counter-affidavits to the amended writ petition within two weeks. The rejoinder affidavits, if necessary, be filed within two weeks thereafter. Renotify on 01.10.2014”

36. It appears that said amendment which came to be allowed was in fact within the knowledge of this Court when the writ petition being W.P.(C) No.3095/2012 was dismissed by a reasoned order dated 13th

37. While dealing with the aspect of amendment, this Court in para 7 of order dated 13th July 2017, dismissing the W.P.(C) No.3095/2012 observed as under: - “…7. It is evident from the above discussion that the petitioner had approached this Court earlier complaining that there was no urgency and the emergency clause invoked under Section 17, was an illegality. Since this Court was inclined to agree with that contention, DMRC conceded to grant a hearing rather than face an adverse order. Consequently, on 02.05.2011, the Section 17 order dispensing with the hearing was quashed. As a result, the petitioner was afforded the opportunity of registering objections which he did on 02.06.2011. The DMRC considered these objections and nevertheless proceeded ahead, by issuing the declaration, by which the suit lands were to be acquired, on 16.02.2012. As a matter of fact, the record would show that the award in respect of the suit lands too was completed on 30.12.2013; That award has subsequently been challenged to an amendment. However, the main grounds for challenge of the award are the same i.e. that the notification is not really for a public purpose.”

38. It is the contention of learned counsel for the petitioners that even if the Award was questioned by amending the petition, however, the petitioners have reserved their right to independently question the Award on the ground of fraud being practiced by the Land Acquisition Collector.

39. The petitioners, for the said purpose, have relied on the pleadings in application for Amendment and claimed that the right was reserved in specific terms for the purpose of questioning the Award independently.

40. The petitioners, in our opinion, though are justified in urging that they have specifically pleaded that their right to question the December 2013 was reserved, as the Award was served on them on 24th January 2014, but in the order dated 21st August 2014 referred supra, by which the application was allowed, no liberty was granted in favour of the petitioners either in the said order or in the order dated 13th July 2017 passed in W.P.(C) No.3095/2012, whereby the writ petition of the petitioners came to be dismissed.

41. Rather, perusal of the application preferred under Order VI Rule 17 CPC specifically reflects that the petitioners in fact have questioned the Award on the very same grounds viz. the same being passed ante-dated by the Land Acquisition Officer, so as to deprive them of higher compensation under the Act of 2013.

42. Relevant pleadings of the petitioners in the application for amendment, whereby the Award was questioned on the similar grounds which are sought to be re-canvassed in this very petition, are referred as under: - Y) That Land Acquisition Collector (South-East) Delhi has informed the petitioners that he has announced Award on 30-12-2013 in respect of the land in question. It is submitted that the hasty announcement of Award dated 30-12-2013 shows that though time was granted by the Land Acquisition Collector (South-East) to the DMRC but no opportunity of leading evidence was given to the petitioners and the said Award is illegal. It is submitted that the instant matter was fixed before the Hon’ble Court on 6-1-2014. It is pertinent to mention that on 6-1-2014, the Ld. Counsel for DMRC mentioned the matter before the Hon’ble Court seeking adjournment to file an affidavit in response to the affidavit filed on behalf of DDA which prayer was granted by the Hon'ble Court and the case was adjourned to 11-3-2014. It is pertinent to mention that though Ld. Counsel for Respondent-3 and Respondent-4 were present in the Court but no one informed the Hon'ble Court as if the alleged Award dated 30-12-2013 has been announced by Respondent-3. It is notable that though the Award is allegedly announced by Respondent-3 on 30-12-2013 but the fact remains that copy of the same as sent by Respondent-3 through Speed Post have been received by the petitioners on 23-1-2014. From the above facts and circumstances, it appears that the Award was announced after the above date of hearing 6-1-2014 and that the date of announcement of the Award has been shown of before 1-1-2014 i.e. before application of The Right To Fair Compensation And Transparency In Land Acquisition, Rehabilitation And Resettlement Act, 2013. Hence, the record of the Award dated 30-12-2013 is liable to be produced/summoned before the Hon'ble Court. Copy of Award dated 30-12-2013 alongwith intimation letter and the envelope with typed copy is ANNEXURE P-11 (Colly).

43. In this background, if we appreciate the above pleadings of the petitioners, the fact remains that they have already questioned the very December 2013 in the earlier petition i.e. in W.P.(C) No.3095/2012 on the same grounds on which this Court has already dwelled on the said issue in order dated 13th

44. As such, in law for the reasons so discussed hereinafter, we are of the view that it is not open for the petitioners to re-open and reagitate the same issue before this Court. An attempt on the part of the petitioners to re-agitate the said issue can be viewed as nothing but an abuse of process of law as the said issue already stood concluded vide earlier order of this Court.

45. In law, the finding recorded by this Court, thereby dismissing the W.P.(C) No.3095/2012 vide order dated 13th July 2017 once has attained finality upto the Hon’ble Apex Court, as the petitioners’ SLP came to be dismissed on 9th October 2017, it is not open to the petitioners to re-agitate the same.

46. It appears that since there was an operation of status quo vide order dated 22nd May 2012 in regard to possession in the W.P.(C) 3095/2012. After dismissal of the said writ petition i.e. W.P.(C) No.3095/2012, the petitioners approached the Hon’ble Apex Court through an SLP, which also stood dismissed on 9th October 2017. Thereafter, the respondents have taken the possession of the land on 3rd May 2018. The possession having been lost by the petitioners is not a fact in dispute.

47. In this background, if we appreciate the very principle of res judicata, the Hon’ble Apex Court in the matter of Puja Ferro Alloys Pvt. Ltd. Vs. State of Goa & Ors 2025 SCC OnLine SC 326, has held as under:- “22. For the principle of res judicata to be applied in the subsequent proceeding, it must be between the same parties and the cause of action of the subsequent proceeding must be the same as in the previous proceeding. The Supreme Court in the case of Satyadhyan Ghosal v. Deorajin Debi: (1960) 3 SCR 590 has succinctly noted that the principle of res judicata is essential in giving a finality to judicial decisions by observing as under: “The principle of res judicata is based on the need of giving a finality to judicial decisions. What it says is that once a res judicata, it shall not be adjudged again. Primarily it applies as between past litigation and future litigation. When a matter — whether on a question of fact or a question of law — has been decided between two parties in one suit or proceeding and the decision is final, either because no appeal was taken to a higher court or because the appeal was dismissed, or no appeal lies, neither party will be allowed in a future suit or proceeding between the same parties to canvass the matter again. This principle of res judicata is embodied in relation to suits in Section 11 of the Code of Civil Procedure; but even where Section 11 does not apply, the principle of res judicata has been applied by courts for the purpose of achieving finality in litigation. The result of this is that the original court as well as any higher court must in any future litigation proceed on the basis that the previous decision was correct. The principle of res judicata applies also as between two stages in the same litigation to this extent that a court, whether the trial court or a higher court having at an earlier stage decided a matter in one way will not allow the parties to reagitate the matter again at a subsequent stage of the same proceedings. …”

23. A three-judge bench of this Court in the case of Hope Plantations Ltd. v. Taluk Land Board: (1999) 5 SCC 590, has elucidated the applicability of the principles of res judicata and estoppel in the Indian context and held that:

Doctrine of res judicata is often treated as a branch of the law of estoppel though these two doctrines differ in some essential particulars. Rule of res judicata prevents the parties to a judicial determination from litigating the same question over again even though the determination may even be demonstratedly wrong. When the proceedings have attained finality, parties are bound by the judgment and are estopped from questioning it. They cannot litigate again on the same cause of action nor can they litigate any issue which was necessary for decision in the earlier litigation. These two aspects are ‘cause of action estoppel’ and ‘issue estoppel’. These two terms are of common law origin. Again, once an issue has been finally determined, parties cannot subsequently in the same suit advance arguments or adduce further evidence directed to showing that the issue was wrongly determined. Their only remedy is to approach the higher forum if available. The determination of the issue between the parties gives rise to, as noted above, an issue estoppel. It operates in any subsequent proceedings in the same suit in which the issue had been determined. It also operates in subsequent suits between the same parties in which the same issue arises. Section 11 of the Code of Civil Procedure contains provisions of res judicata but these are not exhaustive of the general doctrine of res judicata. Legal principles of estoppel and res judicata are equally applicable in proceedings before administrative authorities as they are based on public policy and justice. ………

31. Law on res judicata and estoppel is well understood in India and there are ample authoritative pronouncements by various courts on these subjects. As noted above, the plea of res judicata, though technical, is based on public policy in order to put an end to litigation. It is, however, different if an issue which had been decided in an earlier litigation again arises for determination between the same parties in a suit based on a fresh cause of action or where there is continuous cause of action. The parties then may not be bound by the determination made earlier if in the meanwhile, law has changed or has been interpreted differently by a higher forum. But that situation does not exist here. Principles of constructive res judicata apply with full force. It is the subsequent stage of the same proceedings. If we refer to Order XLVII of the Code (Explanation to Rule 1) review is not permissible on the ground that the decision on a question of law on which the judgment of the Court is based has been reversed or modified by the subsequent decision of a superior court in any other case, shall not be a ground for the review of such judgment’.”

24. It is now well settled that the principle of res judicata applies even to petitions arising for decision in the writ jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution. If any authority is required one may profitably refer to the decision in T.P. Moideen Koya v. State of Kerala: (2004) 8 SCC 106.

25. In the instant case, we are convinced that the writ petitions before the High Court were hit by res judicata in view of its previous decision in GR Ispat (supra) which, when challenged before this Court, was upheld with the further observation that a balanced view of the matter had been taken and no interference was called for. The appellant -companies were all parties and are bound by the decision in GR Ispat (supra). Having failed up to this Court, the appellant-companies could not have adopted a stand different from the one taken in the first round of litigation. They sought to challenge the demand notices by reopening the litigation and arguing that they are entitled to the benefit for five years, which they would have been entitled to had they availed the supply of power within the time that the notification dated 30.09.1991 was in force.”

48. Similarly, in the matter of Delhi Development Authority, Vs. Corporation Bank 2025 SCC OnLine SC 2071, the Hon’ble Apex Court held thus: -

reversed by appeal or other appropriate proceedings permissible under the Constitution.

2. It would not be open to a party to ignore the said judgment and move this Court under Article 32 by an original petition made on the same facts and for obtaining the same or similar orders or writs.

3. If the petition under Article 226 in a High Court is dismissed not on the merits but because of the laches of the party applying for the writ or because it is held that the party had an alternative remedy available to it, the dismissal of the writ petition would not constitute a bar to a subsequent petition under Article 32.

4. Such a dismissal may however constitute a bar to a subsequent application under Article 32 where and if the facts thus found by the High Court be themselves relevant even under Article 32.”

49. In the backdrop of position of law as referred to above, in our opinion, once the issue of Award being passed malafidely and antedated, having been agitated and gone into by the Division Bench of this Court in W.P.(C) No.3095/2012, which was dismissed and confirmed upto Hon’ble Apex Court, it is not open for the petitioners to re-agitate the said issue so as to claim that the acquisition proceedings so also the Award are liable to be quashed and set aside.

50. That being so, there is no substance in the said contention and the same stands rejected.

51. This brings us to the next contention of the petitioners that compensation is not paid till date, though the possession is lost during the pendency of the present petition.

52. We have already discussed hereinabove that there was an operation of status quo in the earlier round of litigation i.e. in W.P.(C) No.3095/2012 by virtue of order dated 22nd May 2012 and the said writ petition was dismissed on 13th July 2017, so also the SLP on 9th October 2017. The petitioners have lost possession on 3rd May 2018.

53. In such an eventuality, the only remedy available with the petitioners is to have the compensation released under the Award with statutory interest under the Act of 1894 and not under the Act of 2013.

54. The law laid down by the Hon’ble Apex Court in the matter of Indore Development Authority v. Manohar Lal & Ors.: (2020) 8 SCC 129 cannot be applied in the present case as the petitioners are not satisfying the twin conditions viz. the possession having already admittedly lost.

55. As such, there is no substance in the writ petition and the same is hereby dismissed with costs of Rs. 25,000/-.

56. Pending applications, if any, also stand disposed of accordingly.

57. A copy of this Judgment be uploaded on the website of this Court.

NITIN WASUDEO SAMBRE (JUDGE)

ANISH DAYAL (JUDGE) DECEMBER 03, 2025/ay/ss