Gopal Jha v. State

1. The petitioner filed petition bearing no. Crl. M.C. 5130/2019 under section 482 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (hereinafter referred to as “the Code”) for quashing of FIR bearing no 0007/2016 registered at PS North Avenue under sections 498A/406/354/34 of the Indian Penal Code, 1860 (hereinafter referred to as “IPC”) and the revision petition bearing no. Crl. Rev. P. 406/2023 under sections 397 and 401 of the Code read with section 482 of Code against order on charge dated 10.03.2023 passed by the court of Sh. Pawan Kumar, Additional Sessions Judge, Special Fast Track Court, Patiala House Courts, Delhi.

2. FIR bearing no. 0007/2016 dated 16.01.2016 was got registered under sections 498A/406/354/34 IPC at P.S. North Avenue, Delhi based on the complaint made by the respondent no. 2. The respondent no. 2 primarily alleged that she got married with Sujeet Kumar Jha CRL.M.C. 5130/2019 & CRL.REV.P. 406/2023 Page 3 s/o Jugal Kishore Jha, who was employed in Air Force, on 10.06.2011 at Village Maniyari, Dist. Sitamarhi, Bihar as per the Hindu rites and ceremonies and at the time of marriage sufficient dowry including cash and jewellery was given. The respondent no 2 was tortured for dowry demands. The petitioner is the brother-in-law (husband of the sister of Sujeet Kumar) of the respondent no 2 and Sujeet Kumar. Sujeet Kumar allegedly compelled the respondent no 2 to establish physical relation with the petitioner and was beaten by Sujeet Kumar on refusal. Jugal Kishore Jha, father in law of the respondent no 2 also tried to establish relations with her forcibly. The respondent no. 2 was left at the native village on the pretext of celebration of Chhath Puja and thereafter, the respondent no 2 was left at the house of the petitioner where his wife was not staying. The respondent no 2 also informed her father about mental and physical torture being faced by her. The respondent no. 2 was brought back to Delhi and the petitioner also came to Delhi after 3-4 days. The petitioner continued to harass the respondent no 2. Sujeet Kumar demanded Rs. 10 lakhs on 17.02.2015 for the construction of new house at Muzaffarpur. Sujeet Kumar on 23.02.2015 at about 4pm had CRL.M.C. 5130/2019 & CRL.REV.P. 406/2023 Page 4 left to join his duty but did not report for the duty and accordingly missing report was lodged at PS Kalkaji. The petitioner also came after about 15 days and asked the respondent no 2 to do the acts as dictated by the petitioner. The respondent no 2 lodged a complaint at DCP Office, Sarita Vihar and PS Kalkaji and went to her parental house. The petitioner had gone back to Sitamarhi but extended threat to the father of the respondent no 2 through two boys. Accordingly, present FIR bearing no 0007/2016 under sections 498A/406/34 and 354 IPC was got registered at PS North Avenue and investigation was handed over to SI Ram Kumar. 2.[1] The statements of the respondent no 2 and her father Sh. Arvind Kumar Jha were recorded under section 161 of the Code during the investigation. The respondent no 2 in supplementary statement recorded under section 161 of the Code on 08.08.2016 stated that the respondent no 2 has committed rape with her several times against her consent when the respondent no 2 was left at house of the petitioner situated at Sitamarhi by her husband Sujeet Kumar. The respondent no 2 did not disclose this fact to anyone due to fear but disclosed it to her mother. The statement of the respondent no 2 was CRL.M.C. 5130/2019 & CRL.REV.P. 406/2023 Page 5 also recorded under section 164 of the Code vide proceedings dated 11.05.2016 conducted by Sh. Aashish Gupta, Metropolitan Magistrate, Patiala House Courts, Delhi wherein the respondent no 2 made allegations of harassment, molestation and rape at Sitamarhi and attempt to rape at Delhi against the petitioner. Thereafter, offence punishable under section 376 IPC was also added against the petitioner on the basis of statement of the respondent no 2 under section 164 of the Code. The investigation was handed over to WSI Neelam Sharma. The respondent no. 2 during investigation had refused to undergo gynaecological examination. The charge sheet after conclusion of the investigation was filed for the offence punishable under sections 498A/406/354/34/376 IPC wherein the petitioner and Jugal Kishore Jha, father-in-law of the respondent no 2 were implicated.

3. The Court of Sh. Pawan Kumar, Additional Sessions Judge, Special FTC, Patiala House Courts, Delhi (hereinafter referred to as “the trial court”) vide order dated 10.03.2023 (hereinafter referred to as “the impugned order”) has discharged the accused Jugal Kishore Jha. The relevant part of order dated 10.03.2023 qua the CRL.M.C. 5130/2019 & CRL.REV.P. 406/2023 Page 6 accused Jugal Kishore Jha reads as under:- 7). Considering the incoherent and general allegations against the accused no. 1 in the FIR and no allegations in the statement recorded under Section 164 Cr.P.C., this court is of the view that this is not the case of grace suspicion wherein the charge can be framed against the accused no. 1. In view of the facts and submissions, this court is of the considered opinion that no prima facie case is made out against accused no. 1 and accordingly, he stands discharged. 3.[1] The trial court vide impugned order framed the charges against the petitioner for the offences punishable under sections 354/354B/376/506 IPC. The relevant part of order dated 10.03.2023 qua the accused the petitioner reads as under:- 9.) Despite the fact that the prosecutrix had not stated about the commission of rape in the FIR and for the first time, the prosecutrix had alleged to have been subjected to the forcible sexual relation by the accused no. 2, while she was staying at the house of the accused no. 2 at Sitamarhi, Bihar, in her statement under Section 164 Cr.P.C. Considering the case law and the factual situation and from the above discussion and perusal of material placed on record by the prosecution, there is sufficient prima facie material to frame charges against the accused no. 2 for having committing sexual intercourse with the prosecutrix against her will and without her consent. Therefore, charge u/s. 354, 354B, 376 & 506 IPC is made out against the accused no. 2 Gopal Jha. Formal charge to be frame accordingly.

4. The petitioner filed the petition bearing no 5130/2019 under section 482 of the Code for quashing of FIR bearing no 0007/2016 CRL.M.C. 5130/2019 & CRL.REV.P. 406/2023 Page 7 and consequential judicial proceedings stated to be pending in the trial court and made following prayer- In view of the above facts and circumstances, it is most respectfully prayed that this Hon'ble Court may graciously be pleased to pass an order: a) allowing the present petition of the petitioner and quashed the FIR No. 7/2016 dated 16.01.2016 registered at Police Station North Avenue, under Section 498A/406/354/376 IPC, against the petitioner, and quash the entire criminal proceedings arisen out of the above FIR which are presently pending in the court of Sh. P.K Jain, learned Additional Session Judge, Patiala House Courts, New Delhi; b) any other or such further orders, as this Hon'ble Court may deem fit and proper on the facts and dated circumstances of the case in the interest of justice. 4.[1] The petitioner filed revision petition bearing no 406/2023 to challenge the impugned order passed by the trial court whereby charges for offences punishable under sections 354, 354B, 376 & 506 IPC were ordered to be framed against the petitioner and made following prayer:- In the premises aforesaid it is most humbly and respectfully prayed that this Hon'ble Court may graciously be pleased to:- (a) allow the petition filed by the petitioner by setting aside impugned order dated 10.03.2023, passed Sh. Pawan Kumar, learned Additional Sessions Judge/SPL, CRL.M.C. 5130/2019 & CRL.REV.P. 406/2023 Page 8 Fast Track Court, Patiala House Courts, New Delhi in connection with the SC No. 108of2019; (b) pass other or further orders as this Hon'ble Court may deem fit and proper on the facts and circumstances of the case and in the interest of justice.

5. The petitioner in petition bearing no 5130/2019 pleaded that the respondent no 2 got married with Sujeet Jha on 10.06.2011 at Village Maniyari, District Sitamarhi, Bihar as per the Hindu rites and ceremonies. Sujeet Jha who was employed in Air Force went missing on 23.02.2015 for which missing report vide DD No 21A dated 24.02.2015 was lodged in PS Kalkaji Police Station and subsequently FIR bearing no 325/2015 was registered on 09.04.2015 under section 365 IPC at PS Kalkaji. Jugal Kishore Jha, father in law of the respondent no 2 filed a Writ of Habeas Corpus bearing WP (Crl.) no 1162/2015. The respondent no 2 also filed a complaint under section 12 of the Protection of Women from Domestic Violence Act, 2005. The respondent no 2 after about 18 months lodged a false and frivolous complaint on 16.01.2016 and accordingly present FIR bearing no. 0007/2016 was registered under sections 498A/406/354/34 IPC at PS North Avenue. The respondent no 2 after 4-5 months of lodging of FIR made statement under section 161 of the Code on 05.04.2016 wherein the respondent no 2 improved her CRL.M.C. 5130/2019 & CRL.REV.P. 406/2023 Page 9 statement by alleging that the petitioner had sexually assaulted her once but in statement recorded under section 164 of the Code, she alleged that the petitioner sexually assaulted her three to four times. 5.[1] The petitioner sought quashing of FIR bearing no. 0007/2016 on grounds that no prima facie case is made out against the petitioner as per the contents of FIR and evidences collected during the investigation. The respondent no.2 did not allege rape till recording of statements under sections 161 and 164 of the Code as such there is considerable delay which is not explained. The alleged incident of rape was committed in year 2014 at Sitamarhi, Bihar and the respondent no. 2 returned at New Delhi thereafter but did not file any complaint before any authority at Delhi. The respondent no 2 has not stated any specific time or date of the alleged incident of rape. There is no independent witness to support the case of the respondent no 2. There is no incriminating evidence against the petitioner except statements recorded under sections 161 and 164 of the Code. The alleged incident of rape was committed at Sitmarhi, Bihar and as such trial should be conducted where alleged offence was committed. CRL.M.C. 5130/2019 & CRL.REV.P. 406/2023 Page 10 It is prayed that present FIR be quashed along with consequential proceedings. 5.[2] The petitioner in revision petition bearing no 406/2023 besides narrating factual background as stated in petition no 5130/2019 challenged the impugned order dated 10.03.2023 on grounds that the impugned order is not sustainable in the eyes of the law. No prima facie case is made out against the petitioner on the basis of material collected during investigation. The respondent no.2 did not file any complaint before any authority pertaining to rape prior to the missing of her husband. There is nothing to suggest that the petitioner visited Sitamarhi, Bihar where the alleged offence of rape had happened. The respondent no.2 did not allege committal of rape till recording of statements under sections 161 and 164 of the Code wherein the respondent no 2 improved her version. There is unexplained delay. The petitioner did not state specific time and date of the alleged incident of rape. There is no independent witness to support the version of the respondent no 2. The alleged incident of rape was committed at Sitamarhi, Bihar and as such trial should have CRL.M.C. 5130/2019 & CRL.REV.P. 406/2023 Page 11 commenced at place of offence. It is prayed that impugned order be set aside.

6. The counsel for the petitioner in respect of petitions bearing no 5130/2019 and 406/2023 argued that the respondent no 2 prior to registration of present FIR has filed complaints before various authorities but in those complaints, the respondent no 2 did not allege committal of rape by the petitioner. The counsel for the petitioner also argued that there was delay in registration of FIR. The present FIR was registered on 16.01.2016 on the basis of written complaint filed by the respondent no 2 but alleged offence of rape was committed of present FIR was committed at Sitamarhi, Bihar in the month of October, 2014 when the respondent no. 2 went to Sitamarhi with her husband Sujeet Kumar Jha. The respondent no. 2 did not file complaint before any local authorities at Sitamarhi, Bihar. 6.[1] The counsel for the petitioner further argued that the respondent no. 2 improved her statement on every occasion. The offence punishable under section 376 IPC was added on the basis of statement of the respondent no. 2 recorded under section 164 of the Code. The allegation pertaining to offence punishable under section CRL.M.C. 5130/2019 & CRL.REV.P. 406/2023 Page 12 376 IPC firstly surfaced in statement of the respondent no. 2 recorded under section 161 of the Code on 05.04.2016. The respondent no. 2 as such told a total different story which was not stated in FIR bearing no. 0007/2016 and previous complaints. The respondent NO. 2 did not mention the specific date and time of the alleged committal of rape by the petitioner in statement recorded under section 164 of the Code. The counsel for the petitioner further argued that no incriminating evidence including medical evidence could be collected against the petitioner during the investigation. The counsel for the petitioner also argued that the petitioner is entitled for discharge on ground of territorial jurisdiction. The alleged offences subject matter of present FIR were committed at Sitamarhi, Bihar and offence of rape is not a continuing offence. The counsel for the petitioner cited Vijayan V State of Kerala & another, (2010)2 SCC 398, Prasant Bharti V State of NCT of Delhi, AIR 2013 SC 2753, Rajiv Thapar & other V Madan Lal Kapoor, AIR 2013 SC (Supp) 1056 etc.

7. The counsel for the respondent no. 2 assisted the Additional Public Prosecutor for the respondent no. 1/State argued that the respondent no. 2 made specific allegations against the petitioner in her CRL.M.C. 5130/2019 & CRL.REV.P. 406/2023 Page 13 complaint. The respondent no. 2 in statement under section 161 of the Code had specifically stated that the petitioner used to do inappropriate acts with the respondent no. 2. The petitioner used to come in the kitchen and grab the respondent no. 2 from behind. The petitioner used to push the respondent no. 2 on the bed and made forceful physical relations with her. The respondent no. 2 on 13.12.2014 came to Delhi along with her husband. The petitioner pushed the respondent no. 2 on the bed and made forceful relations with her when the husband of the respondent no. 2 had left for job and threatened her with consequences. The respondent no. 2 had corroborated her complaint in statements under sections 161 and 164 of the Code. The counsel for the petitioner cited Bhawna Bai V Ghanshyam, (2020) 2 SCC 217 and Manendra Prasad Tiwari V Amit Kumar Tiwari and another, 2022 SCC OnLine SC 1057.

8. The Chapter XVIII of the Code deals with trial before a Court of Session. Section 227 deals with situation when the accused shall be discharged. Section 228 deals with framing of charge. Sections 227 and 228 of the Code reads as under:- CRL.M.C. 5130/2019 & CRL.REV.P. 406/2023 Page 14

227. Discharge.-If, upon consideration of the record of the case and the documents submitted therewith, and after hearing the submissions of the accused and the prosecution in this behalf, the Judge considers that there is not sufficient ground for proceeding against the accused, he shall discharge the accused and record his reasons for so doing.

228. Framing of charge.—(1) If, after such consideration and hearing as aforesaid, the Judge is of opinion that there is ground for presuming that the accused has committed an offence which— (a) is not exclusively triable by the Court of Session, he may, frame a charge against the accused and, by order, transfer the case for trial to the Chief Judicial Magistrate, 3 [or any other Judicial Magistrate of the first class and direct the accused to appear before the Chief Judicial Magistrate, or, as the case may be, the Judicial Magistrate of the first class, on such date as he deems fit, and thereupon such Magistrate] shall try the offence in accordance with the procedure for the trial of warrant-cases instituted on a police report; (b) is exclusively triable by the Court, he shall frame in writing a charge against the accused. (2) Where the Judge frames any charge under clause (b) of sub-section (1), the charge shall be read and explained to the accused and the accused shall be asked whether he pleads guilty of the offence charged or claims to be tried. 8.[1] The purpose of framing a charge is to intimate the accused about the clear, unambiguous and precise nature of accusation that the accused is called upon to meet in the course of a trial as observed in V.C. Shukla V State through C.B.I., 1980 Supp SCC 92. The prosecution is required to establish a prima facie before a charge can CRL.M.C. 5130/2019 & CRL.REV.P. 406/2023 Page 15 be framed. The Supreme Court in Union of India V Prafulla Kumar Samal & another, (1979) 3 SCC 4 considered scope of inquiry at the stage of framing of charge as per section 227 of the Code in Sessions criminal trial and observed as under:- (1) That the Judge while considering the question of framing the charges under section 227 of the Code has the undoubted power to sift and weigh the evidence for the limited purpose of finding out whether or not a prima facie case against the accused has been made out. (2) Where the materials placed before the Court disclose grave suspicion against the accused which has not been properly explained the Court will be, fully justified in framing a charge and proceeding with the trial. (3) The test to determine a prima facie case would naturally depend upon the facts of each case and it is difficult to lay down a rule of universal application. By and large however if two views are equally possible and the Judge is satisfied that the evidence produced before him while giving rise to some suspicion but not grave suspicion against the accused, he will be fully within his right to discharge the accused. (4) That in exercising his jurisdiction under section 227 of the Code the Judge which under the present Code is a senior and experienced Judge cannot act merely as a Post office or a mouthpiece of the prosecution, but has to consider the broad probabilities of the case, the total effect of the evidence and the documents produced before the Court, any basic infirmities appearing in the case and so on. This however does not mean that the Judge should make a roving enquiry into the pros and cons of the matter and weigh the evidence as if he was conducting a trial. 8.[2] The Supreme Court in Onkar Nath Mishra & others V State CRL.M.C. 5130/2019 & CRL.REV.P. 406/2023 Page 16 (NCT of Delhi) & another, Appeal (Crl.)1716 of 2007 decided on 14th December, 2007 regarding framing of charge observed as under:- It is trite that at the stage of framing of charge the court is required to evaluate the material and documents on record with a view to finding out if the facts emerging therefrom, taken at their face value, disclosed the existence of all the ingredients constituting the alleged offence. At that stage, the court is not expected to go deep into the probative value of the material on record. What needs to be considered is whether there is a ground for presuming that the offence has been committed and not a ground for convicting the accused has been made out. At that stage, even strong suspicion founded on material which leads the court to form a presumptive opinion as to the existence of the factual ingredients constituting the offence alleged would justify the framing of charge against the accused in respect of the commission of that offence. 8.[3] The Supreme Court Dipakbhai Jagdish Chandra Patel V State of Gujarat, (2019) 16 SCC 547 discussed law relating to the framing of charge and discharge and observed as under:-

15. We may profitably, in this regard, refer to the judgment of this Court in State of Bihar v. Ramesh Singh wherein this Court has laid down the principles relating to framing of charge and discharge as follows: 4…..Reading Sections 227 and 228 together in juxtaposition, as they have got to be, it would be clear that at the beginning and initial stage of the trial the truth, veracity and effect of the evidence which the prosecutor proposes to adduce are not to be meticulously judged. Nor is any weight to be attached to the probable defence of the accused. It is not obligatory for the Judge at that stage of the trial to consider in any detail and weigh in a sensitive CRL.M.C. 5130/2019 & CRL.REV.P. 406/2023 Page 17 balance whether the facts, if proved, would be incompatible with the innocence of the accused or not. The standard of test and judgment which is to be finally applied before recording a finding regarding the guilt or otherwise of the accused is not exactly to be applied at the stage of deciding the matter under Section 227 or Section 228 of the Code. At that stage the Court is not to see whether there is sufficient ground for conviction of the accused or whether the trial is sure to end in his conviction. Strong suspicion against the accused, if the matter remains in the region of suspicion, cannot take the place of proof of his guilt at the conclusion of the trial. But at the initial stage if there is a strong suspicion which leads the Court to think that there is ground for presuming that the accused has committed an offence then it is not open to the Court to say that there is no sufficient ground for proceeding against the accused. The presumption of the guilt of the accused which is to be drawn at the initial stage is not in the sense of the law governing the trial of criminal cases in France where the accused is presumed to be guilty unless the contrary is proved. But it is only for the purpose of deciding prima facie whether the court should proceed with the trial or not. If the evidence which the prosecutor proposes to adduce to prove the guilt of the accused even if fully accepted before it is challenged in cross examination or rebutted by the defence evidence, if any, cannot show that the accused committed the offence, then there will be no sufficient ground for proceeding with the trial…. If the scales of pan as to the guilt or innocence of the accused are something like even at the conclusion of the trial, then, on the theory of benefit of doubt the case is to end in his acquittal. But if, on the other hand, it is so at the initial stage of making an order under Section 227 or Section 228, then in such a situation ordinarily and generally the order which will have to be made will be one under Section 228 and not under Section 227.

23. At the stage of framing the charge in accordance with the principles which have been laid down by this Court, CRL.M.C. 5130/2019 & CRL.REV.P. 406/2023 Page 18 what the Court is expected to do is, it does not act as a mere post office. The Court must indeed sift the material before it. The material to be sifted would be the material which is produced and relied upon by the prosecution. The sifting is not to be meticulous in the sense that the Court dons the mantle of the Trial Judge hearing arguments after the entire evidence has been adduced after a full-fledged trial and the question is not whether the prosecution has made out the case for the conviction of the accused. All that is required is, the Court must be satisfied that with the materials available, a case is made out for the accused to stand trial. A strong suspicion suffices. However, a strong suspicion must be founded on some material. The material must be such as can be translated into evidence at the stage of trial. The strong suspicion cannot be the pure subjective satisfaction based on the moral notions of the Judge that here is a case where it is possible that accused has committed the offence. Strong suspicion must be the suspicion which is premised on some material which commends itself to the court as sufficient to entertain the prima facie view that the accused has committed the offence. 8.[4] The Supreme Court in Asim Shariff V National Investigation Agency, (2019) 7 SCC 148 expressed that the trial court is not expected or supposed to hold a mini trial for the purpose of marshalling the evidence on record. The Supreme Court in State of Karnataka V M.R. Hiremath, (2019) 7 SCC 515 held that it is a settled principle of law that at the stage of considering an application for discharge the court must proceed on the assumption that the material which has been brought on the record by the prosecution is CRL.M.C. 5130/2019 & CRL.REV.P. 406/2023 Page 19 true and evaluate the material in order to determine whether the facts emerging from the material, taken on its face value, disclose the existence of the ingredients necessary to constitute the offence. The Supreme Court in Bhawna Bai v Ghanshyam, (2020) 2 SCC 217 as cited by the counsel for the respondent no. 2 observed as under:-

13. At the time of framing the charges, only prima facie case is to be seen; whether case is beyond reasonable doubt, is not to be seen at this stage. At the stage of framing the charge, the.court has to see if there is sufficient ground for proceeding against the accused. While evaluating the materials, strict standard of proof is not required; only prima facie case against the accused is to be seen. 8.[5] The Supreme Court in Ghulam Hassan Beigh V Mohammad Maqbool Magrey & Others, Criminal Appeal No. 001041 of 2022 (Arising out of S.L.P. (Criminal) no 4599 OF 2021) decided on 26th July, 2022 observed as under:- Thus from the aforesaid, it is evident that the trial court is enjoined with the duty to apply its mind at the time of framing of charge and should not act as a mere post office. The endorsement on the charge sheet presented by the police as it is without applying its mind and without recording brief reasons in support of its opinion is not countenanced by law. However, the material which is required to be evaluated by the Court at the time of framing charge should be the material which is produced and relied upon by the prosecution. The sifting of such material is not to be so meticulous as would render the CRL.M.C. 5130/2019 & CRL.REV.P. 406/2023 Page 20 exercise a mini trial to find out the guilt or otherwise of the accused. All that is required at this stage is that the Court must be satisfied that the evidence collected by the prosecution is sufficient to presume that the accused has committed an offence. Even a strong suspicion would suffice. Undoubtedly, apart from the material that is placed before the Court by the prosecution in the shape of final report in terms of Section 173 of CrPC, the Court may also rely upon any other evidence or material which is of sterling quality and has direct bearing on the charge laid before it by the prosecution. (See: Bhawna Bai v. Ghanshyam, (2020) 2 SCC 217).

9. It is reflecting that the respondent no. 2 was married with Sujeet Kumar Jha, who was employed in Air Force, on 10.06.2011 at Village Maniyari, Dist. Sitamarhi, Bihar. The petitioner is brother-inlaw of the respondent no. 2 i.e. husband of sister of Sujeet Kumar, husband of the respondent no. 2. The respondent no. 2 after marriage came to Delhi. The respondent no. 2 got registered present FIR bearing no. 0007/2016 registered under sections 406/498A/354/34 IPC at PS North Avenue wherein Jugal Kishore Jha, father in law of the respondent no. 2 and the petitioner were implicated. The respondent no. 2 primarily alleged that she was tortured for dowry demands and was allegedly compelled by Sujeet Kumar to establish physical relation with the petitioner. The respondent no. 2 was taken to native village on the pretext of celebration of Chhath Puja where CRL.M.C. 5130/2019 & CRL.REV.P. 406/2023 Page 21 the petitioner used to harass her. The respondent no. 2 was brought back to Delhi but the petitioner continued to harass the respondent no

2. Sujeet Kumar on 23.02.2015 was found missing and accordingly missing report was lodged at PS Kalkaji. The respondent no. 2 lodged a complaint at DCP Office, Sarita Vihar and PS Kalkaji which was culminated into registration of present FIR bearing no 0007/2016 under sections 498A/406/34 and 354 IPC at PS North Avenue. The respondent no. 2 only made general allegations of harassment and molestation against her father in law namely Jugal Kishore Jha and the petitioner but did not make allegations of forceful sexual acts or rape against the petitioner towards the respondent no. 2. The respondent no. 2 also did not make allegations of rape against the petitioner in other complaints made by her to various authorities as referred by the counsel for the petitioner during arguments. The statements of the respondent no. 2 and her parents were also recorded under section 161 of the Code but no allegations of rape were made against the petitioner. The respondent no. 2 in supplementary statements recorded under section 161 of the Code on 05.04.2016 and 08.08.2016 for first time made allegations of harassment, molestation CRL.M.C. 5130/2019 & CRL.REV.P. 406/2023 Page 22 and rape against the petitioner by stating that the petitioner has committed rape with her several times against her consent when the respondent no. 2 was left at house of the petitioner situated at Sitamarhi, Bihar. The respondent no. 2 in statement under section 164 of the Code recorded vide proceedings dated 11.05.2016 made allegations of harassment, molestation and rape at Sitamarhi, Bihar and attempt to rape at Delhi against the petitioner. The offence under section 376 IPC was added against the petitioner on the basis of statement of the respondent no.2 under section 164 of the Code. The respondent no. 2 had refused to undergo gynaecological examination. The investigating officer had implicated the petitioner and Jugal Kishore Jha in the charge sheet. Jugal Kishore Jha was ordered to be discharged vide impugned order as the trial court opined that only incoherent and general allegations are made against Jugal Kishore Jha in FIR and no allegations are made in the statement recorded under Section 164 of the Code. The trial court vide impugned order framed the charges against the petitioner for the offences under sections 354/354B/376/506 IPC by observing that there is sufficient prima facie material to frame charges against the accused no. 2 for CRL.M.C. 5130/2019 & CRL.REV.P. 406/2023 Page 23 having committed sexual intercourse but simultaneously also observed that the respondent no. 2 had not stated about the commission of rape in the FIR and for the first time alleged to have been subjected to the forcible sexual relation by the accused no. 2 while she was staying at the house of the petitioner at Sitamarhi, Bihar in statement under Section 164 of the Code.