Sh. Vinay Kumar Soni v. Sh. Vijay Kumar

9. In the said suit, one of the tenants in the property was impleaded as a party pursuant to an application being filed by the said tenant. An application under Order 12 Rule 6 of the CPC also came to be filed in the said suit by the plaintiff (landlord) therein, which was disposed of vide judgement/decree dated 28.03.2018, in which it was, inter alia, held as under:-

10. After the aforesaid judgment dated 28.03.2018, a notice came to be issued by the Custodian to the occupants of the property in question. The said notice was assailed by the petitioner in a civil writ petition [W.P.(C) 6461/2018]. Vide order dated 10.09.2018 passed by this court inW.P.(C) 6461/2018, it was inter alia held as under:-

11. Thereafter, vide order dated 29.11.2018, the eviction proceedings were revived, which order was assailed by the petitioner herein vide CM(M) 579/2019; the same was disposed of by this court vide order dated 30.01.2020. The said order dated 30.01.2020 took note of the aforesaid judgment/decree dated 28.03.2018 as also the order dated 10.09.2018 passed in WP(C) 6461/2018 and it was, inter-alia, held as under:-

12. In pursuance thereof, proceedings continued in the eviction petition ultimately culminated in the impugned judgment dated 22.10.2020. The impugned judgment notes that the following points arise for determination in these proceedings:- “(i) Whether the petitioner is the owner of the suit premises? And whether there exists relationship of landlord and tenant between the parties?

(ii) Whether the premises are required bona fide by the petitioner? And

(iii) Whether the applicant has no other reasonably suitable accommodation?”

13. As regards the existence of landlord-tenant relationship, the impugned judgment after minute examination of the pleadings, documents and the evidence on record, holds as under:-

14. As regards the bonafide requirement of the respondent (landlord) and availability of suitable alternative accommodation, the impugned judgment, again after minutely examining the pleadings, documents and evidence on record, came to the following conclusion:-

15. It is in the above backdrop that the present petition has been filed by the petitioner (tenant). Submissions of learned counsel for the petitioner:-

16. Learned counsel for the petitioner has strenuously disputed the respondent‟s assertion that the respondent is the owner of the property in question. The petitioner disputes the veracity of the two oral Wills i.e. the oral Will of Late Sheikh Hazi Abdul Aziz and the oral Will of Late Sheikh Abdul Hamid on the basis of which the property is stated to have devolved upon Sheikh Mohammad Naqi. It is contended that the respondent‟s claim of ownership is subject matter of a suit filed by some other tenant and the issue of ownership is yet to be conclusively decided therein. It is contended that the rule of estoppel incorporated under Section 116 of the Evidence Act, 1872 would not apply since it is well settled that the tenant is entitled to question the derivative title asserted by the landlord. It is contended that the Court of the Rent Controller being a Court of limited jurisdiction is not entitled to return a finding of title. It is contended that even the devolution of the property and/or attornment in favour of Sheikh Abdul Hamid is also not accepted by the tenant inasmuch as even after the death of Sheikh Hazi Abdul Aziz, all his legal heirs continued to issue rent receipts to the various tenants in the property.

17. It is further contended that even after the death of Sheikh Abdul Hamid, his legal heirs i.e. his wife Hazar Bi and his daughter Rukhsana Begum had been collecting rent. Certified copies of these rent receipts were marked as Ex. RW 1/13 to RW 1/21. It is further stated that there was no devolution in favour of Sheikh Mohammad Naqi and that the sale deed in favour of the respondent is forged, fabricated, illegal, invalid and unenforceable under law. Serious doubts have also been expressed with regard to the veracity and genuineness of the release deeds stated to have been executed in 1992 by the legal heirs of Sheikh Abdul Hamid accepting devolution of the property upon Sheikh Mohammad Naqi. It is contended that these alleged release deeds were executed in Pakistan more than 25 years after the alleged oral Will of Late Sheikh Abdul Hamid. It is further contended that there was no reason why the surviving legal heirs of Sheikh Abdul Hamid and even Sheikh Mohammad Naqi himself could not be produced before the concerned Rent Controller by the landlord to depose in his support. Extensive reference has also been made to the evidence adduced before the concerned Rent Controller to negate the contentions of the landlord regarding the chain of devolution. Specific reliance has also been placed on the cross-examination of the respondent himself before the concerned Rent Controller to contend that even the respondent himself was completely unaware about the circumstances regarding the making of the alleged oral Wills. It is submitted that there is no cogent proof whatsoever in support of the chain of succession as asserted by the landlord.

18. It is further contended that there are documents to suggest that Sheikh Abdul Hamid was mentally sick at the time when he is stated to have made his oral Will. It is contended that the procedure contemplated under Muslim Law for proving an oral Will has been completely disregarded. Reliance in this regard has been placed on the judgment in the case of Mahabir Prasad Vs. Mustafa Husain, Syed,1. Strenuous arguments have also been addressed by learned counsel for the petitioner to discredit the release deeds alleged to have been executed in 1992 in Pakistan by the legal heirs of Sheikh Abdul Hamid affirming the devolution of the property upon Sheikh Mohammad (1937) 39 Bom LR 990: 1937 SCC Online PC 36: AIR 1937 PC 174 Naqi. It is submitted that during the cross-examination of the respondent on the said release deeds, the learned Rent Controller himself made an observation that the said release deeds were not stamped/registered. Yet, reliance has been placed in the impugned judgment upon these release deeds. It is further strenuously contended that in the proceedings initiated against another tenant (Virender Kapoor and Paresh Kapoor, both sons of late Yoginder Kumar Kapoor) by the respondent (landlord), it was admitted by the respondent (landlord) in the pleadings that he never travelled to Pakistan in 1992. This is in the face of the release deeds in which the respondent himself is referred to as the witness. It is contended that although the respondent‟s application under Order 12 Rule 6 CPC came to be decided in his favour and culminated in the judgment decree dated 28.03.2018, an RFA/appeal was filed by the Custodian against the said judgment which is stated to be still pending. It is contended that the present proceedings ought to be deferred till the decision in the said RFA is conclusively adjudicated upon. Submissions of learned counsel for the respondent:-

19. Learned counsel for the respondent (landlord) has strongly refuted the contentions made by learned counsel for the petitioner. He has submitted that it has not been denied that the father of the petitioner/tenant (Sh. Chiman Lal) was originally inducted as a tenant in the property by the original landlord Sheikh Hazi Abdul Aziz. Attention has been drawn to the counter-foils/ rent receipts signed by Sh. Chiman Lal in favour of Sheikh Hazi Abdul Aziz and marked as Ex. PW 1/122 to Ex. PW 1/124 before the concerned Rent Controller. Attention has also been drawn to the fact that after the death of Sheikh Hazi Abdul Aziz in 1959, his son Sheikh Abdul Hamid started collecting rent from all the tenants of the same building. In this regard, extensive reference has been made to the cross-examination of the petitioner (tenant) Sh. Vinay Kumar Soni, particularly, the crossexamination dated 01.12.2005 and 09.08.2019. It is submitted that the oral Will of Sheikh Abdul Hamid has been confirmed by the release deeds executed in 1992 by the legal heirs of Sheikh Abdul Hamid which were filed before the concerned Rent Controller marked as Ex. PW 1/8 – Ex. PW 1/12. Attention has been drawn to the fact that apart from the aforesaid release deeds to which the respondent (landlord) himself is an attesting witness, a fresh deed of declaration was issued on 20.07.1997 by the legal heirs of Sheikh Abdul Hamid at New Delhi which is also placed on record and marked as Ex. PW 1/14.

20. Strenuous reliance has been placed on the judgment/ decree dated 28.03.2018 to contend that the property in question is not an enemy property. It is submitted that this became clear through a detailed investigation report dated 28.10.2015 by the concerned ADM and submitted to the Custodian, whose report was thereafter accepted by the Custodian on 19.11.2015. It is on this basis that the respondent‟s application under Order

12 Rule 6 CPC was allowed and the same culminated in judgment/ decree dated 28.03.2018. It is submitted that the said judgment/ decree dated 28.03.2018 has not been stayed by the Appellate Court, despite an appeal being belatedly filed by the Custodian. It is submitted that in the light of the extensive evidence regarding chain of devolution in favour of Sheikh Mohammad Naqi, the registered sale deed executed by Sheikh Mohammad Naqi in favour of the respondent, and on account of the judgment/ decree dated 28.03.2018, there is no merit in the plea of the petitioner regarding absence of landlord-tenant relationship, and that the contentions of the petitioner/tenant in this regard are completely misconceived. Reliance has also been placed upon Sections 116 and 118 of Mulla‟s Principle of Mohammedan Law and on the basis thereof, it is contended that the oral Wills in the present case are permissible under Muslim Law and also duly confirmed by the legal representatives of the deceased. In support of the veracity of the oral Wills, reliance has been placed upon the judgments in the case of Iqbal Amiri Vs. State,[2] and Asma Beevi Vs. M. Ammer Ali[3].

21. Reliance has also been placed on the judgment of Kausar Iram Vs. Govt. of India,4, in support of the contentions that the release deeds merely accepted the oral Wills in question and the release deeds by themselves cannot be considered as a deed transferring the properties in favour of the beneficiaries under the Will. Reliance has also been placed on the judgment of Supreme Court of India in the case of Abid-Ul-Islam Vs. Inder Sain Dua[5] to contend that the scope of revisional powers is very limited and that finding of facts are not liable to be interfered with. Finally, strenuous reliance has been placed on the judgment of the Supreme Court in the case of Shanti Sharma Vs. Ved Prabha,[6] in which it has been held that as long as it is established that a landlord has a better title than that of a tenant, a tenant cannot resist/refute the existence of a landlord tenant relationship.

22. It was contended that in the facts of the present case, once it has been established that the last paid rent was being remitted to the admitted (2016) 229 DLT 586: 2016 SCC Online Del 2176 Order dated 10.06.2008 in A.S. No. 247 of 1996 passed by the Madras High Court landlords i.e. Sheikh Hazi Abdul Aziz and Sheikh Abdul Hamid, and the fact that after Sheikh Abdul Hamid, it was Sheikh Mohammad Naqi who became the owner of the property by way of an oral Will of Sheikh Abdul Hamid, and which oral Will has been confirmed by all his legal heirs by executing release deeds/NOCs, the challenge to the plea of ownership as well as the relationship of landlord and tenant cannot possibly be sustained.

23. As regards, the existence of bonafide requirement and sufficiency of alternative accommodation, it is contended that the impugned judgment of the concerned Rent Controller arrives at a cogent finding of fact in this regard after minutely analysing the evidence/material on record and there is no warrant to interfere with the said findings in these proceedings. Analysis and Conclusion

24. Having heard respective counsel for the parties, I find no merit in the present revision petition. The reasons are enumerated hereunder.

25. Although, it is well settled that a tenant is not precluded from questioning the derivative title asserted by a landlord, it is equally well settled that for the purpose of establishing landlord-tenant relationship, the standard of proof to which a landlord is subjected in proceedings under rent control legislation is not akin to standard of proof in a title suit. This position is re-affirmed in the judgment of the Supreme Court in Vinay Eknath Lad Vs. Chiu Mao Chen,[7] wherein it has been observed as under:- “16. The plaintiffs' argument on law is that in an eviction suit, title need not be proved in a manner required in a suit for declaration of title. On this count, the following passage from Apollo Zipper [Apollo Zipper (India) Ltd. v. W. Newman & Co. Ltd., (2018) 6 SCC 744: (2018) 3 SCC (Civ) 807] has been cited: (SCC p. 754, para 40)

Two earlier authorities, Sheela v. Firm Prahlad Rai Prem Prakash [Sheela v. Firm Prahlad Rai Prem Prakash, (2002) 3 SCC 375] and Boorugu Mahadev & Sons v. Sirigiri Narasing Rao [Boorugu Mahadev & Sons v. Sirigiri Narasing Rao, (2016) 3 SCC 343: (2016) 2 SCC (Civ) 344] broadly lay down the same principle of law. It is not the law that in a landlord-tenant suit the landlord cannot be called upon at all to prove his ownership of a premises, but onus is not on him to establish perfect title of the suit property.”

26. The principle that the tenant is not precluded from questioning the derivative title of a landlord does not detract from the principle laid down by the Supreme Court in a number of cases that all that the landlord needs to establish is that it has a better title than the tenant.

27. In the case of Shanti Sharma Vs. Ved Prabha (supra), it has been held as under:-

28. The Supreme Court in Boorugu Mahadev & Sons Vs. Sirigiri Narasing Rao[8], has held as under:-

29. The Supreme Court in Swadesh Ranjan Sinha Vs. Haradeb Banerjee[9], has held as under:-

30. In Puran Chand Aggarwal v. Lekh Raj10, this Court has held as under:

31. In Meenakshi v. Ramesh Khanna11, this court has held as under:-

32. Thus, in proceedings under rent control legislation, the existence of landlord tenant relationship, is to be ascertained by applying the well settled and time tested propositions that (i) for the purpose of establishing landlordtenant relationship, the onus of proof on the landlord is not akin to a title suit; (ii) as long as it is established that a landlord has a better title than that of a tenant, a tenant cannot resist a plea of existence of a landlord tenant relationship.

33. In the present case, there is no controversy that the father of the petitioner/tenant (Sh. Chiman Lal) was originally inducted as tenant in the subject property by the original landlord i.e. Sheikh Hazi Abdul Aziz to whom he had been paying rent. The rent receipts signed by Sh. Chiman Lal in favour of Sheikh Hazi Abdul Aziz were brought on record and formed part of the evidence adduced before the concerned Rent Controller.

34. Further, after the demise of Sheikh Hazi Abdul Aziz, the rent was paid by the tenants to his legal heirs/Sheikh Abdul Hamid. The impugned judgment records, as a matter of fact, that the tenants “have at least accepted Sheikh Abdul Hamid as co-landlord/joint landlord of the disputed premises”. It has also been noted that the landlord has placed on record various letters/communications between Sh.Chiman Lal, father of the petitioner herein and Sheikh Abdul Hamid (Ex.PW 1/103 to Ex.PW 1/117) which clearly prove the existence of relationship of landlord and tenant between Sheikh Abdul Hamid and Sh.Chiman Lal. As regards these documents, it has been specifically noticed in the impugned judgment as under:-

35. The impugned judgment also notices the copious and extensive evidence adduced by the respondent (landlord) to establish his title including the sale deed executed by Sheikh Mohammad Naqi in his favour, the mutation letter and the house tax bills. The sale deed dated 18.03.1996 executed by Sheikh Mohammad Naqi in favour of the respondent extensively refers to the chain of devolution of title upon Sheikh Mohammad Naqi as under:- “Whereas Haji Abdul Aziz, son of late Haji Mohd, Umer was the sole and absolute owner of property No. XV/1859 to 1864 and 2248-2260, situate at Chuna Mandi, Paharganj, New Delhi. He purchased it from Haji Mohd, Ishaq, son of Haji Abdul Aziz and Zakmullah Khan, son of MaulaviHafizullah Khan by means of Sale Deed dated 10th August, 1949, registered as Document No. 911, Book no. 19, on pages No. 48 to 54 with the Sub-Registrar, Delhi, on 19th August 1942, area 1354.[5] Sq. Yds.

AND WHERAS Sheikh Haji Abdul Aziz orally devised and bequeathed the said property to his son, Sheikh Abdul Hamid, son of Haji Abdul Aziz.

(ii) His oral will was admitted and accepted by his son and daughters in favour of Sheikh Abdul Hamid. Their Release Deed was registered by the Sub-Registrar No. 1, Delhi on 22.4.1964, as Document No. 4269, in Book No. 1, Vol. No. 1091, on pages 57 and 58.

(iii) The aforesaid property was mutated in the Municipal records in the name of Sheikh Abdul Hamid.

AND WHEREAS (i) Sheikh Abdul Hamid orally devised and bequeathed the aforesaid property in favour of Vender on 1.8.1968 according to Muslim Personal Law.

(ii) Sheikh Abdul Hamid died on 2.9.1968 at Calcutta.

AND WHEREAS the oral will of Sheikh Abdul Hamid was accepted and admitted by (i) his widow Mst. Hazra Bi vide her Release Deed dated 2nd January, 1992, and his sisters (ii) Mst. Saeda Khatoon wife of Sheikh Aftab Ahmed, (iii) Mst. Ruqayya Begam wife of Sheikh Sultan Ahmad Batla (iv) Mst. Khairun Nisa, wife of Sheikh Mohd. Ahmed, (v) (a) Sheikh Mohd. Ishaq, son of late Haji Mahboob Elahi, (b) Sheikh Aiz Anwar, (c) Sheikh Yusaf Akhtar, (d) Sheikh Zafar Ahmed, (e) Sheikh Suhail Akhtar, (f) Sheikh Iqbal Ahmed, (g) Mst. Aisha Ishlaq, wife of Sheikh Shamim Ahmed, (v) (a) is the husband, (v) (i), (v) (c), (v) (d), (v) (e), (v) (f), (v) (g) are the children of late Zaibun-Nisa, the deceased sister of Sheikh Abdul Hamid. They executed their Release Deeds dated 7th January, 1992.”

36. Admittedly, no court of law has set aside or nullified the aforesaid sale deed in favour of the respondent (landlord).

37. It is also notable that in the written statement filed on behalf of the petitioner in response to the eviction petition, the primary defence of the petitioner (tenant) was that the property vests in the Central Government. It was categorically pleaded by the petitioner as under:- “3.That the disputed premises vested with the Central Government being an Enemy Property vide notification dated 10.09.1965 and as such this Hon‟ble Court has no jurisdiction as per Section 3 of Delhi Rent Control Act to entertain and decide the present eviction petition.”

38. The above controversy has been put to rest vide judgment dated 28.03.2018 wherein it has been held that the property in question does not vest in the Custodian of enemy property and/or other authorities under the Enemy Property Act, 1968. Further all certificates/notifications/office orders/rent receipts/letters to occupants issued by the said authorities have been declared null and void. The said authorities have been held to be not entitled to control, manage and supervise the concerned property as enemy property. The relevant portion of the aforesaid judgment/decree dated 28.03.2018 has been extracted hereinabove. The above finding assumes relevance in the light of the defence/stand taken in the written statement to the effect that the property in question vests with the Central Government, being an enemy property. The said contention stands negated by the aforesaid judgment dated 28.03.2018. Admittedly, although an RFA/appeal has been filed by the Union of India/Custodian against the aforesaid judgment, the operation of the said judgment/decree has not been stayed.

39. Further, as regards the plea regarding genuineness/veracity of the oral Wills is concerned, it is notable that none of the concerned legal heirs have disputed the same. No material whatsoever has been placed on record to establish that the factum of making of the said oral Wills has been disputed by any legal heir in any correspondence/proceedings. The respondent (landlord) has relied upon Section 116 and Section 118 of Mulla‟s Principles of Mohammedan Law in support of his contentions that an oral Will is very much permissible under Mohammedan Law. The said Section 116 and Section 118 are reproduced here as under:-

40. Section 118 (supra) has been inter alia explained in Mulla's Principles of Mohammedan Law in the 20th Edition as under:- “Consent of heirs: It will be seen from this and the preceding section that the power of a Mahomedan to dispose of his property by will is limited in two ways, first, as regards the persons to whom the property may be bequeathed, and, secondly, as regards the extent to which the property may be bequeathed. The only case in which a testamentary disposition is binding upon the heirs is where the bequest does not exceed the legal third and it is made to a person who is not an heir. But a bequest in excess of the legal third may be validated by the consent of the heirs; similarly, a bequest to an heir may be rendered valid by the consent of the other heirs. The reason is that the limits of testamentary power exist solely for the benefit of the heirs, and the heirs may, if they like to forgo the benefit by giving their consent. For the same reason, if the testator has no heirs, he may bequeath the whole of his property to a stranger: (see Baillie, 625). If the heirs do not consent, the remaining two-thirds must go to the heirs in the shares prescribed by the law. The testator cannot reduce or enlarge their shares, nor can he restrict the enjoyment of their shares.”

41. A perusal of the aforesaid provisions makes it clear that an oral Will is permissible under Muslim Law; moreover even if the bequest in favour of the beneficiary exceeds 1/3rd of the estate, the said oral Will could be confirmed by his legal representatives even after his death. This exposition of law has been recognized in various judgments.

42. In Iqbal Amiri Vs. State (supra), it has been held as under:-

43. It has been noted that the testamentary succession as contemplated in the Indian Succession Act, 1925, does not apply to Muslims and that it is permissible for Muslims to make an oral Will. The same position is taken note of in Asma Beevi Vs. M. Ammer Ali (supra).

44. In the present case, the oral Wills have also been confirmed by all the concerned legal heirs by executing release deeds/NOCs affirming the factum of devolution in favour of the beneficiaries under the Wills. As held by this Court in Kausar Iram Vs. Govt. of India (supra), a release deed of such a kind merely records the consent of the legal heirs in accepting the Will in question. The same cannot be construed as a deed transferring the properties in favour of the beneficiaries under the Will. Reference is apposite to the following observations in the said judgment:-

45. The factum of the petitioner having been inducted as a tenant in the tenanted premises by the erstwhile owner i.e. Sheikh Hazi Abdul Aziz, is not in dispute. Admittedly, Sheikh Abdul Hamid was one of the legal heirs of Sheikh Hazi Abdul Aziz. The oral Wills executed by Sheikh Hazi Abdul Aziz and Sheikh Abdul Hamid have not been refuted/disputed by any of the surviving legal heirs; moreover, they have been corroborated by virtue of release deeds executed by the surviving legal heirs.

46. As noticed hereinabove, it is a well settled proposition in rent jurisprudence, the landlord is not required to prove his title in the subject property in the way he would be expected to do in a title suit. It is sufficient if the landlord can establish that his title is better than that of the tenant. On the basis of the evidence adduced on behalf of the respondent and which has been taken note of in the impugned order, it can be concluded that the respondent (landlord) has discharged his burden of ownership vis-à-vis the Rent Control Act.

47. There is also no merit in the contention raised on behalf of the petitioner as regards alleged admission/s made by the respondent herein in eviction proceedings qua another tenant (Virender Kapoor and Paresh Kapoor, both sons of late Yoginder Kumar Kapoor). Learned counsel for the respondent has filed the pleadings in the said eviction proceedings to bring out that no admission, as alleged by the petitioner, has been made therein. Learned counsel for the respondent has also placed on record a copy of the judgment dated 23.05.2023 passed in the said eviction proceeding whereby the leave to defend application filed by the said tenant has been dismissed, and an eviction order has been passed qua the said tenant. In respect of the landlord tenant relationship, the said judgment dated 23.05.2023 inter alia holds as under:-

48. Reliance placed on behalf of the petitioner, on the judgment of the Supreme Court in the case of Vinay Eknath Lad (supra) is also misplaced. The said case does not advance the case of the petitioner inasmuch as in the present case, the respondent has discharged the onus of proof to the extent necessary for the purpose of the present proceedings. The Supreme Court has specifically observed in Vinay Eknath (supra) that the onus on the landlord is not akin to that in a title suit.

49. In the present case, the respondent (landlord) has placed on record voluminous material and evidence to establish his right in the suit property, and the conclusion drawn in the impugned judgement cannot be faulted.

50. Necessarily also, the findings rendered in these proceedings will not operate to the detriment of the Union of India and the Custodian in any other proceedings, particularly, in the context of RFA stated to have been filed against the judgment/decree dated 28.03.2018. As already held by this Court while reviving the instant eviction proceedings, the order passed in the present eviction petition shall be subject to the outcome of the said RFA which is yet to be decided by the Court. As already held by this Court vide the order dated 30.01.2020, the pendency of the said RFA does not prevent the respondent (landlord) from pursuing the eviction proceedings to seek eviction of the petitioner (tenant).

51. As regards the finding in the impugned judgment regarding existence of bonafide requirement of the respondent (landlord) and absence of sufficient alternative accommodation, there is no warrant to interfere with the same in these proceedings. As held by the Supreme Court in the case of Abid-Ul-Islam (supra), where the tenant disputes the bonafide necessity of the landlord or pleads existence of sufficient alternate accommodation, the tenant is expected to put adequate reasonable material in support of the facts pleaded to raise a triable issue. In para 20 of the said judgment relying upon the observations made in the case of Baldev Singh Bajwa Vs. Monish Saini12, the Supreme Court observed as under:-

16. In Surjit Singh Kalra v. Union of India [Surjit Singh Kalra v. Union of India, (1991) 2 SCC 87] a three-Judge Bench of this Court has held as under: (SCC p. 99, para 20) „20. The tenant of course is entitled to raise all relevant contentions as against the claim of the classified landlords. The fact that there is no reference to the word bona fide requirement in Sections 14-B to 14-D does not absolve the landlord from proving that his requirement is bona fide or the tenant from showing that it is not bona fide. In fact every claim for eviction against a tenant must be a bona fide one. There is also enough indication in support of this construction from the title of Section 25-B which states „special procedure for the disposal of applications for eviction on the ground of bona fide requirement‟.‟

17. In Shiv Sarup Gupta v. Mahesh Chand Gupta [Shiv Sarup Gupta v. Mahesh Chand Gupta, (1999) 6 SCC 222] this Court while dealing with the aspect of bona fide requirement has said that the sense of felt need which is an outcome of a sincere, honest desire, in contradistinction with a mere pretence or pretext to evict a tenant, refers to a state of mind prevailing with the landlord. The only way of peeping into the mind of the landlord is an exercise undertaken by the Judge of facts by placing himself in the armchair of the landlord and then posing a question to himself — whether in the given facts, substantiated by the landlord, the need to occupy the premises can be said to be natural, real, sincere and honest.

19. … In our view there are inbuilt protections in the relevant provisions for the tenants that whenever the landlord would approach the court he would approach when his need is genuine and bona fide. It is, of course, subject to the tenant's right to rebut it but with strong and cogent evidence. In our view, in the proceeding taken up under Section 13-B by the NRI landlords for the ejectment of the tenant, the court shall presume that the landlord's need pleaded in the petition is genuine and bona fide. But this would not disentitle the tenant from proving that in fact and in law the requirement of the landlord is not genuine. A heavy burden would lie on the tenant to prove that the requirement of the landlord is not genuine. To prove this fact the tenant will be called upon to give all the necessary facts and particulars supported by documentary evidence, if available, to support his plea in the affidavit itself so that the Controller will be in a position to adjudicate and decide the question of genuine or bona fide requirement of the landlord. A mere assertion on the part of the tenant would not be sufficient to rebut the strong presumption in the landlord's favour that his requirement of occupation of the premises is real and genuine.”

52. The law is also well settled, and reiterated in a catena of judgments that the landlord is the best judge of his requirements and the tenant cannot be allowed to dictate to the landlord as to how he should accommodate himself without evicting the tenant. This principle has been reiterated in the following judgments.

53. In Prativa Devi (Smt.) Vs. T.V. Krishnan13, it has been held as under:- “The landlord is the best judge of his residential requirement. He has a complete freedom in the matter. It is no concern of the courts to dictate to the landlord how, and in what manner, he should live or to prescribe for him a residential standard of their own.”

54. In Sarla Ahuja Vs. United India Insurance Co. Ltd14, it has been “It is often said by courts that it is not for the tenant to dictate terms to the landlord as to how else he can adjust himself without getting possession of the tenanted premises. While deciding the question of bona fides of the requirement of the landlord, it is quite unnecessary to make an endeavour as to how else the landlord could have adjusted himself.”

55. In Shiv Sarup Gupta Vs. Mahesh Chand Gupta (Dr)15, it has been

“Once the court is satisfied of the bona fides of the need of the landlord for the premises or additional premises by applying objective standards then in the matter of choosing out of more than one accommodation available to the landlord his subjective choice shall be respected by the court."

56. In Baldev Singh Bajwa Vs. Monish Saini (supra), it has been held as under:- “A mere assertion on the part of the tenant would not be sufficient to rebut the strong presumption in the landlord's favour that his requirement of occupation of the premises is real and genuine”

57. In Anil Bajaj Vs. Vinod Ahuja16, it has been held as under:- “It would hardly require any reiteration of the settled principle of law that it is not for the tenant to dictate to the landlord as to how the property belonging to the landlord should be utilized by him for the purpose of his business.”

58. On an overall conspectus, in the present case there is no warrant to interfere with the findings rendered in the impugned judgment as regards the existence of bonafide necessity of the landlord for the tenanted premises. Further, no cogent material whatsoever has been placed on record to establish existence of sufficient alternate accommodation. As such there is no occasion for this Court to interfere with the findings rendered with regard to the issue of bonafide necessity and absence of sufficient alternate accommodation.

59. The scope of revisional jurisdiction of this Court has been delineated by the Supreme Court in Abid-Ul-Islam (supra) as under:-

7. Although, the word “revision” is not employed in the proviso to Section 25-B(8) of the Act, it is evident from the language used therein that the power conferred is revisional power. In legal parlance, distinction between appellate and revisional jurisdiction is well understood. Ordinarily, appellate jurisdiction is wide enough to afford a rehearing of the whole case for enabling the appellate forum to arrive at fresh conclusions untrammelled by the conclusions reached in the order challenged before it. Of course, the statute which provides appeal provision can circumscribe or limit the width of such appellate powers. Revisional power, on the contrary, is ordinarily a power of supervision keeping subordinate tribunals within the bounds of law. Expansion or constriction of such revisional power would depend upon how the statute has couched such power therein. In some legislations, revisional jurisdiction is meant for satisfying itself as to the regularity, legality or propriety of proceedings or decisions of the subordinate court. In Sri Raja Lakshmi Dyeing Works v. Rangaswamy Chettiar [Sri Raja Lakshmi Dyeing Works v. Rangaswamy Chettiar, (1980) 4 SCC 259] this Court considered the scope of the words (“the High Court may call for and examine the records … to satisfy itself as to the regularity of such proceedings or the correctness, legality or propriety of any decision or order…”) by which power of revision has been conferred by a particular statute. Dealing with the contention that the above words indicated conferment of a very wide power on the revisional authority, this Court has observed thus in the said decision: (SCC p. 262, para 3) „3. … The dominant idea conveyed by the incorporation of the words „to satisfy itself‟ under Section 25 appears to be that the power conferred on the High Court under Section 25 is essentially a power of superintendence. Therefore, despite the wide language employed in Section 25, the High Court quite obviously should not interfere with findings of fact merely because it does not agree with the finding of the subordinate authority.‟

8. Dealing with Section 32, the Delhi and Ajmer Rent (Control) Act, 1952, which is almost identically worded as in the proviso to Section 25-B(8) of the Act, a three-Judge Bench of this Court has stated thus in Hari Shankar v. Rao Girdhari Lal Chowdhury [Hari Shankar v. Rao Girdhari Lal Chowdhury, 1962 Supp (1) SCR 933: AIR 1963 SC 698]: (AIR p. 701, para 8) „8. … The section is thus framed to confer larger powers than the power to correct error of jurisdiction to which Section 115 is limited. But it must not be overlooked that the section — in spite of its apparent width of language where it confers a power on the High Court to pass such order as the High Court might think fit, — is controlled by the opening words, where it says that the High Court may send for the record of the case to satisfy itself that the decision is “according to law”. It stands to reason that if it was considered necessary that there should be a rehearing, a right of appeal would be a more appropriate remedy, but the Act says that there is to be no further appeal.‟

9. In Malini Ayyappa Naicker v. Seth Manghraj Udhavadas [Malini Ayyappa Naicker v. Seth Manghraj Udhavadas, (1969) 1 SCC 688] another three-Judge Bench of this Court was considering a similarly worded proviso in Section 75(1) of the Provincial Insolvency Act, 1920. Though, the learned Judges did not give an exhaustive definition of the expression “according to law”, a catalogue of instance in which the High Court may interfere under the said proviso was given in the decision as the following [Ed.: The passage quoted is an extract from Beaumont, C.J.'s judgment in Bell & Co. Ltd. v. Waman Hemraj, 1937 SCC OnLine Bom 99, para 4: (1938) 40 Bom LR 125 which was approved by the Supreme Court in the case cited.]: (SCC p. 691, para 7) „7. … “4. … are cases in which the Court which made the order had no jurisdiction, or in which the Court has based its decision on evidence which should not have been admitted, or cases where the unsuccessful party has not been given a proper opportunity of being heard, or the burden of proof has been placed on the wrong shoulders. Wherever the Court comes to the conclusion that the unsuccessful party has not had a proper trial according to law, then the Court can interfere.” ‟

10. The Bench has, however, cautioned that the High Court should not interfere merely because it considered that “possibly the Judge who heard the case may have arrived at a conclusion which the High Court would not have arrived at”.

11. The learned Single Judge of the High Court in the present case has reassessed and reappraised the evidence afresh to reach a different finding as though it was exercising appellate jurisdiction. No doubt even while exercising revisional jurisdiction, a reappraisal of evidence can be made, but that should be for the limited purpose to ascertain whether the conclusion arrived at by the fact-finding court is wholly unreasonable. A reading of the impugned order shows that the High Court has overstepped the limit of its power as a revisional court. The order impugned on that score is hence vitiated by jurisdictional deficiency.

12. Clause (e) of the proviso to Section 14(1) of the Act affords one of the grounds to the landlord to seek recovery of possession of the building leased. The said clause reads thus: „14. (1)(e) that the premises let for residential purposes are required bona fide by the landlord for occupation as a residence for himself or for any member of his family dependent on him, if he is the owner thereof, or for any person for whose benefit the premises are held and that the landlord or such person has no other reasonably suitable residential accommodation; Explanation.—For the purposes of this clause, “premises let for residential purposes” include any premises which having been let for use as a residence are, without the consent of the landlord, used incidentally for commercial or other purposes;‟

13. If the landlord has another residential accommodation which is reasonably suitable, he is not permitted to avail himself of the benefit afforded in the ground set out in the clause. The learned Single Judge of the High Court has noted that the landlord in this case has „admitted in her deposition that the house in Calcutta was a 3-bedroom house with drawing/dining room and one of the bedrooms was used by her, another by her son with his wife and another bedroom was kept for her daughter who used to come and stay‟. This was one of the reasons which persuaded the learned Single Judge to interfere with the order of eviction. To deprive a landlord of the benefit of the ground mentioned in Section 14(1)(e) on account of availability of alternative residential accommodation, it is not enough that such alternative accommodation is in a far different State. Such accommodation must be available in the same city or town, or at least within reasonable proximity thereof if it is outside the limits of the city. The said limb of clause (e) cannot be interpreted as to mean that if the landlord has another house anywhere in the world, he cannot seek recovery of possession of his building under clause (e). The High Court therefore went wrong in observing that since the landlord has possession of another flat at Calcutta she is disentitled to seek recovery of possession of the tenanted premises situated at Delhi.

14. The crux of the ground envisaged in clause (e) of Section 14(1) of the Act is that the requirement of the landlord for occupation of the tenanted premises must be bona fide. When a landlord asserts that he requires his building for his own occupation, the Rent Controller shall not proceed on the presumption that the requirement is not bona fide. When other conditions of the clause are satisfied and when the landlord shows a prima facie case, it is open to the Rent Controller to draw a presumption that the requirement of the landlord is bona fide. It is often said by courts that it is not for the tenant to dictate terms to the landlord as to how else he can adjust himself without getting possession of the tenanted premises. While deciding the question of bona fides of the requirement of the landlord, it is quite unnecessary to make an endeavour as to how else the landlord could have adjusted himself.”

60. In the circumstances, taking note of the aforesaid observations of the Supreme Court, there is no warrant to interfere with the impugned eviction order dated 22.10.2020.

61. It is, however, clarified that the impugned eviction order will not come in the way of Union of India/Custodian seeking to take appropriate recourse against the respondent (landlord) as may be permissible under law or as may be warranted depending upon the outcome of the RFA stated to have been filed against the aforesaid judgment/decree dated 28.03.2018. The impugned eviction order shall not be an impediment to the exercise of any right/s by the Union of India/ Custodian. It is further clarified that the findings rendered as regards the existence of landlord-tenant relationship are only in the context of proceedings under the DRC Act and for no other purpose.

62. With the aforesaid observations, the present revision petition is dismissed.

63. All pending applications stand disposed of.

SEPTEMBER 14, 2023 SACHIN DATTA, J. r/hg