Harpal Singh v. Deepti Ajay Singh

High Court of Bombay · 03 Aug 2023
ARIF S. DOCTOR
Testamentary Suit No. 119 of 2016
2010 (7) Mh.L.J. 657
civil petition_dismissed Significant

AI Summary

The Bombay High Court dismissed the suit for probate of a Will due to failure to prove due execution, testator's understanding, and presence of suspicious circumstances, denying probate to the Plaintiff.

Full Text
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IN THE HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT BOMBAY
TESTAMENTARY AND INTESTATE JURISDICTION
TESTAMENTARY SUIT NO. 119 OF 2016
IN
TESTAMENTARY PETITION NO. 1124 OF 2015
Ajay Harpal Singh …...Deceased
Harpal Singh, Age 80 years, Hindu, Indian Inhabitant of Ghaziabad, Uttar Pradesh, Occupation: Retired (Former Director & Chief, Agriculture & Rural Development, Govt. of India
& Senior Project Economist, Asian Development
Bank, Manila, Philippines, residing at
R-3/1 Raj Nagar, Ghaziabad, Uttar Pradesh – 201002 being one of the legatees named under the Will of deceased abovenamed …...Plaintiff
V/s.
Deepti Ajay Singh through Power of Attorney
Raj Nagar, Ghaziabad, Uttar Pradesh – 201002 …...Defendant
WITH
INTERIM APPLICATION NO. 1946 OF 2023
IN
IN
Miss Deepti Singh acting through her Constituted Power of Attorney
Mr. Satyendra Kumar Raghav
SHUBHAM
PRAVINRAO
Indian Inhabitant, Age- 83 years, Residing at R-14/33, Raj Nagar, Ghaziabad, U.P. …...Defendant
In the matter between
Dr. Harpal Singh
Residing at R-3/1, Raj Nagar, Ghaziabad, U.P. …….Plaintiff/
Org. Petitioner.
V/s.
Ghaziabad, U.P. …...Defendant/
Caveator.
WITH
INTERIM APPLICATION (L) NO. 7728 OF 2023
IN
IN
Indian Inhabitant, Age- 83 years,
In the matter between
Dr. Harpal Singh
Residing at R-3/1, Raj Nagar, Ghaziabad, U.P. …….Plaintiff/
Org. Petitioner.
V/s.
----------------
Mr. Firoz Bharucha a/w Ravi Gandhi, Mahek A. Kamdar, Rishabh Ranka, Karan
Thakkar, Harsh Choksi and Prathamesh Jadhav i/by Kanga & Co. for Plaintiff.
Ms. Neelam Yadav i/by Mr. Raju R. Gupta for Defendant.
-----------------
CORAM : ARIF S. DOCTOR, J.
RESERVED ON : 3rd MAY, 2023.
PRONOUNCED ON : 3rd AUGUST, 2023.
JUDGMENT

1. The Plaintiff in the present Suit seeks probate in respect of a writing dated 1st December 2013, which is stated to be the last Will and Testament of one Ajay Harpal Singh (“the Deceased”) who was the late son of the Plaintiff. The grant of Probate is opposed by the Defendant who is the daughter of the Deceased who is contesting the Suit through her Power of Attorney holder, Mr. Satyendra Kumar Raghav (“POA holder”). The POA holder is also the maternal grandfather of the Defendant. Thus, the dispute in the present Suit is between a paternal grandfather and his granddaughter.

2. Before adverting to the rival contentions, it is necessary to set out the following facts which will help in giving context to the rival contentions of the Parties, viz. i. The deceased on 12th December 1998 married one Ms. Meenakshi Singh. The deceased and said Meenakshi Singh on 23rd November 1998 had a daughter, namely Deepti Ajay Singh who is the Defendant abovenamed. ii. Thereafter, in view of the disputes and differences that arose between the deceased and the said Meenakshi Singh, the deceased it appears filed a Divorce Petition before the Civil Judge in Ghaziabad. Ms. Meenakshi Singh also it appears, filed proceedings for divorce but before the Meerut Family Court. iii. It is the Plaintiffs case that, on 16th January 2004, a Decree of Divorce was passed by the Ghaziabad Court, by which, the marriage between the deceased and Meenakshi Singh was dissolved. It is the Defendants case that on 27th January 2007, the Principal Judge, Family Court, Meerut, passed an order dissolving the marriage between the deceased and Meenakshi Singh. By the said order custody of the Defendant was handed over to her mother Meenakshi Singh. Additionally, the deceased was directed to pay a sum of Rs. 3,000/- each to the Defendant and Meenakshi Singh from the date of filing of the Petition for divorce i.e., 7th August 2006. iv. It is the Plaintiff’s contention that the deceased on 1st December 2013 executed his last Will and Testament (“the said Will”). Under the said Will, the deceased appointed his brother, one Vijay Singh as the sole executor of the said Will. v. The deceased passed away on 7th September 2014 in his residential flat being 1105, Orchid Building, Jangid Enclave, Beverly Park, Mira Road East, Thane – 401107. vi. Thereafter, in or about October 2014, it is the Plaintiffs case that when the sister of the deceased namely one Mrs. Anita Jadeja visited the said flat, she found the said Will amongst other documents of the deceased and consequently handed over the same to the Plaintiff. vii. Thereafter, Mr. Vijay Singh, the sole executor named in the said Will, by an Affidavit dated 21st May 2015 renounced his executorship. It was thus that the Plaintiff on 30th June 2015, being one of the beneficiaries under the said Will, filed Testamentary Petition No.1124 of 2015 for Letters of Administration with a copy of the said Will annexed. viii. On 10th March 2015, a Caveat was filed by the Defendant pursuant to which Testamentary Petition was converted into Testamentary Suit No.119 of 2016.

3. Based on the contentions raised in the Affidavit in Support of the Caveat, the following issues were framed for determination viz.

“1. Whether the deceased validly executed his Will dated 1 st December, 2013? 2. Whether the defendant proves that the deceased was excessively intoxicated when he executed the Will? 3. Whether the defendant proves that the deceased was forcibly made to sign the Will? 4. Whether the defendant proves that the signatures on the Will are forged/fabricated? 5. What order, including as to costs?”

Parties then led the evidence of the following persons, viz. Plaintiff’s evidence: (i) Mr. Hirein Sharma –

(ii) Mr. Karsan Chaudhary –

(iii) Harpal Singh – Plaintiff (PW-3).

4. Just when the Suit was ripe for final hearing, the Defendant took out two Interim Applications and insisted the same be heard before the present Suit was heard. In the first Interim Application (being Interim Application (L) No.7313 of 2023), the Defendant has sought for the appointment of a handwriting expert to verify the signature of the deceased as appearing on the said Will and in the second Interim Application (being Interim Application (L) No.7728 of 2023), the Defendant sought for maintenance in terms of the decree dated 27th January, 2007 passed by the Family Court, Meerut, as also for enhancement of the maintenance amount payable to the Defendant until such time that she is married. Submissions of Mr. Bharucha on behalf of the Plaintiff

5. Mr. Bharucha at the outset placed reliance upon the following judgments (i) Daulat Ram & Ors. Vs. Sodha & Ors.[1] and (ii) Purushottam Vs. Ambadas[2] to submit that the initial burden of proof to prove a Will was upon the propounder thereof. He submitted that the propounder was required to prove the Will by primary evidence in the same manner that a document was required to

2 (2010 (7) Mh.L.J. 657 be proved under the provisions of the Indian Evidence Act, 1872 (“Evidence Act”). He pointed out that once the propounder had discharged this burden, the onus would shift upon the person who alleges that the Will being propounded was forged or obtained under undue influence. He submitted that in the present case not even an attempt was made by the Defendant to prove that the said Will was forged or had been executed by exerting undue influence. He therefore submitted that all that the Plaintiff was required to prove, was due execution of the said Will, which burden the Plaintiff had duly discharged by leading the evidence of both the attesting witnesses to the said Will as also of the propounder.

6. He then invited my attention to Section 63 (c) of the Indian Succession Act, 1925 (“Succession Act”) and pointed out that a Will was required to be attested by two witnesses in the manner set out therein. He submitted that in the present case, this requirement had been duly fulfilled since the execution of the said Will had been proved by the evidence of both the attesting witnesses, namely Hirein Sharma (PW-1) and Karsan Chaudhary (PW-2). He submitted that each of the said attesting witnesses had filed their respective Affidavits of Evidence (“AOE”) proving due execution of the said Will, as contemplated under Section 63 of the Succession Act. Mr. Bharucha then placed reliance upon Section 68 of the Evidence Act and submitted that a document which in law was required to be attested, shall not be used in evidence until one of the attesting witnesses has been called for the purposes of proving due execution thereof. In the present case he submitted that infact, both the attesting witnesses had led evidence to prove due execution of the said Will even though the law contemplated that the evidence of one would suffice.

7. He then invited my attention to the AOE of PW-1 and pointed out therefrom that PW-1 had specifically deposed as follows.

“3. I say that thereupon the deponent and Karsan Chaudhary did at the request of the said Deceased and in his presence and in the presence of each other all being present at the same time set and subscribed our respective names and signatures at the foot of the said testamentary paper as witnesses thereto.
4. I say that the signatures as “A Singh” subscribed at the foot of the testamentary paper as of the party executing the same and at the bottom of each and every page of the said Testamentary paper as also across the photograph of the Deceased affixed at the right hand side top corner of the first page of the said testamentary paper are in proper hand writing of the said Deceased. The signatures, names and addresses as “Hirein Sharma”, “HIREIN SHARMA, (D583/06), ADVOCATE, Flat No.603, Building No.3B, Patliputra Nagar, Jogeshwari (W), Mumbai 400 102” and “Karsan”, “KARSAN CHAUDHARY, FLAT NO.603, BUILDING NO.3B, PATLIPUTRA NAGAR, OSHIWARA, JOGESHWARI (W), MUMBAI 400 102, PAN No. (AMNPC6082D)” subscribed at the foot of the said testamentary paper are in the proper hand writings of myself, this deponent and Karsan Chaudhary, respectively.

5. That at the time the said Deceased so subscribed his signatures as “A Singh” at the bottom of the said Will as aforesaid, he was of sound and disposing mind, memory and understanding and to the best of my belief made and published the said Will of his free will and pleasure.” He thereafter invited my attention to the cross-examination of PW-1 and placed particular emphasis on the following questions and answers given thereto, viz. Q.[9] Whether the said Will (Exhibit “P-3”) which the deceased had shown you was a draft Will? Ans. No, it was not a draft Will because it was the same Will which the deceased had signed in my presence and requested Karsan and myself to witness the same. Q.10 Who had already signed the said Will (Exhibit P-3) when it was shown to you? Ans. When the said Will was shown to me it was unsigned and after Karsan and I had seen the said Will Mr. Ajay Singh had requested us to witness his signature on the same after he had signed in front of both of us. Thereafter I had singed the Will and subsequently Karsan also signed the said Will as witnesses respectively. Basis the above, he submitted that due execution of the said Will had been duly proved by the evidence of PW-1. He submitted that though not required in law, PW-2 had also filed his AOE to prove due execution. He then invited my attention to the AOE of PW-2 and the answers given by PW-2 in cross examination and submitted that the same corroborated what PW-1 had deposed to and thus also proved the said Will.

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8. From the above, he pointed out that the Defendant had duly proved that, the said Will had been validly executed by deceased in terms of Section 63

(c) of the Succession Act. He submitted that therefore the Plaintiff had duly discharged the initial burden cast upon the Plaintiff to prove due execution of the said Will and therefore Issue No. 1 was required to be answered in the affirmative.

9. He then submitted that insofar as the Issue No. 2 was concerned, the only evidence led by the Defendant in support thereof was that of the Power of Attorney holder Mr. Satyendra Kumar Raghav (DW-1). He pointed out that the only deposition to be found in support of this contention in the AOE of DW-1 was the following, viz. “3. I say that when I personally visited the place where he resided in Mira Road, Thane, neighbours of Ajay Singh told me that he was addicted to alcohol. I say that with the Notice of Motion NO. 150/2019, the petitioner has filed letter dated 28.12.2015 of ICICI Bank, addressed to Prothonotary and Senior Master, High Court Bombay as Exhibit- M at pages 38 to 40. Aforesaid page 40 is “Statement of transactions in Savings Bank Account no. 00041690317 of Ajay Singh for the period 07-09-2014 to 22-12-2015”, wherein the first transaction is as below:- Date Particulars Chq NO. Withdra wals Depo sits Autosw eep Resver se sweep Balance (INR) 08-09- VPS/MIRAJ WINES/2014 /0 800.00 23,759.73 Cr This transaction pertains to purchases made by deceased Ajay Singh on 2014-09-07 [digits in the second line in particulars column show date of transaction [20140907 being: year 2014, month 09, date 07] from Miraj Wines. Copy of letter dated 28.12.2015 of ICICI Bank is annexed herewith and marked as EXHIBIT-2.” Learned Counsel then invited my attention to the following answer given in cross examination by DW-1viz. “Q.13) During your interaction with Mr. Ajay Singh, did you ever see him consume alcohol in your presence? Ans: On the few occasions that he visited my house or I visited his, I have never witnessed him consume alcohol.” Basis the above, he submitted that DW-1 had himself in cross-examination confirmed, that he had never witnessed the deceased consume alcohol. He then submitted that though DW-1 had been informed by the neighbours of the Deceased, that the Deceased was addicted to alcohol. He however submitted that no evidence of any neighbour was led in support of this contention. He thus submitted that the Defendant had not led any positive evidence in support of Issue No. 2

10. He then, submitted that, on the contrary, the evidence of both PW-1 and PW-2 demonstrated that at the time attestation, the deceased was in a sound and disposing state of mind and was not under the influence of alcohol or inebriated when executing the said Will. In support of his contention, he invited my attention to the following questions and answers thereto in the crossexamination of PW-1 and PW-2; PW-1- Hirein Sharma:-

“Q. 34 Do you know that the deceased Ajay Singh was an alcoholic? Ans. I am not aware, but on the day when I met him he did not consume any alcohol and he was in his full sense.
Q. 54 I put it to you that either (i) the Will was prepared after the death of the deceased Mr. Ajay Singh and (ii) his sign was forged or (iii) the deceased was forced to sign the Will when he was heavily intoxicated with alcohol and not within his senses and therefore could not put his signature properly. Do you agree? Ans. I disagree. The deceased was in his full senses when he had signed the Will on 1st December 2013.” PW-2- Karsan Chaudhary:-
“Q. 89 I put it to you that the deceased Mr. Ajay Singh was not in his senses on 1st December 2013. Do you agree? Ans. It is incorrect.
Q. 104 I put it to you that at the time of signing of the said Will (Exhibit P-3), the deceased Mr. Ajay Singh was heavily intoxicated and therefore not in his senses. Do you agree? Ans. It is incorrect. At that time, the deceased was completely in his senses. He was otherwise of sound mind and a healthy person.” Basis this, Learned Counsel submitted that there was nothing to suggest even remotely that (a) the deceased was in any manner addicted to alcohol (b) that the deceased was intoxicated let alone excessively at the time of execution of the said Will.

11. Insofar as issue No. 3, Learned Counsel submitted that the burden of proving the said issue was cast squarely upon the Defendant. He submitted that the Defendant had admittedly, failed to lead any evidence on the said issue and therefore the occasion to cross-examine DW-1 on the said issue did not arise. He reiterated that the evidence of PW-1 and PW-2 was adequate to prove that the deceased was not forcibly made to sign the said Will as had specifically been deposed to in paragraph No.5 of the respective AOEs. He then invited my attention to the following questions put to the respective attesting witnesses and the answers given by them thereto, viz. PW-1- Hirein Sharma:-

“Q. 54 I put it to you that either (i) the Will was prepared after the death of the deceased Mr. Ajay Singh and (ii) his sign was forged or (iii) the deceased was forced to sign the Will when he was heavily intoxicated with alcohol and not within his senses and therefore could not put his signature properly. Do you agree? Ans. I disagree. The deceased was in his full senses when he had signed the Will on 1st December 2013.” PW-2- Karsan Chaudhary:-
“Q. 90 I put it to you that the Plaintiff Mr. Harpal Singh was present at the time of execution of the said Will (Exhibit P- 3). Do you agree? Ans. It is incorrect. At the time of execution of the said Will, the only persons present were the deceased Mr. Ajay Singh, my brother Mr. Hirein Sharma and myself.” In light of the above answers, Learned Counsel submitted that there was absolutely nothing to show that the deceased was made to forcibly sign the said Will.

12. Insofar as the issue No.4 was concerned, Learned Counsel submitted that, the burden of proving this issue again was squarely upon the Defendant. He submitted that the Defendant in support of this issue had admittedly not led the evidence of any handwriting expert. The only evidence led in support of this issue was that of DW-1 wherein DW-1 has stated as follows;

“2. I say that the impugned Will is forged and fabricated document. The Will is not genuine. It does not bear the signature of the deceased. The signature of the deceased is forged as the signature of the deceased is not matching with his signature on application dated 17.01.2000, filed by the deceased and defendant’s mother for Registration of Hindu Marriage in the Office of the Registrar of Hindu Marriages, Ghaziabad, U.P. and wherein both, I and Shri Harpal Singh are witnesses. I say that the intention of the Plaintiff is to grab the property of the deceased and keep the defendant away from her legal share. A copy of the said application dated 17.01.2000 is annexed herewith and marked as EXHIBIT-1. I verify the contents of the said application and state that the same is a true and correct copy of the original.”

Without prejudice to aforesaid, Learned Counsel firstly, submitted that PW-1 was admittedly not a handwriting expert and secondly, that despite having ample opportunity DW-1 had chosen not to produce the evidence of a handwriting, expert but had chosen to prove forgery and fabrication based on his own evidence. He submitted that the Defendant had, conversely taken out an Interim Application being Interim Application (L) No.7313 of 2023 belatedly for verification of the signatures of the Deceased on the said Will. He submitted that the said Application was completely malafide and taken out only with the sole intent of delaying the hearing of the present Suit.

13. Learned Counsel then submitted that in view of the aforesaid, there was admittedly no positive evidence other than the mere ipse dixit of DW-1 to allege that the said signature appearing on the said Will was forged. In view thereof, he submitted that the same must necessarily be answered in the negative.

14. Mr. Bharucha then placing reliance upon a judgment in the case of Corra Vedachalan Chetty vs G. Janakiraman[3] and submitted that this Court was required to taken into consideration the conduct of the Caveator when deciding a Suit for Probate. He then invited my attention to the following to point out the dilatory tactics undertaken by DW-1 to delay the matter viz. i. That the Defendant had by an order dated 3rd September 2019 been granted four weeks’ time to file the AOE. ii. On 17th October, 2019 the Defendant however sought time to file the AOE on the ground that the Defendant was now a major, hence the Defendant was once again granted time of 4 weeks to file the AOE. The Defendant, however, did not file her AOE, but instead filed the AOE of DW-1. iii. On 25th September 2021 the Defendant once again sought time to file a fresh AOE of DW-1 since the AOE of DW-1 was not to the personal 3 2001 (3) CTC 283 knowledge of DW-1. This Court therefore on 25th August, 2021 observed as follows, viz.

“17. The Constituted Attorney, one Satyendra Kumar Raghav, is the Defendant's maternal grandfather, Meenakshi's father. He is not a lay person. He is an advocate and a retired member of the Uttar Pradesh Commercial Tax Tribunal. I should have thought it would have been apparent to one as qualified as Mr. Raghav that he cannot possibly give evidence on behalf of the Defendant. Yet Mr. Raghav persisted in this course of action. I am told across the Bar that the Defendant even came to India. If so, she could well have sought an extension and filed her own Affidavit. Mr. Raghav himself could not possibly have been unaware of the legal position, nor could not have misunderstood what Menon J's order says. It was not open to him, especially as a qualified lawyer and an erstwhile member of a state tax tribunal, to take liberties with this High Court or its order. 18. Mr. Raghav has done his granddaughter a singular disservice. I wil grant the Defendant time until 14 th October 2021 to file her Evidence Affidavit, confined to facts within her personal knowledge, and to be made by herself alone and no one else. But this will be subject to an order of costs payable by Mr. Raghav in the amount of Rs.50,000/-. These are to be paid by Mr Raghav because it is he who has caused this delay and has acted in a manner detrimental to the Defendant's interests, despite being in a position to know far better. Payment of costs to the Plaintiff is therefore a condition precedent. The Registry will not accept that Evidence Affidavit unless there is a proof for payment of costs"
iv. On 22nd July 2021, this Court recorded that the Defendant had on legal advice chosen not to file her own AOE but had chosen to file the AOE of DW-1. v. DW-1 thereafter on 17th November 2021, filed his AOE however the same was not taken on record as the same was not in conformity with the provisions of law. This Court therefore by an Order dated 3rd December 2021 rejected the said AOE and directed the DW-1 to file a fresh AOE within a period of two weeks i.e., on or before 17th December 2021. This is the second time the AOE of DW-1 was rejected. vi. DW-1 thereafter, once again, filed his AOE dated 17th December 2021 alongwith the Compilation of Document and the same were taken on record by an Order dated 14th September 2022. The said Order further recorded that the Commissioner shall endeavour to conclude the cross-examination on or before 4th October 2022. vii. However, the cross-examination of the Defendant's witness could not be to be concluded in the stipulated time due and the cross examination of DW-1 was cancelled on 3 occasions by DW-1. Basis the above he submitted that the conduct of DW-1 was clearly such which completely lacked in bonafides and was only to delay the grant of probate. He submitted that this Court must take into account this conduct of DW-1 when deciding the present Suit. Submissions of Ms. Neelam Yadav on behalf of the Defendant
15. Ms. Yadav submitted that the said Will was a false, fictitious, fabricated, and a forged document which had been produced by the Plaintiff with the sole motive of depriving the Defendant of her lawful inheritance.
16. Ms. Yadav then placing reliance upon Section 21 and 22 of the Hindu Adoptions and Maintenance Act, 1956 and submitted that an unmarried daughter is the dependent of her father and was entitled to receive maintenance from the estate left behind by the deceased father. She submitted that the Defendant cannot not therefore be deprived of her right to receive maintenance. In support of her contention, she placed reliance upon Section 391 of the Succession Act to submit that, nothing in Part VIII, IX or X would invalidate a right of maintenance to which a person would be entitled to in law.
17. She then submitted that there were several inconsistencies in the evidence led by PW-1 and PW-2. She submitted that both PW-1 and PW-2 had not proved due execution of the Will as they had not stated that the deceased had read, understood and was aware of what he was executing. She submitted that the AOE of both the attesting witnesses was totally silent on this aspect. She submitted that the AOE did not explain or set out any details leading upto the execution of the said Will and that the same were mechanically issued.
18. She then submitted that, while the said Will infact did not contain any real bequest in favour of the Defendant. She pointed out that the bequest of Rs.15,00,000/- was (a) to be given to the Defendant only when the Defendant turned 25 years or when the Defendant got married and (b) only if the beneficiaries named under the said Will were able to find the Defendant. She thus submitted that the bequest was entirely at the discretion of the beneficiaries under the said Will, the main beneficiary being the Plaintiff. She submitted that that given the relationship that the Plaintiff had with the deceased and the nonexistent relationship that the Plaintiff had with the Defendant, it was clear the Defendant had effectively been excluded under the said Will and the bequest was only notional.
19. Ms. Yadav then submitted that the deceased was addicted to alcohol. She submitted that when DW-1 had visited the residence of the deceased after his death, he was informed of this fact by the neighbours of the deceased. She placed reliance upon the fact that on the day the deceased was stated to have executed the said Will, the deceased had purchased alcohol worth Rs.800/- from one Miraj Wines. Basis this, she submitted that the deceased was clearly inebriated when the deceased was supposed to have executed the said Will.
20. Ms. Yadav then invited my attention to the judgment of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Murthy & Ors. Vs. C. Saradambal[4] to submit that, when there 4 Civil Appeal No.4270 of 2010, decided on 10th December, 2021. exist suspicious circumstances surrounding a will a heavy onus lay upon the propounder to by cogent evidence, dispel the same. She submitted that a Court would be loath to grant probate when there were suspicious circumstances which had not been adequately explained by the propounder. In support of her contention that in the present case there existed several extremely suspicious circumstances surrounding the said Will, she placed reliance upon the following, viz. i. That fact that the said Will refers to the Deceased in the third person, when the said Will was stated to have been made by the Deceased himself. ii. That, a plain reading of the said Will made clear that the same was drafted by an advocate given the manner, content and nomenclature used in the said Will. However, the said Will records that the Deceased had prepared the same himself, viz. “In presence of the following attesting witnesses, I Ajay Harpal Singh, the Testator, has signed this Will and Testament of me on the day, date, month and year first above written after carefully reading and understanding the contents thereof, which I have prepared myself and I am signing the same in the presence of the witnesses.” iii. That, the said Will had effectively completely excluded the only child and daughter of the deceased who was a minor on the date when the said Will was supposedly made. iv. That the said Will effectively bequeathed the entire estate of the Deceased to the Plaintiff, who had admittedly disowned the Deceased and with whom the Deceased had no contact since the year 2002. v. That the fact that the said Will proceeded on the premises that the Deceased would pass away before the Defendant had attained the age of 25 years, especially since the Deceased was neither old nor was the Deceased suffering from any life-threatening ailment at the time of making of the supposed Will. vi. That, both the attesting witnesses were related to one Mrs. Meena Sharma Chaudhury who had close relations with the Plaintiff and both the attesting witnesses who were from Delhi and did not explain why they were in Mumbai to attest the said Will. vii. That, the deceased was working in a large organization as also living in a 14 story building and therefore could have had the option of choosing people whom he knew well as being attesting witnesses instead of only casual acquaintances.

21. She then submitted that the signatures appearing on the said Will were forged and fabricated and not genuine. Learned Counsel then submitted that DW-1 had prepared a chart of specimen signatures of the impugned Will as compared to three other documents, basis which, she submitted that ex facie the signatures of the deceased as appearing on the said Will were different from that of documents.

22. Basis all the above, she submitted that there existed several suspicious circumstances around the said Will which the Plaintiff had failed to discharge. She thus submitted that probate of the said Will ought not to be granted and the Suit ought to be dismissed. Reason and conclusion

23. I have heard learned counsel for the parties, considered the rival contentions as also the case law cited and the evidence led. Before proceeding further, however, it is first useful to set out the well settled legal principles which a Court is required to take into consideration when deciding a matter regarding the proof of a Will. The Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of H. Venkatachala Iyengar Vs. B. N. Thimmajamma & Ors.[5] laid down as follows, viz.

“18. What is the true legal position in the matter of proof of wills? It is well-known that the proof of wills presents a recurring topic for decision in courts and there are a large number of judicial pronouncements on the subject. The party propounding a will or otherwise making a claim under a will is no doubt seeking to prove a document and, in deciding how it is to be proved, we must inevitably refer to the statutory provisions which govern the proof of documents. Sections 67 and 68 of the Evidence Act are relevant for this purpose. Under Section 67, if a
5 1959 Supp (1) SCR 426 document is alleged to be signed by any person, the signature of the said person must be proved to be in his handwriting, and for proving such a handwriting under Sections 45 and 47 of the Act the opinions of experts and of persons acquainted with the handwriting of the person concerned are made relevant. Section 68 deals with the proof of the execution of the document required by law to be attested; and it provides that such a document shall not be used as evidence until one attesting witness at least has been called for the purpose of proving its execution. These provisions prescribe the requirements and the nature of proof which must be satisfied by the party who relies on a document in a court of law. Similarly, Sections 59 and 63 of the Indian Succession Act are also relevant. Section 59 provides that every person of sound mind, not being a minor, may dispose of his property by will and the three illustrations to this section indicate what is meant by the expression "a person of sound mind" in the context. Section 63 requires that the testator shall sign or affix his mark to the will or it shall be signed by some other person in his presence and by his direction and that the signature or mark shall be so made that it shall appear that it was intended thereby to give effect to the writing as a will. This section also requires that the will shall be attested by two or more witnesses as prescribed. Thus the question as to whether the will set up by the propounder is proved to be the last will of the testator has to be decided in the light of these provisions. Has the testator signed the will? Did he understand the nature and effect of the dispositions in the will? Did he put his signature to the will knowing what it contained? Stated broadly it is the decision of these questions which determines the nature of the finding on the question of the proof of wills. It would prima facie be true to say that the will has to be proved like any other document except as to the special requirements of attestation prescribed by Section 63 of the Indian Succession Act. As in the case of proof of other documents so in the case of proof of wills it would be idle to expect proof with mathematical certainty. The test to be applied would be the usual test of the satisfaction of the prudent mind in such matters.
19. However, there is one important feature which distinguishes wills from other documents. Unlike other documents the will speaks from the death of the testator, and so, when it is propounded or produced before a court, the testator who has already departed the world cannot say whether it is his will or not; and this aspect naturally introduces an element of solemnity in the decision of the question as to whether the document propounded is proved to be the last will and testament of the departed testator. Even so, in dealing with the proof of wills the court will start on the same enquiry as in the case of the proof of documents. The propounder would be called upon to show by satisfactory evidence that the will was signed by the testator, that the testator at the relevant time was in a sound and disposing state of mind, that he understood the nature and effect of the dispositions and put his signature to the document of his own free will. Ordinarily when the evidence adduced in support of the will is disinterested, satisfactory and sufficient to prove the sound and disposing state of the testator's mind and his signature as required by law, courts would be justified in making a finding in favour of the propounder. In other words, the onus on the propounder can be taken to be discharged on proof of the essential facts just indicated.
20. There may, however, be cases in which the execution of the will may be surrounded by suspicious circumstances. The alleged signature of the testator may be very shaky and doubtful and evidence in support of the propounder's case that the signature, in question is the signature of the testator may not remove the doubt created by the appearance of the signature; the condition of the testator's mind may appear to be very feeble and debilitated; and evidence adduced may not succeed in removing the legitimate doubt as to the mental capacity of the testator; the dispositions made in the will may appear to be unnatural, improbable or unfair in the light of relevant circumstances; or, the will may otherwise indicate that the said dispositions may not be the result of the testator's free will and mind. In such cases the court would naturally expect that all legitimate suspicions should be completely removed before the document is accepted as the last will of the testator. The presence of such suspicious circumstances naturally tends to make the initial onus very heavy; and, unless it is satisfactorily discharged, courts would be reluctant to treat the document as the last will of the testator. It is true that, if a caveat is filed alleging the exercise of undue influence, fraud or coercion in respect of the execution of the will propounded, such pleas may have to be proved by the caveators; but, even without such pleas circumstances may raise a doubt as to whether the testator was acting of his own free will in executing the will, and in such circumstances, it would be a part of the initial onus to remove any such legitimate doubts in the matter.
21. Apart from the suspicious circumstances to which we have just referred, in some cases the wills propounded disclose another infirmity. Propounders themselves take a prominent part in the execution of the wills which confer on them substantial benefits. If it is shown that the propounder has taken a prominent part in the execution of the will and has received substantial benefit under it, that itself is generally treated as a suspicious circumstance attending the execution of the will and the propounder is required to remove the said suspicion by clear and satisfactory evidence. It is in connection with wills that present such suspicious circumstances that decisions of English courts often mention the test of the satisfaction of judicial conscience. It may be that the reference to judicial conscience in this connection is a heritage from similar observations made by ecclesiastical courts in England when they exercised jurisdiction with reference to wills; but any objection to the use of the word "conscience" in this context would, in our opinion, be purely technical and academic, if not pedantic. The test merely emphasizes that, in determining the question as to whether an instrument produced before the court is the last will of the testator, the court is deciding a solemn question and it must be fully satisfied that it had been validly executed by the testator who is no longer alive.
22. It is obvious that for deciding material questions of fact which arise in applications for probate or in actions on wills, no hard and fast or inflexible rules can be laid down for the appreciation of the evidence. It may, however, be stated generally that a propounder of the will has to prove the due and valid execution of the will and that if there are any suspicious circumstances surrounding the execution of the will the propounder must remove the said suspicions from the mind of the court by cogent and satisfactory evidence. It is hardly necessary to add that the result of the application of these two general and broad principles would always depend upon the facts and circumstances of each case and on the nature and quality of the evidence adduced by the parties. It is quite true that, as observed by Lord Du Parcq in Harmes v. Hinkson "where a will is charged with suspicion, the rules enjoin a reasonable scepticism, not an obdurate persistence in disbelief. They do not demand from the Judge, even circumstances of grave suspicion, a resolute and impenetrable incredulity. He is never required to close his mind to the truth". It would sound platitudinous to say so, but it is nevertheless true that in discovering truth even in such cases the judicial mind must always be open though vigilant, cautious and circumspect.” It is with keeping in mind the above guiding principle laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme Court that I shall now proceed to consider and determine the Issues which have been framed for determination in the present Suit.

24. The burden of proving issue No.1 is squarely upon the Plaintiff. The Plaintiff has in support of issue No.1 led the evidence of both the attesting witnesses and the propounder in support of proving Issue No. 1. I shall therefore now proceed to examine evidence led by the Plaintiff to ascertain if the same proves due execution of the said Will as contemplated in Section 63 of the Succession Act, viz. i. As noted by the Hon’ble Supreme Court, in the case of H. Venkatachala Iyengar that “The party propounding a will or otherwise making a claim under a will is no doubt seeking to prove a document and, in deciding how it is to be proved, we must inevitably refer to the statutory provisions which govern the proof of documents. Sections 67 and 68 of the Evidence Act are relevant for this purpose. Under Section 67, if a document is alleged to be signed by any person, the signature of the said person must be proved to be in his handwriting, and for proving such a handwriting under Sections 45 and 47 of the Act the opinions of experts and of persons acquainted with the handwriting of the person concerned are made relevant.”. I find that there is absolutely no positive evidence led by the Plaintiff to prove that the signature on the said Will was that of the deceased. Thus, the burden to prove the said Will cast upon the Plaintiff has not been discharged. The Affidavit of Evidence of the Plaintiff really is more in the nature of a pleading and does not in my view even remotely discharge the burden caste upon the Plaintiff as propounder of the said Will to discharge. ii. Additionally, due execution requires the propounder to establish that that the Testator understood the nature and effect of the disposition in the said Will and had put his signature to the said Will knowing what it contained. Therefore, there must necessarily be evidence to support the knowledge of the Testator to the nature and effect of the dispositions made under the said Will which he is stated to have signed. In the facts of the present case, it is the Plaintiff’s contention that at the time of execution of the said Will, only the deceased and the attesting witnesses were present. A perusal of the AOE of both the attesting witnesses showed that they had not anywhere deposed to the fact that the deceased had read and understood the said Will or that the deceased was conscious of the nature amd effect thereof. Both the AOEs simply state as follows, viz. AOE of PW-1- “I was present together with the Deceased and Karsan Chaudhary (my cousin brother) at the residence of the Deceased above named and we did then and there see the said Deceased put his signature at the foot of the testamentary paper in the English language and character, which is referred to in the petition herein as the Will and marked as Exhibit “A” to the Petition, and declare and publish the same as his last will and testament.” AOE of PW-2- “I was present together with the Deceased and Hirein Sharma (my cousin brother) at the residence of the Deceased above named and we did then and there see the said Deceased put his signature at the foot of the testamentary paper in the English language and character, which is referred to in the petition herein as the Will and marked as Exhibit “A” to the Petition, and declare and publish the same as his last will and testament.” At the very highest, this evidence would show that the attesting witnesses had witnessed the ministerial act of the deceased signing the said Will and nothing more. There is absolutely nothing stated in the AOE to the effect that the deceased had signed the said Will after having read and understood the nature and effect of the same. iii. To prove a Will, the propounder is required to show by satisfactory evidence inter alia, that the testator at the relevant time had understood the nature and effect of the dispositions and put his signature to the document of his own free will. It is the Plaintiffs case that the time of execution of the said Will, only the attesting witnesses were present with the deceased. A careful reading of AOEs of both the attesting witnesses make absolutely no mention of the fact that the deceased had understood the nature and effect of the dispositions before signing the said Will. At the highest what the AOEs prove is the ministerial act of the Deceased signing the said Will and nothing more. The Hon’ble Supreme Court in in the context of valid fulfillment of the requirements of Section 63 of the Succession Act has in the case of State of Haryana Vs. Harnam Singh and Ors.[6] held as follows; “The requirement of Section 63 of the Succession Act, 1925 cannot be said to have been fulfilled by mechanical compliance of the stipulations therein. Evidence of meeting the requirement of the said provision must be reliable. The fact-finding courts did not find such evidence to be reliable.” Thus, the Hon’ble Supreme Court has held that there cannot be mechanical compliance with the provisions of Section 63 of the Succession Act. The Court is therefore required to determine whether in substance and spirit the provisions of Section 63 have infact been fulfilled. In the present case, I find that both the AOEs apart from being cryptic and short, are virtually identical in all respects. Both the AOEs could very well have been photocopies of each other. While no doubt an AOE proving due execution of a Will does not have to be elaborate or unnecessarily long. The same must fulfill the criteria of Section 63 of the Succession Act. Section 63(c) of the Succession Act.

In this case, I find that the same are purely mechanical and infact do not. iv. Additionally, both the attesting witnesses have deposed to the fact that they have independently given instructions for the drafting of their respective AOEs. PW-1 has stated in cross examination that his AOE was drafted on his instructions by his stenographer. PW-2 has stated that his AOE was prepared by a stenographer from the chamber of PW-1 on the instructions of PW-2. However, a perusal of both the AOEs show that they are virtually identical in both content and form. Both the said AOE’s for all practical purposes could be the same. It is therefore incredulous to suggest that independent instructions were given for the drafting of these AOEs. To say so, is plainly false. The AOEs were clearly drafted by the same individual and not on the independent instructions given by both the attesting witnesses as stated in cross examination. v. Crucially, PW-1 has in his AOE stated that he knew and was well acquainted with the deceased since the deceased was a childhood friend of his uncle Mr. Rajiv lal Chaudhary. However, in crossexamination, PW-1 has stated that he has met the deceased for the first time on 1st December 2013, i.e., the date on which the said Will is supposed said to have been executed viz. “Q.[4] Have you ever met the deceased, Mr. Ajay Singh during his lifetime? Ans. I have met Mr. Ajay Singh twice. The first time was on the day when he asked me to sign as a witness on his Will, i.e., on 1st December 2013. The second instance was probably on 7th or 8th December 2013 when he had come to my house to meet Karsan Chaudhary (PW-2) and me.” Clearly therefore, PW-1 has given false evidence in his AOE when he has stated that he knew and was well acquainted with the Deceased. vi. PW-2 in cross-examination has initially stated in answer to question No. 46 that he had no discussions with the deceased regarding the said Will. However, thereafter, in answer to question No. 53, PW-2 has stated that he had discussions with the deceased who orally described the contents of the said Will to PW-1 and PW-2. This again shows the inconsistency in the evidence led. vii. PW-2 has answered question No.100 answered as follows; “Q.100. Can you tell us who asked you to mention your PAN? Ans: Prior to my signing of the said Will, the same was signed by my brother Mr. Hirein Sharma. As Mr. Hirein Sharma has mentioned his PAN, I also did the same. No one asked me to do specifically.” However, a perusal of the said Will shows that PW-1 has infact not mentioned his PAN number anywhere on the said Will. Clearly, therefore, PW-2 has also given false evidence. viii. Hence, in view of the above, I have no hesitation in holding that the Plaintiff has failed to prove Issue No. 1 and is therefore answered in the negative. Given that Issue No. 1 has been answered in the negative, the need to consider and answer Issue Nos. 2 to 4 does not arise.

25. Additionally, I must note that in the present case, there are overwhelming suspicious circumstances in addition to the said Will being a grossly unnatural Will. The law is now well established that, there is a heavy burden upon a Propounder to dispel the suspicious circumstance. In the present case, not so much as an attempt has been made by the Plaintiff to do so. What to my mind are glaring examples of the said Will not being a genuine and infact a wholly unnatural will are the following, viz. i. The said Will effectively completely excludes the only child and daughter of the deceased who was a minor at the time when the Will was supposedly made and ensures that the minor child will get nothing (no matter what dire straits she may be in) until attaining the age of 25 years or marriage, and that to on production of a marriage certificate. Additionally, even this bequest/condition is at the total and unfettered discretion of the other beneficiaries of the Deceased. ii. The said Will while excluding the only child of the Deceased, has effectively bequeathed his entire estate to his father who had admittedly disowned the deceased and had absolutely no contact with since the year

2001. iii. The said Will though stated to be made by the Deceased himself refers to the Deceased in the third person. iv. That the fact that the said Will predetermined that the Deceased would pass away before the Defendant had attained the age of 25 years. v. The fact that both the attesting witnesses who were infact young boys in their 20’s and early 30’s who admittedly were permanent residents of New Delhi, were chosen as attesting witnesses instead of persons well known to the deceased. I have no hesitation in holding that all of the above are indeed most suspicious circumstance and there had been not even an attempt by the Plaintiff to explain away the same by leading any evidence. The Will has sought to be proved in the most mechanical matter and the Plaintiff has miserably failed to prove both the requirements for proof of a will as also the conscience of the Court.

26. Before parting with this order, one aspect, I must also deal with since great emphasis was laid by the Plaintiff, was the conduct of DW-1 namely Mr. Satyendra Kumar Raghav. The Plaintiff placed strong reliance upon the Order dated 25th August 2021, where the Learned Judge held that Mr. Raghav had done a great disservice to the Defendant, his granddaughter. Firstly, I must note that the said Order was passed in the context of the time taken by Mr. Raghav to file the AOE and secondly, the Learned Judge did not have the benefit of appreciating the evidence in the matter, as I have had. Hence, the emphasis on the said Order at the final hearing stage is entirely out of context and misplaced. I find that there is absolutely no disservice done by Mr. Raghav to the Defendant whatsoever. The disservice to the Defendant, to put it mildly is at the hands of those who seek propound such an unnatural and patently false Will. What it really boils down to is a grandfather, who, by his own admission is well placed in life, and yet seeks to exclude his own granddaughter from the estate of her deceased father..

27. Insofar as the Interim Applications are concerned, Ms. Yadav apart from stating the same had been filed and ought to be considered before the final hearing of the present Suit, did not really advanced any arguments in support of either of the Interim Applications. I have perused Interim Applications and find that in view of the fact that issue No.1 has been answered in the negative, the same do not therefore survive.

28. Hence, for the reasons aforestated, I dismiss the present Suit and the Interim Applications are also disposed of accordingly. (ARIF S. DOCTOR, J.)