The Chief Executive Officer, Zilla Parishad, Nashik v. Balu Baburao Dhanwate; The Chief Executive Officer, Zilla Parishad, Nashik v. Dadasaheb Gangadhar Shete

High Court of Bombay · 12 Sep 2023
Milind N. Jadhav
Writ Petition No. 4103 of 2003; Writ Petition No. 4110 of 2003
labor appeal_dismissed Significant

AI Summary

The Bombay High Court upheld the reinstatement of Muster Assistants terminated without statutory compliance, affirming their status as workmen entitled to protection under labour laws.

Full Text
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WP.4103.03 & 4110.03.doc
IN THE HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT BOMBAY
CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION
CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION
WRIT PETITION NO. 4103 OF 2003
WRIT PETITION NO. 4103 OF 2003
The Chief Executive Officer, Zilla Parishad, Nashik and Anr. … Petitioners
VERSUS
Balu Baburao Dhanwate and Ors. … Respondents
WITH
WRIT PETITION NO. 4110 OF 2003
WRIT PETITION NO. 4110 OF 2003
The Chief Executive Officer, Zilla Parishad, Nashik and Anr. … Petitioners
VERSUS
Dadasaheb Gangadhar Shete and Ors. … Respondents .............…..
 Mr. Vivek B. Rane i/by Mr. Ashwin Kapadnis, Advocate for
Petitioners.
 Mr. Sanjeev B. Deore a/w Ms. Suchita J. Pawar and Mr. Hariharan
Ramaswami, Advocates for Respondent No.1.
 Mr. A. P. Vanarase, AGP for Respondent Nos.2 and 3 - State ...................
CORAM : MILIND N. JADHAV, J.
DATE : SEPTEMBER 12, 2023
JUDGMENT
:

1. These Writ Petitions have been filed under the provisions of Article 227 of the Constitution of India taking exception to the common judgment and order dated 01.11.2001 passed by Industrial Court, Nashik in Revision Application No.41 of 2001 and Revision Application No.42 of 2001 thereby dismissing the Revision Applications filed by Petitioners against the common judgment and order dated 05.08.2000 passed by Labour Court, Nashik in Complaint 1 of 16 (ULP) No.346 of 1986 and Complaint (ULP) No.331 of 1986 filed by Respondent No.1 (in both Petitions) wherein Respondent No.1 (in both Petitions) were directed to be reinstated w.e.f. their date of termination without any back wages.

2. This common Judgment shall dispose of both the aforesaid Writ Petitions as facts are identical in both the cases.

3. Briefly stated such of the relevant facts leading to filing of the present Writ Petitions are as follows:-

3.1. On 07.05.1983, Respondent No.1 in Writ Petition No.4103 of 2003 viz. Balu Baburao Dhanwate was appointed on the post of Muster Assistant by Petitioners under the Employment Guarantee Scheme (for short “EGS”) and he continued to work on the same post until 11.10.1986 on which date his services were terminated by Petitioners in an abrupt manner without complying with mandatory provisions of Section 25-F and 25-G of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 (for short “the said Act”) and despite availability of work with Petitioners.

3.2. Similarly on 14.03.1983, Respondent No.1 in Writ Petition No. 4110 of 2023 viz. Dadasaheb Gangadhar Shete was appointed on the post of Muster Assistant by Petitioners under EGS and on 13.09.1986 his services were terminated by Petitioners in a similar fashion as mentioned herein above. 2 of 16

3.3. Thereafter, Balu Baburao Dhanwate and Dadasaheb Gangadhar Shete approached the Labour Court, Nashik alleging unfair labour practice at the instance of Petitioners and sought reinstatement in service alongwith all consequential benefits by filing Complaint (ULP) No.346 of 1986 and Complaint (ULP) No.331 of 1986 under Item 1 (a), (b), (d), (f) and (g) of Schedule IV of the Maharashtra Recognition of Trade Unions and Prevention of Unfair Labour Practice Act, 1971 (for short “MRTU & PULP Act”).

3.4. As reliefs sought in both Complaints were identical and against same Respondents (Petitioners herein), Labour Court, Nashik proceeded with hearing of both Complaints simultaneously and framed the following issues for adjudication separately in both Complaints:- “(i) Whether the Complainant proves that he is a workman within the meaning of Section 2 (s) of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947?

(ii) Whether the Complainant proves that the work of respondent is an industry with the meaning of Section 2 (j) of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947?

(iii) Does the Complainant prove that the respondents engaged in unfair labour practice under item 1 (a), (b), (d), (f), (g) of schedule IV of the Maharashtra Recognition of Trade Unions and Prevention of Unfair Labour Practice Act,1971 in terminating his services as alleged in the complaint?

(iv) Is the Complainant entitled to reinstatement with continuity of service and full back wages?

(v) What order and Relief?”

3.5. Labour Court, Nashik after duly considering the evidence 3 of 16 placed on record and arguments advanced by both parties, adjudicated all issues in the affirmative and passed a common judgment and order dated 05.08.2000 directing Petitioners to reinstate Respondent No.1 (in both Petitions) w.e.f. the date of termination, however without any back wages. Thus both Respondents were entitled for reinstatement with continuity of service from the date of their termination w.e.f. 05.08.2000 i.e. the date of Judgment of the Labour Court.

3.6. Being aggrieved by the judgment and order dated 05.08.2000, Petitioners filed Revision Application No. 41 of 2001 and Revision Application No. 42 of 2001 before the Industrial Court, Nashik under section 44 of the Maharashtra Recognition of Trade Unions and Prevention of Unfair Labour Practice Act,1971. The Industrial Court, Nashik by common judgment and order dated 01.11.2001 upheld the judgment and order passed by the Labour Court, Nashik.

3.7. Hence Petitioners filed the present Writ Petitions challenging the judgment and order dated 01.11.2001 passed by the Industrial Court, Nashik.

4. By order dated 15.10.2003, this Court issued notice to Respondents and granted interim relief in terms of prayer clause (c) of the Petitions granting stay to the judgment and order dated 01.11.2001 until final disposal of the Writ Petitions. 4 of 16

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4.1. After receipt of notice, Respondent No.1 (in both Petitions) filed Civil Application No. 1324 of 2004 and Civil Application NO. 1323 of 2004 under provisions of section 17-B of the said Act claiming wages from Petitioners. By order dated 14.07.2004, this Court disposed of both Applications rejecting their claims.

4.2. Thereafter, in the year 2014, Respondent No.1 (in both Petitions) filed Civil Application No. 2246 of 2014 and Civil Application No. 2247 of 2014 seeking expeditious hearing of the Petitions, however both these Applications were disposed of by this Court by order dated 28.10.2014 with directions for placing these Petitions on final hearing board as per chronology.

4.3. By order dated 16.07.2015, both Petitions were dismissed for default by this Court as none appeared for Petitioners. Subsequently, Petitioners filed Civil Application No. 2463 of 2015 and Civil Application No. 2464 of 2015 seeking restoration of both Petitions and by order dated 07.10.2015, this Court allowed both Applications and the Petitions were accordingly restored to the file of this Court.

5. I have heard Mr. Rane, learned Advocate for Petitioner, Mr. Deore, learned Advocate for Respondent No.1 and Mr. Vanarase, learned AGP for Respondent Nos. 2 and 3 – State and with their able assistance perused the pleadings and record of the case. 5 of 16

6. Mr. Rane would argue that Respondent No.1 (in both Petitions) were appointed for a temporary period for completion of specific work under EGS formulated by the State Government and no employer – employee relationship existed between Petitioners and both Respondents. He argued that EGS was formulated by State Government to provide work to rural and unskilled people for a specific period and hence Petitioners were not liable to absorb such workers employed under EGS or regularize their services on permanent basis. He further argued that appointment of Respondent No.1 (in both Petitions) was purely on temporary basis with due breaks and issuance of fresh appointment letters for specific periods of six months. Hence he would submit that there was no question of issuing termination notice or giving any compensation in lieu of their termination. He argued that Respondent No.1 (in both Petitions) failed to produce any proof of completion of 240 days of continuous service in any year of their service tenure. He would submit that Government Resolution dated 01.12.1995 passed by the State Government for absorption of Muster Assistants in permanent services cannot be applied retrospectively in the present case as both of them were not employed beyond 11.10.1986.

6.1. In support of his above submissions, Mr. Rane has placed reliance on the decision dated 02.02.2017 in the case of Shri Asaram 6 of 16

N. Patil Vs. The Zilla Parishad in Writ Petition No.5247 of 1997 passed by a coordinate learned Single Judge of this Court, Bench at Aurangabad (Coram: Ravindra V. Ghuge, J.) and urged the Court to consider the facts of the said case wherein the Petitioner was not in employment in the year 1990 and hence he was not considered favourably for appointment as Muster Assistant as per Government Resolution dated 01.12.1995. He would submit that similar are the facts in the present case also. I have perused the above decision and I find that in that case there was no evidence placed before the learned Trial Court with regard to continuous service of the employee / Muster Assistant whereas contrary thereto in the present case there is a clear fining returned by the learned Trial Court that on the basis of oral evidence adduced by the employees / Muster Assistants it was shown that they had worked for more than 240 days in each calendar year. The decision of the Industrial Court in Revision proceedings has upheld this finding returned by the learned Labour Court in the present case. In that view of the matter, I find that the decision in the case of Shri Asaram N. Patil (supra) is clearly distinguishable on facts and cannot be ipso facto applied to the facts of the present case.

7. PER-CONTRA, Mr. Deore, learned Advocate appearing for the contesting Respondent in both Writ Petitions has drawn my attention to the judgment and order passed by the learned Labour 7 of 16 Court which is upheld by the learned Industrial Court and would submit that the Labour Court has rightly held that the original complainant i.e. Respondent No.1 was employed for more than 3 years and certificate to that effect had been issued by the Petitioners’ Officer which indicated that the Respondent / employee were never engaged under EGS as their work was of a permanent nature i.e. clerical.

7.1. He has argued that the Labour Court rightly held that the Petitioner adduced no evidence to demonstrate that the Respondent No.1 was employed under EGS and to demonstrate that at the time of termination of Respondent No.1, work under EGS was finished or completed permanently.

7.2. He has next argued that stand taken by Petitioners that they were an implementing agency and there was no employer-employee relationship is well answered by the decision in the case of Divisional Manager, Division Wanprakalpa Office (W) Forest Development Corporation Nashik Versus Chimna Arjun Jadhav[1] wherein in paragraph No.10 of judgment and order dated 13.06.2001 it is held that merely because the Petitioner was an implementing agency for the State Government Scheme, that would not alter the jural relationship between the Petitioner Corporation and the workman engaged by them and in such circumstances the respondent 1 2001 (4) Mh.L.J. 97 8 of 16 complainants / workmen are engaged by Petitioner - Corporation and there exists employer-employee relationship between them.

7.3. He would submit that thus Respondent No.1 was not employed under EGS which was rightly held by Labour Court in paragraph No.15 of its judgment and order dated 05.08.2000; that it was specifically held by Labour Court that Respondent No.1 was not an unskilled manual worker which is the nucleus of EGS; that Respondent No.1 was appointed to perform clerical work like preparation and maintenance of muster rolls and assignment of work which is of permanent nature and not seasonal work; that EGS nowhere contemplated about appointment of Muster Assistant. Thus according to him the Labour Court rightly held that Muster Assistant was not part of EGS on the backdrop of the material placed on record and the decision passed by the Apex Court and this Court which were relied upon by the answering Respondents.

8. I have heard submissions made by both learned Advocates and considered the judgments passed by the learned Labour Court and the learned Industrial Court which are impugned before me. In the first instance, it needs to be emphasized that in the decision of the learned Labour Court dated 05.08.2000, there is a categorical findings returned in respect of the fact that the Respondent No. 1 was a workman within the meaning of Section 2(s) of the said Act in the 9 of 16 affirmative and that he has proved that the work of the Respondent is an industry within the meaning of Section 2(j) of the said Act.

9. It is seen that both complainants / employees / Respondent No. 1 led oral evidence on oath about their employment from 1983 to

1986. They produced certificates issued by Petitioners certifying their length of employment by leading evidence. It is pertinent to note that the learned Labour Court has recorded finding that the evidence indicated that the complainants / employees were never EGS labourers and that different project works were undertaken under EGS and employment was given to them on one project after the other. A further categorical finding has been given on the basis of oral as well as documentary evidence recorded by the learned Labour Court to the effect that such evidence sufficiently established that both complainants / employees / Respondent No. 1 were employed for more than 3 years and their services were continuous as contemplated under the provisions of Section 25(B) of the said Act. Perusal of the judgment of the learned Labour Court further reveals that Petitioners did not lead or adduce any evidence to show that at the time of termination of services of the complainants / employees / Respondent No. 1, EGS works had indeed finished or completed permanently. Hence, in the absence of any evidence led by Petitioners before the learned Labour Court, it was not possible for the learned Labour Court 10 of 16 to accept the case of the Petitioners. These findings of the learned Labour Court have been upheld by the Industrial Court. Further perusal of the judgment passed by the learned Labour Court reveals that after discussion on the case law relating to appointment of complainants / employees on EGS project and as to whether the EGS project is an industry or otherwise, a positive finding has been given to the effect that the evidence placed on record indicated that complainants / employees / Respondent No. 1 were not unskilled manual workers and that EGS contemplated appointment of Muster Assistant independent of the provisions of the said Act for carrying out incidental duties of preparation, maintenance of muster rolls and assignment of works etc. and their duties were essentially clerical in nature. The learned Labour Court has categorically held that merely because of complainants were appointed to work on EGS projects it would not be sufficient to hold that their employment was subject to the provisions of EGS. The learned Labour Court has held that having regard to the material and record and ratio of the decision of the Supreme Court in the case of Chief Conservator of Forest and Anr. Vs. Jagannath Maruti Kondhare etc.[2] and the decision of the Division Bench of this Court in the case of M.D. Khairnar and Ors. Vs. State of Maharashtra and Ors.3, the complainants / employees / Respondent No. 1 were independently appointed as Muster Assistants by giving 2 1996 CLR 680 SC 3 1985 CLR 649 (Bom. High Court) 11 of 16 them separate appointment orders and therefore concluded that they were doing mainly clerical work and were thus ‘workmen’ as defined under the said Act and therefore provisions of both the said Act and the MRTU & PULP Act were applicable to them.

10. The learned Labour Court has held that reference to Government Resolution dated 01.12.1995 could not be made applicable directly to the case of the complainants / employees / Respondents because it was concerned with examining whether their termination from service amounted to unfair labour practice or otherwise. In that view of the matter, the learned Labour Court concluded that their termination was an unfair labour practice and hence directed reinstatement.

11. In so far as determination of issue Nos.[3] and 4 by the learned Labour Court is concerned, it is seen that oral evidence of the complainants / employees / Respondent No. 1 was led before the learned Labour Court that they were employed in 1983 and served till 1986, when their services were finally terminated. The learned Labour Court has stated that after going through the oral evidence of both complainants / employees / Respondent No. 1, the fact of their continuous employment and abrupt termination has remained unshaken. Contrary thereto, the learned Labour Court observed that Petitioners herein did not lead or produce any evidence on record and 12 of 16 that they have at least produced their appointment orders and attendance register or pay register to show their status. However that was not done by Petitioners.

12. I have perused the judgment passed by the learned Labour Court which is a detailed reasoned judgment on all issues taking into account and appreciating the entire evidence produced by the complainants / employees / Respondent No. 1 before the learned Labour Court and I find that no reason as to why the said decision needs to be differed with.

13. The learned Industrial Court while passing its judgment and order has upheld the findings passed by the learned Labour Court on both the principal issues and given its reasoning in paragraph Nos.[7] and 8 of its decision in Revision proceedings.

13.1. For the purpose of reference, paragraph Nos.[7] and 8 are reproduced below:-

“7. At the outset, it is necessary to mention that under Section 44 of the M.R.T.U. and P.U.L.P. Act, 1971, this Court is having very limited jurisdiction so as to interfere in the Order passed by the Labour Court. Industrial Court could not reappreciate or reassess the evidence on record and disturb the findings of the Labour Court, unless and until there is apparent error committed on record, and findings are erroneous and perverse. Therefore, keeping in mind this well settled position of law, it will have to be scrutinized whether there is any justified reason so as to interfere in the Order passed by the Labour Court. It is admitted fact that both Complainants were appointed as the Muster Assistant and their services were terminated without complying provisions of Industrial Disputes Act; hence, termination was held to be illegal by the Labour Court. It is undisputed fact that while passing the impugned order, Labour
13 of 16 Court elaborately considered the Judgments cited by the both parties. Labour Court has also considered the Resolution dated 1-12-95 on which Complainant has relied. Labour Court has discussed all the relevant Judgments cited the parties in paras 12-to-16. After considering the ratio of the Judgments cited by the parties, Labour Court has come to the conclusion that Complainants are workmen and the Respondent Department is the Industry within the definition of Sections 2(s) and 2(j) of the I.D. Act respectively. Labour Court has given findings in para 17 and 18 of the Judgment.
8. Labour Court has considered the oral evidence adduced by the Complainants on record and came to the conclusions that Complainants have worked for more than 240 days in each year. It is pertinent to note that Respondent Department has not adduced any oral evidence before the Labour Court in support of its contention. Therefore, there is nothing wrong on the part of the Labour Court in drawing inference in favour of the Complainants, by holding that services of the Complainants were terminated illegally in breach of provisions Section 25(f) of the I.D. Act. Even Labour Court has considered all the aspects, while denying the back wages. Thus, taking into consideration all the facts and circumstances of the case, findings of the Labour Court, by stretch of imagination, could not be said to be erroneous and perverse. I do not find that Order passed by the Labour Court is in any way illegal, improper and bad-in-law. On the contrary, Order passed by the Labour Court seems to be legal, proper and justified. Since the Ld. Counsel for the petitioners/Respondents has failed to point out any apparent error committed by the Labour Court while passing the impugned Order, and any perverse and erroneous findings of the Labour Court, I am not inclined to interfere in the Order passed by the Labour Court, as there is no reason to interfere in the Order passed by the Labour Court. I do not find any substance in the present Revision Applications. Revision Applications being devoid of any substance deserve to be dismissed. Hence, I answer all issues accordingly and proceed to pass the Order as follows:-…”

13.2. Identical reasons have been given in respect of both Respondent No. 1 and I find that no reason to interfere with the concurrent findings returned by the learned Labour Court and the learned Industrial Court.

14. Both the judgments are therefore sustained. 14 of 16

15. In the present case, it is seen that pursuant to termination, the learned Labour Court and the learned Industrial Court have held that the employees / Respondent No. 1 shall be entitled for reinstatement but without any back wages. It is argued on behalf of the contesting Respondents that the said finding in not granting back wages is a gross error on the part of the learned Labour Court as also the learned Industrial Court. However they have not independently challenged the said finding of the learned Labour Court and the Industrial Court for this Court to consider their grievance.

16. Record of the case does not indicate the details of the Respondent No. 1 in both Writ Petitions and their respective date of birth and date of superannuation and hence in that view of the matter, in the event if both Respondent No. 1 have retired, upholding the order of reinstatement shall entitle them to only for benefit of continuity of service w.e.f. the date of their termination and thus consequential pensionary benefits / retirement benefits as applicable in accordance with law.

17. In that view of the matter, both the judgments passed by the learned Labour Court dated 05.08.2000 and the learned Industrial Court dated 01.11.2001 are upheld. 15 of 16

18. With the above directions, both Writ Petitions i.e. Writ Petition Nos. 4103 of 2003 and 4110 of 2003 are dismissed. [ MILIND N. JADHAV, J. ] Ajay 16 of 16 MOHAN AMBERKAR