Santosh Tukaram Patil & Ors v Slum Rehabilitation Authority & Ors

5. On the last occasion, we briefly heard Mr Khandeparkar and Mr Jagtiani. From this discussion, it emerges that neither of the impugned orders of 7th March 2022 (by the President of the SRA in Appeal) or 6th May 2017 (by the CEO of the SRA) deals with sufficient clarity or precision about fundamental factual aspects.

6. We put this into perspective. On the project site, there are even now standing certain ‘chawl-like structures’. That these were the subject of various leases by the original owners, the AH Wadia Charities, is also not contentious. We have seen documentation that shows the names of at least some of the Petitioners as ‘tenants’ in an agreement with the 3rd Respondent, Ambika Developers. Unfortunately, that agreement does not precisely state what premises are covered by these tenancies. It only lists the names of some individuals and describes them as ‘tenants’.

7. This is important because Mr Jagtiani’s case for Ambika Developers is that the Petitioners are not in fact in the chawl-like structures at all. According to him, they occupy unauthorised structures adjacent to, abutting or located in the area around the chawl-like structures. It is his submission that by claiming to be in occupation of the chawl-like structures, the Petitioners are unlawfully obstructing the Slum Rehabilitation Project and seeking protection to their entirely unauthorized structures. Mr Khandeparkar on the other hand maintains that the Petitioners are all occupy and use identifiable premises in the chawl-like structures. These chawl-like structures, he submits, are not only authorised but have been the subject of the lease agreements and rent payments. They have been in existence for a very long time, although he cannot say precisely when in respect of each one of the chawls. This does not matter, he submits, because the chawl-like structures the Petitioners occupy have been in existence longer than the Ambika Developers.

8. The impugned Appellate order does not consider this factual dispute at all. A copy of that order is at page 203 at Exhibit T. There was one more issue raised in that appeal and also before us but which is now no longer material. This is the argument once advanced by the Petitioners that their lands were in a gaothan area and therefore could not be the subject matter of a Slum Rehabilitation Project. There is a return filed by the State Government that says that the land is not a gaothan. Mr Khandeparkar has instructions not to press this point further in view of his affidavit.

9. Before the Appellate Authority, the Petitioners contended that certain Imla Maliks constructed these Santosh Tukaram Patil & Ors v SRA & Ors chawls and rented them out to the appellants (the Petitioners and others like them). The Petitioners also claim that their documents were not considered by the CEO of SRA. The impugned Appellate order notes the finding returned that the entire site was not conducive or fit for human habitation and local site conditions justified the declaration of the area as a Slum Rehabilitation Area within the meaning of Chapter 1-A of the Maharashtra Slum Areas (Improvement, Clearance and Redevelopment) Act, 1971 (“the Slum Act”).

10. The Appellate Authority framed three points for decision. The first related to locus. The second was about the procedure followed by the CEO of SRA. The third was whether the order impugned in appeal (of the CEO of SRA) required interference.

11. On any reading of this order, it appears that the factual points that are now canvassed before us and which we obviously cannot resolve were never considered and do not form part of the Appellate order’s findings. Paragraph 18 notes that the CEO of the SRA found that the Petitioners did not adduce proof of payment of municipal taxes. But this does not go the necessary distance.

12. Mr Khandeparkar’s argument is fundamentally this. That if the Petitioners are indeed occupying the chawl-like structures that were the subject matter of the original leases, the Petitioners cannot be treated on par with slum dwellers as if their structures are “unauthorized”. There can be no question of the SRA examining ‘eligibility’. What rights they would have in any redevelopment is also uncertain, but they simply cannot be subjected to the restrictions and conditions of a Slum Rehabilitation Project, whether it is under Chapter 1-A or some other provision of the Slum Act.

13. Everything seems to us to turn on a correct factual Santosh Tukaram Patil & Ors v SRA & Ors identification of what is it that each of the 26 Petitioners are in fact occupying. We note that Mr Jagtiani has more than one string to his bow because he proposes to argue even if these 26 Petitioners are in chawl-like structures, they are nonetheless, on a correct reading of Chapter 1-A, required to be subjected to the discipline of the Slum Rehabilitation Project in question. That question is of course left open and is not being decided today, especially since Mr Khandeparkar says it has no substance whatsoever.

14. But as a matter of fact, before we make any order, we must know with absolute certainty what is it that the Petitioners are actually occupy. Are they in the chawl-like structures, as Mr Khandeparkar says? Or are they, as Mr Jagtiani would have it, in some unauthorized structure outside the chawls? This is not a factual determination we can make. We therefore require the CEO of SRA to return to us a factual report in regard to each of these 26 Petitioners. The CEO is of course entitled to take the assistance of such officers within the SRA establishment as he thinks fit. The Petitioners will place before the CEO of SRA the documents that they have in their possession. We permit the CEO to also conduct an actual physical site inspection. We make it clear that we are not ordering a “survey” either as understood under the Slum Act or under the Maharashtra Land Revenue Code, 1966. This is an inspection for the purposes of this order. In his report, the CEO of SRA would be well advised to include photographs of the structures in question, as also the chawls.

15. Mr Jagtiani claims to have certain documents, or at least access to certain documents. that relate to the Petitioners. Prominent among these is a slum of Photo Pass in respect of the at least one. This has not yet been placed on Affidavit. We do not know how Ambika Developers came upon this document or in what context. It is open to Santosh Tukaram Patil & Ors v SRA & Ors the Developers to place documents before the CEO of SRA but if there is a document such as a Photo Pass then this must be accompanied by an Affidavit on behalf of Ambika Developers showing how Ambika Developers obtained this document and from where.

16. Rival documentation may not accurately identify the position on site. It is for this reason that we are not expecting the CEO of SRA to make a ruling or pass an order but only to make a report about his factual finding. Obviously, the documents that are placed before the CEO of SRA must be in an organized fashion so that they can be referenced by the CEO of SRA in a systematic manner. Each Petitioner must therefore submit a separate completion of all documents.

17. Operationally, we are not going to permit either side to take adjournments to put in additional documents or to constantly come up with new documents. We will give each of them two weeks until 1st March 2023 to submit the documents to the CEO of SRA and to simultaneously exchange them. The CEO must afford the parties a brief hearing but only for the limited purpose of explaining the documents so that there is no misunderstanding going forward.

18. We request the CEO of SRA to give us his report by 27th March 2023.

19. In the meantime, if there is any ambiguity or if there is clarification required, we grant liberty to both sides to apply to Court urgently for necessary directions.

20. The CEO of SRA is also at liberty to call for documents from the planning authority in question to establish inter alia the date of construction of the chawls. This may be required to establish whether the chawls were put up prior to what is called the datum line. This may also be required in relation to other structures. All planning Santosh Tukaram Patil & Ors v SRA & Ors authorises, including the MCGM and MHADA if it is at all concerned, are required to co-operate with the CEO of SRA and to provide the necessary information on request.

21. Given this conspectus, this necessarily means that there is to be no possible eviction or removal of these 26 Petitioners from their present structures, whatever those may be, nor any demolition until 31st March 2023.

22. List the Petition on 29th March 2023.”

10. This will demonstrate that this Court in exercise of its writ jurisdiction perhaps went further than usual. Clearly, we did so with equity in mind, to avoid any possible injustice being done to the Petitioners before us. But although the powers of the writ Court are indeed wide, it is equally well-settled that there are limits to the exercise of those powers and the exercise of discretion. A certain amount of prudence and circumspection is always necessary.

11. The matter continued to be listed periodically. We were told there were discussions. We adjourned the matter a few times. It came up before another Bench on a couple of occasions in September 2023 because of a change in the roster.

12. But in the interregnum we had received by March 2023, a report of the SRA.

13. This is important. The SRA report establishes that the land in question is not gaothan land. This has two immediate consequences. If the Petitioners maintain that it is gaothan land, then that is a factual dispute, and is surely the matter of a civil suit. It cannot lie in Santosh Tukaram Patil & Ors v SRA & Ors our writ jurisdiction. We have to therefore proceed on the footing that the argument that the land is not gaothan land. In fact, this argument was on not one but several previous occasions specifically given up by the Counsel then appearing. We noted this in our order of 13th February 2023. There is no turning back that clock. This meant that the case had now narrowed to a consideration of whether the Petitioners were in occupation of chawls which could be said to be either authorised or tolerated and whether these could be included in a slum scheme under Section 3C of the Maharashtra Slum Areas (Improvement, Clearance And Redevelopment) Act 1971 (“the Slum Act”) This is noteworthy because the developer represented by Mr Jagtiani had at some point contended that none of these persons were actually in any chawl at all but were in unauthorised hutments in the spaces between the chawls.

14. We had even earlier noted that the names of some of these tenants had appeared in transactional documents of a certain vintage as part of a list of tenants. That was one possible factor in favour of the Petitioners.

15. It was also important to note that three of the Petitioners had what are called slum photo passes. Even then we had expressed our reservations as to how a person could claim rights flowing from the issuance of a photo pass but yet maintain that the Slum Act and the scheme formulated under — and only under — the Slum Act was inapplicable to that person. This seems to us to be entirely a selfdefeating and mutually destructive contradiction.

16. What therefore remained was a consideration of Section 3C of the Slum Act. This is important because it is clearly the frame of prayer clauses (a) and (b) of the Petition.

17. Section 3C is somewhat peculiarly placed because there has been an unusual kind of amendment to the Slum Act 1971. An entire Chapter I-A was inserted dealing with ‘Slum Rehabilitation Schemes’. So were Chapters I-B and I-C, but we are dealing only with Chapter I-A. The peculiarity is that this Chapter I-A has several Sections numbered 3A to 3Z (and the alphabet having been exhausted, there then follow certain numbers). Section 3D, as is well known, has another peculiarity in that it amends other provisions of the Slum Act, notably Section 13, and makes the modified version applicable to Chapter I-A.

18. That this is a slum scheme is not in doubt. Therefore, Chapter I-A will apply. The moment that happens, we are taken straight to Section 3C regarding the declaration of a slum rehabilitation area. Before we go to the Section itself, we note that ‘slum rehabilitation area’ is defined in Section 2(h-b) added by amendment, to read thus: “2(h-b) “Slum Rehabilitation Area” means a Slum Rehabilitation Area, including community economic activity area, declared as such under sub- section (1) of section 3C by the Competent Authority or the Chief Executive Officer, as the case may be, in pursuance of the Slum Rehabilitation Scheme notified under section 3B.”

19. Thus, the definition of the ‘slum rehabilitation area’ has a direct reference to Section 3C. This definition of a ‘slum rehabilitation area’ is different from the definition of ‘slum area’ under Section 2(ga) and also from the definition of ‘slum rehabilitation scheme’ under Section 2(h-d).

20. A ‘slum rehabilitation scheme’ means the one notified under Section 3B, which is also in Chapter I-A. Now let us look at the sequence in which this operates. First, there is Section 3C: “3C. Declaration of a slum rehabilitation area (1) As soon as may be, after the publication of any Slum Rehabilitation Scheme, the Chief Executive Officer on being satisfied about the circumstances in respect of any land, whether or not previously declared as slum area, justifying its declaration as Slum Rehabilitation Area which may include community economic activity area, for implementing the Slum Rehabilitation Scheme, shall after giving the land owners, including any public authorities or local bodies under the State Government constituted under any law enacted by the State Legislature, thirty days notice and after giving a reasonable opportunity of being heard, by an order published in the Official Gazette, and thereafter within forty-five days, declare such land to be a “Slum Rehabilitation Area”. The order declaring the Slum Rehabilitation Area (hereinafter referred to as “the slum rehabilitation order”), shall also be given wide publicity in such manner as may be specified by the Chief Executive Officer of the Slum Rehabilitation Authority. Thereafter, notwithstanding anything contained in any law for the time being in force, in such Slum Rehabilitation Area, the permission or the No Objection Certificate of the land owning authority or agency shall not be required: Provided that, only in respect of any land which is required for Vital Public Project purpose, as per orders of the State Government and where the State Government either directly or through any public authority has undertaken the responsibility of relocation and rehabilitation of the protected and other occupiers of the building, then the Chief Executive Officer shall, exclude the land required for Vital Public Project from the Slum Rehabilitation Area and issue an order to omit such land from the Slum Rehabilitation Area. Where the State Government either directly or through any public authority has undertaken the responsibility of relocation and rehabilitation of the protected and other occupiers of the building, such public authority shall prepare the Scheme of such rehabilitation or relocation and get it approved by the Chief Executive officer within the period specified in the Scheme which shall not be more than ninety days. (2) Any person aggrieved by the order of the Chief Executive Officer may, within thirty days of the publication of such slum rehabilitation order, prefer an appeal to the Apex Grievance Redressal Committee. The decision of the Apex Grievance Redressal Committee shall be final. (3) On the completion of the Slum Rehabilitation Scheme, the Slum Rehabilitation Area shall cease to be such area.”

21. As we can see there is a reference in Section 3C to a ‘slum rehabilitation scheme’. That is a reference to Section 3B and for completeness we set this out as well. “3B. Slum Rehabilitation Scheme (1) The Slum Rehabilitation Authority concerned, with the previous sanction of the State Government, shall, prepare or amend the general Slum Rehabilitation Scheme Santosh Tukaram Patil & Ors v SRA & Ors for the areas specified under sub-section (1) of section 3A, for rehabilitation or relocation of protected occupiers and other occupiers of the building in such areas. (2) The general Slum Rehabilitation Scheme prepared or any amendment to it under sub-section (1) shall be published in the Official Gazette, by the concerned Slum Rehabilitation Authority, as draft general Slum Rehabilitation Scheme or draft amendment to general Slum Rehabilitation Scheme, for the area specified under subsection (1) of Section 3A, for the information of general public, inviting objections and suggestions, giving reasonable period of not less than thirty-days but not more than forty-five days, for submission of objections and suggestions, if any, in respect of the Scheme. (3) The Chief Executive Officer of the concerned Slum Rehabilitation Authority shall, within sixty days consider the objections and suggestions, if any, received within the specified period in respect of the said draft general Slum Rehabilitation Scheme or any draft amendment to the general Slum Rehabilitation Scheme and after considering the same and after carrying out such modifications as deemed fit or necessary, finally publish the said general Slum Rehabilitation scheme or such amendment to it, with the approval of the State Government, in the Official Gazette. (4) The general Slum Rehabilitation Scheme published under sub-section (3) shall be deemed Development Control Regulations under the provisions of Chapter III of the Maharashtra Regional and Town Planning Act, 1966 for the said area and the provisions of the general Slum Rehabilitation Scheme shall prevail over the Development Control Regulations, published under the Maharashtra Regional and Town Planning Act, 1966. (5) The Slum Rehabilitation Scheme so notified under sub-section (3) shall, generally lay down the parameters for declaration of any land as the Slum Rehabilitation Area and indicate the manner in which rehabilitation of the occupants of the area declared as Slum Rehabilitation Area shall be carried out. In particular, it shall provide for all or any of the following matters, that is to say,— (a) the parameters or guidelines for declaration of land as the Slum Rehabilitation Area; (b) basic and essential parameters of development of Slum Rehabilitation Area under the Slum Rehabilitation Scheme;

(c) provisions for obligatory participation of the owners, landholders and occupants of the land declared as the Slum Rehabilitation Area under the approved Slum Rehabilitation Scheme in the implementation of such Scheme;

(d) provision relating to transit accommodation or entitlement of compensation in lieu of transit accommodation to the slum dwellers pending development of the Slum Rehabilitation Area. (e) provision relating to allotment of tenements either in situ or otherwise, on development free of cost to the protected occupiers of the building in such Slum Rehabilitation Area; (f) provision relating to allotment of tenements either in situ or otherwise, on ownership or on rent, to the other non-protected occupiers up to the 1st January 2011, subject to the availability of tenements as per the terms and conditions and guidelines so notified in the Official Gazette, by the Chief Executive Officer with the prior approval of the State Government; (g) scheme for development of the Slum Rehabilitation Areas under the Slum Rehabilitation Scheme by the landholders and occupants by themselves or through a developer and the terms and conditions of such developments; and the option available to the Slum Rehabilitation Authority for taking up such development in the event of nonparticipation of the landholders or occupants; (h) provision regarding sanction of Floor Space Index and transfer of development rights, if any, to be made available to the developer for development of the Slum Rehabilitation Area under the Slum Rehabilitation Scheme;

(i) provision regarding non-transferable nature of tenements for a certain period, etc. (6) The Chief Executive Officer of the Slum Rehabilitation Authority, with prior approval of the State Government shall, regulate the procedure for appointment and registration of developers for implementation of the Slum Rehabilitation Scheme as per the rules prescribed by the State Government, from time to time. The Chief Executive Officer or the Slum Rehabilitation Authority, as the case may be, may register any person or an association of persons registered under the Partnership Act, 1932 or a company registered under the Companies Act, 2013 as a developer in the prescribed manner for the implementation of Slum Rehabilitation Scheme.”

22. While on this, it is important to note that Section 3C uses the words “whether or not previously declared as slum area, justifying its declaration as the slum rehabilitation area”. Slum areas are covered in Chapter II, but this is omitted from Chapter I-A. To understand how this works, the declaration of a slum area (as distinct from a Santosh Tukaram Patil & Ors v SRA & Ors slum rehabilitation area) is one under Section 4 and certain slumlike conditions must obtain. Section 3C (1) is far wider in its scope and is not restricted to a determination based on conditions that obtain on the ground. This is not a distinction that can be obliterated. When, therefore, there is a slum rehabilitation scheme, it is no answer at all to say that there are no slum like conditions. The slum rehabilitation scheme set out in Section 3B precedes the declaration of a slum rehabilitation area.

23. It is Section 3B(5) that sets out the parameters that may be generally specified for the declaration of any land as a slum rehabilitation area and not Section 4 of Chapter II. There is also a provision to invite suggestions and objections, i.e., the involvement or public participation in the formulation of a slum rehabilitation scheme under Section 3B.

24. But what is determinative and possibly dispositive is Section 3A(1), the very first Section of Chapter I-A. It opens with a nonobstante clause and says that the State Government may appoint an authority called the SRA for such area or areas as may be specified. This body has perpetual succession, and its powers and duties are inter alia to survey and review the existing position regarding slum areas to formulate schemes for rehabilitation of slum areas and to get the slum rehabilitation scheme implemented.

25. This use of the word ‘slum areas’ in Section 3A ties into the definition and also to some extent Section 4 under Chapter II. But this does not mean that the conditions specified in Section 4 will Santosh Tukaram Patil & Ors v SRA & Ors necessarily determine the formulation of a slum rehabilitation scheme. Nothing in the reading of Chapter I-A can be read to suggest this. All that the SRA is required to do is to survey and review the existing position and then to formulate and implement a slum rehabilitation scheme.

26. The notification under Section 3B in question is dated 9th April 1998. This is a widely worded notification and it provides inter alia for the size of rehab flats and so on.

27. It is in this context that we have to look again at the prayers in the Petition. With the issue of the gaothan now given up, what remains is a consideration of whether grounds are set out for exclusion of these Petitioners and their structures from the Section 3B scheme and specifically the exclusion from the slum rehabilitation area under Section 3C.

28. Prayer clause (a) refers to two orders of 6th May 2017 and 7th March 2022. Both are concurrent findings against the Petitioners. The second is an appellate order and we therefore need to consider that. It is passed by the Slum Areas Tribunal. The appellants included the slum society and two individuals, one Raju Kashinath Chavan and the present 9th Petitioner, Naresh Vitthal Ghase. The appellate order sets out the rival submissions and then frames the points for determination in paragraph 13 at page 209. The argument that the land is gaothan is first rejected in paragraph 18. The discussion on Section 3C starts in paragraph 19 at page 212. It is notable that the appellate order says that the order in original was Santosh Tukaram Patil & Ors v SRA & Ors based upon a site inspection report of 26th August 2016 of the Deputy Collector, that all the structures were unauthorised and were encroachments on private land.

29. As to the Section 3C Notification, the facts, including the issuance of a public notice, were recorded. The appellants were noted to have filed objections. They were given a hearing. The decision was on merits. It was therefore held that there was no basis to the challenge to Section 3C.

30. Of particular relevance to us is the finding returned in paragraph 16 at page 211 that the site inspection shows that it was not fit for human habitation.

31. Then prayer clause (b), although it does not use the words Section 3C is clearly a challenge to the declaration as a slum rehabilitation area.

32. There are two fundamental obstacles before the Petitioners. First, they must establish how a writ Court can be turned into a second appellate Court in this manner, or worse, into a first appellate Court as if this was a full-envelope appeal on facts and law. We are concerned in our writ jurisdiction with judicial review of administrative, executive, judicial and quasi-judicial action; not with the merits of the decision but with the decision-making process. The Petition is entirely silent on this aspect of the matter. We have been at some pains to point out the facts of notice, hearing and so forth, because there is no procedural due process that is said to have Santosh Tukaram Patil & Ors v SRA & Ors been breached. There is no question of any violation of substantive due process either. None is pointed out. What is instead canvassed is every conceivable factual ground starting from a dispute as to title and then going on to a dispute as to the legitimacy of the construction and even the conditions on site.

33. To put this beyond controversy, and although we would ordinarily not do it in such detail, we have considered the grounds from ground (a) to ground (v). Ground (s) has sub-paragraphs (i) to (viii). Grounds (a) to (f) are the usual generic chanting without particulars, such as breach of natural justice, non-application of mind, premeditated orders, etc. Then it is alleged that there are no reasons. This is facially incorrect.

34. Ground (h) at pages 31 and 32 is a factual dispute as to the site conditions. It reads as follows: “h) Both the Respondent Nos. 2 and 5 have totally overlooked the fact that the structures on the said Gaothan area were in existence since the time immemorial and the said area has been occupied by the Petitioners and their ancestors since the last over 200 years. No reference is made to the photographs produced of the said structures which show that the structures are regular chawls and one of the chawls is of ground plus one floor with proper tenements, sewage, toilet facilities, water connection, and open areas. The Respondent Nos. 2 and 5 have whilst deciding the matter failed in their duty to ascertain the correct facts by calling upon the concerned parties including the Collector, Mumbai Suburban District and the Municipal Corporation of Greater Mumbai, the City Survey Officer to produce the records relating to the said area Santosh Tukaram Patil & Ors v SRA & Ors which would reveal the existence of the said structures at least since the past several decades i.e. from the time the records have been maintained by the Municipal Corporation relating to the structures.”

35. Ground (i) is the strangest possible ground because it alleges that the Respondent authorities ought to have directed the Petitioners to produce documents. Why the Petitioners did not produce documents is unexplained. It is not even shown that those very documents are today before the Court.

36. Ground (j) seems then to cast burden on the authority to ascertain a factual position as if to suggest that it is no part of the obligation of the Petitioner to produce documents when required to do so to show the legitimacy of the structure.

37. Ground (k) disputes as a matter of fact that a survey was done on 26th August 2016. The only documents that the Petitioners have to show this is their one-sided correspondence but there is no explanation for the fact that the site survey was after the notice, pasted on the site and that there is a panchnama showing the survey.

38. It is at this stage where the curious becomes the bizarre because, as we have noted, one of the appellants before the appellate authority was the society. Now in ground (l) these 26 Petitioners turn on the society itself and allege wrongdoing on the society’s part.

39. Ground (m) deals with title documents, ground (n) with revenue documents, ground (o) with rent receipts and ground (p) revisits the question of slum-like conditions. Then there are general allegations of non-application of mind.

40. Ground (s) and its sub-paragraphs are an attempt to bring forward in a writ petition disputed questions of fact and also to introduce allegations of fraud, collusion, connivance and so on to the end of the chapter. Ground (s)(iii), for instance, speaks of an attempt to fraudulently increase the size of tenements. Ground (s)

(iv) alleges a fraud on the State. Ground (s)(v) impeaches a notice of

14th June 2022 and alleges that this too was fraudulent. Curiously, ground (s)(vi) accepts that this survey in 2022 was carried out but that the Petitioners protested. Ground (s)(vii) and (s)(viii) deal with contents of a notice.

41. This is the sum and substance of the Petition. It is impossible to tell from this what right is being canvassed let alone what enforceable right. It is not demonstrated what legal or constitutional right of the Petitioners is infringed. It is not shown what is the public duty of the authorities that is said to have been breached or in what fashion. In the guise of challenging an appellate order, a writ petition is sought to be impermissibly enlarged in scope to the level of a substantive first appeal and the writ Court is expected to delve with into questions of fact.

42. Despite all this, at one stage, we endeavoured to allay the apprehensions of the Petitioners. Mr Jagtiani had instructions at Santosh Tukaram Patil & Ors v SRA & Ors that time to make a carefully calibrated statement to put an end to these disputes. We understood his objective because, from the developer’s perspective, there is a constant outflow of cash. To Mr Jagtiani and his clients, we attribute no great altruism or charitable purpose. But that is not to be expected of a developer. A much greater concern for us was — and remains — the condition of the 100 others who are supposedly the beneficiaries of this slum rehabilitation scheme. If the Petitioners are to continue like this, literally squatting on an ad-interim injunction, for weeks and months on end and obtaining adjournments on one pretext or the other, for those 100 or more others who are affected, there is neither rehabilitation nor a scheme worth mentioning. To the Petitioners, this is a bonanza because it comes at no cost and is on no terms. They are not required to bear the financial burden of transit rent that is paid month on month to these other affected slum dwellers. They are not bothered about cost over runs and resultant increases in costs. They are not bothered about the delay and the clear prejudice to other slum dwellers, the delivery of whose promised rehab homes will now be pushed back several months.

43. We appreciate Mr Bhavsar’s predicament. He is very lately on the scene. Possibly these are complex matters and possibly he was not given complete instructions. But we believe there was enough time in which to study the papers for an argument on merits. But we wanted to cause no prejudice to a counsel at our Bar and therefore we directly asked the 1st Petitioner who is present what, according to him, the Petitioners were claiming. The answers we received were indeed alarming, only for the sake of claiming some opposition to engineer an adjournment. a completely incorrect statement was Santosh Tukaram Patil & Ors v SRA & Ors made that these Petitioners did not know what Mr Jagtiani’s and his attorneys had offered earlier. This despite the fact that our Bench itself was told that not only Advocates but parties had met and that these statements were conveyed but were repeatedly rejected out of hand without any particular reason being shown.

44. Mr Jagtiani draws our attention to the decision of the Supreme Court in Kantabai Vasant Ahir v Slum Rehabilitation Authority & Ors.[1] That also dealt with the Slum Act. There is an analysis of certain provisions of the Act and in paragraph 17 the finding of the Supreme Court was that Chapter I-A is a selfcontained code and that the phrase ‘slum area’ used in Section 12 (1) does not have the same meaning as in Section 2(ga). For the purposes of the slum rehabilitation schemes Chapter I-A is a selfcontained code. Thus, a slum area does not necessarily always partake of the meaning under Section 4(1). This tells us that for the purposes of a slum rehabilitation scheme, while one of the considerations may well be slum-like conditions as enumerated in Section 4(1), it is not an essential requirement that those slum-like conditions must necessarily restrict a slum rehabilitation scheme under Chapter I-A.

45. Section 4 is not part of Chapter I-A. This is inter alia apparent from Section 3D, which modifies other portions of the Slum Act and is applicable to Chapter I-A. Section 12 is considerably modified. Section 11 is wholly omitted. Chapters II and III are also entirely

Santosh Tukaram Patil & Ors v SRA & Ors omitted (therefore including Section 4) for the purposes of slum rehabilitation schemes.

46. Thus, from any perspective, no relief can be granted to the Petitioners. The challenge to the Section 3C declarations and notifications must fail.

47. Above all, and at the cost of repetition, we will not permit the present Petitioners to continue to prejudice the other eligible slum dwellers, nor to delay almost indefinitely the redeveloped proper homes to which they are entitled in law. The Slum Act is a welfare legislation. The statutory purpose is not served by allowing a few to hold to ransom on entirely specious ground the legitimate and lawful rights and entitlements of others. Notably, the Petitioners have not even ventured to suggest that they will furnish any kind of security or monetary recompense to the 100-plus others who are prejudiced by this ongoing delay.

48. Having regard to these circumstances, we do not believe that a ground is made out for interference. The Writ Petition is rejected. The ad-interim order is vacated.

49. The compilation that was prepared as part of the fact-finding inquiry referred to above is to be filed in the Registry.

50. Incidentally, we note that Mr Bhavsar’s Vakalatnama is under objection. The proforma of the Vakalatnama was signed only by the 1st Petitioner wrongly stated to be the 1st Respondent. To this Santosh Tukaram Patil & Ors v SRA & Ors proforma is a list on green paper of various names written in Devnagari with signatures. The list bears Mr Bhavsar’s rubber stamp. Mr Bhavsar says that the list with the signatures was given to him, and he accepted it. We do not want Mr Bhavsar to suffer any embarrassment and we particularly will not permit these Petitioners to now make an allegation against Mr Bhavsar that he was not properly authorised or appointed by them as their Advocate. Therefore, we direct the Registry to accept the Vakalatnama which so far has been under objection.

51. In our view this is a fit case for the imposition of costs. However, Mr Jagtiani and Dr Saraf request that these costs may not be imposed in this matter. It is at their request, therefore, that we refrain from making an order of costs. (Kamal Khata, J) (G. S. Patel, J)