Ram Kishan Singh v. Bala Choudhary & Ors.

14. On bare perusal of the above provision, it is clear that the High Court can only interfere with the orders of the Subordinate Court if the Court has committed illegality or material irregularity in exercise of its jurisdiction. It is imperative to note that under the revision powers, this Court cannot delve into the findings on the facts by the Subordinate Court and can only interfere if any infirmities are found with the exercise of jurisdiction of the Court and not when the courts erroneously decide the cases.

15. The primary object of the revision powers conferred to the High Court is to prevent subordinate courts from acting arbitrarily, capriciously and illegally while they exercise their jurisdiction. The objective and scope of revisional powers under Section 115 of the CPC has been discussed by the courts in a catena of judgments. In Chaube Jagdish Prasad v. Ganga Prasad Chaturvedi, 1959 Supp (1) SCR 733, the Hon’ble Supreme Court delved into the aspect of limited revisional powers given to the High Courts under Section 115 of the Code and held:

LR II IA 237] and Balakrishna Udayar v. Vasudeva Aiyar [(1917) LR 44 IA 261] were reviewed and it was held that Section 115 Civil Procedure Code applies to matters of jurisdiction alone, the irregular exercise or non-exercise of it or the illegal assumption of it. Thus if a subordinate court had jurisdiction to make the order it made and has not acted in breach of any provision of law or committed any error of procedure which is material and may have affected the ultimate decision, then the High Court has no power to interfere. But if on the other hand it decides a jurisdictional fact erroneously and thereby assumes jurisdiction not vested in it or deprives itself of jurisdiction so vested then the power of interference under Section 115 CPC, becomes operative.”

13. The appellant also relied on Rai Brij Raj Krishna v. S.K. Shaw and Bros. [1951 SCC 102: (1951) SCR 145] where this Court quoted with approval the observations of Lord Esher in Queen v. Commissioner for Special Purposes of the Income Tax [(1888) 21 QBD 313, 319] and Colonial Bank of Australia v. Willan [(1874) LR 5 PC 417, 443] where Sir James Colville said: “Accordingly the authorities … establish that an adjudication by a Judge having jurisdiction over the subject-matter is, if no defect appears on the face of it, to be taken as conclusive of the facts stated therein and that the Court of Queen's Bench will not on certiorari quash such an adjudication on the ground that any such fact, however essential has been erroneously found.” But these observations can have no application to the judgment of the Additional Civil Judge whose jurisdiction in the present case is to be determined by the provisions of Section 5(4) of the Act. And the power of the High Court to correct questions of jurisdiction is to be found within the four corners of Section 115 CPC. If there is an error which falls within this section the High Court will have the power to interfere, not otherwise.

14. The only question to be decided in the instant case is as to whether the High Court had correctly interfered under Section 115 of the Civil Procedure Code, with the order of the Civil Judge. As we have held above, at the instance of the landlord the suit was only maintainable if it was based on the inadequacy of the reasonable annual rent and for that purpose the necessary jurisdictional fact to be found was the date of the construction of the accommodation and if the Court wrongly decided that fact and thereby conferred jurisdiction upon itself which it did not possess, it exercised jurisdiction not vested in it and the matter fell within the rule laid down by the Privy Council in Joy ChandlalBabu v. Kamalaksha Chaudhury [(1949) LR 76 IA 131]. The High Court had the power to interfere and once it had the power it could determine whether the question of the date of construction was rightly or wrongly decided. The High Court held that the Civil Judge had wrongly decided that the construction was of a date after June 30, 1946 and therefore fell within Section 3-A.”

16. In Nawab Shaqafath Ali Khan v. Nawab Imdad Jah Bahadur, (2009) 5 SCC 162, the Hon’ble Supreme Court decided the issue related to the jurisdiction of a Court in a civil revision application and held that the jurisdictional questions may not arise only when the Courts act wholly without jurisdiction, but can also arise where other jurisdictional errors are committed by the Subordinate Court. The relevant paragraph is reproduced herein: “43. A civil revision application although must necessarily having regard to the terminologies used in Section 115 of the Code of Civil Procedure involve the question of jurisdiction, the question which would arise is as to what are the jurisdictional questions. A jurisdictional question may arise not only when a court acts wholly without jurisdiction but also in a case where jurisdictional errors are committed while exercising jurisdiction. There are various facets of “jurisdictional errors”. Taking into consideration any irrelevant fact or nonconsideration of a relevant fact would involve jurisdictional issue.”

17. Hence, from the foregoing discussion, it is clear that the said provision has a limited scope and the Courts can only decide the revision application if the question involves the jurisdiction conferred to the Subordinate Courts.

18. In the instant revision petition, the petitioner has raised the issue of non-arisal of cause of action in the plaint filed by the respondent no.1. Therefore, it is imperative to discuss the said aspect related to a suit.

19. As per settled principle of law, in a suit, a party needs to establish a cause of action in his favor for successful admission and adjudication of the dispute. The term cause of action consists of a bundle of facts, which give cause to enforce the legal inquiry for redress in a court of law. In other words, it is a bundle of facts, which, taken with the law applicable to them gives the plaintiff a right to claim relief against the defendant. It must include some act done by the defendant since in the absence of such an act no cause of action would possibly accrue or would arise.

20. The expression “cause of action” has acquired a judicially settled meaning. In the restricted sense “cause of action” means the circumstances forming the infraction of the right or the immediate occasion for the reaction. In the wider sense, it means the necessary conditions for the maintenance of the suit, including not only the infraction of the right, but also the infraction coupled with the right itself. Compendiously, as noted above, the expression means every fact, which it would be necessary for the plaintiff to prove, if traversed, in order to support his right to the judgment of the court.

21. Hence, the only consideration before this Court under revision is to determine whether the impugned order needs any interference or not. Therefore, it is pertinent to peruse the impugned order and determine its legality. The relevant part of the said order is reproduced herein:

22. On perusal of the above paragraphs of the impugned order it is clear that the learned Trial Court had referred to the plaint filed by the respondent no. 1, and held that the question of whether the suit properties are ancestral or not is a matter of trial which cannot be decided in an application filed under Order 7 Rule 11 thereby rejecting the application on the grounds that the apprehension of the suit getting rejected at a later stage cannot be a ground to dismiss the suit in an application filed under Order VII Rule 11 of the CPC.

23. As per paragraph no. 4 and 5 of the plaint, the properties belonging to the father of the petitioner was vested out to their LRs i.e. the petitioner and the other family members excluding the respondent no. 1. Furthermore, the plaint filed by the respondent also makes out a case where the land provided against the acquisition of the ancestral land is solely given to the petitioner and not divided among the other members, thereby raising a cause of action to approach the Court.

24. The underlying object of Order VII Rule 11(a) is that if in a suit, no cause of action is disclosed, or the suit is barred by limitation under Rule 11(d), the Court would not permit the plaintiff to unnecessarily protract the proceedings in the suit. In such a case, it would be necessary to put an end to the sham litigation, so that further judicial time is not wasted.

25. It is well settled that the Court, while deciding such an application must have due regard only to the statements in the plaint. Whether the suit is barred by any law must be determined from the statements in the plaint and it is not open to decide the issue on the basis of any other material including the written statement in the case. Therefore, the rejection of plaint on the ground of non-arisal of the cause of action should be established, otherwise, the suit cannot be rejected.

26. It is relevant to state that there is a difference between the nondisclosure of a cause of action and defective cause of action: while the former comes within the scope of Order VII Rule 11 of the CPC, the latter is to be decided during trial of the suit. The contention raised on behalf of the appellant that the cause of action disclosed is vague and incomplete, is not a ground for rejection of the plaint, under Order VII Rule 11 of the CPC, no exception can be taken to the order.

27. Therefore, keeping in view the facts, circumstances, the arguments advanced as well as the contentions raised and also the scope of revision powers settled by law and reiterated by the Hon’ble Supreme Court, this Court is not inclined to allow the instant petition. There is no error in the impugned order, dated 20th May, 2023, that warrants interference by this Court in exercise of its revision powers under Section 115 of the CPC.

28. Accordingly, the instant petition stands dismissed.

29. Pending applications, if any, also stands dismissed.

30. The order be uploaded on the website forthwith.