Bhawarlal Parasmal Joshi v. The Solapur Municipal Corporation & Ors.

13. Mr. Godbole, the learned senior advocate would appear on behalf of Petitioners in Writ Petitions filed by successors-in-title of lessees and sub-tenants. He would also oppose the Petitions filed by the Municipal Corporation on behalf of successors-in-title of lessees and sub-tenants. He would submit that though the Principal District Judge has set aside katkam 28/74 the eviction order dated 17 May 2018, it has not recognized the absolute right of Lessees to seek ‘extension’ of lease for a further period of 50 years. He would invite my attention to the terms and conditions of the General Body Resolution Nos. 161 and 181, which according to Mr. Godbole, confers an absolute right on the Lessees to seek extension of lease on expiration of its original tenure. He would submit that there is a stark difference between the concepts of ‘extension’ and ‘renewal’ of a lease. That the Principal District Judge has erroneously held that the Lessees had a right to seek ‘renewal’ of lease. In support of his contention about difference in the concepts of ‘extension’ and ‘renewal’ of lease, he would rely upon judgment of the Apex Court in Delhi Development Authority vs. Durga Chand Kaushish, 1973 (2) SCC 825. He would also rely upon the judgment of the Apex Court in Provash Chandra Dalui & Anr. vs. Biswanath Banerjee & Anr., 1989 Supp (1) SCC 487, in support of his contention that in case of ‘renewal’, a new lease is required whereas in case of ‘extension’ the same lease continues in force during additional period by performance of the stipulated act. Relying on the judgment of the Apex Court in State of U.P. & Ors. vs. Lalji Tandon, 2004 (1) SCC 1, Mr. Godbole would contend that there is no question of ‘renewal’ of lease in the present case as what is conferred by virtue of Resolution Nos. 161 and 181 together with the covenants of lease deed is a right to ‘extend’ the lease and not the right to ‘renew’ the same.

14. Mr. Godbole would submit that there is no inconsistency between clauses 4 and 5 of the Lease Deed. Clause 5 provides for an eventuality katkam 29/74 where the Lessees can exercise option of extension/renewal of lease, whereas under clause 4, the possession of the premises is to be handed over to the Municipal Corporation after expiration of the tenure of the lease. That therefore, clause 4 would trigger only in the event Lessees not expressing desire to seek extension/renewal.

15. Mr. Godbole would further submit that the terms and conditions of General Body Resolution No. 161 dated 13 December 1967 is unilateral act of the Municipal Corporation, where the terms and conditions are not settled after consent of the Lessees. That there is no ambiguity in condition Nos. 6 and 7 of Resolution No.161 as condition No. 7 clearly provides for extension/renewal of the lease. If the intention of the draftsman of the Resolution was to restrict the tenure of lease to only 50 years, there was no necessity of including condition No.7. That condition No.7 gives an absolute right to the Lessees to continue the lease for further tenure of 50 years. That condition Nos. 6 and 7 of Resolution NO. 161 and Clause Nos. 4 and 5 of the Lease Deed can co-exist harmoniously and the correct way to interpret those clauses would mean handing over possession of the leased land only if the Lessees do not desire to continue after expiry of tenure of 50 years.

16. Mr. Godbole would further submit that though there is no inconsistency between the Resolution No. 161 and covenants of the Lease Deed, in the event of any incongruity being noticed between the two, the interpretation which gives effect to all clauses of Lease Deed is katkam 30/74 required to be accepted. If indeed there is any inconsistency in the stipulations of Resolution No.161, the same would come to the aid of Lessees as their rights are further crystallized by subsequently executed document in the form of the Lease Deed. If condition No.7 of the Resolution No.161 is interpreted in any other manner, the same would render various clauses in the Lease Deed nugatory and otiose. He would rely on the judgment of the Apex Court in Radha Sunder Datta vs. Mohd. Jahadur Rahim and others, AIR 1959 SC 24 to contend that in the event of possibility of two constructions of a document, the one which gives effect to all clauses therein must be preferred over the one which may render one or more of them nugatory. He would press into service the doctrine of contra proferentem under which words are to be taken most strongly against him who uses them. That therefore in the event of any ambiguity, the words must be interpreted against the Municipal Corporation, who is attempting to wriggle out of commitments under the Lease Deed. In this regard he would rely on the judgment of the Apex Court in Sahebzada Mohammad Kamgar Shah vs. Jagdish Chandra Deo Dhabal Deo and others, 1960 SCR (3) 604. He would also rely upon the judgment of the Apex Court in Bank of India & Anr. vs. K Mohandas & Ors., (2009) 5 SCC 313 in support of the contention that intention of parties must be ascertained from the language they have used, considered in the light of surrounding circumstances and object of the contract. Relying on the judgment of the Privy Council in Raneegunge Coal Association Limited vs. The Tata Iron and Steel Company Limited, AIR 1940 PC 151, he would contend that clauses of the contract must be interpreted in a manner so katkam 31/74 as to reconcile the other clauses therein. He would also rely upon the judgments in Bangalore Electricity Supply Company Ltd. vs. E.S. Solar Power (Pvt) Ltd. & Ors, 2021 (6) SCC 718 and Shri Nashik Panchavati Panjarpol Trust and others vs. The Chairman and another, 2023 SCC OnLine SC 1046 in support of his contention that Court must consider underlying intent of the parties and interpretation of a clause must be consistent with other clauses.

17. Mr. Godbole would further submit that in any case, the issue relating to interpretation of clauses of Resolution No.161 and Lease Deed cannot be decided in summary proceedings and filing of Civil Suit is the only correct remedy. That the successors in title of Lessees and subtenants have already instituted Civil Suits and the issue of interpretation of various clauses must be left to be determined in the civil proceedings. Relying on the judgments of the Apex Court in Express Newspapers (Private) Ltd. & Anr. vs. The Union of India & Ors., 1986 (1) SCC 133 and Government of Andhra Pradesh vs. Thummala Krishna Rao and Anr. 1982 (2) SCC 134, Mr. Godbole would contend that summary eviction proceedings can be initiated only when a person is in unauthorized occupation of the public premises. That the present case involves interpretation of clauses of General Body Resolution and Lease Deed and in the light of the clear right conferred on the Lessees to continue the tenure of lease, it cannot be stated that the successors-in-title of Lessees or sub-tenants are in unauthorized occupation of the premises. He also relies on judgments of the Apex Court in State of Rajasthan vs. Padmavati katkam 32/74 Devi, 1995 Supp. (2) SCC 290 and of this Court in Sir N.P. Vakil Trust vs. Union of India and others, 2016 SCC OnLine Bom. 4913.

18. Mr. Godbole would then submit that even if it is assumed that a right of ‘renewal’ is contemplated in the present case, there is no question of granting any discretion in favour of the Municipal Corporation to take a decision with regard to such right of renewal. The right to seek renewal is absolute and not subject to the discretion of the Municipal Corporation and therefore the Principal District Judge ought to have issued a direction to the Municipal Corporation to renew the lease rather than leaving it for the Municipal Corporation to exercise its discretion in the matter of grant of renewal. Relying on the judgment of the Apex Court in M/s. Govind Impex (Pvt.) Ltd. & Ors. vs. Appropriate Authority, Income Tax Department, 2011 (1) SCC 529, Mr. Godbole would submit that once the conditions precedent for renewal are fulfilled, the Lessor cannot refuse renewal of lease once such conditions are complied with. He would submit that since Lessees had absolute right of extension (or renewal), the only variance in the terms of lease would be, the rent payable in respect of the extended/renewed tenure. That the Lessees have not committed any default as the rent has always been paid from time to time and an application is filed under the rent control legislation for fixation of rent.

19. Mr. Godbole would then attack the quantum of damages fixed by the Principal District Judge for occupation of the premises during katkam 33/74 pendency of decision-making process by the Municipal Commissioner. He would submit that once the action of the Municipal Corporation under section 81-B of the MMC Act, 1949 is held to be premature and unsustainable, the possession cannot be termed as unauthorized and that therefore there is no question of payment of any damages under the MMC Act, 1949. Referring to the order passed by this Court in Writ Petition No.8211 of 2018 on 31 July 2018, Mr. Godbole would contend that the rates of damages fixed by the Principal District Judge are higher than the one fixed by this court (Rs.50/- psf for ground floor and Rs.40/psf for first floor). That therefore the order of the Principal District Judge in fixing the damage rent is in excess of jurisdiction.

20. So far as the Petitions filed by the Municipal Corporation are concerned, Mr. Godbole would oppose them on the ground of gross delay and laches in filing the same. He would submit that the Writ Petitions filed by the Municipal Corporation are afterthought and are filed only with a view to frustrate the Petitions filed by the successors-in-title of lessees and sub-tenants. That the Municipal Corporation has acted upon the impugned judgment and order of the Principal District Judge by demanding damages from the Lessees and Tenants as per the judgment and order dated 26 July 2019. He would invite my attention to some of the demand notices issued by the Municipal Corporation demanding the damages at the rate fixed by the Principal District Judge. katkam 34/74

21. So far as the merits of the Petitions filed by the Municipal Corporation are concerned, Mr. Godbole would in addition to the submissions recorded above, submit that the same are filed on a deliberate misinterpretation of the covenants of the lease deed as well as terms and conditions of Resolution Nos.161 and 181. That the showcause notice and the order passed by the Deputy Municipal Commissioner were in teeth of the provisions of the MMC Act, 1949 and the order has rightly been set aside by the Principal District Judge. That the order of eviction was without jurisdiction and could not have been passed by the Deputy Municipal Commissioner, even under exercise of delegated powers of Municipal Commissioner. That such decision could only be taken by the General Body or Standing Committee of the SUBMISSIONS ON BEHALF OF MUNICIPAL CORPORATION

22. Mr. Damle, the learned senior advocate appearing for Solapur Municipal Corporation would submit that the Principal District Judge has erred in setting aside the eviction order dated 17 May 2018, which was lawfully passed in exercise of statutory powers by the Municipal Corporation. That the Lessees specifically agreed for handing over possession of the leased land and premises immediately upon expiry of the tenure of lease. The Municipal Corporation had already rejected the request of Lessees for renewal of the lease. That therefore there is no katkam 35/74 question of deciding the application dated 3 October 2017 submitted by the Lessees. He would submit that the Principal District Judge has glossed over the fact that the application dated 3 October 2017 was rejected by letter dated 7 November 2017 and once the Municipal Corporation took a decision not to renew the lease, there is no question of deciding the same once again. He would submit that the finding recorded by the Principal District Judge about obtaining prior sanction of the Standing Committee with regard to decision for renewal of lease is totally unsustainable. That under provisions of sections 79-A and 79-D of the MMC Act, 1949 it is the Municipal Commissioner who has to take the decision to dispose of the Municipal Corporation’s property. That the sanction of the Standing Committee would be necessary, at the highest, only when the Commissioner chooses to sell or let out any immovable property. That in the present case, the Municipal Commissioner did not take such a decision but a decision was taken merely to take over possession from successors-in-title of lessees and sub-tenants after expiry of the original period of lease. That the Deputy Municipal Commissioner has rightly exercised delegated power of Municipal Commissioner while passing the eviction order under section 81-B of the MMC Act, 1949. That the Principal District Judge has erred in holding such delegated powers cannot be exercised under section 79 of the MMC Act, 1949. He would rely upon the judgment of the Apex Court in Bombay Municipal Corporation vs. Dhondu Chowdhary, 1965 AIR 1486 and of this Court in Ramchandra Jivatram Chetwani vs. Pune Municipal Corporation (Writ Petition No.5764 of 2012 with connected Writ Petitions, decided katkam 36/74 on 2 November 2012) in support of his contention that the Deputy Municipal Commissioner can exercise delegated powers of the Municipal Commissioner.

23. Mr. Damle would further contend that condition No. 7 of General Body Resolution No.161 is in three parts, namely, (i) restriction on Lessees to induct sub-tenants only during tenure of lease, (ii) permission to Lessees to continue to retain possession for themselves on payment of rent fixed as per rent control legislation, and (iii) first right of Lessees and sub-tenants to remain as tenants of Municipal Corporation. That therefore, condition No. 7 does not create any right of extension or renewal of lease in favour of Lessees or their sub-tenants. That interpretation sought to be advanced by Mr. Godbole would result in perpetual lease of Municipal property, which is not the intention behind passing Resolution No.161 or in executing the Lease Deed. That the rule of harmonious construction is required to be applied while reading the Lease Deed in conjunction with the conditions of the General Body Resolution.

24. Mr. Damle would further submit that the Resolution No.161 as well as Lease Deed, at the highest, created rights in favour of ‘Original Lessees’, and not in favour of their ‘successors in title’. That in the present case the application for renewal is made by successors in title of Lessees without existence of any right in their favour. He would rely on the katkam 37/74 judgment of the Apex Court in Naveen Chand & Anr. vs. Nagarjuna Travels & Hotel Pvt. Ltd. 2002 (6) SCC 331, in support of his contention that when the clauses of Lease Deed for renewal are not specific and clear, the Lessor has made his intention of terminating the lease clear and consequently there has been no question of any renewal.

25. Mr. Damle would further contend that the Municipal Corporation has decided to construct a town-hall and parking area in the leased land and therefore successor-in-title of Lessees and sub-tenants cannot be permitted to retain the land and construction in perpetuity.

26. Mr. Damle would further contend that the Principal District Judge has erred in holding that a unilateral right of renewal was created in favour of the Lessees. That the judgment of the Apex Court in Lalji Tandon (supra) is distinguishable as there is no presumption in the present case of perpetual lease. That since the property in question is of public authority, private persons cannot be permitted to hold the same perpetually. He would therefore pray that the impugned judgment and order of the Principal District Judge be set aside and the eviction order dated 17 May 2018 be upheld.

27. So far as Writ Petitions filed by the successors-in-title of lessees and sub-tenants are concerned, Mr. Damle would oppose the same without prejudice to the contentions raised in the Writ Petitions filed by katkam 38/74 the Municipal Corporation. He would submit that the directions for payment of damages issued by the Principal District Judge cannot be disturbed as there is unauthorized use of Corporation’s property after expiry of the lease and the occupants must be liable to be paid damages. So far as the directions of the learned Principal District Judge for consideration of application dated 3 October 2017 for renewal of lease is concerned, Mr. Damle would submit that in the event of this Court arriving at the conclusion that Lessees had some right to seek renewal of lease, the ultimate decision about renewal of lease must be left to the wisdom of the Municipal Corporation. That being public property vested in the Municipal Corporation, the same cannot be subject to unilateral rights of private persons and that the ultimate decision for grant or refusal to grant renewal of lease must be left to the public authority. He would submit that if the contention of the successors-in-title of lessees and sub-tenants is accepted, they would perpetually continue to hold the Municipal property as there is no outer period specified in either General Body Resolutions or the lease deed after which the right of renewal would cease to exist. He would submit that interpretation of General Body Resolutions and lease deed to mean unilateral right of renewal in perpetuity would result in situation where the successors-in-title of lessees and sub-tenants would never return the Municipal land. That such interpretation would lead to absurdity and therefore required to be avoided. He would pray for dismissal of Writ Petitions filed by the successors-in-title of lessees and sub-tenants. katkam 39/74 REASONS AND ANALYSIS

28. As observed above, both Municipal Corporation as well as Lessees/ Tenants are aggrieved by the common Judgment and order dated 26 July 2019 rendered by the Principal District Judge while the judgment is challenged in entirety by the Municipal Corporation, the challenge raised by the successors-in-title of lessees and sub-tenants are restricted to recognition of discretion in Municipal Commissioner to take a decision on ‘renewal’ application and quantum of damage rent fixed by the Principal District Judge.

29. The entire controversy between the parties revolve around the nature of rights created in favour of Lessees by three documents of (i) General Body Resolution No.161, dated 13 December 1967, (ii) General Body Resolution No.181, dated 29 December 1967, and (iii) Lease deed, dated 4 January 1968. The documents are interpreted by the Municipal Commissioner to mean tenure of only 50 years without any further unilateral right to seek renewal or extension. On the other hand, successors-in-title of lessees and sub-tenants read those three documents to mean creation of an absolute right to seek ‘extension’ of tenure of lease. Alternatively, the successors-in-title of lessees and subtenants contend that even if right of ‘renewal’ is to be read in those three documents, renewal is automatic subject to fixation of rent for subsequent tenure. It would therefore be necessary to refer to the relevant clauses/terms and conditions of those three documents. katkam 40/74

30. Resolution No.161/1967 was adopted by the Administrator of the Municipal Corporation exercising powers of General Body. The Resolution reads thus: ‘संदर्भ:- मा. सहा. आयुक्त यांचेकडील नि वेद निद.०५/१२/१९६७. मा. महा गरपानिलक े च्या कक्षेतील निवषय ठराव क्रमांक १६१-१९६७ निद ांक: १३/१२/१९६७. मा. सहा. आयुक्त यांचेकडील निद. ०५/१२/१९६७ चे नि वेद ात उल्लेख क े लेल्या कारणास्तव, महा गरपानिलक े च्या मालकीची निस.स. ं. ८६२४ म्यु. पल घ.क्र.८६ मधील, २४ गुंठे, ४१ स्क्वे. याड या जागेपैकी महा गरपानिलक े च्या ताब्यात सध्या सलेली व स्टेट बैंकमध्ये जाणारी जागा सोडू रानिहलेली २०१४८ स्क्वे.फ ु ट (सोबतच्या काशात निहरव्या रंगा े दशनिवलेली) जागा मा. महाराष्ट्र शास, ागरीनिवकास, साव. आरोग्य व गृहनि माण खाते अनिधसूच ा क्र. एस.एम.सी. ११६७- ५९८४२-सी निद. १४/११/६७ में निदलेल्या अनिधकारा ुसार मुं.प्रा.महा. अनिध. १९४९ चे कलम ७९ (क) अन्यये मा. महा गरपानिलक े च्या अनिधकाराचा वापर करु, अजदार श्री. राजगोपाल रामचंद्र उपाध्ये व श्री. पारसमल जयराम जोशी, राहणार सोलपूर यां ा खालील शनित व अटीवर ५० वषाच्या र्भाडेपट्टा करारा े जागा र्भाड्या े देणेस मंजूरी देणेत येत आहे. १) २०१४८ चौ. फ ु ट जागा ५० वषाचे र्भाडेपट्ट्या े लेखी करार ामा करू व तो ोंदवू देणेत यावा. २) या जागेचे र्भाडे खालील प्रमाणे राहील. अ) दरसाल रु. १८,०००-०० प्रथम २५ वषJ. ब) दरसाल रु.२१,०००-०० पुढील २५ वषJ. २) र्भाडेपट्टेदारा े या जागेच्या तळमजल्यावर कमीत कमी ५०० लोक मावतील या आकाराचा एक हॉल बांधला पानिहजे आनिण सदरच्या हॉलसाठी व्यासपीठ, प्रवेशद्वार व बाहेर जाण्याचा माग वगैरे सोयी मा. महा गरपानिलका पसंत करेल त्याप्रमाणे क े ल्या पानिहजेत. ४) सदरच्या हॉल महा गरपानिलक े स कोणत्याही कायक्रमास निव ामूल्य कोणत्याही वेळी व कोणतीही अट घालता निदला पानिहजे. ५) सदरच्या नि योनिजत इमारतीचे बांधकाम म्हणजे हॉल, लॉजींग बोडींग व इतर धंद्याची दुका े वगैरे ताबडतोब सुरु करण्यात आले पानिहजे. ६) र्भाडेपट्ट्याची मुदत संपल्या ंतर र्भाडेपट्टेदारा े सदरची जागा बांधलेल्या इमारतीसह कोणतीही अट घालता, मुदत संपलेल्या निदवशीच्या निस्थनितत सोलापूर महा गरपानिलक े च्या स्वानिध क े ली पानिहजे. ७) र्भाडेपट्ट्याची मुदतपयंच र्भाडेपट्टेदारा े सदरची जागा पोटर्भाडेकरु ा द्यावी. र्भाडेपट्ट्याच्या मुदती ंतरच्या कालाकनिरता देऊ ये. पण जर र्भाडेपट्टेदारास सदरची जागा स्वतः katkam 41/74 कडे ठेऊ घेण्याची इच्छा असल्यास त्यास त्यावेळच्या प्रचनिलत कायद्या ुसार महा गरपानिलका जे र्भाडे ठरेल ते र्भाडे देऊ जागा पुढे ताब्यात ठेवता येईल व त्याचप्रमाणे र्भाडेपट्ट्याची मुदत ज्या निदवशी संपते त्या निदवशी अनिस्तत्वात असलेला र्भाडे नि यंत्रण कायद्याचा निवचार क े ला जाईल, र्भाडेपट्ट्याची मुदत संपल्या ंतर र्भाडेपट्टेदारात व पोटर्भाडेकरूस महा गरपानिलका र्भाडेकरु म्हणू राहण्याचा त्यावेळी ठरवू त्या अटीप्रमाणे प्रथम हक्क राहील. ८) प्रत्येक वषाचे र्भाडे त्या वषाच्या १५ एनिप्रलच्या आत आगाऊ निदले पानिहजे. तथानिप सदरचे आगाऊ र्भाडे आनिथक वषाच्या ३१ माचपयंत निदले ाही तर त्या े र्भाडे देण्यात कसर क े ली आहे, असे समजले जाईल. र्भाडेपट्ट्याच्या मुदतीत अशा प्रकारचे लागोपाठ निक ं वा वेगवेगळ्या ५ वेळा वरील प्रमाणे कसर क े ल्यास र्भाडेपट्टा रद्द करण्यात येईल व अशा ५ व्या र्भंगा ंतर येणान्या एनिप्रलच्या १ तारखेस सदरची जागा इमारतीसह महा गरपानिलक े च्या स्वानिध राहील. ९) प्रत्येक वषाच्या १५ एनिप्रलच्या आत र्भाडे निदल्यास त्यावर ६ टक्क े दरसाल दंडव्याज आकारले जाईल. र्भाडेपट्टेदारा े दो वषापेक्षा अनिधक काळ र्भाडे थकवू ये. तसे र्भाडे थकल्यास र्भाडेपट्टा रद्द झाला असे समजू सदरची जागा व त्यावरील इमारतीसह पुढील वषाच्या एनिप्रल १ तारखेस महा गरपानिलक े च्या स्वाधी राहील. (१०) करार ामा निलहू देण्यापूवी करारा ाम्यात मूद क े ले जाणारे एका वषांचे र्भाडे े च्या खानिजन्यात अगोदर र्भरले पानिहजे. (११) याबाबतीत महा गरपानिलका नि यमाप्रमाणे इमारतीचे कर व दर र्भाडेपट्टेदारा र्भरले पानिहजेत व हे कर व दर दो वषापेक्षा जास्त मुदतीचे बाकी राहणार ाहीत. १२) करार ाम्यात ज्या बाबी मूद क े ल्या सतील अथवा शत व अटी यांच्याशी प्रत्यक्ष संबंधीत सतील अशा बाबीत कांही मतर्भेद अथवा तंटा नि माण झाल्यास, त्याबाबतीत मा. गरआयुक्त (Municipal Commissioner) यांचा नि णय अखरेचा राहील. (मु.गो. समे) प्रशासक सोलापूर ’ महा गरपानिलका

31. For the purpose of determination of issue involved in the present Petitions condition Nos. 6 and 7 of Resolution No.161 are relevant, English translation of which is as under: ‘(6) Upon expiry of tenure of lease, the lessee shall handover the said land alongwith constructed building to Municipal Corporation without any condition in the situation of as it stands on the date of expiry of tenure. (7) The said land can be allotted to sub-tenants only till tenure of lease. It cannot be granted after tenure of lease. However, if the lessees desire to keep the said land with themselves, they can retain possession of the land by payment of such rent as would be fixed by the Municipal Corporation in accordance with the applicable law. Similarly, the provisions of rent control legislation applicable on the date of expiry of tenure of lease shall be taken katkam 42/74 into consideration. After expiry of tenure of lease, the lessees and sub-tenants shall have first right to remain as tenant of Municipal Corporation on conditions agreed at that time.’

32. The Administrator of the Municipal Corporation thereafter adopted one more Resolution on 29 December 1967 numbered as 181 under which three conditions of earlier Resolution No.161 were altered. The alteration of the three conditions is with regard to location of town hall, issuance of prior notice for use of town hall and keeping the land at northern side (not covered by lease deed) vacant for the purpose of footpath and parking. Therefore, for the purpose of determining the controversy involved in these Petitions, the Resolution No.181 dated 29 December 1967 is not of much relevance. However what is required to be noted is the fact that the Resolution No. 181 was adopted at the request of the lessees who desired modification of conditions of Resolution NO. 161. This has some relevance, which is discussed in the latter part of the judgment.

33. In pursuance of the Resolution Nos.161 and 181 so adopted, a Lease Deed came to be executed between the Municipal Corporation and Lessees on 4 January 1968. The Lease Deed make a specific reference to the Resolution Nos.161 and 181. Therefore, there is no dispute between the parties that the covenants of lease deed are required to be read together with the terms and conditions of the General Body Resolution Nos.161 and 181. The relevant terms and conditions of the Lease Deed dated 4 January 1968 are as under: katkam 43/74 ‘निड व सब निड सोलापूर पैकी तालुका उत्तर सोलापुर पैकी शहर सोलापूर मधील गोल्डनिफ ं च पेठ येथील निस.स. ं. ८६२४ व म्यु. पल. ं. ८६ ची एकूण २४ गुंठे ४१ चौरस याड ची जागा े च्या मालकीची आहे. त्यापैकी म पा च्या सध्या ताब्यात सलेली व मंजूरी मास्टरप्लॅ प्रमाणे सदर ंबर पैकी सेटबॅक मध्ये जाणारी जागा सोडू दनिक्षण र्भागाकडील २०१४८ चौ. फ ु ट जागा आम्ही ंबर १/२ यां ी म पा कडे निद ांक १४/०९/१९६७ च्या अजा े मागणी क े ली. त्याबाबत प्रकरण चालू वर वण क े लेली जागा मा. सहाय्यक आयुक्त यांचे निद.०५/१२/१९६७ च्या नि वेद ात उल्लेखलेल्या कारणास्तव मा.महाराष्ट्र शास ागरी निवकास सावजनि क आरोग्य गृहनि माण खाते अनिधसूच ा क्रमांक SMC ११६७-५९८४२-C निद ांक १४/११/१९६७ े निदलेल्या अनिधकारा ुसार मु.प्रा.महा. अनिध. नि यम १९४९ चे कलम ७९ (क) अन्वये मा. महा गरपानिलक े च्या अनिधकाराचा वापर करु महा गरपानिलका ठराव. १६१ निद. १४/१२/१९६७ व निद ांक २९/१२/१९६७ च्या ठराव ंबर ९८१ / १९६७ च्या ठरावास अ ुसरु आम्हास खालील शतीवर ५० पन् ास वषाच्या करारा े जागा र्भाडया े देण्यास मंजूरी देण्यात आली आहे. त्या ुसार आम्ही खालील शतीस व अटीस अ ुसरु त्याबद्दलचा र्भाडेपट्टा आजरोजी आम्ही निलहू देत आहोत.’ ‘र्भाडयाच्या करारा ुसार तुमचे व आमचे दरम्या या शती व अटी ठरल्या त्या खालीलप्रमाणे. १) वर वण क े लेल्या खुल्या जागेचे र्भाडे प्रथम २५ वषJ दरसाला रुपये १८०००/- अठरा हजार प्रमाणे व ंतरचे २५ वषJ दरसाल रुपये २१०००/- एक वीस हजार प्रमाणे आम्ही तुम्हास देत जावु. २) या र्भाडेपट्टया े र्भाडया े घेतलेल्या २०१४७ चौ. फ ु टाच्या जागेत पनिहल्या मजल्यावर कमीत कमी ५०० लोक मावतील या आकाराचा एक हॉल आम्ही बांधण्याचा आहे व तसा हॉल तो बांधला पानिहजे व सदरच्या हॉलसाठी व्यासपीठ, प्रवेशद्वार व बाहेर जाण्याचा माग वगैरे सोयी म..पा. पसत करील त्याप्रमाणे हॉल बांधता ा क े ल्या पानिहजेत. सदरचा हॉल म..पा.स कोणत्याही कायक्रमास निव ामुल्य कोणत्याही वेळी व कोणतीही अट घालता निदला पानिहजे. सदरचा हॉल फक्त लग्, मुंजी, सर्भा इ. लहा मुदतीचे सावजनि क अथवा खाजगी कामासाठी र्भाडया े देण्यात यावा. लांब मुदतीकरीता सदरचा हॉल र्भाडया े देण्याचा ाही वर निदले प्रमाणे म..पा. करेल त्याचे क ु ठल्याही कायक्रमास निव ामुल्य व म..पा मागेल त्यावेळी कोणतीही अट घालता व कोणतीही सबब सांगता आम्ही म..पा स देण्याचे आहे. मात्र महा गरपानिलक े े सदरचा हॉल मागणेपूवी १० दहा निदवस पूव मुदतीची लेखी सूच ा आम्हास निदली पानिहजे. ३) सदरच्या खुल्या जागेत आम्ही नि योनिजत इमारतीचे बांधकाम म्हणजे हॉल, लॉनिजंग बोडींग व इतर धंदयाचे दुका े वगैरे जागा ताब्यात घेतलेल्या बरोबर ताबडतोब सुरु करण्याचे आहे. बांधकाम पूण होताच व वापर परवा ा निमळताच सदरचा हॉल व इतर दुका े पोटर्भाडया े देण्याचा त्याचेकडेल र्भाडे वसूल करण्याचा पूण हक्क आहे. सदरच्या खुल्या जागेत आम्ही जे जे बांधकाम करू ते ते म..पा च्या नि यमा ुसार व कायदया ुसार म..पा चे मंजूरी घेवू व त्या मंजूर काशाप्रमाणे बांधकाम करावयाचे आहे. या र्भाडेपट्टयासोबत जोडलेल्या काशात निहरवे रंगा े दाखनिवलेली जागा आम्हास तुम्ही र्भाडया े निदली आहे. या जागेचे उत्तरेस तांबडया रेषेच्या आत व तसेच तांबडया रेषेच्या बाहेर निपवळया रेषे पावेतो च्या जागेत हल्ली दुका े आहेत यांचा प्रत्यक्ष कब्जा महा गरपानिलक े कडे सध्या ाही. परंतु यापुढे क े व्हाही त्या जागेचा प्रत्यक्ष कब्जा े स निमळाला तर महा गरपानिलक े ी ती जागा यापुढे कोणासही क े व्हाही र्भाडया े देण्याची ाही. ती सव जागा, फ ु टपाथ साठी अगर मोटारी उर्भे करण्यासाठी खुली अशी सतत े े ठेवण्याचे ठरलेलेल आहे. katkam 44/74 ४) र्भाडेपट्टयाची मुदत निद ांक २०/१२/१९६७ ते तारीख १९/१२/२०१७ अखेर मुदत संपल्या ंतर सदरच्या खुल्या जागेवर बांधलेल्या इमारतीसह कोणतीही सबब सांगता मुदत संपल्यानिदवशी ज्या निस्थतीत जागा असेल त्या निस्थतीत ती जागा इमारतीसह आम्ही तुमचे प्रत्यक्ष कब्जात देऊ. ५) र्भाडेपट्टयाची मुदत असेपावेतो सदरील जागा पोटर्भाडया े देण्याचा आम्हास हक्क व अनिधकार आहे. मात्र र्भाडेपट्टयाच्या मुदती ंतर च्या काळाकरीता आम्ही ती जागा पोटर्भाडया े देणेची ाही. र्भाडेपट्टयाची मुदत संपल्या ंतर सदरची जागा आम्हास स्वतःकडे ठेवू घेण्याची इच्छा असल्यास त्यास महा गरपानिलका त्यावेळी जे र्भाडे. ठरनिवल ते र्भाडे देवू आम्ही जागा पुढे र्भाडया े घेवु. ‘येणेप्रमाणे हा र्भाडेपट्टा आम्ही महा गरपानिलका ठराव क्र. १६१ निद ांक १३/१२/१९६७ प्रमाणे व दुसरा ठराव क्र. १८१ निद ांक २९/१२/१९६७ प्रमाणे व सदर ठरावात मूद क े लेल्या शती व अटीमध्ये आणखी शती व अटी दुरुस्ती करणेस मा. महाराष्ट्र शास, गरनिवकास सवाजनि क आरोग्य व गृहनि माण खाते अनिधसूच ा क्रमांक एसएससी ११६७-५९८४२ निद ांक १४/११/१९६७ े निदलेल्या अनिधकारा ुसार मु.प्र.महा. अनिधनि यम १८४९ चे कलम ७९ (क) अन्वये मा.म..पा. च्या अनिधकाराचा वापर करु म..पा. ठराव ंबर १८१ / १९६७ चे ठरावास अ ुसरु अटी व शती दुरुस्त क े ल्या आहेत व त्या दोन्ही ठरावास अ ुसरू त्यातील अटी व शती ुसार हा र्भाडेपट्टा निलहू निदला आहे व या गोष्टीचे साक्षीसाठी आम्ही आपल्या सहया खालील साक्षीदारासमक्ष क े ल्या आहेत.’

34. For the purpose of the controversy involved in the present Petition covenants in clauses 4 and 5 of the Lease Deed would be relevant, English translation of which reads thus: ‘(4) The tenure of the lease deed from 20 December 1967 to 19 December 2017 and after expiry of the lease, we shall handover possession of the land alongwith building constructed thereon in same condition as it exists on the date of expiry of tenure in your possession without any pretext. (5) We shall have right to give the said property on sub-tenancy during the tenure of lease. However, such sub-tenancy is not to be created for period after tenure of the lease. After expiry of tenure of lease if we desire to retain the said property with us, we shall take the same on lease for further period on the rent as may be determined by the Municipal Corporation.’

35. The first issue that needs to be decided in the light of the terms and conditions of the General Body Resolutions and Lease Deed is about katkam 45/74 nature of right created in favour of lessees, whether it is right of ‘extension’ or right of ‘renewal’. The distinction between the two terms ‘extension’ and ‘renewal’ is discussed in the judgment of the Apex Court in Provash Chandra Dalui & Anr. (supra) wherein it is held in para 14 as under: ‘14. It is pertinent to note that the word used is 'extension' and not renewal'. To extend means to enlarge, expand, lengthen, prolong to carry out further than its original limit. Extension, according to Black's Law Dictionary, means enlargement of the main body; addition of something smaller than that to which it is attached; to lengthen or prolong. Thus extension ordinarily implies the continued existence of something to be extended. The distinction between 'extension' and 'renewal' is chiefly that in the case of renewal, a new lease is required, while in the case of extension the same lease continues in force during additional period by the performance of the stipulated act. In other words, the word 'extension' when used in its proper and usual sense in connection with a lease means a prolongation of the lease. Construction of this stipulation in the lease in the above manner will also be consistent when the lease is taken as a whole. The purposes of the lease were not expected to last for only 10 years and as Mr. A.K. Sen rightly pointed out the Schedule specifically mentioned the lease as "for a stipulated period of twenty years." As these words are very clear, there is very little for the Court to do about it.’

36. Thus, an extension of lease would mean continuation of the same lease during additional period by performance of a stipulated act. As held by the Apex Court, extension of lease would mean prolongation of the lease. On the contrary ‘renewal’ implies execution of a new lease at the end of expiry of the earlier tenure.

37. In Lalji Tandon (supra) again the Apex Court discussed the difference between extension and renewal and held in para 13 as under: ‘13. In India, a lease may be in perpetuity. Neither the Transfer of Property Act nor the general law abhors a lease in perpetuity. (Mulla on The Transfer of Property Act, Ninth Edition, 1999, p.1011). Where a covenant for renewal katkam 46/74 exists, its exercise is, of course, a unilateral act of the lessee, and the consent of the lessor is unnecessary. (Baker v. Merckel (1960) 1 All ER 668, also Mulla, ibid, p.1204). Where the principal lease executed between the parties containing a covenant for renewal, is renewed in accordance with the said covenant, whether the renewed lease shall also contain similar clause for renewal depends on the facts and circumstances of each case regard being had to the intention of the parties as displayed in the original covenant for renewal and the surrounding circumstances. There is a difference between an extension of lease in accordance with the covenant in that regard contained in the principal lease and renewal of lease, again in accordance with the covenant for renewal contained in the original lease. In the case of extension it is not necessary to have a fresh deed of lease executed; as the extension of lease for the term agreed upon shall be a necessary consequence of the clause for extension. However, option for renewal consistently with the covenant for renewal has to be exercised consistently with the terms thereof and, if exercised, a fresh deed of lease shall have to be executed between the parties. Failing the execution of a fresh deed of lease, another lease for a fixed term shall not come into existence though the principal lease in spite of the expiry of the term thereof may continue by holding over for year by year or month by month, as the case may be.’

38. In Lalji Tandon, the Apex Court referred to a Division Bench judgment of the Calcutta High Court in Secretary of State for India in Council vs. A.H. Forbes, (1912) 17 IC 180 and held in para 16 as under: ‘16. Another illuminating decision on the point is by Sir Ashutosh Mookerjee J. speaking for the Division Bench of the Calcutta High Court in Secretary of State for India in Council Vs. A.H. Forbes (1912) 17 IC 180. The Division Bench on a review of several English decisions held:

1) A lease, which creates a tenancy for a term of years, may yet confer on the lessee an option of renewal.

2) If the lease does not state by whom option is exercisable, it is exercisable (as between the lessor and lessee) by the lessee only, that is to say, a covenant for renewal, if informally expressed, is enforced only in favour of the lessee. (3) The option is exercisable not merely by the lessee personally but also by his representative-in-interest. katkam 47/74 (4) If the option does not state the terms of renewal, the new lease will be for the same period and on the same terms as the original lease, in respect of all the essential conditions thereof, except as to the covenant for renewal itself.

5) There is no sort of legal presumption against a right of perpetual renewal. The burden of strict proof is imposed upon a person claiming such a right. It should not be inferred from any equivocal expressions which may fairly be capable of being otherwise interpreted. The intention in that behalf should be clearly shown; otherwise, the agreement is satisfied and exhausted by a single renewal. (6) A covenant for renewal runs with the land. (7) The position of a lessee, who has been always ready and willing to accept a renewal on proper terms, is the same in equity as if a proper lease had been granted. Where the covenant for renewal was still specifically enforceable at the commencement of a suit for ejectment against the lessee, the position of the lessee in equity is the same as if it had been specifically enforced.’

39. After having examined the difference between the concepts of ‘extension’ and ‘renewal’ of lease in the light of the judgments in Provash Chandra Dalui & Anr. and Lalji Tandon, it would be necessary to determine the exact nature of right created in favour of the Lessees in the present case. As per General Body Resolution No.161, dated 13 December 1967, Condition No. 6 mandated the Lessees to handover possession of the leased land alongwith construction thereon immediately upon expiry of tenure of lease. Condition No.7 granted an option to the Lessees to retain the leased land on payment of such rent as would be determined by the Municipal Corporation after taking into consideration the provisions of the rent control legislation prevailing as on the date of expiry of the tenure of lease. Condition No.7, while permitting Lessees to induct sub-tenants, prohibited Lessees from inducting sub-tenants for a period exceeding the tenure of lease. The katkam 48/74 option for retention of lease premises was only for the purpose of retaining the same in possession of Lessees. Thus condition No.7 of Resolution No.161 did not contemplate retention of possession by subtenants through lessees, in any manner. Under condition No.7, if Lessees desired retention of lease premises in their possession, they could do so by payment of rent as would be determined by the Municipal Corporation. There is another sub-condition in condition No.7 which stipulates that both Lessees and their sub-tenants would have first right to become the Municipal Corporation’s tenants.

40. Thus, after taking into consideration the effect of the stipulations included in condition No. 7 of Resolution No.161, the nature of arrangement which the Municipal Corporation suggested appears to be, prohibiting the sub-tenants from continuing in occupancy after expiry of tenure of lease in the first part of condition No. 7. In the third part of condition No. 7, first right is conferred on sub-tenants to become Municipal Corporation’s tenants. The harmonious construction of the two conditions included in para 7 would mean that the sub-tenants cannot continue occupancy of the premises as sub-tenants of Lessees after expiry of tenure of lease but they have first right to become direct tenants of Municipal Corporation. Thus upon expiry of the tenure of lease, the sub-tenants could exercise their first right to demand tenancy directly through Municipal Corporation. The drafters of the resolution have been careful in using the terms ‘sub-tenants’ and ‘tenants’ at appropriate places, which is clear from the Resolution’s language: katkam 49/74 ‘The said land can be allotted to sub-tenants only till tenure of lease. It cannot be granted after tenure of lease. ------ After expiry of tenure of lease, the lessees and sub-tenants shall have first right to remain as tenants of Municipal Corporation on conditions agreed at that time.’ (emphasis and underlying supplied)

41. Thus, the status of occupants (other than lessness) during tenure of lease is described as ‘sub-tenants’, whereas after expiration of the tenure of lease, their continuation in the premises would be in capacity as ‘tenants’. This would also mean their sub-tenancy with the Lessees would expire with expiry of the tenure of lease. Thus, the right of subtenants to continue to remain in possession of premises was co-terminus with the first tenure of the lease.

42. So far as the Lessees are concerned, condition No. 7 of the Resolution No.161 conferred first right on the Lessees to become direct tenants of the Municipal Corporation. Therefore, so far as Lessees are concerned, a harmonious construction of two parts of condition No. 7 would indicate that continuation of possession by Lessees after expiry of tenure of lease could only be in capacity as tenants of the Municipal Corporation.

43. As observed above, Resolution No.181 does not throw any light about the rights and obligations between the parties with regard to renewal or extension of tenancy. So far as the lease deed dated 4 January katkam 50/74 1968 is concerned, under clause 4 thereof the Lessees agreed to handover possession of the lease land alongwith the construction thereof on 19 December 2017. Under clause 5 the right of Lessees to grant the same on sub-tenancy basis during the tenure of lease was recognised. However, a specific prohibition was imposed not to induct any sub-tenant for a period exceeding the tenure of lease. Under clause 5 the Lessees were permitted to retain the lease land on payment of rent as decided by the Municipal Corporation.

44. As contended by Mr. Godbole and not disputed by Mr. Damle, the lease deed is to be read in conjunction with the Resolution Nos.161 and 181 as the lease deed make specific reference to said two Resolutions with a specific stipulation that the lease was executed in accordance with the terms and conditions specified in those two Resolutions. Upon conjunctive reading of covenants of lease with the terms and conditions of Resolution Nos.161 and 181, it is difficult to hold that any right of ‘extension’ was created in favour of the Lessees by the said three documents. As observed above, condition No. 7 of Resolution No.161 granted first right of remaining as direct tenant of Municipal Corporation both in favour of Lessees as well as sub-tenants.

45. If by acting on condition No.7 any sub-tenant was to apply for becoming direct tenant of Municipal Corporation and if Municipal Corporation was to accede to such a request after 19 December 2017 katkam 51/74 such sub-tenant would become direct tenant of the Municipal Corporation. Such a contingency is recognized in condition No.7 of Resolution No.161. Therefore, in a contingency where a sub-tenant of Lessees becoming direct tenant of Municipal Corporation after 19 December 2017, could the Lessees claim a right of ‘extension’? The answer to this question would obviously be in the negative. If the Lessees had right to seek extension of lease, their tenants could not become direct tenants of Municipal Corporation. Therefore, as observed above, the harmonious reading of various conditions stipulated in para 7 of Resolution No.161 would indicate that the right to retain leased premises after 19 December 2017 created in favour of Lessees was only in capacity as direct tenants of the Municipal Corporation. There is also difference between the concept of ‘sub-tenants’ continuing as ‘tenants’ of Lessees and ‘sub-tenants’ becoming ‘direct tenants’ of Municipal Corporation after 19 December 2017. Under clause 3 of the lease agreement, the Lessees had right to recover rent from the sub-tenants. After paying the rent of Rs.18,000/- for first 25 years and Rs.21,000/- for next 25 years, the Lessees were not supposed to make any further payment to Municipal Corporation. However in lieu of payment of such rent and for having constructed the building on the leased land, the Lessees had right to induct sub-tenants and to recover rents from them. This was the commercial arrangement between the Municipal Corporation and the Lessees during the period of lease from 20 December 1967 to 19 December 2017. However, after 19 December 2017, if the Municipal Corporation was to permit any sub-tenant of Lessees to continue in the katkam 52/74 premises by becoming direct tenants of Municipal Corporation, it is Municipal Corporation alone who could receive rent from such subtenants. Thus after 19 December 2017 the right of Lessees to collect rent from sub-tenants would cease to exist. If any premises in the constructed building remained in occupation of Lessees themselves, they had first right to remain in occupation as direct tenants of the Municipal Corporation. Therefore, the correct construction of the terms and conditions of the Resolution Nos.161 and 181 and Lease Deed is that the Lessees only had right to become direct tenants of Municipal Corporation only in respect of premises occupied by them. Similar right is created in favour of sub-tenants inducted by Lessees who can seek right to become Municipal Corporation’s direct tenants. If this construction of terms and conditions of General Body Resolutions and Lease Deed is not made, as is sought to be suggested by Mr. Godbole, the same would lead to absurdity. Because in the first part of para 7 of Resolution No.161 the right of the Lessees to retain leased land was only for Lessees’ own possession. This is because condition No.7 specifically uses the expressions ‘पण जर र्भाडेपट्टेदारास सदरची जागा स्वतः कडे ठेऊ घेण्याची इच्छा असल्यास‘ (however if Lessees desire to retain the said land with themselves …….….). This sentence is to be read in conjunction with earlier sentence in condition No. 7 which contains a specific prohibition on induction of sub-tenants in excess of tenure of the lease. This would mean that the right to retain the premises in favour of Lessees is only if such retention is sought for self possession and not for possession of sub-tenants. Thus, the arrangement agreed was that sub-tenancy between sub-tenants and Lessees would katkam 53/74 come to an end on 19 December 2017. The Lessees’ sub-tenants would exercise first right of becoming Municipal Corporation’s direct tenants. In respect of premises which continue in possession of Lessees, they have right of retaining the possession of such premises by exercising first right of becoming the Municipal Corporation’s tenants.

46. Both Mr. Godbole and Mr. Damle agree to the proposition that conditions of General Body Resolution No. 161 and clauses of Lease Deed must be harmoniously construed. It is Mr. Godbole’s contention that both the set of covenants can co-exist harmoniously and without causing violence to each other. There is no difficulty in accepting this contention as the harmonious construction condition Nos.[6] and 7 of Resolution No.161 and clauses 4 and 5 of the Lease Deed would mean right in favour of Lessees to continue only as direct tenants of the Municipal Corporation after expiry of the tenure of lease. Mr. Godbole has relied on judgment of the Apex Court in Bank of India (supra) in which the Apex Court has held in paras 28, 31 and 32 as under: ‘28. The true construction of a contract must depend upon the import of the words used and not upon what the parties choose to say afterwards. Nor does subsequent conduct of the parties in the performance of the contract affect the true effect of the clear and unambiguous words used in the contract. The intention of the parties must be ascertained from the language they have used, considered in the light of the surrounding circumstances and the object of the contract. The nature and purpose of the contract is an. important guide in ascertaining the intention of the parties.

29. In Ottoman Bank of Nicosia v. Ohanes Chakarian, AIR 1938 PC 26, Lord Wright made these weighty observations: (AIR p. 29) "... that if the contract is clear and unambiguous, its true effect cannot be changed merely by the course of conduct adopted by the parties in acting under it." katkam 54/74

30. In Ganga Saran v. Firm Ram Charan Ram Gopal, AIR 1952 SC 9, a four-Judge Bench of this Court stated: (AIR p. 11, para 6) "6.... Since the true construction of an agreement must depend upon the import of the words used and not upon what the parties choose to say afterwards, it is unnecessary to refer to what the parties have said about it."

31. It is also a well-recognised principle of construction of a contract that it must be read as a whole in order to ascertain the true meaning of its several clauses and the words of each clause should be interpreted so as to bring them into harmony with the other provisions if that interpretation does no violence to the meaning of which they are naturally susceptible. (North Eastern Railway Co. v. Lord Hastings, (1900-03) All ER Rep 199 (HL.)

32. The fundamental position is that it is the banks who were responsible for formulation of the terms in the contractual Scheme that the optees of voluntary retirement under that Scheme will be eligible to pension under the Pension Regulations, 1995, and, therefore, they bear the risk of lack of clarity, if any. It is a well-known principle of construction of a contract that if the terms applied by one party are unclear, an interpretation against that party is preferred (verba chartarum fortius accipiuntur contra proferentem).’

47. Thus while construing clauses of a contract, the Court must not only read the contract as a whole but also gather the surrounding circumstances and intention behind execution of the contract. This principle is reiterated by the Apex Court in Bangalore Electricity Supply Company Limited (supra) wherein it is held in para 17 as under: ‘17. The duty of the court is not to delve deep into the intricacies of human of human mind to explore the undisclosed intention, but only to take the meaning of words used i.e. to say expressed intentions (Kamla Devi v. Takhatmal Land, (1964) 2 SCR 152: AIR 1964 SC 859). In seeking to construe a clause in a contract, there is no scope for adopting either a liberal or a narrow approach, whatever that may mean. The exercise which has to be undertaken is to determine what the words used mean. It can happen that in doing so one is driven to the conclusion that clause is ambiguous, and that it has two possible meanings. In those circumstances, the court has to prefer one above the other in accordance with the settled principles. If one meaning is more in accord with what the court considers to be the underlined purpose and intent of the contract, or part of it, than the other, then the court will katkam 55/74 choose the former or rather than the latter. Ashville Investments Ltd. v. Elmer Contractors Ltd., 1989 QB 488: (1988) 3 WLR 867: (1988) 2 ALL ER 577 (CA). The intention of the parties must be understood from the language they have used, considered in the light of the surrounding circumstances and object of the contract. Bank of India v. K. Mohandus, (2009) 5 SCC 313: (2009) 2 SCC (Civ) 524: (2009) 2 SCC (L&S) 32. Every contract is to be considered with reference to its object and the whole of its terms and accordingly the whole context must be considered in endeavouring to collect the intention of the parties, even though the immediate object of inquiry is the meaning of an isolated clause. Bihar SEB v. Green Rubber Industries, (1990) 1 SCC 731.’

48. In Shri Nashik Panchavati Panjarpol Trust (supra) relied upon by Mr. Godbole, the Apex Court has held in para 8 that the Courts should interpret a clause raising an ambiguity in a manner which is consistent with the other clause: ‘8. It cannot be gainsaid that as per the rules of doctrine of harmonious construction, the document has to be read as a whole and in its totality. If there is any ambiguity either patent or latent, in any of the clauses of the document, the courts should interpret such clause in such manner which is consistent with the other clauses and with the purpose and intent of the parties executing it.’

49. In my view, reliance by Mr. Godbole on judgments in Bank of India, Bangalore Electricity Supply Company Limited (supra) and Shri Nashik Panchavati Panjarpol Trust (supra), far from assisting the case of his clients, actually militates against them. If the intention and object behind passing Resolution No. 161 and execution of the Lease Deed is gathered and once all the terms and conditions of that Resolution together with Lease Deed are taken into consideration, the inescapable conclusion that emerges is that the Municipal Corporation did not intend to create a perpetual lease in favour of the Lessees. Though Mr. Godbole has katkam 56/74 repeatedly submitted that the Lease Deed and General Body Resolution No.161 do not create perpetual lease and that the successors-in-title of Lessees sought continuation of lease only for another term of 50 years, neither condition No.7 of Resolution No.161 nor clause No.5 of Lease Deed prescribe any such outer limit. Therefore, on account of absence of any outer limit for renewal/extension of lease, it is possible that the Lessees can contend that they would hold the leased land in perpetuity. Therefore, if the construction as sought to be suggested by Mr. Godbole is accepted, the same would mean that the Municipal Corporation intended creation of a perpetual lease. On the contrary, if the construction as is made in the preceding paragraphs is accepted, the same would actually further the intent and object behind execution of the lease by the Municipal Corporation. The intent appears to handover vacant land on lease at a concessional rate, get a building constructed thereon with a hall for use of public free of costs, permit Lessees to induct sub-tenants for 50 years to recover costs of construction and make profits and later handover the land with constructed premises to the Municipal Corporation. After handing over the land with constructed building an obligation is put on the Municipal Corporation that it will accept the subtenants as well as Lessees as its own tenants. Thus, the arrangement is such that the right created in Lessee’s favour to collect the rent from subtenants for first 50 years is to be transferred to the Municipal Corporation after 2017, whereafter the Municipal Corporation would start collecting rent from the occupants directly. Thus, the intention behind passing Resolution No.161 and in execution of Lease Deed was to katkam 57/74 permit the Lessees to earn profits out of the land only for a period of 50 years. The Municipal Corporation never intended to create a perpetual lease or even lease for a period of 100 years as sought to be suggested by Mr. Godbole.

50. One may also consider a situation that where the construction does not (and the present case, is unlikely to) survive for a period of 100 years. If Mr. Godbole’s contention is accepted and an extension for another period of 50 years is granted and if the constructed building collapses during 60th or 70th year, whether Lessees (or their successors-in-title), then construct a new building on the leased land?; What would be the composition of that building?; Whether Lessees can construct more than what was originally constructed and induct more sub-tenants? All these contingencies are not provided for in the Resolution No.161 or the Lease Deed. Therefore, the intention of the Municipal Corporation is quite clear and obvious that the Lessees were not to continue in the leased land for a period exceeding 50 years but had a right to demand that they would continue as direct tenants of Municipal Corporation in respect of the premises in their occupation.

51. Mr. Godbole has attempted to suggest that Resolution No.161 is a unilateral act of Municipal Corporation to which the Lessees were not parties. In fact, this argument clearly turns against Mr. Godbole’s clients. Execution of Lease Deed is sort of a ministerial act performed in pursuance of the authority derived from the General Body Resolution katkam 58/74 Nos.161 and 181. It must be borne in mind that it’s a municipal property and can be disposed of only by the authority of Standing Committee/General Body. Therefore, what is not intended by the General Body of the Municipal Corporation cannot be incorporated in the Lease Deed. If the Lessees wanted to seek any variance in the conditions of the General Body Resolution No.161, they were required to approach the General Body, which appears to have been done in the present case. Resolution No.181 was adopted shifting the location of the town-hall as per request of the Lessees. Here the dates of adoption of Resolution NO. 181 assumes importance. Resolution No. 181 was adopted on 29 December 1967 at lessee’s request amending the terms and conditions of earlier Resolution No. 161. This was done before execution of the Lease Deed on 4 January 1968. Thus if lessees were not agreeable to condition No. 7 of Resolution No. 161 dated 13 December 1967, they had the option of seeking modification of that condition before execution of the lease deed. However, modification of condition No. 7 of the Resolution No. 161 was not sought by the lessees, thereby raising a presumption that the lessees were agreeable to retain lease only for 50 years and to become Municipal Corporation’s direct tenants in respect of premises in their possession thereafter. This conduct of lessees not only falsifies their contention that Resolution No. 161 was unilateral act of Municipal Corporation, but in fact suggests that they always knew that the tenure of lease was for 50 years only. katkam 59/74

52. Thus, there can be no doubt to the position that, if there was any inconsistency between the terms and conditions of Resolution No. 161 and the Lease Deed, the terms of conditions of General Body Resolution would prevail over the covenants of Lease Deed. Fortunately, in the present case, there is no inconsistency with the conditions of Resolution No.161 and covenants of Lease Deed.

53. Mr. Godbole has contended that if multiple constructions of clauses of contract is possible, the one which gives effect to all the clauses will have to be adopted. He has relied upon the judgment of the Apex Court in Radha Sunder Datta (supra) in para 11 of which, it is held as under: ‘11. Now, it is a settled rule of interpretation that if there be admissible two constructions of a document, one of which will give effect to all the clauses therein while the other will render one or more of them nugatory, it is the former that should be adopted on the principle expressed in the maxim "ut res magis valeat quam pereat". What has to be considered therefore is whether it is possible to give effect to the clause in question, which can only be by construing Exhibit B as creating a separate Patni, and at the same time reconcile the last two clauses with that construction. Taking first the provision that if there be other persons entitled to the Patni of lot Ahiyapur they are to have the same rights in the land comprised in Exhibit B, that no doubt posits the continuance in those persons of the title under the original Patni. But the true purpose of this clause is, in our opinion, not so much to declare the rights of those other persons which rest on statutory recognition, but to provide that the grantees under the document should take subject to those rights. That that is the purpose of the clause is clear from the provision for indemnity which is contained therein. Moreover, if on an interpretation of the other clauses in the grant, the correct conclusion to come to is that it creates a new Patni in favour of the grantees thereunder, it is difficult to see how the reservation of the rights of the other Patnidars of lot Ahiyapur, should such there be, affects that conclusion. We are unable to see anything in the clause under discussion, which militates against the conclusion that Exhibit B creates a new Patni.’ katkam 60/74

54. Here again, this principle in Radha Sunder Datta would go against the clients of Mr. Godbole. Firstly, I do not see any other construction, than the one which is made in the proceeding paragraphs, is possible on harmonious reading of the conditions of Resolution No.161 and covenants of the Lease Deed. However, even if such multiple constructions are indeed possible, the construction which would fulfills the intention behind grant of lease will have to be preferred. Mr. Godbole’s reliance on the doctrine of contra proferentem and on the judgment of the Apex Court in Sahebzada Mohammad Kamgar Shah (supra) would not cut any ice as multiple interpretations are not possible after harmonious reading of the conditions of General Body Resolutions and clauses of the Lease Deed.

55. Mr. Godbole has contended that intricate exercise of construction of clauses of Lease Deed and of General Body Resolution cannot be undertaken in a summary enquiry under section 81-B of the MMC Act,

1949. He has submitted that only Civil Court would in a position to undertake that exercise. In this regard he submits that two suits between the parties are already pending, in which alone the interpretation of conditions of General Body Resolutions and Lease Deed can be done. I am unable to agree. It is the Municipal Corporation’s contention that the tenure of lease was only for 50 years and since that tenure has expired in 2017, possession of the leased property is treated as unauthorized. In that view of the matter, enquiry under section 81-B of the MMC Act, 1949 is fully maintainable. Also of relevance is the fact that the Petitioners did katkam 61/74 not raise this contention either before the Deputy Municipal Commissioner or before the Principal District Judge. Once the Municipal Corporation records a satisfaction that the tenure of lease has expired and once it refuses to renew it, the occupation automatically becomes unauthorized. Therefore, reliance of Mr. Godbole on judgments of the Apex Court in Express Newspapers (Private) Limited (supra), Government of Andhra Pradesh (supra), State of Rajasthra (supra) and of this Court in Sir N.P. Vakil Trust (supra) would not assist his case.

56. The Principal District Judge has not at all appreciated the exact purport of arrangement between the parties by way of Resolution Nos.161 and 181 and lease deed dated 4 January 1968. It has erroneously assumed that a right of renew exist in favour of the Lessees to seek renewal of the lease. The Principal District Judge has erred in arriving at a finding that a unilateral right of renewal of lease was created in favour of the Lessees.

57. I am therefore of the view that the Lessees neither had a right to seek ‘extension’ of lease nor the right to seek ‘renewal’ of lease on expiry of the tenure of the lease. The Lessees had limited right of seeking retention of premises in their possession by exercising first right of becoming Municipal Corporation’s direct tenants. The sub-tenants inducted by Lessees also had similar right of exercising first right of becoming Municipal Corporation’s sub-tenants. In short, if any subtenant or the Lessee was to exercise first right of retaining the premises katkam 62/74 in their respective possessions in capacity as Municipal Corporation’s direct tenants, the Municipal Corporation could not induct a new tenant in those premises. This is the broad arrangement agreed between the parties by way of Resolution Nos.161 and 181 as well as the lease deed dated 4 January 1968.

58. The next issue is about the validity of eviction order dated 17 May 2018 passed by the Deputy Municipal Commissioner in exercise of delegated powers of Municipal Commissioner. The Principal District Judge has arrived at a finding that since the application of Lessees dated 3 October 2017 for renewal of lease has not been decided by the Municipal Commissioner with sanction of the Standing Committee, the order of eviction passed under section 81-B of the MMC Act, 1949 is unsustainable. The finding of authority to decide the issue of renewal of lease by Municipal Commissioner only with sanction of Standing Committee is recorded by the Principal District Judge by referring to provisions of section 79 of the MMC Act, 1949. Section 79 reads thus: ‘79. With respect to the disposal of property belonging to the Corporation other than property vesting in the Corporation exclusively for the purposes of the Transport Undertaking the following provisions shall have effect, namely:— (a) the Commissioner may, in his discretion, dispose of by sale, letting out on hire or otherwise, any moveable property belonging to the Corporation not exceeding in value in each instance five hundred rupees or such higher amount as the Corporation may, with the approval of the State Government, from time to time determine, or grant a lease of any immoveable property belonging to the Corporation including any right of fishing or of gathering and taking fruit, and the like, for any period not exceeding twelve months at a time: katkam 63/74 Provided that the Commissioner shall report to the Standing Committee every lease of immoveable property within fifteen days of the grant thereof unless it is a contract for a monthly tenancy or the annual rent thereof at a rack rent does not exceed three thousand rupees; (b) with the sanction of the Standing Committee the Commissioner may dispose of by sale, letting out on hire or otherwise any moveable property belonging to the Corporation, of which the value does not exceed five thousand rupees; and may with the like sanction grant a lease of any immoveable property belonging to the Corporation, including any such right as aforesaid, for any period exceeding one year or sell or grant a lease in perpetuity of any immoveable property belonging to the Corporation the value of premium whereof does not exceed fifty thousand rupees or the annual rental whereof does not exceed three thousand rupees;

(c) with the sanction of the Corporation the Commissioner may lease, sell, let out on hire or otherwise convey any property, moveable or immoveable, belonging to the Corporation;

(d) the consideration for which any immoveable property or any right belonging to the Corporation may be sold, leased or otherwise transferred shall not be less than the current market value of such premium, rent or other consideration; (e) the sanction of the Standing Committee or of the Corporation under clause (b) or clause (c) may be given either generally for any class of cases or specially in any particular case; (f) the aforesaid provisions of this section and the provisions of the rules shall apply, respectively, to every disposal of property belonging to the Corporation made under or for any purposes of this Act: Provided that (a) no property vesting in the Corporation for the purpose of any specific trust shall be leased, sold or otherwise conveyed in such a manner that the purpose for which it is held will be prejudicially affected; (b) no property transferred to the Corporation by the Government shall be leased, sold or otherwise conveyed in any manner contrary to the terms of the transfer except with the prior sanction of the appropriate Government. (g) notwithstanding anything contained in this section, the Commissioner may, with the sanction of the Corporation and with the katkam 64/74 approval of the State Government grant a lease, for a period not exceeding thirty years, of a land belonging to the Corporation which is declared as a slum area under the provisions of the Maharashtra Slum Areas (Improvement, Clearance and Redevelopment) Act, 1971, to a cooperative society of slum dwellers or to persons who are dishoused as a result of the implementation of any Development Scheme of the Corporation or to the Co-operative Housing Society formed exclusively by persons who are dishoused as a result of the implementation of any Development Scheme of the Corporation or to any Department or undertaking of the Government of Maharashtra or of the Government of India, for the public purposes or to a public trust exclusively for medical and educational purposes registered under the Bombay Public Trusts Act, 1950; or to a society registered under the Societies Registration Act, 1860 or the Maharashtra Co-operative Societies Act, 1960 or a company registered under the Companies Act, 1956 or any person for the purposes of the provisions of public latrines, urinals and similar conveniences or construction of a plant for processing excrementitious or other filthy matters or garbages at such rent, which may be less than the market value of the premium, rent or other consideration, for the grant of such lease, and subject to such conditions as the Corporation may impose. The approval of the State Government under this clause may be given either generally for any class of cases of such lands or specially in any particular case of such land: Provided that, the Commissioner may in like manner renew, from time to time, the lease for such period and subject to such conditions as the Corporation may determine and impose. Explanation.—For the purposes of this clause, the expression “slum dwellers” means the slum dwellers whose names are included— (a) in the list of hutment dwellers prepared in the census of hutments taken in the year 1976; or (b) where such census of hutments is not taken in the Assembly roll in force in the year; or

(c) in the Assembly roll prepared in 1980 and published in

(d) where it is contended that the name of a slum dweller remained to be included in the Assembly roll for the year 1980, in the Assembly roll in force in the years 1977, 1978 or 1979; and who are occupying such land on the date of making an application by the cooperative society to the Corporation for grant of lease of such land.’ katkam 65/74

59. It is by relying upon clause (b) of section 79 that the Principal District Judge has recorded a finding that sanction of the Standing Committee is necessary for the Municipal Corporation to take a decision for disposal of the Municipal property by sale, letting out on hire or otherwise. Mr. Damle has contended that the decision taken by the Municipal Commissioner is not for ‘disposal’ of the Municipal property and that the decision merely ‘refuses’ the request for renewal/extension of lease. Mr. Damle has therefore contended that for such decision of ‘refusal’, there is no question of obtaining prior sanction of the Standing Committee.

60. In the present case, before expiry of the tenure of the lease, the first communication came to be addressed by the Municipal Corporation in the form of letter dated 19 September 2017. By that letter, the Chief City Engineer called upon the Lessees to handover possession of leased land upon expiry of the tenure on 19 December 2017. The letter dated 3 October 2017 was addressed by the Lessees only in response to Municipal Corporation’s letter dated 19 September 2017. Lessees’ letter dated 3 October 2017 refers to Municipal Corporation’s letter dated 19 September 2017. In that letter, the Lessees referred to clause 5 of the lease deed and requested the Municipal Commissioner to grant the leased land for further period of 50 years on payment of fair market rent. The request made in letter dated 3 October 2017 was rejected by the Chief City Engineer vide letter dated 7 November 2017. The Principal District Judge has proceeded on an assumption that the request for renewal was not decided. He then assumed that such request was katkam 66/74 required to be decided by the Municipal Commissioner with sanction of Standing Committee. In my view this finding recorded by the Principal District Judge does not appear to be in consonance with the scheme of section 79 of the MMC Act, 1949. Section 79 of the MMC Act, 1949 comes into play only when the Municipal Commissioner decides to dispose of the Municipal properties. If upon expiry of tenure of lease, the Municipal Commissioner wants to take back the possession of the land, he is not required to approach the Standing Committee to seek its sanction for seeking possession of land in respect of which lease has expired. On the other hand, if the Municipal Commissioner was to accede to the request made by the Lessees in letter dated 3 October 2017, it would have been mandatory for the Municipal Commissioner to seek previous sanction of the Standing Committee.

61. Also, Mr. Damle’s reliance on the judgments of the Apex Court in Bombay Municipal Corporation (supra) and of this Court in Ramchandra Jivatram Chetwani (supra) to justify the authority of Deputy Municipal Commissioner to exercise powers of the Municipal Commissioner appear to be apposite. It is however not necessary to delve deeper into this aspect about the exact authority who could take a decision of refusal to renew the lease, since this Court has already arrived at a conclusion that no right vested in the Lessees to seek renewal of lease as such. The only right created in favour of the Lessees was to exercise first right of seeking direct tenancy with Municipal Corporation in respect of premises in their occupation. katkam 67/74

62. In the present case, neither the Lessees nor sub-tenants have exercised their first right of seeking direct tenancy of Municipal Corporation in respect of premises in their respective occupation. The question is whether the Municipal Commissioner or the Deputy Municipal Commissioner could have proceeded to pass an order of eviction under section 81-B of the MMC Act, 1949 without considering the issue of making Lessees or sub-tenants as direct tenants of the Municipal Corporation. In ordinary course, such right ought to have been exercised well before expiry of the tenure of the lease. However, it appears that both Lessees as well as sub-tenants were laboring under a misconception that an absolute right of extension/renewal of lease existed in favour of Lessees. The sub-tenants therefore expected that once the lease is extended/renewed in favour of the Lessees, their subtenancy would automatically stand protected. It is on this count that apparently neither successor-in-title of Lessees nor sub-tenants exercised first right to become direct tenants of Municipal Corporation. The issue that therefore arises for consideration is whether the eviction order passed on 17 May 2018 can be sustained when neither Lessees nor sub-tenants could exercise first right of becoming direct tenants of Municipal Corporation owing to the confusion as stated above. In my view, it would be appropriate to grant an opportunity both Lessees and sub-tenants to exercise their first right to become direct tenants of Municipal Corporation before it takes any action for their eviction.

63. It must however be clarified here that first right to become direct tenants of the Municipal Corporation would essentially mean that if the katkam 68/74 Municipal Corporation decides to let the constructed premises, the occupants would have first right to become Municipal Corporation’s tenants by paying it rent as per the rent control legislation. If the Municipal Corporation decides not to let the premises, the successors-intitle or sub-tenants cannot insist that they must be continued as tenants. ‘First right’ to become Municipal Corporation’s tenants would mean priority over any other person desirous of becoming a tenant. Therefore if the Municipal Corporation decides to let out the premises, it will consider the first right of the successors-in-title of lessees and subtenants to become its direct tenants. To this limited extent only, the successors-in-title of lessees and sub-tenants have proved their right.

64. Next issue is the nature of final order that can be passed in the present Petitions. This Court has arrived at a finding that the successorsin-title of lessees do not have a right to seek extension or renewal of the lease. The right of the successors-in-title of lessees and sub-tenants is restricted only to exercise the first right to become Municipal Corporation’s direct tenants. This Court is inclined to grant an opportunity to the successors-in-title of lessees and sub-tenants to exercise that right by making applications to the Municipal Corporation and leaving it to the discretion of the Municipal Corporation to take a decision thereon. Successors-in-title of lessees and sub-tenants can continue to retain possession of premises in their occupation by becoming Municipal Corporation’s direct tenants only if the Municipal Corporation decides to induct tenants in the premises. If it decides not to katkam 69/74 induct any tenants, such first right to seek direct tenancy would not survive. The issue is whether under such circumstances, is about the validity of the order of eviction dated 17 May 2018. Whether the order is required to be technically set aside for decision of first right of direct tenancy? In my view the order of eviction dated 17 May 2018 is required to be technically set aside in order to enable the Municipal Corporation to decide the claims for first right of direct tenancy. The eviction order is addressed to the lessees and their successors in title (and only to one sub-tenant). If the successors-in-title of lessees or sub-tenants fail to vacate the premises in the event of Municipal Corporation rejecting the request for first right of direct tenancy, the Municipal Corporation will have to evict the individual occupants in respect of their premises by adopting appropriate action prescribed in law.

65. In such circumstances, the order of eviction dated 17 May 2018 will have to be set aside. Therefore, I agree with the ultimate direction of the Principal District Judge for setting aside the eviction order dated 17 May 2018, albeit for different reason altogether. However, the direction for consideration of application dated 3 October 2017 of successors-intitle of lessees for renewal of lease is however unsustainable and deserves to be set aside. Instead what is required to be granted is an opportunity to both successors-in-title of Lessees as well as to subtenants to exercise their first right to become direct tenants of the katkam 70/74

66. The next issue is about the quantum of damage rent determined by the Principal District Judge during the intervening period. As per the agreement between the parties, the rent after expiry of tenure of lease was required to be mutually agreed upon by taking into consideration the provisions of rent control legislation. The Lessees in their letter dated 3 October 2017 agreed to pay fair market rent. The learned Principal District Judge has directed payment of damages at the rate of Rs.60/- per square feet for ground floor and Rs.50/- per square feet for first floor. However, in the entire judgment, there appears to be no discussion as to how these figures of Rs.60 psf for ground floor and Rs.50/- psf for first floor have been arrived at. A year before pronouncement of judgment by the learned Principal District Judge, this Court had determined the quantum of damages payable during the interregnum on 31 July 2018 at the rate of Rs.50/- psf for ground floor and Rs.40/- psf for first floor. Those amounts were determined by this Court in modification of the interim order passed by the learned Principal District Judge on 17 July 2018 wherein a flat rate of Rs.70/- psf was fixed. While determining the interim damages by order dated 31 July 2018, this Court considered the reports of two valuers - Assistant Director of Town Planning suggesting rate of Rs.189/- psf for first floor and Rs.129.11/- psf for ground floor and Mr. Pravin R. Shah suggesting Rs.12.45/- psf for both ground and first floor. After taking into consideration the wide gap between the two reports, as well as the rate of Rs.70/- psf fixed by the Principal District Judge, this Court held rate of Rs.50/- psf for ground floor and Rs.40/- psf for first floor would be just and proper. A year later, the Principal District katkam 71/74 Judge has escalated the rates to Rs. 60/- psf for ground floor and Rs.50/psf for first floor. By now period of 4 years have elapsed from the date of the Order of the Principal District Judge. To my mind therefore, the said figures decided by the Principal District Judge appear to be fair for being applied from the date of expiry of lease till the date of decision of first right of direct tenancy. I do not find any patent error on the part of the Principal District Judge in fixing the rates for this Court to interfere in exercise of the jurisdiction under Article 227 of the Constitution of India.

67. I accordingly proceed to pass the following Order:

(i) The judgment and order dated 26 July 2019 passed by the

Principal District Judge, Solapur, in various Municipal Appeals filed by the successors-in-title of the original lessees and subtenants is upheld to the limited extent of setting aside the eviction order dated 17 May 2018 and fixing the quantum of interim rent.

(ii) Eviction order dated 17 May 2018 is set aside for limited purposes of consideration of applications by successors-in-title of the original lessees and sub-tenants for becoming direct tenants of

(iii) Successors-in-title of the original lessees and sub-tenants shall be at liberty to file applications with the Municipal Corporation within 8 weeks exercising their first right to retain the premises in their respective occupation as direct tenants of the Municipal Corporation; katkam 72/74 (iv)The Municipal Corporation shall proceed to take a decision to on applications so submitted by the successors-in-title of the original lessees and sub-tenants for direct tenancy of Municipal Corporation within 8 weeks of receipt of such applications, on their own merits.

(v) In the event the Municipal Corporation decides to grant tenancy to all or any of the successors-in-title of the original lessees or to any sub-tenant in respect of premises under their occupation, such direct tenancy would be for such period as decided by the Municipal Corporation and for such rent as is mutually agreed between the parties; (vi)In the event the Municipal Corporation decides to reject the applications filed by successors-in-title of the original lessees and sub-tenants for direct tenancy, subject to their right to challenge that decision the successors-in-title of the original lessees and sub-tenants shall hand over possession of premises in their respective occupation within 8 weeks of rejection of their applications. If any successors-in-title of the original lessees or sub-tenant(s) fails to hand over possession of the premises, the Municipal Corporation shall be entitled to recover possession in accordance with law; (vii)Till decision of the Municipal Corporation on applications for direct tenancy of successors-in-title of the original lessees and sub-tenants, they shall continue to occupy the premises in their katkam 73/74 respective possession by paying to the Municipal Corporation rent as directed by the Principal District Judge in judgment and order dated 26 July 2019.

68. With the above directions the Writ petitions are disposed of. There shall be no orders as to costs. (SANDEEP V. MARNE, J.) katkam 74/74