Uttar Pradesh State Road Transport Corporation v. Gajadhar Nath

2. The order dated 20.1.2021 passed by the High Court of Allahabad is the subject matter of challenge in the present appeal at the instance of the employer whereby the order dated 22.10.2008 passed by the Industrial Tribunal[1] was not interfered with. The Tribunal directed that the respondent[2] be reinstated in service and ordered 50% of the salary to be paid for the period when he was not in employment.

3. The workman was removed from service as conductor on account of misconduct on 14.12.2001. He raised an industrial dispute

1 For short, the ‘Tribunal’ 2 For short, the ‘workman’ which was referred to the Tribunal. On 5.5.2008, the Tribunal returned a preliminary finding that the domestic inquiry conducted into the charges levelled against the workman in question was not fair and proper. Therefore, the employer led evidence by examining Sheshmani Mishra, an Assistant Traffic Inspector[3] who had conducted inspection of the vehicle on 12.11.1998. The said witness supported the report submitted by him to the Assistant Regional Manager as Ex.P/10. He deposed that he checked the bus at Katra when the bus was coming from Banda to Allahabad. All the 17 passengers in the bus had stated that they had given the money but the conductor did not issue even a single ticket. Thus, the Inspector concluded that all the passengers were without ticket. He also deposed that when he tried to record the statement of the passengers, the conductor misbehaved with him and used unruly words which he could not state even before the Court. In the cross-examination, he deposed that his report was dated 13.11.1998 and that such report does not bear the signature of driver or the conductor. Further, no statement of any of the passengers was filed.

4. The learned Tribunal considering the said statement, set aside the order of removal inter alia holding that the Inspector should have recorded the statements of passengers who have been found travelling without ticket and if they had shown reluctance in recording their statements, at least their oral statements, names

3 For short, the ‘Inspector’ and addresses must have been submitted. The Tribunal also returned a finding that the Inspector was not proved to have inspected the bus on 12.11.1998. It was also observed that if the conductor had misbehaved with the Inspector, why an FIR was not recorded in the concerned police station. On these grounds, the learned Tribunal set aside the order of removal.

5. The scope of an adjudicator under the Industrial Disputes Act, may be noticed. The domestic inquiry conducted can be permitted to be disputed before the Tribunal in terms of Section 11A of the Act. This Court in a judgment reported as Workmen of M/s Firestone Tyre and Rubber Co. of India (P.) Ltd. v. Management & Ors.[5] held that in terms of Section 11A of the Act, if a domestic inquiry has been held and finding of misconduct is recorded, the authorities under the Act have full power and jurisdiction to reappraise the evidence and to satisfy themselves whether the evidence justifies the finding of misconduct. But where the inquiry is found to be defective, the employer can lead evidence to prove misconduct before the authority. This Court held as under:

6. The question as to whether the employer is required to seek liberty to prove misconduct in the written statement or could lead evidence at a later stage was considered by a Constitution Bench of this Court in a judgment reported as Karnataka State Road Transport Corporation v. Smt. Lakshmidevamma & Anr.6. Therein this Court was examining a conflict, if any, between two judgments reported Shambhu Nath Goyal v. Bank of Baroda & Ors.[7] and Rajendra Jha v. Presiding Officer, Labour Court, Bokaro Steel City, District Dhanbad & Anr.8. The majority opinion of the Court noticed that the right of a management to lead evidence before the Labour Court or the Industrial Tribunal in

8 1984 Supp. SCC 520 justification of its decision under consideration by such Tribunal or Court is not a statutory right. This is actually a procedure laid down by this Court to avoid delay and multiplicity of proceedings in the disposal of disputes between the management and the workman.

7. Now on merits, keeping in view the principles of law, learned counsel for the appellants-employer contended that the Indian Evidence Act, 18729 applies to all judicial proceedings in or before any Court. Since the domestic inquiry is not by a Court, therefore,

9 For short, the ‘Evidence Act’ strict rules of the Evidence Act are not applicable to such domestic inquiry. Reliance is placed upon a three-Judge Bench of this Court reported as State of Haryana & Anr. v. Rattan Singh10 wherein in respect of a conductor who was found to have not issued tickets, this Court held as under: “4. It is well settled that in a domestic enquiry the strict and sophisticated rules of evidence under the Indian Evidence Act may not apply. All materials which are logically probative for a prudent mind are permissible. There is no allergy to hearsay evidence provided it has reasonable nexus and credibility. It is true that departmental authorities and Administrative Tribunals must be careful in evaluating such material and should not glibly swallow what is strictly speaking not relevant under the Indian Evidence Act. For this proposition it is not necessary to cite decisions nor text books, although we have been taken through case-law and other authorities by counsel on both sides. The essence of a judicial approach is objectivity, exclusion of extraneous materials or considerations and observance of rules of natural justice. Of course, fairplay is the basis and if perversity or arbitrariness, bias or surrender of independence of judgment vitiate the conclusions reached, such finding, even though of a domestic tribunal, cannot be held good. However, the courts below misdirected themselves, perhaps, in insisting that passengers who had come in and gone out should be chased and brought before the tribunal before a valid finding could be recorded. The ‘residuum’ rule to which counsel for the respondent referred, based upon certain passages from American Jurisprudence does not go to that extent nor does the passage from Halsbury insist on such rigid requirement. The simple point is, was there some evidence or was there no evidence — not in the sense of the technical rules governing regular court proceedings but in a fair commonsense way as men of understanding and worldly wisdom will accept. Viewed in this way, sufficiency of evidence in proof of the finding by a domestic tribunal is beyond scrutiny. Absence of any evidence in support of a finding is certainly available for the court to look into because it amounts to an error of law apparent on the record. We find, in this case, that the evidence of Chamanlal, Inspector of the Flying Squad, is some evidence which has relevance to the charge levelled against the respondent. Therefore, we are unable to hold that the order is invalid on that ground.”

8. In a judgment reported as U.P. State Road Transport Corporation v. Suresh Chand Sharma11, this Court set aside the order of the High Court wherein the writ petition was allowed holding that the passengers without tickets have not been examined and cash with the employee was not checked. This Court relied upon the judgment of this Court in Rattan Singh and found that the punishment of dismissal from service was not disproportionate to the proved delinquency of the employee.

9. The Division Bench of the Allahabad High Court to which the learned Single Bench was bound in a judgment reported as U.P. State Road Transport Corporation through M.D. & Ors. v. Rajendra Prasad12 allowed the appeal of the employer wherein the Tribunal returned a finding that 16 passengers who were without tickets at the time of inspection were not examined. Therefore, the punishment order was set aside being in contravention of the principles of natural justice. The Division Bench of the High Court held as under: