Jogender Prasad Fentmar v. Union of India & Ors.

1. This petition has been filed, challenging the Order dated 28.01.2020 passed by the learned Central Administrative Tribunal, Principal Bench, New Delhi (hereinafter referred to as the ‘Tribunal’) in O.A. No.3442/2015, titled Jogender Prasad Fentmar v. Union of India & Ors., dismissing the said O.A. filed by the petitioner herein.

2. The petitioner filed the above O.A. challenging the Inquiry Report dated 23.09.2014; Order dated 01.04.2015 passed by the Disciplinary Authority; and the Order dated 23.07.2015 passed by the Appellate Authority, by which the petitioner was ultimately removed from service.

3. The petitioner had been proceeded departmentally on the following Charges: “Article-I Shri Joginder Prasad Fentmar, Driver (Ordinary Grade) has submitted fake driving license No. 71989[9] with driving permission No. 3039/P /2001, dt. 12.4.2001 to secure employment as Driver (Ordinary Grade) in the Department of Atomic Energy, Government of India, obtained through fraudulent means. By the aforesaid conduct, the said Shri Joginder Prasad Fentmar has failed to maintain absolute integrity and acted in a manner unbecoming of a Government servant thereby contravening the provisions of subrule 1(i) and (iii) of Rule 3 of the CCS (Conduct) Rules, 1964.”

4. Interestingly, only three documents were relied upon in support of the charge, which are as under:

5. The Inquiry also did not cite any oral evidence to be led and no oral evidence was in fact led.

6. The limited plea of the learned counsel for the petitioner is that this was a case of no evidence against the petitioner.

7. On the other hand, the learned counsel for the respondents has submitted that the case against the petitioner was based on the letter No.148/D.L.Satyapan/2012 dated 28.12.2012 issued by the Assistant Regional Transport Office, Agra certifying that the driving licence produced by the petitioner at the time of seeking employment had not been issued by the RTO, Agra and further confirming that the last licence number issued in the year 2001 was 2717/P/2001 dated 31.12.2001. She submits that the case against the petitioner was based on documentary evidence, and the absence of oral evidence would not vitiate the inquiry proceedings. She further submits that in a Departmental Inquiry, the strict burden of proof is not placed on the Department and the charges are to be proved on preponderance of probabilities. She submits that this Court will not interfere or reappreciate the evidence to come to a different conclusion.

8. We have considered the submissions made by the learned counsels for the parties.

9. While there is no doubt that in a Departmental Inquiry case against the Delinquent Employee is to be proved on the basis of the preponderance of probability and not on the standard of proof beyond reasonable doubt, at the same time, it should be based on some evidence. In the present case, the entire allegation against the petitioner is based on a report received from Assistant Regional Transport Office, Agra. The said report had to be proved to be made admissible in evidence. Although the strict rules of evidence are inapplicable in a Disciplinary Inquiry, however, the non-examination of the relevant witness, has, in fact, rendered the Inquiry Proceedings into a case of no evidence at all. The difference between the same has been highlighted by the Supreme Court in context of a departmental inquiry in Roop Singh Negi v. Punjab National Bank and Ors. (2009) 2 SCC 570. We quote the relevant findings as under:

....Although the charges in a departmental proceedings are not required to be proved like a criminal trial, i.e., beyond all reasonable doubts, we cannot lose sight of the fact that the Enquiry Officer performs a quasi-judicial function, who upon analysing the documents must arrive at a conclusion that there had been a preponderance of probability to prove the charges on the basis of materials on record. While doing so, he cannot take into consideration any irrelevant fact. He cannot refuse to consider the relevant facts. He cannot shift the burden of proof. He cannot reject the relevant testimony of the witnesses only on the basis of surmises and conjectures. He cannot enquire into the allegations with which the delinquent officer had not been charged with."

17. Furthermore, the order of the disciplinary authority as also the appellate authority are not supported by any reason. As the orders passed by them have severe civil consequences, appropriate reasons should have been assigned. If the enquiry officer had relied upon the confession made by the appellant, there was no reason as to why the order of discharge passed by the Criminal Court on the basis of self-same evidence should not have been taken into consideration. The materials brought on record pointing out the guilt are required to be proved. A decision must be arrived at on some evidence, which is legally admissible. The provisions of the Evidence Act may not be applicable in a departmental proceeding but the principles of natural justice are. As the report of the Enquiry Officer was based on merely ipse dixit as also surmises and conjectures, the same could not have been sustained. The inferences drawn by the Enquiry Officer apparently were not supported by any evidence. Suspicion, as is well known, however high may be, can under no circumstances be held to be a substitute for legal proof.”

10. In view of the above, the order passed by the learned Tribunal dismissing the O.A. filed by the petitioner cannot be sustained. The same is accordingly set aside.

11. This brings us to the relief to which the petitioner may be entitled.