J K Tyagi & Anr. v. Jai Bhagwan & Anr.

brought on record and may even himself put questions to the complainant and his witnesses to elicit answers to find out the truthfulness of the allegations or otherwise and then examine if any offence is prima facie committed by all or any of the accused.

29. No doubt the Magistrate can discharge the accused at any stage of the trial if he considers the charge to be groundless, but that does not mean that the accused cannot approach the High Court under Section 482 of the Code or Article 227 of the Constitution to have the proceeding quashed against him when the complaint does not make out any case against him and still he must undergo the agony of a criminal trial....”

13. The learned Magistrate is thus required to satisfy himself as to whether there is "sufficient ground for proceeding" against the accused by carefully scrutinising the material on record as well as the nature of allegations and material adduced in support thereof. While the Magistrate is not required to give detailed reasons, the order of issuance of process cannot be treated as an empty formality and a person ought not to be subjected to agony of long trial merely because a complaint is filed [Ref. Lalankumar Singh v. State of Maharashtra: 2022 SCC OnLine SC 1383].

14. The Court is not a mere post office for reproducing allegations; rather, it must be evaluated whether the evidence would constitute the offence and failure to undertake such scrutiny vitiates the summoning order.

15. In the present case, the record reveals that the Respondents/Complainants are the sons of Late Shri Durga Prasad, the recorded owner of Khasra no. 35/29/2, measuring 3 bigha 9 biswa, falling in revenue estate of Village - Burari, Delhi who died intestate leaving behind five sons, Widow Smt. Gulab Kaur and one daughter Smt. Basanti Devi. One son, who is not the complainant died as a bachelor and his share was inherited by the Complainants in terms of the Delhi Land Reforms Act, 1954.

16. It is also a matter of record that Widow Smt. Gulab Kaur died intestate in the year 1972 and the Complainants sold their entire share in Khasra no. 35/29/2 falling in revenue estate of Village - Burari, Delhi by way of registered sale deed dated l[4].05.l990, in favour of father of the Petitioners namely Shri Devdutt and real uncle of the Petitioners namely Shri Rajender.

17. However, considering the above factual matrix and the documents on record and that the sale deed dated 14.05.1999 was never disputed by the complainants, the Order dated 24.05.2005 was passed by the learned Tehsildar in favour of the Petitioners. This order was challenged by the Complainants before the learned Deputy Commissioner and their appeal was also dismissed vide Order dated 12.01.2011.

18. This Order dated 12.01.2011 was again challenged by the Complainants, however, the Appeal before the Financial Commissioner was also dismissed, with a categorical finding that the registered sale deed dated 14.05.1990, which forms the core of the transaction regarding the entire subject property including the share of Smt. Gulab Kaur, was never disputed by the complainants.

19. Though it is alleged in the present case that a forged affidavit dated 31.08.1999, confirming the sale vide sale deed dated 14.05.1990, was filed by the Petitioners during the mutation proceedings, the said sale deed dated 14.05.1999 pertaining to the transfer stands admitted and it was never the case of the Complainants that they are claiming any loss, prejudice, in respect of the subject property. They are further not claiming any right, title or interest in the property but are only asserting that the signatures were not put by them in the Affidavit. This clearly demonstrates that even if the allegation of forged signature is taken at face value, there is no assertion that the complainants were deceived, defrauded, induced to part with property, or otherwise misled to their detriment.

20. These factors strike at the very root of the allegations and were a relevant circumstance which the learned Magistrate was required to evaluate before issuing summons.

21. A perusal of the impugned summoning order indicates that the learned Magistrate relied exclusively on the statements of CW-1 and CW-2, who merely reiterated the averments in the complaint. No independent material, documentary scrutiny, or foundational verification accompanies the order.

22. Further, the learned Magistrate did not summon the original record of the Financial Commissioner to ascertain whether the impugned affidavit was in fact filed therein. No enquiry was made regarding the genuineness of the notarisation, nor was any attempt made to assess whether the affidavit could prima facie be said to be fabricated.

23. Section 468 of the IPC reads as under: -

purpose of cheating, shall be punished with imprisonment of either description for a term which may extend to seven years, and shall also be liable to fine.

24. It is well-settled that to constitute an offence under Section 468 of the IPC, the prosecution must prima facie disclose, firstly, the making of a false document within the meaning of Sections 463–464 of the IPC; Secondly, that such document was forged by the accused with dishonest or fraudulent intent; and lastly, the forgery was committed for the specific purpose of cheating. The provision is not attracted by a mere allegation of a forged signature unless it is accompanied by particulars showing how such forgery was used, or intended to be used, to deceive a person and thereby cause wrongful gain or loss. The existence of a forged signature, by itself, is not sufficient to constitute the offence unless it is tied to a dishonest inducement or deception.

25. In the present case, a careful reading of the complaint, coupled with the statements recorded at the pre-summoning stage, reveals a complete absence of foundational facts that could satisfy the statutory ingredients. The complaint does not identify any document forged by the Petitioner, nor does it describe how the alleged forgery was employed to deceive or induce the complainants.

26. It is well-settled that making a false document simpliciter does not satisfy the requirements of Section 468 of the IPC unless the document is created with the intention that it be used for the purpose of cheating, which in turn requires dishonest inducement and resultant wrongful loss or wrongful gain. In the absence of any such allegation, let alone prima facie material, the essential ingredient of ‘cheating’ is also wholly missing. Therefore, even assuming the signature was not genuine, the same does not constitute an offence under Section 468 of the IPC.

27. In the landmark judgment of Vimla (Dr) v. Delhi Admn., 1962 SCC OnLine SC 172, Dr. Vimla purchased a car in the name of her minor daughter Nalini aged about 6 months. The insurance policy already issued was transferred in the name of Nalini and several documents and forms were signed by Dr. Vimla and thus, she was subsequently convicted under 467 and 468 of the IPC. The Hon’ble Apex Court, while acquitting her of the charged offences, held that: - “Now let us apply the said principles to the facts of the present case. Certainly, Dr. Vimla was guilty of deceit, for though her name was Vimla, she signed in all the relevant papers as Nalini and made the insurance company believe that her name was Nalini, but the said, deceit did not either secure to her advantage or cause any non-economic loss or injury to the insurance company. The charge does not disclose any such advantage or injury, nor is there any evidence to prove the same. The fact that Dr. Vimla said that the owner of the car who sold it to her suggested that the taking of the sale of the car in the name of Nalini would be useful for income-tax purposes is not of any relevance in the present case, for one reason, the said owner did not say so in his evidence and for the other, it was not indicated in the charge or in the evidence. In the charge framed, she was alleged to have defrauded the insurance company and the only evidence given was that if it was disclosed that Nalini was a minor, the insurance company might not have paid the money. But as we have pointed out earlier, the entire transaction was that of Dr. Vimla and it was only put through in the name of her made minor daughter for reasons best known to herself. On the evidence as disclosed, neither was she benefited nor the insurance company incurred loss in any sense of the term. In the result, we allow the appeal and hold that the appellant was not guilty of the offence under ss. 467 and 468 of the Indian Penal Code. The conviction and sentence passed on her are set aside. Fine, if paid, is directed to be refunded to the appellant, Appeal allowed.”

28. In Jibrial Diwan v. State of Maharashtra: (1997) 6 SCC 499, it was the case of the prosecution that two forged letters were prepared on the letterhead of the Minister, and the same did not bear the signature of the Minister. While setting-aside the conviction of the accused for the offences under sections 417, 471 read with 465 of the IPC, following observations were made by the Apex Court: -

wrongful gain to anyone nor any wrongful loss to another. The act of the appellant could not thus be termed to have been done dishonestly. Likewise the appellant cannot be said to have any intention to defraud because his action resulted in no disadvantage to anyone which but for the deception the person defrauded would have acted otherwise. The basic ingredients of the act done “dishonestly” or “fraudulently” being missing, the charge under Section 471 read with Section 465 IPC was totally misplaced and the High Court fell into an error in convicting the appellant on those charges.”

29. The Hon’ble Apex Court, in Criminal Appeal No. 3977 of 2025 titled Vandana v. State of Maharashtra, has categorically observed that: - “7. It is apposite to note that to attract offence of Section 468 IPC, the prosecution must establish that the accused made a false document within the meaning of Section 464 IPC, with intent to cheat. Likewise, Section 471 IPC requires proof that the accused used a forged document as genuine, knowing or having reason to believe it to be forged at the time of its use.”

30. Recently, in the case of Jupally Lakshmikantha Reddy v. State of A.P., 2025 SCC OnLine SC 1950, the Apex Court allowed the criminal appeal and quashed proceedings against the appellant’s educational society under Section 420 of the IPC by holding that since the building of the appellant’s institution was below 15 metres in height, no Fire Department No-Objection Certificate (NOC) was legally required for obtaining or renewing recognition. Therefore, even if a forged NOC was submitted, it did not constitute “cheating” under Section 420 IPC because no wrongful gain or wrongful loss was caused to anyone. It was further held that the ingredients of forgery under Sections 465, 468, and 471 of the IPC were also not met, as there was no evidence connecting the appellant to the creation of the alleged forged document. It was held as under: -

16. It is strenuously argued the appellant had used a fake NOC from the Fire Department and thereby held out a false representation that he possessed a valid NOC to obtain recognition/renewal of affiliation for his institution. Uncontroverted allegations in the charge sheet including the order in the writ proceedings, unequivocally show NOC from the Fire Department was not necessary for grant of such recognition/renewal of affiliation as the height of the appellant's building was below 15 metres. Given this situation, the representation of the appellant that he possessed a valid NOC cannot be said to have induced the Education Department to grant recognition or renew the affiliation. To attract penal consequences, it must be shown that the false representation was of a material fact which had induced the victim to either part with property or act in a manner which they would not otherwise do but for such false representation. In the absence of such vital link between the alleged false representation and the issuance of recognition/renewal of affiliation, the essential ingredient of offence is not satisfied.

17. Ms. Prerna Singh has also argued that though the chargesheet has been filed under Section 420, the contours of the offence of forgery are evident as the appellant has knowingly used a fake document.

18. We are unable to accept her submission on this score too. There is nothing on record to show the appellant had manufactured the alleged fake document which is a sine qua non to attract Section 465 IPC. In fact, the original fabricated document had not been recovered.

19. In Sheila Sebastian v. R. Jawaharaj, this Court held to attract Section 464 IPC, the prosecution must establish that the accused had made the fake document. No material connecting the appellant to the making of the fake document has been adduced in the impugned charge sheet.

20. Similarly, offences under Section 468 IPC and Section 471 IPC are not attracted, as the requisite mens rea, i.e., dishonest intention to cause wrongful loss to the Education Department and wrongful gain to himself has not been demonstrated as the issuance of the recognition was not dependent on the production of the alleged forged NOC.”

31. The facts of the present case clearly indicate that the complainant had not alleged any attempt of wrongful loss by the Petitioners. It was also admitted during the course of arguments that no wrongful loss ever occurred or could have accrued to the complainant because of the alleged act of Petitioners deceitfully putting complainant’s signatures on the Affidavit. Therefore, the mens rea to cause wrongful loss to the complainant and wrongful gain to the Petitioners does not exist.

32. It thus becomes evident that the learned Magistrate proceeded mechanically and without undertaking the minimal judicial scrutiny mandated and impugned summoning order was issued based on vague allegations that do not disclose the essential ingredients of the alleged offence.

33. In such circumstances, continuation of proceedings against the Petitioners would be an abuse of the process of law and merits the exercise of the jurisdiction of this Court under Section 482 of the CrPC.

34. In view of the aforesaid discussion, the impugned summoning order is set aside. The present petition is allowed in the aforesaid terms. Pending applications, if any, also stand disposed of. AMIT MAHAJAN, J DECEMBER 10, 2025 “SK”