Yamuna Expressway Industrial Development Authority v. Shakuntla Education and Welfare Society

16. In pursuance to the said G.O. and the Resolution dated 15th September, 2014 of the Board of YEIDA, additional demand notices were issued to various allottees. In case of the respondent No.1, an additional premium at the rate of Rs.600/­ per sq. meter, for the land allotted and leased out, came to be demanded, totaling to Rs.12,14,10,000/­.

17. It was in this background that various writ petitions came to be filed before the Allahabad High Court, including Writ Petition No.28968 of 2018, filed by the respondent No.1.

18. By the impugned judgment and order dated 28th May, 2020, the Allahabad High Court allowed the said writ petitions holding that:­

(i) the decision in the case of Gajraj (supra), as approved by this Court in the case of Savitri Devi (supra), was not a judgment in rem and could not have been applied to proceedings for acquiring the land under different notifications or for YEIDA;

(ii) the said G.O. and the Resolution of the Board of YEIDA dated 15th September, 2014 were violative of the provisions of the L.A. Act; and

(iii) the policy of the State Government was unfair, unreasonable, arbitrary and in violation of the provisions of the Transfer of Property Act, 1882.

19. Being aggrieved thereby, the present appeals by way of special leave have been filed on behalf of YEIDA, State of Uttar Pradesh and farmers whose lands were acquired.

20. We have heard Shri C.A. Sundaram, Shri C.U. Singh and Shri Maninder Singh, learned Senior Counsel appearing on behalf of YEIDA, Shri Vinod Diwakar, learned Additional Advocate General appearing on behalf of the State of Uttar Pradesh, Shri Rakesh U. Upadhyay and Dr. Surat Singh, learned counsel appearing on behalf of the farmers whose lands were acquired, Shri Nakul Dewan, Shri Sunil Gupta, Shri Ravindra Srivastava and Shri Sanjiv Sen, learned Senior Counsel appearing on behalf of the respondents­original allottees of land.

21. The main contention of the appellants in the present appeals is that the said G.O. was a policy decision of the State Government, taken in public interest. It is submitted that the said policy decision was taken after taking into consideration the farmers’ agitation, the report of the Chaudhary Committee and all other relevant factors. It is submitted that in order to avoid acquisitions from being declared illegal, the Cabinet of Ministers of the State Government had taken a considered decision to adopt a formula, which was carved out by the judgment of the Full Bench of the Allahabad High Court in the case of Gajraj (supra) and approved by this Court in the case of Savitri Devi (supra).

22. It is also the contention on behalf of the appellants that the policy of the State Government was in consonance with the decision of this Court in the case of Centre for Public Interest Litigation and others vs. Union of India and others[3], wherein this Court has held that it is obligatory on the State to ensure that people are adequately compensated for the transfer of resource to the private domain. Relying on the judgment of this Court in the case of Narmada Bachao Andolan vs. Union of India and others[4], it is submitted that the policy of the State Government was formulated by looking at the welfare of the people at large rather than restricting the benefit to a small section of the society. Relying on various judgments of this Court, it is submitted that when the change in the policy of the State is in public interest, it will override all private agreements entered into by the State.

23. It is further submitted on behalf of the appellants that, as a matter of fact, on account of agitation of the farmers, development could not take place in the concerned area. It is submitted that various plot owners had approached the State Government and its authorities for finding out a solution to these problems, so that the development could proceed further. It is submitted that the proceedings of the Chaudhary Committee would itself reveal that all the stakeholders including the representatives of allottees were heard by the Chaudhary Committee. Not only that, but various allottees had, in writing, agreed that they are willing to pay the additional compensation so that the hindrance in the development is removed. It is therefore submitted that it does not lie in the mouth of the respondents to question the said G.O. and oppose the payment of additional compensation.

24. Relying on various judgments of this Court, it is further submitted on behalf of the appellants that the lease deed itself permitted additions, alterations or modifications in the terms and conditions of the lease. As such, even as per the lease deed, the appellants were entitled to modify or alter the terms and conditions of the lease. It is submitted that the word “modify” has to be used in a broader sense and not in a narrower sense.

25. Learned counsel for the appellants further submitted that the High Court fell in great error in holding that no writ petitions were pending. It is submitted that, as a matter of fact, more than 600 writ petitions were pending when the policy decision was taken by the State Government. It is submitted that the policy decision was taken so as to save the acquisition, which was otherwise liable to be quashed and set aside. It is submitted that it is, in fact, the respondents, who are the beneficiaries of the said measure and as such, having taken benefit of the said measure, they cannot be permitted to refuse to pay the additional compensation.

26. It is also submitted on behalf of the appellants that the allotees had an option, either to make additional payment or to take refund with interest. Having opted not to seek refund with interest, it does not lie in the mouth of the respondents to refuse to pay the additional compensation.

27. It is also submitted on behalf of appellant­YEIDA that it had specifically submitted that stay orders passed by the High Court were in force in most of the cases related to residential plots, due to which the development work could not be completed.

28. Learned counsel appearing on behalf of the farmers also support the stand of YEIDA. It is submitted that the builders had already recovered additional compensation from the homebuyers. As such, the additional compensation was already passed on by the builders to the homebuyers. It is submitted that if the contention of the respondents is accepted, it will amount to nothing else but allowing of unjust enrichment.

29. It is further submitted that the respondents were not entitled to the discretionary relief under Article 226 of the Constitution of India. The writ petitions filed by them before the Allahabad High Court were filed without impleading the farmers who were necessary parties as respondents to the writ petitions.

30. Elaborate arguments have been advanced on behalf of the respondents. To summarize, they are as under:

(i) The respondents had not given any undertaking to pay additional compensation, as stated;

(ii) The term “modification/addition” with regard to payment was restricted only to any clerical or technical error;

(iii) The High Court has rightly held that Gajraj (supra) and

Savitri Devi (supra) applied only to the peculiar facts and circumstances of those cases. In the case of Gajraj (supra), the High Court had done elaborate exercise of categorizing the cases into three types. In any case, it is submitted that the State itself was aggrieved by the decision in Gajraj (supra), which has been challenged by it before this Court;

(iv) In the present case, many of the acquisitions were by private negotiations and as such, there is no question of applicability of either Section 17 or Section 5A of the L.A. Act;

(v) There were concluded contracts entered between the allottees and YEIDA. As such, it was not open for YEIDA to unilaterally change the terms and conditions of the contract and enhance the lease premium;

(vi) The High Court has rightly held that the so­called policy of the State Government was arbitrary, irrational and therefore not sustainable in law;

(vii) On behalf of the respondent No.19­Supertech Limited, an additional submission was made that the appropriate authority has already passed an order admitting the petition filed under Section 7 of the Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code, 2016;

(viii) On behalf of the individual plot owners, it is submitted that the said plot owners, who belong to the middle class section of the society cannot be burdened with the additional amount.

(ix) The respondents also placed reliance on the judgment of this Court in the case of ITC Limited vs. State of Uttar Pradesh and others[5] to support the proposition that concluded contracts cannot be interfered with or reopened.

31. With the assistance of the learned counsel for the parties, we have perused the material on record.

32. The main reasons that weighed with the High Court while allowing the writ petitions are thus:

(i) That the lands which were acquired for YEIDA in the present case were under different notification than the notification which fell for consideration in the case of Gajraj (supra);

(ii) That this Court in the case of Savitri Devi (supra) has categorically held that the directions given in the case of Gajraj (supra) were issued by the High Court in the peculiar facts and circumstances of the case and therefore, the same could not have been applied to the facts of the present case;

(iii) That some other petitions filed before the High Court claiming the benefit on the basis of Gajraj (supra) were ultimately rejected by the High Court;

(iv) That the State Government has to strictly act in accordance with the law or statutory provisions. It cannot act arbitrarily or in an unfair manner in breach of specific provisions of law;

(v) That it is only for the Courts to grant equitable relief and the Government is not entitled to pass order on equitable ground of law.

33. We are called upon to examine the correctness of these findings.

34. The relevant portion of the judgment of the Full Bench of the High Court in the case of Gajraj (supra) is reproduced by this Court in the case of Savitri Devi (supra). It will be apposite to refer to following observations in the case of Savitri Devi (supra):

22. We may point out at this stage that in respect of all these three categories, the High Court has provided its justification for granting relief in the aforesaid nature. We shall be referring to the same while discussing the cases of the appellants belonging to one or the other category.”

35. After considering various judgments, this Court in the case of Savitri Devi (supra) observed thus:

39. Answering the aforesaid question, this Court in the said case observed thus:

46. The Chaudhary Committee conducted its proceedings on 30th September, 2013 with the representatives of the farmers. The said Committee thereafter held deliberations with the representatives of the allottees on 29th October, 2013. It will be apposite to refer to the relevant part of the discussion that took place in the meeting held with the representatives of the allottees on 29th October,2013, which reads thus:

47. It could thus be seen that even the representatives of the allottees were of the opinion that on account of the agitation of the local farmers, the developers were not in a position to carry out any work on the spot. It was also impressed upon that on account of this, the cost of the project was getting escalated. As such, it was urged to solve the problem.

48. The Chaudhary Committee also considered the submissions made on behalf of the appellant­YEIDA. It was submitted on behalf of the appellant­YEIDA that on account of the judgment delivered in a similar case, i.e., in the case of Gajraj (supra), the farmers, whose lands were acquired, were also demanding the compensation on similar lines.

49. After considering the rival submissions, the Chaudhary Committee gave its recommendation as under: “Recommendation of Committee:­ The opinion of Authority as well as the demands of the Farmers' Organizations were carefully considered by the Committee. In the common order passed in the different Writ Petitions filed by Noida and Greater Noida Authorities, the Hon'ble High Court by not finding the proceedings conducted under Section 17 of Land Acquisition Act, 1894 to be proper, had directed that the Authority shall pay 64.7% additional compensation to the farmers and return them 10% developed land. Also in the Yamuna Expressway Authority, around 700 Writ Petitions have been filed by the farmers by challenging the different notifications, wherein, stay orders have been passed in the most of the Petitions, the circumstances which were existing in the acquisition made by Noida and Greater Noida Authority, same circumstances are also existed in the most of the cases of acquisition of Yamuna Expressway. The lands acquired by the Authority, have been allotted to the different allottees for different projects, due to which, the third party rights have been created in this acquired land and if order is passed against the Authority in the Petitioners filed against the Acquisition Proceedings, then, many difficulties would arise. Therefore, keeping in view the legal expected legal complications, it is required to do the out of court settlement with the affected farmers. At the time of discussion, it was assured by the farmers' representatives that if the Government/ Authority agrees to give 64.7% additional compensation, then, the farmers will withdraw the Petitions filed in the Court. Therefore, Committee recommends that:­ I.(a) If, all the farmers/ Petitioners of a village related to the land acquired/ purchased by the Yamuna Expressway Authority, withdraw their Petitions filed in the Hon'ble High Court or in any other Court and if they give written assurance for future that they will not file any claim against the Authority or it's allottees in any Court and will not cause any obstruction in the Development Works, then, like the Greater Noida Authority, the Authority may consider to give amount equivalent to 64.7% additional compensation in the form of No Litigation Incentive/ Additional Compensation, which may be compensated proportionally from the concerned allottees and same may also be imposed proportionally in the costing of allotment of land available with the Authority. These benefits shall be allowed also to those farmers, whose' lands have been purchased by the Authority vide Sale Deed on mutual consent basis. (b) The process of payment of additional compensation, be completed villagewise in accordance with the Schemes/ Priorities of Authority after obtaining physical possession of on the spot and after withdrawal of all the Writ petitions/ Cases of concerned village after doing settlement with the farmers. In view of the financial condition of Authority, if the payment of additional compensation is not possible in lumpsum, then, the consideration could also be made regarding payment in installments or in the form of developed land.

2. Regarding allotment of 10% developed land in place of 7% developed land, the proceedings be conducted according to the order of Appeal/SLP filed by the Noida/Greater Noida Authorities.

3. The proceedings of amendment proposed by the Authority in Abadi Rules, are at final stage of approval, the proceedings be conducted as per the decision of Government.

4. Regarding abolishing the distinction between ancestral and non­ancestral, this decision has been taken in the 48th meeting dated 08.01.2014 of Yamuna Expressway Authority Board, that such land owners of the lands acquired or to be acquired/purchased by the Authority, whose' names have remained recorded in Six Yearly Register/ Khatauni on the acquired land prior to the date of establishment of Authority i.e. 24.04.2001, and the landowners are residents of any village related to any District lying within the notified area of Yamuna Expressway Authority, then, the benefit of 7% abadi land be granted to him against his acquired land. In the decision of Authority Board, this facility has also been allowed to the successors of eligible land owners, who fulfill the aforesaid conditions. The further proceedings be conducted as per the decision of Authority Board.

5. In view of the demands of farmers organizations and local public of District Mathura, after taking into consideration the proposal submitted by Concessionaire namely M/s. J.P. Infratech Ltd., in the 48th meeting dated 08.01.2014 of Yamuna Expressway Authority Board, a decision in principle has been taken for construction of Exist & Entry Ramps at Bajna­Nauhjheel Road at Yamuna Expressway and by making necessary amendments in DPR accordingly, a letter has been sent to the Concessionaire namely M/s. J,P. Infratech for necessary action. The further proceedings be conducted as per the decision of Authority Board. It is recommended by the Committee that the aforementioned additional benefits be granted to the landowners only in that case when they will handover the physical possession of land to the Authority and withdraw Writ Petition/Case pending in Hon'ble High Court or any other Court and agreement for not causing any obstruction in future in the development works of allottees and for not filing any claim in any Court against the acquisition of land in future. Regarding the other demands, the Committee will give it's recommendation after further consideration.”

50. It could thus be seen that the recommendations of the Chaudhary Committee were principally intended to resolve the issue between the farmers and the allottees, and to find out a workable solution to the problem. The Chaudhary Committee recommended similar treatment to be given to the farmers whose lands were acquired for YEIDA, as was given to the farmers whose lands were acquired for the benefit of NOIDA and Greater NOIDA. The Chaudhary Committee found that the same benefits as were given to the farmers whose lands were acquired for the benefit of NOIDA and Greater NOIDA in view of the judgment of the High Court in the case of Gajraj (supra), as affirmed by this Court in the case of Savitri Devi (supra) should also be given to the farmers whose lands were acquired for the benefit of YEIDA. However, this was made conditional. Additional benefit was granted to the landowners on the condition that they would handover the physical possession of land to YEIDA and withdraw the writ petitions/cases filed by them pending before the High Court.

51. The State Government vide the said G.O. gave effect to the recommendations of the Chaudhary Committee.

YEIDA too, in its Board meeting dated 15th September, 2014, resolved to implement the decision of the State Government. Accordingly, demand notices came to be issued to the allottees.

52. It could thus be seen that the policy decision of the State Government is preceded by various factors. Firstly, the farmers’ agitation, after they were denied the benefits which were granted to the farmers whose lands were acquired for the benefit of NOIDA and Greater NOIDA; the report of the Commissioner, the appointment of the Chaudhary Committee, the deliberations of the Chaudhary Committee with various stakeholders, and thereafter the recommendations of the Chaudhary Committee.

53. It will be relevant to refer to the judgment of this Court in the case of the Kasinka Trading and another vs. Union of India and another[7], wherein this Court has referred to various earlier pronouncements and the treatise of Prof. S.A. de Smith on “Judicial Review of Administrative Action”. The relevant paragraphs of the said judgment read thus:

14. In Excise Commissioner, U.P. v. Ram Kumar [(1976) 3 SCC 540: 1976 SCC (Tax) 360: AIR 1976 SC 2237] four learned Judges of this Court observed: (SCC p. 545, para 19) “The fact that sales of country liquor had been exempted from sales tax vide Notification No. ST­1149/X­802 (33)­51 dated 6­4­1959 could not operate as an estoppel against the State Government and preclude it from subjecting the sales to tax if it felt impelled to do so in the interest of the revenues of the State which are required for execution of the plans designed to meet the ever­ increasing pressing needs of the developing society. It is now well settled by a catena of decisions that there can be no question of estoppel against the Government in the exercise of its legislative, sovereign or executive powers.”

15. Prof. S.A. de Smith in his celebrated treatise Judicial Review of Administrative Action, 3rd Edn., at p. 279 sums up the position thus: “Contracts and covenants entered into by the Crown are not to be construed as being subject to implied terms that would exclude the exercise of general discretionary powers for the public good. On the contrary they are to be construed as incorporating an implied term that such powers remain exercisable. This is broadly true of other public authorities also. But the status and functions of the Crown in this regard are of a higher order. The Crown cannot be allowed to tie its hands completely by prior undertakings is as clear as the proposition that the Courts cannot allow the Crown to evade compliance with ostensibly binding obligations whenever it thinks fit. If a public authority lawfully repudiates or departs from the terms of a binding contract in order to have been bound in law by an ostensibly binding contract because the undertakings would improperly fetter its general discretionary powers the other party to the agreement has no right whatsoever to damages or compensation under the general law, no matter how serious the damages that party may have suffered.”

54. It has been held by this Court that the doctrine of promissory estoppel cannot be invoked in the abstract and the courts are bound to consider all aspects including the results sought to be achieved and the public good at large. It has been held that while considering the applicability of the doctrine, the courts have to do equity and the fundamental principles of equity must for ever be present to the mind of the court, while considering the applicability of the doctrine. It has been held that the doctrine being an equitable doctrine, it must yield when the equity so requires, if it can be shown by the Government or Public Authority that having regard to the facts and circumstances as they have transpired, it would be inequitable to hold the Government or the Public Authority to the promise, assurance or representation made by it. The judgment of this Court in the case of Kasinka Trading (supra) has been consistently followed.

55. If we apply the principle as laid down in the case of Kasinka Trading (supra) to the facts of the present case, it will be clear that the policy decision of the State Government was not only in the larger public interest but also in the interest of the respondents. The projects were stalled on account of the farmers’ agitation. The farmers felt discriminated as they found that the compensation paid to them was much lesser than the one being paid to the equally circumstanced farmers in NOIDA and Greater NOIDA. It was the allottees of the land who had approached the State Government for redressal of the problem. In these circumstances, the Government took cognizance of the problem and appointed the Commissioner to look into the issue. Since the Commissioner recommended appointment of a High­Level Committee, the Chaudhary Committee was appointed. The Chaudhary Committee had threadbare discussions with all the stakeholders. It also took into consideration that on account of stay orders passed by the High Court in various writ petitions, the development of the project was stalled. On account of pendency of the writ petitions, there was always a hanging sword over the entire acquisition of it being declared unlawful. In this premise, in order to find out a workable solution and that too, on the basis of the law laid down by the High Court in the case of Gajraj (supra) as affirmed by this Court in the case of Savitri Devi (supra) and followed by this Court in the case of Savitri Mohan (Dead) (supra), recommendations were made by the Chaudhary Committee. The Chaudhary Committee specifically recommended that the additional compensation and other incentives would be paid only if the landowners agree to handover physical possession of the land to YEIDA and withdraw all the litigations.

56. It could thus be seen that the recommendations, which were accepted by the State Government and formulated in the policy, were made taking into consideration the interests of all the stakeholders. As held by this Court, it is not only the interest of a small section of the allottees which should weigh with the Government, but the Government should also give due weightage to the interest of the large section of farmers, whose lands were acquired.

57. We further find that the High Court fell in error in observing that no writ petitions were filed challenging the acquisition for YEIDA. The report of the Chaudhary Committee itself would clarify that YEIDA had itself submitted that insofar as the residential plots are concerned, there were stay orders operating in majority of the writ petitions due to which the development of the project work was stalled.

58. We are therefore of the considered view that the policy decision of the State Government was in the larger public interest. It was taken considering entire material collected by the Chaudhary Committee after due deliberations with all the stakeholders. The factors which were taken into consideration by the State Government were relevant, rational and founded on ground realities. In this view of the matter, the finding of the High Court that the policy decision of the State Government was arbitrary, irrational and unfair, is totally incorrect.

59. The law with regard to interference in the policy decision of the State is by now very well crystalized. This Court in the case of Essar Steel Limited vs Union of India and others[8] had an occasion to consider the scope of interference in the policy decision of the State. After referring to various decisions of this Court, the Court observed thus:

45. Thus, we will test the impugned policy on the above grounds to determine whether it warrants our interference under Article 136 or not. Further, this Court neither has the jurisdiction nor the competence to judge the viability of such policy decisions of the Government in exercise of its appellate jurisdiction under Article 136 of the Constitution of India. In Arun Kumar Agrawal v. Union of India [Arun Kumar Agrawal v. Union of India, (2013) 7 SCC 1], this Court has further held as under: (SCC p. 17, para 41) “41. … This Court sitting in the jurisdiction cannot sit in judgment over the commercial or business decision taken by parties to the agreement, after evaluating and assessing its monetary and financial implications, unless the decision is in clear violation of any statutory provisions or perverse or taken for extraneous considerations or improper motives. States and its instrumentalities can enter into various contracts which may involve complex economic factors. State or the State undertaking being a party to a contract, have to make various decisions which they deem just and proper. There is always an element of risk in such decisions, ultimately it may turn out to be a correct decision or a wrong one. But if the decision is taken bona fide and in public interest, the mere fact that decision has ultimately proved to be wrong, that itself is not a ground to hold that the decision was mala fide or taken with ulterior motives.” (emphasis supplied)

46. In Villianur Iyarkkai Padukappu Maiyam v. Union of India [Villianur Iyarkkai Padukappu Maiyam v. Union of India, (2009) 7 SCC 561], it was held as under: (SCC p. 605, para 169) “169. It is neither within the domain of the courts nor the scope of judicial review to embark upon an enquiry as to whether a particular public policy is wise or whether better public policy can be evolved. Nor are the courts inclined to strike down a policy at the behest of a petitioner merely because it has been urged that a different policy would have been fairer or wiser or more scientific or more logical. Wisdom and advisability of economic policy are ordinarily not amenable to judicial review. In matters relating to economic issues the Government has, while taking a decision, right to “trial and error” as long as both trial and error are bona fide and within the limits of the authority. For testing the correctness of a policy, the appropriate forum is Parliament and not the courts.”

47. A three­Judge Bench of this Court in Narmada Bachao Andolan v. Union of India [Narmada Bachao Andolan v. Union of India, (2000) 10 SCC 664] cautioned against courts sitting in appeal against policy decisions. It was held as under: (SCC p. 763, para 234) “234. In respect of public projects and policies which are initiated by the Government the courts should not become an approval authority. Normally such decisions are taken by the Government after due care and consideration. In a democracy welfare of the people at large, and not merely of a small section of the society, has to be the concern of a responsible Government. If a considered policy decision has been taken, which is not in conflict with any law or is not mala fide, it will not be in public interest to require the court to go into and investigate those areas which are the function of the executive. For any project which is approved after due deliberation the court should refrain from being asked to review the decision just because a petitioner in filing a PIL alleges that such a decision should not have been taken because an opposite view against the undertaking of the project, which view may have been considered by the Government, is possible. When two or more options or views are possible and after considering them the Government takes a policy decision it is then not the function of the court to go into the matter afresh and, in a way, sit in appeal over such a policy decision.”

48. A similar sentiment was echoed by a Constitution Bench of this Court in Peerless General Finance & Investment Co. Ltd. v. RBI [Peerless General Finance & Investment Co. Ltd. v. RBI, (1992) 2 SCC 343], wherein it was observed as under: (SCC p. 375, para 31) “31. … Courts are not to interfere with economic policy which is the function of experts. It is not the function of the courts to sit in judgment over matters of economic policy and it must necessarily be left to the expert bodies. In such matters even experts can seriously and doubtlessly differ. Courts cannot be expected to decide them without even the aid of experts.”

49. A perusal of the abovementioned judgments of this Court would show that this Court should exercise great caution and restraint when confronted with matters related to the policy regarding commercial matters of the country. Executive policies are usually enacted after much deliberation by the Government. Therefore, it would not be appropriate for this Court to question the wisdom of the same, unless it is demonstrated by the aggrieved persons that the said policy has been enacted in an arbitrary, unreasonable or mala fide manner, or that it offends the provisions of the Constitution of India.”

60. It is trite law that an interference with the policy decision would not be warranted unless it is found that the policy decision is palpably arbitrary, mala fide, irrational or violative of the statutory provisions. We are therefore of the considered view that the High Court was also not right in interfering with the policy decision of the State Government, which is in the larger public interest.

61. It will also be apposite to refer to the following observations of this Court in the case of APM Terminals B.V. vs. Union of India and another[9]:

62. It could thus be seen that it is more than settled that a change in policy by the Government can have an overriding effect over private treaties between the Government and a private party, if the same was in the general public interest. The additional requirement is that such change in policy is required to be guided by reason.

63. Insofar as the reliance placed by the respondents on the judgment of this Court in the case of ITC Limited (supra) is concerned, in our considered view, the said judgment would not be of any assistance to the case of the respondents. This Court in the said case in paragraph 107.[1] has clearly observed that in the case of conflict between public interest and personal interest, public interest should prevail.

64. A number of judgments of this Court have been cited at the Bar by the respondents in support of the proposition that in view of concluded contracts, it was not permissible for the appellants to unilaterally increase the premium by framing a policy.

65. We have hereinabove elaborately discussed that when a policy is changed by the State, which is in the general public interest, such policy would prevail over the individual rights/interests. In that view of the matter, we do not find it necessary to refer to the said judgments. The policy of the State Government as reflected in the said G.O. was not only in the larger public interest but also in the interest of the respondents.

66. We further find that the respondents have indulged into the conduct of approbate and reprobate. They have changed their stance as per their convenience. When their projects were stalled on account of the farmers’ agitation, it is they who approached the State Authorities for finding out a solution. When the State Government responded to their representations and came up with a policy which was equitable and in the interest of both, the farmers and the allottees and when the said policy paved the way for development, when called upon to pay the additional compensation, the respondents­allottees somersaulted and challenged the very same policy before the High Court, which benefitted them. We have already hereinabove made reference to the various communications made by the allottees of the land for intervention of the State Government.

67. Insofar as the individual plot owners are concerned, it will be worthwhile to mention that the residential plot owners in Sectors 18 and 20 of Yamuna Expressway city have formed an association, viz., Yamuna Expressway Residential­Plot­Owners Welfare Association (hereinafter referred to as “the YERWA”). The communication addressed by the president of the YERWA to the CEO of YEIDA would reveal that 98.5% of the allottees/owners have voted in favour of paying the additional premium demanded by the Authority. The only request made by the YERWA is with regard to making a provision for paying additional premium in installments.

68. It can thus be seen that even insofar as the individual residential plot owners are concerned, more than 98% of the plot owners do not have any objection to the payment of the additional compensation.

69. With respect to the contention of the respondent No.19­ Supertech with regard to initiation of CIRP, we are not concerned with the said issue in the present proceedings. The law will take its own course.

70. In conclusion, we are of the considered view that the policy decision of the State Government as reflected in the said G.O. dated 29th August, 2014 and the Resolution of the Board of YEIDA dated 15th September, 2014 were in the larger public interest, taking care of the concerns of the allottees as well as the farmers. As already discussed hereinabove, had the said decision not been taken, there was a hanging sword of the acquisition being declared unlawful. The development of the entire project was stalled on account of farmers’ agitation. Before taking the policy decision, the State Government, through the Chaudhary Committee, had done a wide range of deliberations with all the stakeholders including the allottees, farmers and YEIDA. The policy decision was taken after taking into consideration all relevant factors and was guided by reasons. In any case, it is a settled position of law that in case of a conflict between public interest and personal interest, public interest will outweigh the personal interest. The High Court was therefore not justified in holding that the policy decision of the State was unfair, unreasonable and arbitrary. We are of the considered view that the High Court has erred in allowing the writ petitions. The present appeals, therefore, deserve to be allowed.

71. In the result, we pass the following order:

(i) The appeals are allowed;

(ii) The impugned judgment and order dated 28th May,

2020, passed by the Allahabad High Court in Writ Petition No. 28968 of 2018 and companion matters is quashed and set aside;

(iii) The writ petitions filed by the respondents covered by the impugned judgment and order dated 28th May, 2020 passed by the Allahabad High Court are dismissed;

72. Applications for Intervention are allowed. Pending applications, including the applications for directions, shall stand disposed of in the above terms. There shall be no order as to costs. …..… ....................... J. [L. NAGESWARA RAO] …… ......................... J. [B.R. GAVAI] NEW DELHI; MAY 19, 2022.