Vijay Thakur v. State (NCT of Delhi) & Thakur Balwan Singh

Delhi High Court · 14 Jan 2026 · 2026:DHC:311
Neena Bansal Krishna
CRL.M.C. 4716/2025
2026:DHC:311
criminal petition_allowed Significant

AI Summary

The Delhi High Court quashed a supplementary charge sheet filed without court permission based on reappreciation of evidence and held that cognizance was not taken nor was the accused summoned, emphasizing the necessity of judicial application of mind and fresh evidence for further investigation.

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CRL.M.C. 4716/2025
HIGH COURT OF DELHI
Reserved on: 26th November, 2025 Pronounced on: 14th January, 2026
CRL.M.C. 4716/2025, CRL.M.A. 20447/2025
VIJAY THAKUR
S/o LATE MR. M. N. THAKUR.
R/o D 200, GROUND FLOOR DEFENCE COLONY, NEW DELHI ....Petitioner
Through: Mr. Vikas Pahwa, Senior Advocate
WITH
Mr. Rishabh Shukla, Advocates.
Versus
JUDGMENT

1. STATE (NCT OF DELHI) Through Station House Officer Police Station Mehrauli South East District, Delhi......Respondent No. 1

2. THAKUR BALWAN SINGH S/o Jalla Singh R/o D- 200, First Floor Defence Colony, New Delhi......Respondent No. 2 Through: Ms. Kiran Bairwa, APP for the State. Mr. Sakal Bhushan, Senior Advocate; with Mr. Rahul Shukla; Adv. Mr. Naveen Sharma; Adv. Mr. Vasu Bhushan, Adv. Mr. Ramandeep Singh; Adv. Mr. Nipun Bhushan, Advocates for R[2]. CORAM: HON'BLE MS.

JUSTICE NEENA BANSAL KRISHNA

JUDGMENT

NEENA BANSAL KRISHNA, J.

1. The Petition under Section 482 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 („Cr.P.C‟), corresponding to Section 528 of the Bharatiya Nyaya Suraksha Sanhita, 2023 („BNSS‟), has been preferred by the Petitioner seeking the quashing of the Supplementary Charge Sheet dated 08.07.2019 filed in FIR No. 197/2012, registered at Police Station Mehrauli.

2. The Petitioner further challenges the Order dated 22.10.2019, whereby Notice was issued to the Petitioner, and the impugned Order dated 25.04.2025 of the Ld. JMFC-05, in C.C. No. 335/2019, wherein it was held that cognizance had already been taken by its Predecessor vide Order dated 22.10.2019 and listed the matter for scrutiny of documents/arguments on charge.

3. Briefly stated, the dispute pertains to property bearing No. D-200, Defence Colony, New Delhi, the Ground Floor of which was purchased by the Petitioner vide Sale Deed dated 16.02.2000, while the Complainant/Respondent No. 2 purchased the First Floor. A dispute arose regarding alleged encroachment of common areas by the Petitioner.

4. A Complaint filed by Respondent No. 2, to claim ownership of common areas and including allegations of forgery of Sale Deed by inserting 5 unnumbered pages, on which FIR No. 197/2012 was registered under Sections 466, 467, 468, 448, and 120B IPC, on 27.04.2012.

5. After investigation, the Investigating Officer (IO) filed the first Charge Sheet on 14.01.2019, wherein the Petitioner was placed in Column No. 12, as it was concluded that no wrongful loss/gain was caused, noting the dispute was civil in nature.

6. Respondent No. 2/Complainant filed objections to the first Charge Sheet. Subsequently, without any Order from the Court directing further investigation, the Police filed a Supplementary Charge Sheet on 08.07.2019, wherein the IO moved the Petitioner from Column No. 12 to Column NO. 11. On 22.10.2019, the Ld. Trial Court observed “Issue notice to the accused Vijay Thakur for NDOH”.

7. The Petitioner raised objections regarding the validity of the Supplementary Charge Sheet. By the impugned Order dated 25.04.2025, the Ld. Trial Court rejected the Petitioner‟s contentions, holding that cognizance had already been taken vide the Order dated 22.10.2019 and listed the matter for arguments on charge.

8. The Petitioner has challenged the impugned Orders and proceedings on the grounds that the Supplementary Charge Sheet was filed without seeking prior leave of the Magistrate. The concerned ACP admitted before the Trial Court on 28.01.2025 that the Supplementary Charge Sheet was based on a “re-appreciation of FSL report” that was available at the time of the first Charge Sheet. Reliance has been placed on Vinay Tyagi v. Irshad Ali (2013) 5 SCC 762, to assert that while the police have a right to further investigation, seeking leave of the court is a necessary implication of law to prevent abuse.

9. Reliance has also been placed on Mariam Fasihuddin & Anr. v. State (2024), to submit that “further investigation” requires fresh evidence; not merely a change of opinion on existing evidence.

10. The Petitioner further asserts the dispute is purely civil, involving title and possession, which has been given a criminal colour. It is further submitted that the Order dated 22.10.2019 is a non-speaking, failing to reflect application of judicial mind required for taking cognizance.

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11. Thus, it is prayed that the Petition be allowed.

12. The Respondent No. 2/Complainant has opposed the petition and submitted that the Ld. Magistrate correctly held that cognizance was taken on 22.10.2019. Relying on State of Karnataka v. Pastor P. Raju and Darshan Singh Ram Kishan v. State of Maharashtra, the Respondent has contended that taking cognizance does not require formal action, but occurs as soon as the Magistrate applies his mind to the suspected commission of an offense. Reliance is placed on State of T.N. v. Hemendhra Reddy (2023) wherein it is held that even dehors any direction from the court, it is open to the police to conduct further investigation.

13. The Respondent asserts that the FSL Report clearly establishes the insertion of unnumbered pages in the Sale Deed, constituting a grave offence of forgery.

14. Thus, it is prayed that Petition be dismissed. Submissions Heard and Record Perused.

15. Before delving into the issue at hand, it is pertinent to make reference to the judgment of Hardeep Singh vs. State of Punjab, (2014) 3 SCC 92, wherein the Court had observed as under:

“7. The Constitutional mandate under Articles 20 and 21 of the Constitution of India, 1950 (hereinafter referred to as the 'Constitution') provides a protective umbrella for the smooth administration of justice making adequate provisions to ensure a fair and efficacious trial so that the accused does not get prejudiced after the law has been put into motion to try him for the offence but at the same time also gives equal protection to victims and to the society at

large to ensure that the guilty does not get away from the clutches of law. For the empowerment of the courts to ensure that the criminal administration of justice works properly, the law was appropriately codified and modified by the legislature under the Cr.P.C. indicating as to how the courts should proceed in order to ultimately find out the truth so that an innocent does not get punished but at the same time, the guilty are brought to book under the law. It is these ideals as enshrined under the Constitution and our laws that have led to several decisions, whereby innovating methods and progressive tools have been forged to find out the real truth and to ensure that the guilty does not go unpunished. The presumption of innocence is the general law of the land as every man is presumed to be innocent unless proven to be guilty.”

16. Now, the issue before this Court is whether the filing of the Supplementary Charge Sheet without any direction from the Court is bad in law and whether the cognizance has been taken on the Charge- Sheet/Supplementary Charge Sheet.

I. Whether Cognizance was taken on the Charge Sheet:

17. The first challenge pertains to the taking of Cognizance on the Charge-Sheet/Supplementary Charge Sheet.

18. The Petitioner challenges the impugned Order dated 25.04.2025, wherein the Ld. Trial Court held that cognizance of the offence had already been taken by the Predecessor vide the Order dated 22.10.2019.

19. Before delving into the merits of the instant case, it is imperative to understand what amounts to „taking cognizance’.

20. The law in this regard was enunciated by the Apex Court in R.R. Chari v. State of Uttar Pradesh, 1951 SCC 250 wherein it was observed as under: “taking cognizance does not involve any formal action or indeed action of any kind but occurs as soon as a magistrate as such applies his mind to the suspected commission of an offence”

21. This decision was followed by the Apex Court in Ajit Kumar Palit vs. State of West Bengal, AIR 1963 SC 765, wherein the Apex Court held as under:

“19. The provisions of s. 190 (1) being obviously, and on its own terms, inapplicable, the next question to be considered is whether it is the requirement of any principle of general jurisprudence that there should be some additional material to entitle the Court to take cognizance of the offence. The word “cognizance” has no esoteric or mystic significance in criminal law or procedure. It merely means become aware of and when used with reference to a Court or judge, to take notice of judicially. It was stated in Gopal Marwari v. Emperor, AIR 1943 Pat 245 by the learned judges of the Patna High Court in a passage quoted with approval by this Court in R.R. Chari v. State of Uttar Pradesh, 1951 SCC 250 : 1951 SCR 312, 320 that the word, “cognizance‟ was used in the Code to indicate the point when the Magistrate or judge takes judicial notice of an offence and that it was a word of indefinite import, and is not perhaps always used in exactly the same sense. As observed in Emperor v. Sourindra Mohan Chuckerbutty, ILR 37 Cal 412, 416 “taking cognizance does not involve any formal action; or indeed action of any kind, but occurs as soon as a Magistrate, as such, applies his mind to the suspected commission of an offence.” Where the statute prescribes the materials on which alone the judicial mind shall operate before any step is taken, obviously the statutory requirement must be fulfilled. Thus, a sessions judge cannot exercise that

original jurisdiction which magistrates specified in s. 190(1) can, but the material on which alone he can apply his judicial mind and proceed under the Code is an order of commitment. But statutory provision apart, there is no set material which must exist before the judicial mind can operate. It appears to us therefore that as soon as a special judge receives the orders of allotment of the case passed by the State Government it becomes vested with jurisdiction to try the case and when it receives the record from the Government it can apply its mind and issue notice to the accused and thus start the trial of the proceedings assigned to it by the State Government.”

22. Subsequently, while endorsing the observations made in the same observations in the case of R.R. Chari (supra) Apex Court in the case of Tularam vs. Kishore Singh, (1977) 4 SCC 459, held as under:

“7. …… While considering the question in greater detail this Court endorsed the observations of Justice Das Gupta in the case of Superintendent and Remembrancer of Legal Affairs, West Bengal v. Abani Kumar Banerjee, AIR 1950 Cal 347 which was to the following effect (1) 1951 SCC 250 : 1951 SCR 312. (2) AIR 1950 Cal 347. “It seems to me clear however that before it can be said that any Magistrate has taken cognizance of any offence under section 190(1) (a), Criminal Procedure Code, he must not only have applied his mind to the contents of the petition but he must have done so far the purpose of proceeding in a particular way as indicated in the subsequent provisions of this Chapter-proceeding under section 200 and thereafter sending it for inquiry „and report under section 202. When the Magistrate applies his mind not for the purpose of proceeding under the subsequent sections of this Chapter, but for taking action of some other kind, e.g. ordering investigation under section 156(3), or issuing a search warrant for the purpose of the investigation, he cannot be said to have taken cognizance of the offence”.

8. Section 190 of the Code runs thus …. It seems to us that there is no special charm or any magical formula in the expression “taking cognizance” which merely means judicial application of the mind of the Magistrate to the facts mentioned in the complaint with a view to, taking further action. Thus what section 190 contemplates is that the Magistrate takes cognizance once he makes himself fully conscious and aware of the allegations made in the complaint and decides to examine or test the validity of the said allegations The Court prescribes several modes in which a complaint can be disposed of after taking cognizance. In the first place. cognizance can be taken on the basis of three circumstances: (a) upon receiving a complaint of facts which constitute such offence; (b) upon a police report of such facts; and

(c) upon information received from any person other than the police officer or upon his own knowledge, that an offence has been committed. These are the three grounds on the basis of which a Magistrate can take cognizance and decide to act accordingly. It would further appear that this Court in the case of Narayandas Bhagwandas Madhavdas v. The State of West Bengal (1960) 1 SCR 93 observed the mode in which a Magistrate could take cognizance of an offence and observed as follows:— “It seems to me clear however that before it can be said that any Magistrate has taken cognizance of any offence under section 19(1)(a), Criminal Procedure Code, he must not only have applied his mind to the contents of the petition but must have done so for the purpose of proceeding in a particular way as indicated in the subsequent provisions of this Chapter-proceeding under-section 200 and thereafter sending it for inquiry and report under section 202.”

23. It would also be enlightening to refer to CREF Finance Ltd. v. Shree Shanthi Homes (P) Ltd., (2005) 7 SCC 467 wherein Supreme Court held thus: “10.... Cognizance is taken of the offence and not of the offender and, therefore, once the court on perusal of the complaint is satisfied that the complaint discloses the commission of an offence and there is no reason to reject the complaint at that stage, and proceeds further in the matter, it must be held to have taken cognizance of the offence. One should not confuse taking of cognizance with issuance of process. Cognizance is taken at the initial stage when the Magistrate peruses the complaint with a view to ascertain whether the commission of any offence is disclosed.”

24. To the very same effect are the observations made in the judgment in State of Karnataka v. Pastor P. Raju, (2006) 6 SCC 728, which read as under:

“13. It is necessary to mention here that taking cognizance of an offence is not the same thing as issuance of process. Cognizance is taken at the initial stage when the Magistrate applies his judicial mind to the facts mentioned in a complaint or to a police report or upon information received from any other person that an offence has been committed. The issuance of process is at a subsequent stage when after considering the material placed before it the court decides to proceed against the offenders against whom a prima facie case is made out.”

25. The above principle has been reiterated again in Chief Enforcement Officer v. Videocon International Ltd., (2008) 2 SCC 492. The relevant paragraph is extracted hereunder:

“19. The expression 'cognizance' has not been defined in the Code. But the word (cognizance) is of indefinite import. It has no esoteric or mystic significance in criminal law. It

merely means 'become aware of' and when used with reference to a court or a Judge, it connotes 'to take notice of judicially'. It indicates the point when a court or a Magistrate takes judicial notice of an offence with a view to initiating proceedings in respect of such offence said to have been committed by someone.”

26. In Mona Panwar v. High Court of Judicature of Allahabad, (2011) 3 SCC 496 what is meant by “taking cognizance” has been explained as under:

“19. The phrase 'taking cognizance of' means cognizance of an offence and not of the offender. Taking cognizance does not involve any formal action or indeed action of any kind but occurs as soon as a Magistrate applies his mind to the suspected commission of an offence. Cognizance, therefore, takes place at a point when a Magistrate first takes judicial notice of an offence. This is the position whether the Magistrate takes cognizance of an offence on a complaint or on a police report or upon information of a person other than a police officer. Before the Magistrate can be said to have taken cognizance of an offence under Section 190(1 )(b) of the Code, he must have not only applied his mind to the contents of the complaint presented before him, but must have done so for the purpose of proceeding under Section 200 and the provisions following that section. However, when the Magistrate had applied his mind only for ordering an investigation under Section 156(3) of the Code or issued a warrant for the purposes of investigation, he cannot be said to have taken cognizance of an offence.”

27. Again, in the decision of the Apex Court in Sarah Mathew v. Institute of Cardio Vascular Diseases, (2014) 2 SCC 62, in para 34, the position has been reiterated as under:

“34. Thus, a Magistrate takes cognizance when he applies his mind or takes judicial notice of an offence with a view to initiating proceedings in respect of offence which is said to

have been committed. This is the special connotation acquired by the term 'cognizance' and it has to be given the same meaning wherever it appears in Chapter XXXVI. It bears repetition to state that taking cognizance is entirely an act of the Magistrate. Taking cognizance may be delayed because of several reasons. It may be delayed because of systemic reasons. It may be delayed because of the Magistrate‟s personal reasons.”

28. It thus, emerges that while cognizance has no esoteric or mystic or special charm nor is there any magical formula in the expression “taking cognizance”, it simply means judicial application of the mind of the Magistrate to the facts mentioned in the complaint with a view to initiating proceedings in respect of such offence said to have been committed by someone.

29. In the light of this principle, the Orders made by the Ld. MM may be considered to ascertain whether cognizance was ever taken on the Charge Sheet/Supplementary Charge Sheet.

30. Before proceeding further, it may be noted that the Charge Sheet got filed in 27.11.2018 wherein the petitioner was placed in Column No.12. The first Order dated 22.03.2019 on filing of Charge Sheet, read as: “IO already filed chargesheet in which accused place in column no. 12. Issue notice to the IO to appear in person for some clarifications on NDOH. List on 14.05.2019.” Order dated 14.05.2019: “Objection filed by the complainant. Copy supplied for the SHO. Issue notice to the SHO to either appear in person or depute an official to file reply to the objection on 08.07.[2] 019.” Order dated 08.07.2019: “Let previous order be complied with afresh for 28.08.2019.” Order dated 28.08.2019: “IO SI Ajit Singh seeks time to complete the investigation and file a supplementary chargesheet with res pect tothe objections raised by the complainant. List for further proceedings on 22.10.2019.” Order dated 22.10.2019: “Issue notice to the accused Vijay Thakur for NDOH. At this stage, counsel for the complainant has moved an application u/s 173 (8) Cr.PC for carrying out further investigation. Copy supplied to the IO. List for reply and for arguments on 19.12.2019.”

31. It thus, emerges that no notice was directed to be issued to the Petitioner on the Charge-Sheet, but only a Notice was issued to the IO for clarification and also the Complainant had filed the Protest petition. It needs no scientific tools to state that no cognizance was taken on the Charge-Sheet but the process had been issued merely to seek clarification from the IO.

32. Pertinently, even though the Objections and Application u/s 173 (8) Cr.P.C for carrying out further investigation of the Complainant was still pending, the IO, on his own submitted the supplementary Charge- Sheet, wherein interestingly the petitioner was placed in Column No.11.

33. The Order dated 28.01.2025 followed which reads as under: “Perusal of the case file reflects that the matter is pending at the stage of cognizance. Supplementary charge-sheet had been filed. An application u/s 173(8) CrPC filed on behalf of the complainant is also pending for consideration. Submissions of ACP Vedprakash have been heard on the supplementary charge-sheet. Inspector Vedprakash Jha, the then SHO, PS Mehrauli who had forwarded the supplementary charge-sheet has submitted that the accused Vijay Thakur was chargesheeted as per the supplementary charge-sheet by keeping in column no. 11 after re-appreciation of FSL report which was then made as part of the main charge-sheet. Retd. ACP Rajender Pathania has not been able to give any cogent explanation with regard to the queries put by this court on the supplementary charge-sheet. Arguments on the supplementary charge-sheet as well as the main charge-sheet have been heard in part. Ld. APP for the State has sought some time to peruse the case file. Exemption application from personal appearance has been received from SI Ajeet Singh on the ground that he is on EL till 26.01.2025. Allowed for today only. Issue notice to SI Ajeet Singh for appearance on the NDOH. Issue notice to ACP Vedprakash, Inspector Vedprakash, Inspector Rampal and Retd. ACP Rajender Pathania for appearance on the NDOH. At request, put up for further arguments on 10.03.2025 at

12.00 noon.”

34. From a perusal of this Order of 28.01.2025, it is evident that the case is pending at the stage of cognizance. Despite this, the Order dated 25.04.2025, was made: “... 6. Upon the perusal of the closure report as well as the supplementary chargesheet, this court finds that there is sufficient material to take cognizance of the offence and process was accordingly issued to Accused, Vijay Thakur on 22.10.2019 by the Ld. Predecessor of this court....”

35. Thus, the impugned Order dated 25.04.2025, which records a finding that the cognizance has already been taken by the Ld. Predecessor Court in its Order dated 22.10.2019, patently incorrect.

36. The Order dated 22.10.2019 as reproduced above as well as the subsequent Orders, clearly spell out that no cognizance was ever taken on the Charge Sheet or the Supplementary Charge Sheet.

37. Accordingly, it is held that the case is still pending at the stage of precognizance.

II. Validity Of Supplementary Charge Sheet Filed on Re-appreciation of Evidence:

38. The next seminal question which arises is in regard to the validity of the Supplementary Charge Sheet.

39. As is evident from the various Orders referred above, the main Chargesheet was filed in the Court on 22.03.2019 wherein the Petitioner was placed in Column No. 12. The objections were filed by the Complainant which were pending and the matter was listed for arguments on Application under Section 173(8) Cr.P.C. Then the COVID period ensued and nothing substantive happened on 19.12.2019, 25.02.2020, 13.08.2020 and 25.08.2020. The next relevant Order dated 22.09.2020 is as under: “An application u/s 173(8) Cr. PC was filed. The notice of the said application has been issued to IO and Ld. APP. Perusal of file shows that accused was kept in column no. 12. Ld. Predecessor had issued notice to the accused, however, no order was passed mentioning that there is sufficient material to proceed against the accused. Thereafter, another application was moved by the complainant u/s 173(8) Cr. PC. Be listed for filing of reply and arguments on 12.12.2020.”

40. Thereafter, interestingly, even though the Application under Section 173(8) Cr.P.C. filed by the Complainant was pending and there were no directions whatsoever given by the learned MM, the Supplementary Chargesheet got filed on 08.07.2019.

41. The basis of filing the Supplementary Charge Sheet was noted in the Order dated 28.01.2025 that Inspector Vedprakash Jha, the then SHO, PS Mehrauli in the Supplementary Charge Sheet “has submitted that the accused Vijay Thakur was charge-sheeted as per the supplementary charge-sheet by keeping in column no. 11 after re-appreciation of FSL report which was then made as part of the main charge-sheet”.

42. The law for carrying out further investigations in the light of Section 173(8) Cr.P.C. is well settled. While the police retains the power to conduct further investigation, this power is not unbridled. As held in Vinay Tyagi, (supra) seeking leave of the court is a salutary practice to ensure the investigation is not used as a tool to harass the accused. More importantly, “further investigation” must be based on new evidence.

43. The Apex Court in Mariam Fasihuddin & Anr. v. State (2024) has categorically held that submitting a Supplementary Report based on a “reevaluation or reassessment” of material already collected, violates the investigative rigour required under Section 173(8) CrPC. The relevant extract is reproduced as under: “26. It is a matter of record that in the course of ' further investigation', no new material was unearthed by the investigating agency. Instead, the Supplementary Chargesheet relies upon the Truth Lab report dated 15.07.2013, obtained by Respondent No.2, which was already available when the original Chargesheet was filed. The term 'further investigation' stipulated in Section 173(8) Cr.P.C obligates the officer in charge of the concerned police station to 'obtain further evidence, oral or documentary', and only then forward a supplementary report regarding such evidence, in the prescribed form.

27. The provision for submitting a supplementary report infers that fresh oral or documentary evidence should be obtained rather than re-evaluating or reassessing the material already collected and considered by the investigating agency while submitting the initial police report, known as the Chargesheet under Section 173(2) Cr.P.C. In the absence of any new evidence found to substantiate the conclusions drawn by the investigating officer in the supplementary report, a Judicial Magistrate is not compelled to take cognizance; as such a report lacks investigative rigour and fails to satisfy the requisites of Section 173(8) Cr.P.C. What becomes apparent from the facts on record of this case is that the investigating agency acted mechanically; in purported compliance with the Trial Magistrate‟s order dated 24.06.2015.”

44. In the present case, it is candidly stated in the supplementary Charge Sheet that “after re-appreciation of FSL report which was then made as part of the main charge-sheet”. No fresh material appears to have been unearthed.

45. Furthermore, the Application under Section 173(8) filed for further investigations qua the involvement of Mrs. Manjeet Kaur @ Manjeet Nanda and some unknown officials of the office Sub-Registrar, was dismissed by the Ld. Trial Court vide its impugned Order dated 24.05.2025, and the same is extracted as under:

“7. Further, one application filed on behalf of the complainant under section 173(8) CrPC is also stated to be pending. In the application, it has been prayed that further investigation qua the involvement of Mrs. Manjeet Kaur @ Manjeet Nanda and some unknown officials of the office Sub-Registrar, Delhi may be ordered in the matter.

Submissions on the aforesaid application had been addressed at length by the counsel for the complainant on the LDOH. While the application has been field on behalf of the complainant seeking further seeking further investigation in the matter, it is pertinent to note that in paragraph 10 of the application, it has been averred that IO has not filed the chargesheet against other accused, Manjeet Nanda and other unknown officials of the subregistrar, Delhi against whom specific evidence has already come on record during investigation. It is trite law that further investigation can be ordered by the court to collect further evidence. Since, the applicant has himself admitted that there exists specific evidence against the proposed accused Manjeet Kaur on record, accordingly, the present application seeking further investigation by the IO as regards the involvement of proposed accused Manjeet Kaur and other unknown officials of the office of Sub-Registrar is clearly not maintainable. It was also submitted in the alternative by the counsel for the complainant that there exists sufficient material on record to summon the proposed accused Manjeet Kaur in the present FIR. It has already been observed hereinbefore that cognizance of the offence had been taken and the process against accused, Vijay Thakur was issued by the Ld. Predecessor of this court vide order dated 22.10.2019. Perusal of the supplementary charge sheet filed by the IO states in categorical terms that by alleged insertion of additional documents in the sale deed dated 16.02.2000, wrongful gain and wrongful loss has allegedly accrued to the accused, Vijay Thakur only. Having regards to the facts and circumstances of the present case, this court does not find it expedient to order further investigation in the matter and the application is accordingly dismissed.”

46. This Order reinforces that there was no new material but reappreciation of the FSL Report which already formed part of the Charge- Sheet and there was no new material but only re-appreciation of existing evidence to shift the petitioner from Column 12 to Column 11.

47. The Supplementary Charge Sheet is therefore, not sustainable and is liable to be quashed.

III. Power of the Court to Summon an accused placed in Column

48. Having held that the Supplementary Charge Sheet is not sustainable on re-appreciation of evidence collected in the main Charge Sheet by the Investigating Agency, the question arises as to whether the Ld. MM is empowered to re-appreciate the evidence and summon the accused placed in Column No.12 in the Charge Sheet.

49. In the context of the Court‟s power to summon an accused, it may at the outset be observed that the Code of Criminal Procedure visualizes three scenarios in which the accused can be summoned.

50. The first scenario is when the charge sheet is filed in court and the accused is placed in Column 11. Section 190 of the Cr.P.C. empowers the Court to take cognizance on the charge sheet. At this stage, the material collected in the charge sheet is considered and if sufficient prima facie material exists in the Charge Sheet, the accused may be summoned.

51. The second scenario is where an accused is placed in Column NO. 12, or where some are placed in Column No. 11 and others in Column NO. 12, implying that the Investigating Officer could not gather sufficient evidence to charge-sheet those placed in Column No.11. The question then arises regarding the Court's jurisdiction to summon an individual placed in Column No. 12. The Law in this regard is also unambiguous that the individuals placed in Column No. 12, can can still be summoned at the time of taking cognizance, provided the Court finds and records a speaking Order there is enough incriminating material to prima facie establish the offence against them.

52. The third scenario is when an accused placed in Column No. 12 is not initially summoned, then Section 319 of the Cr.P.C. provides a second opportunity, visualizing that if incriminating evidence emerges during the trial against third parties or those previously placed in Column No. 12, such persons can be summoned through the exercise of powers under Section 319 Cr.P.C.

53. While summoning an accused who is placed in Column No.12 at the time of taking cognizance or under S.319, the Ld. MM must make a speaking Order and cogent reasons must be reflected to explain why the learned M.M does not concur with the finding of the I.O in placing an Accused in Column No.12 and the reasons for which it is deemed appropriate to the summon the Accused placed in Colum No.12. If the MM comes to the conclusion that a person has been wrongly placed in Column No.12, and then there is nothing which prevents the M.M to summon even those who are placed in Colum No.12, with the only condition that it should reflect some reason and application of mind.

54. The Coordinate Bench in the case of SD vs. State of NCT of Delhi, 2024 DHC:1589 held that if the Person placed in Column No.12, is not summoned at the time of taking cognizance, then subsequent summoning by the Successor Court with no additional evidence, tantamount to review of the earlier Order which is bad in law, as has also been held in Adalat Prasad vs. Roop Lal Jindal & Ors. 2004 (3) JCC 1347.

55. The Constitution Bench of the Apex Court in the case of Hardeep Singh (supra) while recognizing the desire of a person to avoid trial to be strong, pursuant to which he may be making every effort to get himself absolved at the stage of investigations or enquiry even though he may be connected to the commission of the offence, it was held that the power under Section 319 Cr.P.C can only be exercised “on evidence recorded in the Court and not the material gathered at the investigation stage, which has already been tested at the stage of taking cognizance under Section 190 Cr.P.C and the issue of process under 204 Cr.P.C”.

56. This principle has been reiterated in Bijender Singh vs. State of Rajasthan (2017) 7 SCC 706, wherein it was observed that at the time of taking cognizance the Court has to see whether a prima facie case is made out against the Accused under Section 319 Cr.P.C. The test of prima facie case though is same, but the degree of satisfaction required is much stricter.

57. Similar observations have been made by the Apex Court in the case of Vikas vs. State of Rajasthan (2014) 3 SCC 321, Ramesh Chander Srivastava vs. State of Uttar Pradesh (2021) 12 SCC 608.

58. This principle has been explained in the recent judgment of Omi @ Omkar Rathore vs. State of Madhya Pradesh (2025) SCC OnLine SC 27, wherein after referring to the judgment of the Constitution Bench in Hardeep Singh (supra), the principles were reaffirmed and observed “that when a person is named in the FIR by the complainant, but police, after investigation, finds no role of that particular person and files the chargesheet without implicating him, the Court is not powerless, and at the stage of summoning, if the trial court finds that a particular person should be summoned as accused, even though not named in the charge-sheet, it can do so. At that stage, chance is given to the complainant also to file a protest petition. However, once that stage has gone, the Court is still not powerless by virtue of Section 319 Cr.P.C. However, this section gets triggered when during the trial some evidence surfaces against the proposed accused.”

59. In Omi@Omkar Rathore (supra), it was further observed that undoubtedly the Trial Court has the jurisdiction to add any person not being the accused before it, to face the trial along with other accused persons, if the Court is satisfied at any stage of the proceedings on the evidence adduced that the persons who have not been arrayed as accused should face the trial.

60. The distinction between summoning of accused placed in Column 12 and those sought to be summoned under S.319 is that the summoning at the stage of summoning on the Charge Sheet would be on the basis of the material collected during the investigations, but under S.319, a person can be summoned as an accused only on the basis of evidence adduced before it and not on the basis of the material available in the Charge-Sheet or the Case Diary.

61. From the aforesaid discussion and the judgment, it emerges that the Ld. MM is the competent person to consider the evidence presented in the Charge Sheet and to summon the accused even though placed in Column No 12 provided there is prima facie sufficient evidence disclosing commission of offence by him. Further, it needs no reiteration that once the Charge Sheet is filed, its appreciation is in the exclusive domain of the Court alone, who may on finding prima facie evidence, choose to summon the accused placed in Column No.12, though this power of summoning an accused must not be exercised in a cavalier manner, and must be supported with prima facie evidence and cogent reasons. No such powers exist with the IO to reappreciate the evidence already forming a part of charge sheet and file a Supplementary Charge Sheet by shifting the accused placed in Column No.12 to Column No.11.

62. In the present case, the Order Sheets as reproduced herein above, reflect that neither cognizance was ever taken nor was the petitioner ever summoned as an accused by the Ld. M.M, vide Order dated 22.10. 2019 or thereafter.

63. In this context, reference be made to the Order dated 25.04.2025 in regards to summoning of the accused reads as under:

“1. Matter is listed today for orders on the point of cognizance of the offence and summoning of the proposed accused namely, Mr. Vijay Thakur. ... 6. Upon the perusal of the closure report as well as the supplementary chargesheet, this court finds that there is sufficient material to take cognizance of the offence and process was accordingly issued to Accused, Vijay Thakur on 22.10.2019 by the Ld. Predecessor of this court. ... 8. Issue notice to IO to appear on the NDOH for supplying of the copy of the closure report and supplementary chargesheet to the accused Vijay Thakur. 9. Put up for scrutiny of documents/arguments on charge on 21.07.2025.”

64. This Order again reinforces that on 25.04.2025, the matter was still pending at the stage of cognizance on the Charge Sheet, but fell in error in observing that the accused had already been summoned vide Order dated 22.10.2019 (which merely directed: “Issue notice to the accused Vijay Thakur for NDOH”), which is blatantly incorrect in the light of aforesaid discussion. As already discussed above, mere notice to the Petitioner in a Charge Sheet where he is kept in Column No.12, did not reflect that cognizance was taken and Petitioner was summoned as an accused, but only to ascertain the future course of action.

65. The proceedings were still at a nascent stage where the Court was required to decide whether to accept the Charge Sheet and whether the Petitioner is required to be summoned as an accused, which needs a reasoned Order. Conclusion:

66. It is thus, held that the observation in the impugned Order dated 25.04.2025 that cognizance has already been taken and the accused has been summoned, is set aside as incorrect. The case is held to be at the precognizance stage, as correctly noted by the Trial Court itself in its Order dated 28.01.2025.

67. The Petitioner is at liberty to agitate all his objections before the Ld. Trial Court, who mat consider them before deciding on the point of cognizance/summoning on the Charge Sheet.

68. The Petition is disposed of in the above terms. Pending Applications are disposed of accordingly.

JUDGE JANUARY 14, 2026