Full Text
HIGH COURT OF DELHI
Date of Decision: 14.01.2026
JUSTICE FOR ALL .....Petitioner
Through: Mr. Khagesh B. Jha, Adv.
Mann, Ms.Jyoti Shokeen and Ms.Khushi Sachdeva, Advs.
AND ORS. .....Respondents
Through: Mr.Sameer Vashisht, SC (Civil) for GNCTD
Mr. S.V. Raju, ASG
Goswami, Mr.Ayush Raj, Mr.Harsh Paul Singh, Mr.Pranjal Tripathi, Mr.Satyam, Mr.Shikhar Yadav, Mr.Chinmay, Ms.Agrimaa Singh, Mr.Aryansh Shukla, Ms.Prachi
Dhingra, Mr.Utkarsh Vatsa, Mr.Udit Bajpai, Mr.Sahurya Sarin, Ms.Aditi
Andley, Mr.Hitarth Raja and Mr.Sanjeev Memon, Advs. along
Ms.Manisha Agrawal Narain, CGSC
Ms.Aditi Singh, Advs. for R-3/UOI.
Digiltally
HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE TEJAS KARIA DEVENDRA KUMAR UPADHYAYA, CJ. (ORAL)
JUDGMENT
1. Heard learned Counsel for the respective parties.
2. This Public Interest Litigation petition has been filed with the prayer to issue appropriate directions to the respondents to frame and notify necessary rules for smooth functioning of the Delhi School Tribunal [hereinafter referred to as the “Tribunal”] and for effective implementation and execution of its orders in the context of Section 8, 11 and 27 of the Delhi School Education Act, 1973 [hereinafter referred to as the “Act”].
3. To appropriately appreciate the concerns raised in this petition, we may refer to certain provisions of the Act.
4. The Act was enacted with the objective of providing for better organization and development of school education in the Union Territory of Delhi and the matters connected or incidental therewith. The Act contains various provisions for establishment, recognition and management of, and aid to the schools. It also lays down the terms and conditions of service of employees of the recognized private schools.
5. Section 8 of the Act provides terms and conditions of service of employees. Sub-section 2 of Section 8 of the Act provides that no employee of a recognized private school shall be either dismissed, removed or reduced in rank; nor shall his service be either terminated except with the prior approval of the Director of Education. Sub-section 3 of Section 8 of the Act provides that any employee who is dismissed, removed or reduced in rank may file an appeal against such order to the Tribunal constituted under section 11 of the Act. Section 8 (2) and 8 (3) of the Act are extracted herein below:
6. Section 11 of the Act provides that the Administrator i.e. Hon’ble Lieutenant Governor of Delhi, shall constitute a Tribunal by way of issuing a notification, which shall be called “Delhi School Tribunal”. It further provides that such Tribunal shall consist of one person. Sub-section 6 of Section 11 of the Act vests with the Tribunal the same power as are vested in a Court of appeal by the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 for the purpose of disposal of an appeal preferred under Section 8(3) of the Act. Section 11 of the Act reads as under:
another person, in accordance with the provisions of this section, to fill the vacancy and the proceedings may be continued before the Tribunal from the stage at which the vacancy is filled. (3) The Administrator shall make available to the Tribunal such staff as may be necessary in the discharge of its functions under this Act. (4) All expenses incurred in connection with the Tribunal shall be defrayed out of the Consolidated Fund of India. (5) The Tribunal shall have power to regulate its own procedure in all matters arising out of the discharge of its functions including the place or places at which it shall hold its sittings. (6) The Tribunal shall for the purpose of disposal of an appeal preferred under this Act have the same powers as are vested in a court of appeal by the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (5 of 1908) and shall also have the power to stay the operation of the order appealed against on such terms as it may think fit.”
7. Section 27 of the Act is a penal provision, according to which in case of certain omissions or failures on the part of the Manager of an institution, he makes himself liable for punishment with imprisonment for a term, which may extend to three months, or with fine which may extend to one thousand rupees, or with both. The omissions and failures making the Manager liable for such punishment are, (a) if he omits or fails to carry out any orders made by the Tribunal without any reasonable excuse, (b) if a Manager permits a student for any public examination in violation of the provisions of Section 19, and (c) if he omits or fails to deliver the school property to the Administrator or any officer authorized by the Administrator under Subsection (2) of Section 20 of the Act. Section 27 of the Act is also extracted herein below:
(b) presents any student for any public examination without complying with the provisions of section 19, or
(c) omits or fails to deliver any school property to the
Administrator or any officer authorised by him under sub-section (2) of section 20, he shall be punished with imprisonment for a term which may extend to three months, or with fine which may extend to one thousand rupees, or with both.”
8. Section 28 of the Act vests with the Administrator the power to make rules with the previous approval of the Central Government. Sub-section 2 of Section 28 of the Act vests the subjects on which rules may be framed without prejudice to the generality of the provisions of Sub-section (1) of Section 28 of the Act. The subjects on which rules under Section 28 of the Act can be made include the manner in which education may be regulated by the Administrator in Delhi. Certain statutory rules have been framed known as Delhi School Education Rules, 1973, Rule 43 whereof vests power with the Administrator to issue necessary instructions in relation to any matter not covered by the said rules, if it is thought appropriate by the Administrator in his opinion that issuance of such instructions shall be in the interest of school education in Delhi.
9. From a bare perusal of the scheme of the Act and the Rules framed thereunder, what we find is that the Tribunal has been vested with the authority and power to hear and decide the appeal preferred by an employee of a private school under Section 8(3) of the Act in respect of order of dismissal, removal or reduction in rank or an order terminating his services otherwise. However, no provision appears to be in sight either in the said Act or in the Rules which provides for any appropriate effective mechanism for ensuring compliances of the orders passed by the Tribunals constituted under Section 11 of the Act.
10. So far as Section 27 of the said Act is concerned, as already noticed above, the said provision is a penal provision and if Manager of a recognized private school is found to have omitted or failed to carry out orders passed by the Tribunal, he will be liable to the penalty or punishment as prescribed in the said provision, however, the penal provision cannot be equated with an effective mechanism of executing the orders passed by the Tribunal.
11. Noticing the aforesaid anomaly, a Full Bench of this Court in the judgment rendered in the case of Presiding Officer Delhi School Tribunal v. Govt. of NCT of Delhi reported in 2010 SCC OnLine Del 2924, noted the submissions made by the learned Amicus Curiae in the said matter that the Tribunal had felt that the provisions contained in Section 27 of the Act are not sufficient enough to get its orders executed. The Full Bench also noted the submission of the learned Amicus Curiae in the said matter that the Manager may be punished because of criminal liability, but would not confer any benefit to the employees or a teacher who has fought before the Tribunal and obtained the relief.
12. The Full Bench also recorded a statement made by the learned Counsel representing the Government of NCT of Delhi on a query put forth by the Bench in that matter. In reply whereof, it was stated that the State Government is contemplating to frame a set of rules for execution of orders passed by the Tribunal. The Full Bench further made a suggestion that a set of rules should be framed as expeditiously as possible so that the orders passed by the Tribunal are executed. The aforesaid judgment by Full Bench was rendered on 27.08.2010 i.e. one and half decades ago. However, till date, neither any rules have been framed to ensure that the orders passed by the Tribunal are executed nor any other alternative mechanism for the said purpose has been evolved. Such a situation, in our considered opinion, warrants immediate attention of the authorities concerned, for providing an adequate mechanism ensuring compliance of the orders passed by the Tribunal.
13. Sh. Vashisht, learned counsel representing the GNCTD, however, has drawn our attention to Section 20 of the Act and has submitted that in case of non-compliance of the orders passed by the Tribunal recourse by the Government can be taken to the provisions contained in Section 20 of the Act, whereby the Administrator on his satisfaction that the management of an institution has neglected to perform any of its duties can take over the management of the schools and once the management is taken over by the Administrator, the orders passed by the Tribunals will be executed. He has also stated that the instant public interest litigation petition lacks the necessary data to establish that orders passed by the Tribunal in Delhi are not being complied with or obeyed, necessitating a need of evolving an execution mechanism.
14. Having considered the respective submissions made by the learned counsel for the parties, we are of the opinion that the suggestions as given by the Full Bench judgment way back in the year 2010 ought to have been considered and appropriate mechanism ought to have been provided by either by framing rules or evolving any other legally permissible mechanism for ensuring compliance of the orders passed by the Tribunal. Paragraphs 35, 36 and 37 of the judgment of the Full Bench in Presiding Officer Delhi School Tribunal (supra) are extracted herein below:
15. Sh. Vashisht has also stated that as a matter of practice the execution proceedings are being instituted before the Tribunal, which are also being heard and decided. With the said submission, it has been stated by learned counsel for the petitioner that the Act or the Rules framed thereunder do not permit the Tribunal to draw any execution proceedings and therefore, merely because of practice such execution petitions are being entertained, does not address the problem posed on account of non-availability of any adequate mechanism of execution of the orders passed by the Tribunal. He has further stated that if any such execution proceedings are initiated, they are prone to be challenged and stayed/quashed in case of such a challenge by this Court.
16. So far as the shelter sought to be taken by learned counsel representing the GNCTD to Section 20 of the Act is concerned, the submission made by him do not convince us. The authority/power available to the Administrator under Section 20 of the Act has to be exercised by the Administrator and in case of non compliance of the orders passed by the Tribunal, such authority may or may not be exercised by the Administrator at the instance of the employee of the private school in whose favour Tribunal passes an order, in case of an appeal preferred by him under Section 8(3) of the Act. The power under Section 20 of the Act, thus, is to be exercised by the Administrator and though an employee aggrieved by non-compliance of the orders passed by the Tribunal can be a complainant before the Administrator for invoking Section 20 of the Act, however, such a provision cannot be said to be a legal remedy available to an employee of a private recognized school in case he is aggrieved by non-implementation or disobedience of the orders passed by the Tribunal.
17. As to the submission that the instant public interest litigation petition lacks adequate data to suggest that orders of the Tribunals are not being implemented cannot be the ground to deny to have a provision for execution or implementation of the orders passed by the Tribunal.
18. As far as the practice by the Tribunal of entertaining execution petitions is concerned, we may clearly state that Tribunal is a statutory Tribunal created under Section 18 of the Act and therefore, it has to exercise its powers well within the four corners of the statute under which it has been established. Unless and until the statute or by any other legally permissible mechanism, the Tribunal is vested with the authority of execution, entertaining such petition for execution of its orders, in our opinion would legally not be permissible for the simple reason that the Tribunals are not the Courts of plenary jurisdiction. In this view, the need of empowering the Tribunal by legally permissible means for having authority and requisite power and jurisdiction to get its orders executed cannot be denied.
19. As already observed above, the Tribunal is a creation of the statute and, therefore, any exercise of power beyond the power vested in it under the said Act, would not be permissible.
20. Having regard to the aforesaid facts and circumstances of the case, we hope and expect that the need of having such an execution mechanism shall be considered by the appropriate authority of the respondents and adequate steps shall also be taken to provide for such a mechanism either by insertion of certain rules, as may be permissible under Section 28 of the Act or by any other legally permissible means.
21. We, thus, dispose of this writ petition with a direction to the Hon’ble Lieutenant Governor/Administrator to consider the issues raised in this petition and take appropriate steps to address the same by way of making an appropriate rule or evolving any other mechanism, ensuring that the Tribunal is vested with appropriate legal authority to get its orders executed.
22. We also direct that in case any such proposal is made for amendment in the rules in terms of Section 28 of the Act, the Central Government shall immediately attend to such proposal and consider the approval at the earliest.
23. We hope that appropriate decision and action which may be warranted under law in the light of the observations made herein above in this order, shall be completed as early as possible preferably, within a period of three months from today.
24. We request Sh. Sameer Vashisht, learned Standing Counsel for GNCTD to communicate this order to all concerned. The order shall also be communicated by the learned counsel representing the Union of India to the appropriate authority of the Central Government.
DEVENDRA KUMAR UPADHYAYA, CJ TEJAS KARIA, J JANUARY 14, 2026 “shailndra”