Union of India v. Mago Constructions Pvt. Ltd.

4.2. It is contended that the impugned award is in conflict with the public policy of India. The impugned award is contrary to the first principles of the SHARMA 18:48 law of contract. It is not that the learned Arbitrator has misinterpreted the terms of the contract, but it is submitted that the learned Arbitrator has completely ignored and further gone ahead to allow claims contrary to the contractual terms. Submissions qua challenge to award of Claim No. 1

4.3. The Petitioner has challenged the award of Claim No. 1 on the ground that the Contract was duly amended on 05.12.2013 and thirteen [13] buildings were removed from the scope of the Contract with the consent of the Respondent. It is stated that the amendment was duly executed by the Respondent without any demur and therefore, the finding returned by the Arbitrator that the amendment was signed by the Respondent under coercion is without any credible evidence.

4.4. The amendment dated 05.12.2013 was signed before two [2] witnesses, without any protest. Their evidence was not recorded before the learned Arbitrator before coming to conclusion of coercion. Hence, plea of coercion is untenable as it is settled position of law that mere bald allegation of coercion, fraud or financial duress is not sufficient and same is required to be proved by evidence. In this regard he relied upon the judgment passed by the Supreme Court in New India Assurance Co. v. Genus Power Infra Ltd.1.

4.5. It is submitted that the Respondent’s had contended that the site was not handed in time. In this regard, reference was made to Condition 29 of Special Conditions, which stipulates that ‘In case it is not possible to make the entire site available on the award of work, the contractor will have to (2015)2 SCC 11 424 [Paragraph Nos. 7 and 9] SHARMA 18:48 arrange his works program accordingly’. It is contended that no claim whatsoever, for not giving entire site on award of work and for giving site gradually part will be tenable.

4.6. It is contended that the descoping of the buildings was within the permissible variation limit stipulated in Condition 7(c) of the GCC[2] and therefore, the descoping was valid. Separately, it is contended that the rates adopted and the quantities of woodwork and bricks accepted by the Arbitrator on basis of which, the Arbitrator has awarded this claim is based on bare calculations submitted by the Respondent and are unsubstantiated from the record.

4.7. It is contended that in the Statement of Claim [‘SOC’] it was claimed that the Respondent had an agreement with a scrap dealer for the prices quoted in the claim; however, no such alleged agreement was filed on record.

4.8. It is stated that under the Contract, Petitioner was entitled to a credit from the Respondent for the material recovered by the Respondent from demolition of the buildings. This credit was estimated as Rs. 32,24,200/under Schedule A Section XV, against which actual credit recovered by Petitioner was Rs. 41,17,252/- and therefore, no loss has been suffered by the Respondent. It is stated that the grant of loss of profit is impermissible. Submissions qua challenge to award of Claim No. 7

4.9. It is contended that the escalation in respect of the material was to be paid as per the mathematical formula based on the Whole Sale Price Indices [‘WPI’], published by Economic Advisors to Government of India. It is General Conditions of the Contract SHARMA 18:48 stated that in case of extension of contract the WPI as was applicable on the last date before the original date of completion was to be made applicable for working out the escalation in the extended period. It is stated that the WPI was frozen at the original date of completion for the extended period and the escalation was paid to the Respondent as per the contractual provisions. Submissions qua challenge to award of Claim Nos. 2, 3, 4 and 9

4.10. It is stated that with regard to Claim Nos. 2, 3, 4, and 9 though the said Claims have not been challenged in the Section 34 petition, the Petitioner is relying on Ground A of the Section 34 petition to challenge these claims by way of oral submissions and written submissions dated 31.07.2025.

4.11. With respect to Claim No. 2 it is contended that escalation for labour has been duly given to the Respondent as per the formula provided in the agreement and refers to Special Condition Nos. 31, 31.[1] and 31.2. It is contended that the Respondent was aware at the time of submission of the tender bid that enhanced 20% wages would be payable in high rise buildings and therefore, it cannot now separately seek 20% extra wages. It is stated that escalation is only permissible as per the formula stated in the Contract and no additional compensation is permissible.

4.12. With respect to Claim Nos. 3 and 4, it is stated that the work of toilet block and alarm post near guard house is provided in the list of drawings and is within the scope of work as stipulated in the Contract.

5. Mr. Udit Seth, learned counsel for the Respondent has set up the Respondent’s case as under:

5.1. At the outset, he stated that the Petitioner is impugning the factual findings arrived at by the Arbitrator. It is settled law that a possible and plausible view taken by the Arbitrator on facts must pass the muster as the arbitrator is the master of the quantity and quality of evidence. An award based on little evidence or on evidence which does not measure up in quality to a trained legal mind would not be held to be invalid. Once it is found that the arbitrator’s approach is not arbitrary or capricious, then the Arbitrator is the last word on facts. The instant case has been filed as if it were a regular appeal against the impugned award assailing factual finding is beyond the scope of Section 34 of the Act of 1996.

5.2. He stated that the Arbitrator in paragraph no. ‘20’ of the impugned award has given the correct finding that the Petitioner was in breach of contract. The Petitioner failed to vacate the buildings and hand over the same to the Respondent. The Arbitrator has cited other reasons for Petitioner being in breach, which have not been challenged by the Petitioner in this case. The Arbitrator has correctly held, inter alia that “I agree with Claimant to the extent that in such unending period of non-handing over buildings for demolition there was no other option left with them but to sign the amendment to bring the contract to end, thus element of coercion cannot be ruled out.” SHARMA 18:48 Submissions qua challenge to award of Claim No. 1

5.3. He stated that the justification and basis for calculation of quantities and rates relevant for adjudication of Claim No. 1 was filed as Appendix A, enclosed with the SOC. It is stated that the said calculations were accepted by the Arbitrator. It is stated that the Petitioner in its Statement of Defence [‘SOD’] had given a vague denial of the Appendix A and also failed to provide its counter calculation for the quantities provided by the Respondent in Appendix A.

5.4. He contended that the Respondent had raised a claim for five [5] items under Claim No. 1, however, the Arbitrator awarded claim for only two [2] items i.e., wood and brick. It is stated that the Arbitrator had considered the MES’s SSR[3] to ascertain the rates for the wood and brick. It is stated that in fact, the Arbitrator after his due diligence has awarded lower rates than the rates provided in the said SSR. It is stated that said SSR is the Petitioner’s document and is available in the public domain.

5.5. He contended that the work under the Contract had been completed in January, 2012 and barring the demolition of thirteen [13] buildings all the work stood complete. The work of demolition of thirteen [13] buildings was removed on 05.12.2013 and the project was declared complete on 06.12.2013. This led to idling for almost 24 months. It is stated that the value to be realised from the sale of the scrap of the demolished material of the thirteen [13] buildings formed the basis of the quote of Rs. 19.14 crores submitted by the Respondent and it would have been the income of the Respondent. Thus, by descoping the thirteen [13] buildings from the Standard Schedule of Rates SHARMA 18:48 Contract, the Respondent was deprived from the value of the scrap, which would have been the income of the Respondent.

5.6. He stated that it is a settled position of law that the Arbitral Tribunal can award claims by reasonable and intelligent guesswork [‘guesstimates’]. In this regard, he relies upon the judgment of the Supreme Court in Gemini Bay Transcription Pvt. Ltd. v. Integrated Sales Service Ltd.4. In the present case, the Arbitrator has inspected the site in presence of both the parties and has duly considered; (1) conduct of the parties during the contract execution period, (2) documents in support of computation of claim, (3) breaches by Respondent in not making available the buildings for demolition, (4) scheme of the Contract, more specifically the manner in which the rates were quoted by the Respondent at the bidding stage, (5) rates prescribed in the SSR of MES, (6) rich condition of the buildings to be demolished at the site, which included school building, officers mess, barracks, etc., before awarding the claim only for 2 items [i.e. wood and brick] out of the 5 claimed items.

5.7. He stated that the Respondent in its rejoinder filed before the Arbitrator has exhaustively explained the legal position with respect to Respondent entering into the supplementary agreement under coercion. He relies upon the judgment dated 19.04.2011 passed by the Division Bench of this Court in BSNL v. BWL Ltd.5, to address Petitioner’s contention that the Respondent did not repudiate the supplementary agreement. He stated that the payment towards the final bill and bank guarantees [given as securities] (2022)1 SCC 753 [paragraph nos. 77, 78, 81, 82] FAO(OS) 457/2010 (DB) [paragraph no. 5] SHARMA 18:48 was released by the Petitioner in March 2018, i.e. after almost 4 years of entering into the supplementary agreement. As such, there was no immediate relief granted to the Respondent when it entered into the supplementary agreement.

5.8. He stated that the challenge to Claim No. 1 is premised on a misreading of the supplementary agreement dated 05.12.2013, which was executed under compelling circumstances and does not preclude the Respondent from claiming loss of profit due to descoping of work. The Arbitrator has righty held that the Respondent was constrained to sign the supplementary agreement due to prolonged inaction and breaches by the Petitioner, including non-handing over of buildings for demolition, which led to idling of resources and financial prejudice.

5.9. He stated that there is nothing contained in the supplementary agreement dated 05.12.2013, which prohibits the Respondent from raising the subject matter claim of loss of profits. As such, this claim is in tandem with the principles of contract law and the law laid down by the Supreme Court in Dwarka Das vs. State of Madhya Pradesh[6] and MSK Projects (I) (JV) Ltd. v. State of Rajasthan[7], which entitled a party to claim damages if the party was wrongly prevented to execute the work given to it, thereby denying the party to earn profit on the work withdrawn from the said party.

5.10. He stated that the Petitioner’s argument of ‘deviation limits’ is beyond pleadings and unsubstantiated, and, therefore, meritless. The pleadings does

(2011) 10 SCC 573 [paragraph nos. 38 and 39] SHARMA 18:48 not refer to the applicable contract clause, relevant surrounding facts etc. Moreover, if non-handing over the site was within the deviation limits as contended by the Petitioner, then no descoping was required by the Petitioner in the first place. The Petitioner’s contention is therefore contradictory to its conduct and self-destructive. The same findings are given by Arbitrator in paragraph no. ‘20’ of the award. The Petitioner has relied upon Condition 7 of GCC IAFW-2249 and this ‘condition’ is not placed on record. He stated that the Petitioner’s reliance on Clause 29 of the Special Conditions is inapplicable to the issue at hand. The clause is regarding handing over of the ‘entire site on award of work’. The present case is descoping the work awarded to the Respondent.

5.11. He stated that the Petitioner’s argument that since no agreement with the scrap dealer was placed on record and hence, the claim deserves rejection is unmerited. The Arbitrator has considered all the facts and evidence before allowing the claim.

5.12. He stated that the Petitioner’s reliance on ‘price variation’, ‘labour escalation’, ‘credit schedule’ in its written note dated 31.07.2025 is beyond pleadings, unsubstantiated and meritless. He stated that the Petitioner’s reliance on the judgment in New India Assurance Co. v. Genus Power Infra Ltd. [supra] is misplaced as the said judgement is on Section 11 of the Act of 1996.

5.13. He stated that the Arbitrator has awarded Claim No. 1 after duly considering the (1) breaches of the Petitioner including but not limited to handing over of buildings for demolition, (2) ground realities at the site, (3) SHARMA 18:48 conditions of the buildings to be demolished and after duly considering the documents on record and site gave the findings. Submissions qua challenge to award of Claim No. 7

5.14. He stated that since there was delay in the handing over of the site, the Respondent could not procure the material early on, and therefore, freezing of the material price index at the original date of completion for working out the material escalation was unreasonable and has been correctly decided in its favour by the Arbitrator. He stated that the Arbitrator has correctly held that the material indices could not be frozen at the original completion date due to delays attributable solely to the Petitioner. In this regard, the Respondent has relied upon the decision of the Supreme Court in Assam State Electricity Board and Others v. Buildworth Private Limited[8] and the decision of this Court in Union of India v. K. Tech Engineers Builders Pvt. Ltd.[9] to contend that the decision of the Arbitrator is in accordance with law. Submissions qua challenge to award of Claim Nos. 2, 3, 4, and 9

5.15. He stated that the Petitioner has assailed only Claim Nos. 1 and 7 in the Section 34 petition, and any attempt to traverse beyond these claims is impermissible and contrary to settled law. He contended that any challenge to Claim Nos. 2, 3, 4, and 9 is beyond the scope of this petition. In this regard he relied upon the judgments of the Supreme Court in State of Maharashtra v. Hindustan Construction Company Ltd.10, and Fiza

(2010) 4 SCC 518 [paragraph nos. 36 and 37] SHARMA 18:48 Developers & Inter-Trade (P) Ltd. V. Amci (I) (P) Ltd.11. He stated that therefore, the Petitioner cannot be permitted to raise this challenge to Claim Nos. 2, 3, 4 and 9 by way of oral submissions or written submissions dated 31.07.2025. Findings and Analysis

6. This Court has heard the learned counsel for the parties and perused the findings recorded in the impugned award; the documents placed on record and considered the rival contentions of the parties.

7. The Supreme Court in UHL Power Co. Ltd. v. State of H.P.12, while holding that that jurisdiction conferred on Courts under Section 34 of the Act of 1996 is fairly narrow, opined as under: - “16. As it is, the jurisdiction conferred on courts under Section 34 of the Arbitration Act is fairly narrow, when it comes to the scope of an appeal under Section 37 of the Arbitration Act, the jurisdiction of an appellate court in examining an order, setting aside or refusing to set aside an award, is all the more circumscribed. In MMTC Ltd. v. Vedanta Ltd. [MMTC Ltd. v. Vedanta Ltd., (2019) 4 SCC 163], the reasons for vesting such a limited jurisdiction on the High Court in exercise of powers under Section 34 of the Arbitration Act have been explained in the following words: (SCC pp. 166-67, para 11) “11. As far as Section 34 is concerned, the position is well-settled by now that the Court does not sit in appeal over the arbitral award and may interfere on merits on the limited ground provided under Section 34(2)(b)(ii) i.e. if the award is against the public policy of India. As per the legal position clarified through decisions of this Court prior to the amendments to the 1996 Act in 2015, a violation of

SHARMA 18:48 Indian public policy, in turn, includes a violation of the fundamental policy of Indian law, a violation of the interest of India, conflict with justice or morality, and the existence of patent illegality in the arbitral award. Additionally, the concept of the “fundamental policy of Indian law” would cover compliance with statutes and judicial precedents, adopting a judicial approach, compliance with the principles of natural justice, and Wednesbury [Associated Provincial Picture Houses Ltd. v. Wednesbury Corpn., (1948) 1 KB 223 (CA)] reasonableness. Furthermore, “patent illegality” itself has been held to mean contravention of the substantive law of India, contravention of the 1996 Act, and contravention of the terms of the contract.” [Emphasis Supplied]

8. Keeping in view the aforesaid scope of limited jurisdiction, this Court will not proceed to decide whether the Petitioner has made a case for interference by this Court in the impugned award passed by the Arbitrator.

I. Challenge qua Award of Claim No. 1

9. The Arbitrator has awarded a sum of Rs. 41,74,400/- in this claim towards loss of profit in favour of the claimant/Respondent herein. The relevant paragraph no. 20 and 21.1.10 of the impugned award reads as under:

SHARMA 18:48 by Users is a mystery. UOI has therefore faulted and committed breach of contract leading to several consequences resulting in disadvantage and loss to other party. There has been further changes made after construction which has resulted in extra expenses to the claimant which have not been regularized through Deviations. UOI contention that deviation can be applied on Schedule of Demolition cannot come to rescue when ultimately amendment to the contract was the only remedy left with UOI. I agree with Claimant to the extent that in such unending period of non-handing over buildings for demolition there was no other option left with them but to sign the amendment to bring the contract to end, thus element of coercion cannot be ruled out. I shall adjudicate the claims accordingly. … 21.1.10 I have heard both parties and examined carefully the documents on record. I find that there has been certain amount of profit from the demolished material which has possibility of inclusion in the quotation. I also find that UOI has failed to hand over all buildings stated to be demolished as per contract. I also find that due to inability of UOI to get the buildings vacated from users has led to deletion of some buildings and regularization through amendment to contract on 05 Dec 2013 so as to enable giving completion on 06 Dec 2013. This itself indicates that there was no alternative with claimant for getting the work completion certificate without signing the said amendment. Thus I consider that the amendment is under coercion and bad in law. I also consider that there can be variation in quantity but not buildings. Accordingly, the claim of claimant is sustained. However the rates claimed for wood can be considered at Rs 30,000/- per cum being old & used wood. The rates for bricks are considered reasonable at Rs 2.00 per brick i.e. Rs 10,000/- per cum. Claimant stated during hearing that their claim is for these two items primarily which are highly profitable. Further I find that other part of claim is regarding demolition cannot be sustained as this do not justify any loss. Accordingly the following is sustained: (a) Wood 124 Cum @ Rs 27000/- (Rs 30,000 – 3000/-) 33,48,000/- (b) Brick 1033 Cum @ Rs 800/- (Rs 1000 – 200) 8,26,400/- Rs 41,74,400/- I award Rs 41,74,400/- in this Claim.” SHARMA 18:48 (a) Amendment dated 05.12.2013 executed under coercion or not?

10. The subject matter of Claim No. 1 is the loss of profit to Respondent due to descoping of the work pertaining to demolition of thirteen [13] buildings vide amendment dated 05.12.2013.

11. The Respondent claimed that upon demolition of the thirteen [13] buildings, it would have been entitled to sell the scrap recovered from the said demolition in the market, which would have earned the Respondent substantial monies. As per Appendix A [filed along with the SOC], the Respondent raised a claim of Rs. 61.50 lakhs under this head. In the said Appendix, the Respondent provided the quantity of the five [5] items, which it reasonably expected to recover from the demolished material and sell in the market to earn profit. The quantities were worked out by the Respondent on the basis of the plinth area details of the thirteen [13] buildings and calculation of quantities filed as part of the said Appendix A.

12. The Petitioner in its SOD disputed the calculations pertaining to both, the quantities and the rates forming the basis of this claim, which were provided in the said Appendix A. The Petitioner disputed the entitlement of the Respondent to maintain this claim after executing the amendment dated 05.12.2013. The Petitioner further contended that upon demolition of all 110 buildings, the Petitioner would have been entitled to an enhanced credit of Rs. 41,17,252/-. However, the Petitioner has not recovered the full amount of credit from the Respondent and, therefore, there was no loss to the Respondent due to the descoping of the demolition work of the thirteen [13] buildings.

SHARMA 18:48

13. In the facts of this case, the parties had elected not to lead any oral evidence and relied upon the pleadings as well as the documentary evidence in support of their respective claims before the Arbitrator.

14. The finding returned by the Arbitrator that the amendment dated 05.12.2013 was executed by the Respondent under coercion is based on the admitted circumstance that the certification of the completion of the project was held up due to the thirteen [13] buildings, and the completion certificate was only issued to the Respondent/claimant on 06.12.2013 after the descoping of the thirteen [13] buildings happened on 05.12.2013.

15. The Respondent in its written submissions13 has contended that all works under the Contract were completed in January, 2012 and the only remaining work was the demolition of the thirteen [13] buildings, which could not have been executed due to the inability of the Petitioner to get the said buildings evicted from its occupants. It is stated that this led to nonissuance of the completion certificate for the work, which already stood completed in January, 2012 and consequently led to holding up of its final bill, securities, bank guarantees, etc. It is stated that the final bill was released only in the year 2018 during the arbitration proceedings. All the afore-noted facts vis-à-vis holding up of the completion certificate and the consequent formalities in 2012-2013, are not disputed by the Petitioner.

16. The Respondent had placed on record in support of this claim with the SOC, correspondences exchanged between the parties, wherein the period of contract was extended from time to time to await handing over of the Written submission dated 02.09.2025 SHARMA 18:48 thirteen [13] buildings to the Respondent, for demolition. The Petitioner ought to have descoped these thirteen [13] buildings at the earliest point of time, when the remaining part of the contract stood concluded; but having elected to keep the contract subsisting from January, 2012 to December, 2013 [i.e., for 24 months] for this purpose, it would have certainly led to the Respondent incurring idling. In these circumstances, the Respondent would not have ordinarily been readily agreeable to descope the thirteen [13] buildings in December, 2013 without getting compensation and the Petitioner’s act of withholding/non-issuance of completion certificate for the work already completed in 2012, would have certainly been a coercive fact leading the Respondent to execute the amendment agreement dated 05.12.2013 so as to facilitate release of its security deposit, pending payments, completion certificate for work done etc. The contemporaneous timing of the amendment dated 05.12.2013 and the issuance of completion certificate dated 06.12.2013 lends credence to the contention of the Respondent.

17. In the considered opinion of this Court, in these facts the submission of the Respondent that it was compelled to execute the amendment dated 05.12.2013 so as to secure the completion certificate for the work already executed, which was accepted by the Arbitrator, appears to be reasonable conclusion to draw. The fact that the Arbitrator herein is a Chief Engineer (QS&C) with the Petitioner’s organisation and, therefore, familiar with its working ascribes to him personal knowledge of the circumstances as they exist on ground and would have weighed in the mind of the Arbitrator while returning the finding of coercion in favour of the Respondent.

SHARMA 18:48

18. Therefore, this Court finds no ground to interfere in the finding of the Arbitrator vis-à-vis the amendment dated 05.12.2013 was executed by the Respondent under coercion. (b) Scope of Clause 7(c) of the GCC

19. The Petitioner next contended that the amendment agreement dated 05.12.2013 led to a variation in the quantity of work, which fell within the permissible limits as stipulated in Clause 7(c) of the GCC. The relevant Clause 7(c) of the GCC along with its Note reads as under: -

7. Deviations (Applicable specifically to Measurement and Lump Sum Contracts and generally to Term Contracts -

(c) The Deviations ordered on items of any individual trade included in the Contract shall not exceed plus/minus 25% of the value of that trade in the Contract as a whole or half the Deviation Limit, whichever is less except in the case of Prime Cost and Provisional Items where the parties to the contract may agree to at different percentage for any particular trade item. … Note: Individual trade means. the trade sections into which a Bill of Quantities or Schedule ‘A’ has been divided or, in the absence of any such division, the individual sections of M.E.S. Standard Schedule of Rates such as Excavation and Earthwork, Concrete, Wood Work and Joinery, etc.

20. The Arbitrator has held that the said clause permits variation in quantity but not in number of buildings. On a bare perusal, the said clause refers to deviations in ‘individual trade’ and the said expression has been further clarified in the Note appended thereto. The interpretation given by the Arbitrator to Clause 7(c) of GCC in the award to hold that variation does not contemplate descoping SHARMA 18:48 of buildings appears to be reasonable especially when read with the Note, which clarifies the expression ‘individual trade’ and would not merit interference by this Court in exercise of its jurisdiction under Section 34 on the principles laid down by the Supreme Court in McDermott International Inc. v. Burn Standard Co. Ltd.14 and Associate Builders v. Delhi Development Authority15. The relevant paragraphs of McDermott International Inc. v. Burn Standard Co. Ltd. are reproduced hereinunder: - “112. It is trite that the terms of the contract can be express or implied. The conduct of the parties would also be a relevant factor in the matter of construction of a contract. The construction of the contract agreement is within the jurisdiction of the arbitrators having regard to the wide nature, scope and ambit of the arbitration agreement and they cannot be said to have misdirected themselves in passing the award by taking into consideration the conduct of the parties. It is also trite that correspondences exchanged by the parties are required to be taken into consideration for the purpose of construction of a contract. Interpretation of a contract is a matter for the arbitrator to determine, even if it gives rise to determination of a question of law. (See Pure Helium India (P) Ltd. v. ONGC [(2003) 8 SCC 593] and D.D. Sharma v. Union of India [(2004) 5 SCC 325].)

113. Once, thus, it is held that the arbitrator had the jurisdiction, no further question shall be raised and the court will not exercise its jurisdiction unless it is found that there exists any bar on the face of the award.” The relevant paragraphs of Associate Builders v. Delhi Development Authority [supra] are as under: - (2006) 11 SCC 181 [Paragraph No. 112 and 113]

SHARMA 18:48 “42.3. (c) Equally, the third subhead of patent illegality is really a contravention of Section 28(3) of the Arbitration Act, which reads as under: “28.Rules applicable to substance of dispute.—(1)-(2)*** (3) In all cases, the Arbitral Tribunal shall decide in accordance with the terms of the contract and shall take into account the usages of the trade applicable to the transaction.” This last contravention must be understood with a caveat. An Arbitral Tribunal must decide in accordance with the terms of the contract, but if an arbitrator construes a term of the contract in a reasonable manner, it will not mean that the award can be set aside on this ground. Construction of the terms of a contract is primarily for an arbitrator to decide unless the arbitrator construes the contract in such a way that it could be said to be something that no fair-minded or reasonable person could do.”

21. This Court therefore finds no ground to interfere in the Arbitrator’s interpretation of Clause 7(c) of the GCC.

(c) Quantities and Rates

22. This leads the Court to the last submission of the Petitioner on this claim as to whether the Respondent is entitled to the awarded claim of loss of profit for a sum of Rs. 41,74,400/-, which it could have earned from the sale of the scrap of wood and brick recovered from the demolition of the thirteen [13] buildings.

23. The Petitioner contended that the quantities and the rates awarded by the Arbitrator have not been proved by the Respondent by leading evidence. It is contended that no agreement with the alleged scrap dealer has been placed on record to prove the rates of the scrap materials. It is stated that the rates as provided in Section XV to Schedule A of the Contract were the SHARMA 18:48 highest rates and quantities, which could have been adopted by the Arbitrator for determining the value of the scrap of wood and brick.

24. The Respondent contended that the Arbitrator had conducted a site inspection of the thirteen [13] buildings, which were descoped from the Contract. It is stated that the Arbitrator is a Chief Engineer (QS&C), i.e., the highest rank in MES and has a sound understanding of the engineering aspects. The Respondent relied upon the Appendix A filed by it with the SOC in support of this claim, which gives the working of the quantities of the thirteen [13] buildings. With respect to the rates, the Respondent referred to SSR of 2010 to substantiate that the value of Rs. 27,000/- awarded by the Arbitrator for the wood is on the lower side.

25. The Supreme Court in Associate Builders v. Delhi Development Authority[supra] has held that the Arbitrator is the master of the quantity and quality of evidence; and held that an award cannot be set aside on the ground that it does not measure up to a trained legal mind. The relevant paragraph no. ‘33’ of the said judgment reads as under: “33. It must clearly be understood that when a court is applying the “public policy” test to an arbitration award, it does not act as a court of appeal and consequently errors of fact cannot be corrected. A possible view by the arbitrator on facts has necessarily to pass muster as the arbitrator is the ultimate master of the quantity and quality of evidence to be relied upon when he delivers his arbitral award. Thus an award based on little evidence or on evidence which does not measure up in quality to a trained legal mind would not be held to be invalid on this score.” SHARMA 18:48

26. The Respondent along with its SOC had filed Appendix A giving a working sheet of the quantities of scrap, which it reasonably expected to recover from the thirteen [13] buildings, and also provided the rates, which it is reasonably expected to fetch for the said scrap material. The Petitioner in its SOD elected to simply deny the aforesaid quantities though, it had the wherewithal to verify the measurements filed by the Respondent as Appendix A and file a counter submission on quantities. The Petitioner also did not file any counter market rates for the scrap. Both the Petitioner and the Respondent agreed that they would not lead any oral evidence and rely on documentary evidence. The Arbitrator in these facts decided these claims on the basis of the documents filed by the parties, rightly so, and on basis of his own expertise as a Chief Engineer (QS&C). In the facts of this case, the Arbitrator is the Chief Engineer (QS&C), who is a domain expert and is stated to have carried out an inspection of the site i.e., the thirteen [13] buildings during the course of the arbitration; a fact borne out from paragraph no. 20 of the award, extracted hereinabove. This Court finds merit in the submission of the Respondent that, the Arbitrator, who is an engineering expert would have duly satisfied itself with respect to the calculation of the quantities as provided by the Respondent with the SOC as Appendix A. The Petitioner except for making bald denials has not brought any contra evidence on record before the Arbitrator.

27. This Court finds that the Arbitrator has not accepted the entire claim of the Respondent as it is. The Arbitrator has awarded the claim for value of scrap for only 2 items out of 5 items claimed by the Respondent in its SOC.

SHARMA 18:48 Further, the Arbitrator has not accepted the market rate quoted by the Respondent and has comparatively adopted a lower rate. The Arbitrator, who is a Chief Engineer would be reasonably well versed with the value, which the scrap can obtain and also had the assistance of the reference to the SSR of 2010. For instance, the Respondent claimed a market rate of Rs. 40,000/for the wood, however, the Arbitrator has adopted a rate of Rs. 30,000/-. Similarly, the Respondent claimed a market rate of Rs. 1,300/- for brick, however, the Arbitrator has adopted a rate of Rs.1,000/-. The Respondent’s reliance on the judgment of Gemini Bay Transcription Pvt. Ltd. v. Integrated Sales Service Ltd. (supra)16 is apposite. Lastly, the Arbitrator has also given credit to the Petitioner for the value of the scrap at Rs. 3,000/- for wood and Rs. 200/- for brick as per Section XV to Schedule A of the Contract, which is the value the Petitioner would have been entitled to receive for the quantity of wooden brick if the demolition work of thirteen [13] buildings would have been permitted; and for this reason, the submission of the Petitioner that it has not received the entire credit of Rs. 41,17,252 is also without any merit. This Court, therefore, finds that the Arbitrator has not acted capriciously and has applied its mind to the claim. The dicta of the Supreme Court in Associate Builders (supra) with respect to the Arbitrator being the master of the quantity and quality of evidence brought before it aptly applies to these facts. The scheme of this Contract under Section XV to Schedule A of the Contract was that the Respondent was entitled to demolish the buildings and realise the market value of the scrap by selling the same in the market. The Paragraph Nos. 77, 78, 81 and 82 SHARMA 18:48 Petitioner had estimated the tentative value of the scrap at Rs. 32.24 lakhs (approx.), which was payable to it and the Respondent was entitled to retain the actual amount realised from the sale. The Petitioner was aware that the market value of the scrap is potentially higher than the rates mentioned in the said Section XV to Schedule A of the Contract and this was the incentive to the Respondent under the Contract. The Note Nos. 1 and 2 in Section XV to Schedule A of the Contract only indemnifies the Petitioner against any claims of shortfall by the Petitioner; however, the said Notes do not imply that the market value of the scrap cannot be higher. Therefore, the contention of the Petitioner that the Arbitrator should have awarded the value of the scrap on the basis of the rates specified in Section XV to Schedule A of the Contract is not persuasive.

28. In view of the aforesaid, this Court does not find any merit in the submission of the Petitioner and opines that the findings returned by the Arbitrator qua Claim No. 1 do not warrant any interference of this Court.

II. Challenge qua Award of Claim No. 7

29. The Arbitrator has awarded a sum of Rs. 20,06,400/- in favour of the Respondent towards material escalation. The relevant portion at paragraph no. 21.7.[6] of the award reads as under: - “21.7.[6] I have heard both parties and examined documents on record. I consider that the contract caters for freezing of indices In the present case UOI has defaulted by not handing over buildings for demolition, wherein some buildings were to be constructed and even trees were not cut and site cleared. Further UOI did not even order add back DOs before date of completion. All other delays have been brought out hereinbefore. In such circumstances there was no possibility of claimant planning to purchase material before completion of work, SHARMA 18:48 which was the basis of freezing indices. Therefore it shall not be in the interest of justice if one party is put to loss due to inaction of other party. Accordingly in this case freezing of indices cannot be upheld. Therefore, I consider that the claim is sustained. I, therefore award Rs 20,06,400/- in this claim.”

30. The Respondent along with its SOC had filed Appendix-G to show the working of its differential claim of Rs. 20,06,437/-. The said Appendix shows that the Petitioner had already paid escalation for sum of Rs.90,91,801/-as per the contractual provisions and Claim No. 7 was for the aforesaid differential amount i.e., Rs. 20,06,437/-. The calculation of the claim for Rs. 20,06,437/- is not in dispute; however, the entitlement of the Respondent to claim this amount is the dispute.

31. The Arbitrator has returned a finding of fact that there was substantial delay by the Petitioner in providing a clear site to the Respondent at the initial point of time in the contract itself, which led to extension of the time period of the Contract. As a result, the Respondent was unable to purchase the material early on. In these facts, the Arbitrator held that the object of freezing the material price index under the Contract cannot be implemented and the Respondent could not be blamed for not procuring materials early on, in the absence of a clear site. The Arbitrator opined that freezing of indices in such facts was inequitable to the Respondent, who was not responsible for the delay in completion of Contract and the Respondent should be entitled to claim material escalation.

32. The Petitioner has not disputed the fact finding of the Arbitrator at paragraph nos. 20, 21.1.10, 21.7.[6] and 21.11.[3] of the award with respect to SHARMA 18:48 substantial delay in handing over of the clear site to the Respondent for commencement of work. The reasoning of the Arbitrator that in view of this delay freezing of WPI at original completion period cannot be sustained and is inequitable to the Respondent, who is the innocent party, is a reasonable interpretation of the contractual clause.

33. At this stage it would be relevant to refer to the judgment of the Supreme Court in Assam State Electricity Board and Others v. Buildworth Private Limited (supra), wherein the Court held that the contractor therein was justified in seeking price escalation on account of an extension of time for the completion of work. The relevant paragraphs of the said judgment are as under: - “13. The arbitrator has taken the view that the provision for price escalation would not bind the claimant beyond the scheduled date of completion. This view of the arbitrator is based on a construction of the provisions of the contract, the correspondence between the parties and the conduct of the Board in allowing the completion of the contract even beyond the formal extended date of 6-9-1983 up to 31- 1-1986. Matters relating to the construction of a contract lie within the province of the Arbitral Tribunal. Moreover, in the present case, the view which has been adopted by the arbitrator is based on evidentiary material which was relevant to the decision. There is no error apparent on the face of the record which could have warranted the interference of the court within the parameters available under the Arbitration Act,

1940. The arbitrator has neither misconducted himself in the proceedings nor is the award otherwise invalid.

14. The view which has been adopted by the arbitrator is in fact in accord with the principles enunciated in the judgments of this Court. In P.M. Paulv. Union of India [P.M. Paul v. Union of India, 1989 SHARMA 18:48 Supp (1) SCC 368], a Bench of two learned Judges of this Court has held that: (SCC p. 372, para 12) “12. … Escalation is a normal incident arising out of gap of time in this inflationary age in performing any contract. The arbitrator has held that there was delay, and he has further referred to this aspect in his award. … After discussing the evidence and the submissions the arbitrator found that it was evident that there was escalation and, therefore, he came to the conclusion that it was reasonable to allow 20% of the compensation under Claim I, he has accordingly allowed the same. This was a matter which was within the jurisdiction of the arbitrator and, hence, the arbitrator had not misconducted himself in awarding the amount as he has done.” This Court held that the contractor was justified in seeking price escalation on account of an extension of time for the completion of work. Once the arbitrator was held to have the jurisdiction to determine whether there was a delay in the execution of the contract due to the respondent, the latter was liable for the consequence of the delay, namely, an increase in price.

15. A similar principle finds expression in another judgment of two learned Judges of this Court in Food Corporation of India v. A.M. Ahmed & Co.[Food Corporation of India v. A.M. Ahmed & Co., (2006) 13 SCC 779]: (SCC pp. 794-95, para 32) “32. Escalation, in our view, is normal and routine incident arising out of gap of time in this inflationary age in performing any contract of any type. In this case, the arbitrator has found that there was escalation by way of statutory wage revision and, therefore, he came to the conclusion that it was reasonable to allow escalation under the claim. Once it was found that the arbitrator had jurisdiction to find that there was delay in execution of the contract due to the conduct of FCI, the Corporation was liable for the consequences of the delay, namely, increase in statutory wages. Therefore, the arbitrator, in our opinion, had jurisdiction to go into this question. He has SHARMA 18:48 gone into that question and has awarded as he did. The arbitrator by awarding wage revision has not misconducted himself. The award was, therefore, made rule of the High Court, rightly so in our opinion.”

16. In K.N. Sathyapalan v. State of Kerala [K.N. Sathyapalan v. State of Kerala, (2007) 13 SCC 43], this Court has held that: (SCC pp. 51-52, para 32) “32. Ordinarily, the parties would be bound by the terms agreed upon in the contract, but in the event one of the parties to the contract is unable to fulfil its obligations under the contract which has a direct bearing on the work to be executed by the other party, the arbitrator is vested with the authority to compensate the second party for the extra costs incurred by him as a result of the failure of the first party to live up to its obligations. That is the distinguishing feature of cases of this nature and Alopi Parshad case [Alopi Parshad & Sons Ltd. v. Union of India, (1960) 2 SCR 793: AIR 1960 SC 588] and also Patel Engg. case [State of U.P. v. Patel Engg. Co. Ltd., (2004) 10 SCC 566]. As was pointed out by Mr Dave, the said principle was recognised by this Court in P.M. Paul [P.M. Paul v. Union of India, 1989 Supp (1) SCC 368] where a reference was made to a retired Judge of this Court to fix responsibility for the delay in construction of the building and the repercussions of such delay. Based on the findings of the learned Judge, this Court gave its approval to the excess amount awarded by the arbitrator on account of increase in price of materials and costs of labour and transport during the extended period of the contract, even in the absence of any escalation clause. The said principle was reiterated by this Court in T.P. George case [T.P. George v. State of Kerala, (2001) 2 SCC 758].”

17. The award comports with principles of law governing price escalation firmly established by the decisions of this Court. For these SHARMA 18:48 reasons, we find merit in the contention of the learned counsel appearing on behalf of the claimant that the award does not suffer from any error apparent on the face of the record insofar as the aspect of price escalation is concerned.”

34. In light of the finding on delay against the Petitioner, which led to the extension of time of the Contract and the due completion of the Contract by the Respondent within the extended period of time, this Court finds that the Arbitrator’s approach that the WPI ought not to be frozen for the extended period is reasonable and does not merit any interference by this Court.

III. Challenge qua award of Claim Nos. 2, 3, 4, and 9 by way of written submissions dated 31.07.2025

35. The Petitioner in its oral submissions and by way of its written submissions dated 31.07.2025 has challenged award of Claim Nos. 2, 3, 4 and 9.

36. The Respondent has raised a preliminary objection to the aforesaid submission of the Petitioner qua Claim Nos. 2, 3, 4 and 9. Learned counsel for the Respondent stated that the Petitioner has challenged Claim Nos. 2, 3, 4 and 9 for the first time in its oral arguments and written submissions dated 31.07.2025. However, there are no pleadings/grounds assailing these claims as per Section 34(2)(a) of the Act of 1996 in the Section 34 petition. He contended that any challenge to these Claims is beyond the scope of this petition. In this regard, he relied upon the judgments of the Supreme Court in State of Maharashtra v. Hindustan Construction Company Ltd.17, (2010) 4 SCC 518 [paragraph nos. 36 and 37] SHARMA 18:48 and Fiza Developers & Inter-Trade (P) Ltd. V. Amci (I) (P) Ltd.18. He stated that therefore, the Petitioner cannot be permitted to raise this challenge to Claim Nos. 2, 3, 4 and 9 by way of oral submissions or written submissions dated 31.07.2025.

37. In response, learned counsel for the Petitioner stated that though there are no specific grounds raising a challenge to the award of Claim Nos. 2, 3, 4 and 9 in the Section 34 petition, however he relied upon Ground ‘A’ of the petition to contend that the said ground is enough to encompass a challenge to the said claims. The said Ground ‘A’ reads as under:

“A. BECAUSE the Impugned Arbitral Award is against the Public Policy of India and is liable to be set aside as per the mandate of Section 34 of the Act.”

38. It is a matter of record that in the Section 34 petition, the Petitioner has not challenged the findings of the Arbitrator qua Claim Nos. 2, 3, 4, and 9 in this petition. In the petition there are specific grounds challenging Claim No. 1 [on basis of Grounds ‘C’ to ‘I’] and Claim No. 7 [on basis of Ground ‘J’]. There are no specific grounds or pleadings setting out a challenge to award of Claim Nos. 2, 3, 4, and 9 in this petition. No facts necessary to make out the ingredients of any of the grounds mentioned in sub-section 2(a) of Section 34 of the Act of 1996 for maintaining the challenge to these claims have been set out in the petition, and therefore, the Petitioner has failed to discharge its onus of proof as required under Section 34(2)(a) of the Act of 1996.

SHARMA 18:48

39. At this stage it would be apposite to refer the judgment of the Supreme Court in Fiza Developers & Inter-Trade (P) Ltd. (supra), wherein the Court held as under: - “22. The scope of enquiry in a proceeding under Section 34 is restricted to consideration whether any one of the grounds mentioned in sub-section (2) of Section 34 exists for setting aside the award. We may approvingly extract the analysis relating to “grounds of challenge” from The Law & Practice of Arbitration and Conciliation by Shri O.P. Malhotra [1st Edn., p. 768, Para (I) 34-14]: “Section 5 regulates court intervention in arbitral process. It provides that notwithstanding anything contained in any other law for the time being in force in India, in matters governed by Part I of this Act, the court will not intervene except where so provided in this Part. Pursuant to this policy, Section 34 imposes certain restrictions on the right of the court to set aside an arbitral award. It provides, in all, seven grounds for setting aside an award. In other words, an arbitral award can be set aside only if one or more of these seven grounds exists. The first five grounds have been set forth in Section 34(2)(a). In order to successfully invoke any of these grounds, a party has to plead and prove the existence of one or more of such grounds. That is to say, the party challenging the award has to discharge the burden of proof by adducing sufficient credible evidence to show the existence of any one of such grounds. The rest two grounds are contained in Section 34(2)(b) which provides that an award may be set aside by the court on its own initiative if the subjectmatter of the dispute is not arbitrable or the impugned award is in conflict with the public policy of India.” The grounds for setting aside the award are specific. Therefore, necessarily a petitioner who files an application will have to plead the facts necessary to make out the ingredients of any of the grounds mentioned in sub-section (2) and prove the same. Therefore, the only SHARMA 18:48 question that arises in an application under Section 34 of the Act is whether the award requires to be set aside on any of the specified grounds in sub-section (2) thereof. Sub-section (2) also clearly places the burden of proof on the person who makes the application. Therefore, the question arising for adjudication as also the person on whom the burden of proof is placed is statutorily specified. Therefore, the need for issues is obviated.”

40. Similarly, it would be relevant to refer to the judgment of the Supreme Court in Hindustan Construction Co. Ltd. (supra), wherein the Court held that new grounds containing new materials/facts could not have been introduced for the first time in the memorandum of appeal, when admittedly these grounds were not originally raised in the arbitration petition filed under Section 34 for setting aside the award. The said observations were made by the Supreme Court while considering an order of the High Court declining amendment to the memorandum of arbitration appeal on the ground that the amendments sought to raise grounds which were not raised in the Section 34 petition. The relevant paragraph nos. 36 and 37 of the judgment reads as under: – “36. As noticed above, in the application for setting aside the award, the appellant set up only five grounds viz. waiver, acquiescence, delay, laches and res judicata. The grounds sought to be added in the memorandum of arbitration appeal by way of amendment are absolutely new grounds for which there is no foundation in the application for setting aside the award. Obviously, such new grounds containing new material/facts could not have been introduced for the first time in an appeal when admittedly these grounds were not originally raised in the arbitration petition for setting aside the award. Moreover, no prayer was made by the appellant for amendment in the SHARMA 18:48 petition under Section 34 before the court concerned or at the appellate stage.

37. As a matter of fact, the learned Single Judge in para 6 of the impugned order has observed that the grounds of appeal which are now sought to be advanced were not originally raised in the arbitration petition and that the amendment that is sought to be effected is not even to the grounds contained in the application under Section 34 but to the memo of appeal. In the circumstances, it cannot be said that discretion exercised by the learned Single Judge in refusing to grant leave to the appellant to amend the memorandum of arbitration appeal suffers from any illegality.”

41. The observations of the Supreme Court in the aforesaid judgments leave no manner of doubt that a party challenging the award has to plead and prove the existence of facts and documents on which it challenges the award to show the existence of any one of the grounds enlisted in Section 34(2)(a) of the Act of 1996. The Petitioner during its oral arguments and in its written submissions dated 31.07.2025 has referred to the documents for challenging award of Claim Nos. 2, 3, 4 and 9 which pleas and grounds find no mention in Section 34 petition. In contrast, the Petitioner raised specific grounds for pleading its challenge to award of Claim Nos. 1 and 7. In the absence of specific grounds challenging award of Claim Nos. 2, 3, 4 and 9 in Section 34 petition, the Petitioner cannot raise a challenge to the said claims by way of oral arguments and written submissions. The Petitioner is thus estopped from challenging award of Claim Nos. 2, 3, 4, and 9 by way of oral SHARMA 18:48 arguments as well as written submissions dated 31.07.2025 and is deemed to have accepted the part of the award pertaining to the said claims.

42. Notwithstanding the aforesaid finding, this Court on the basis of the written submissions dated 31.07.2025 is examining the challenge raised by the Petitioner to Claim Nos. 2, 3, 4 and 9.

43. Claim No. 2 pertains to 20% labour escalation for high rise buildings amounting to Rs. 38,60,479/-. The Arbitrator at paragraph 21.2.[8] of the award after taking into consideration the Central Government Gazette Notification dated 20.05.2009 [‘Notification dated 20.05.2009’] held that 20% higher labour charges were in fact payable for high rise buildings executed under the contract. The Arbitrator held that since the Notification dated 20.05.2009was issued after the date of the receipt of the tender on 24.12.2008, the 20% higher charge for high rise buildings was not factored in the bid by the claimant and is liable to be allowed. The Petitioner does not dispute the issuance of the Notification dated 20.05.2009 obliging the Respondent to pay 20% higher labour charges for high rise buildings or the fact that indeed 20% higher labour charges were consequentially paid by the Respondent.

44. The Petitioner in its written submissions dated 31.07.2025 has submitted that this is contrary to the formula stipulated in Special Condition Nos. 31, 31.[1] and 31.[2] of the Contract and has urged that the Respondent should have factored the 20% higher labour charges for high rise buildings in its bid. The last submission of the Petitioner fails to persuade this Court considering that the Central Government notification dated 20.05.2009 obliging the Respondent to pay 20% higher labour charges for high rise SHARMA 18:48 buildings came into existence post the submission of the Petitioner’s bid and it stands to reason as to why the Respondent did not provide for such higher labour charges in its tender bid dated 24.12.2008. The compliance with the Notification dated 20.05.2009 was a legal obligation of the Respondent and this claim deals with actual reimbursement and therefore this Court finds no ground to interfere in the award of this claim by the Arbitrator.

45. Claim No. 3 pertains to award of costs of Rs. 1,44,000/- for construction of a Toilet Block with OR’s Institute. The Arbitrator has recorded its findings at paragraph no. 21.3.[9] of the award. It has recorded that there is no objection on record for the costs of Rs. 1,44,000/- worked out by the claimant and has concluded that though Toilet Block was depicted in the drawings, it found no mention in Section I to Schedule A of the Contract and opined that this is a separate item which should have been specifically enlisted in the said Schedule and in the absence thereof, the claimant was entitled to raise this amount.

46. In its written submissions, the Petitioner contended that the Toilet Block was specifically shown in the drawings annexed with the tender document, though not mentioned specifically in Section I to Schedule A of the Contract and was therefore within the scope of work. The Petitioner thus contended that no amount was due and payable.

47. The Arbitrator after perusing the tender document has concluded that the terms of the tender failed to specifically enlist the construction of the Toilet Block in Section I to Schedule A and found in favour of the Respondent/claimant. This Court has perused Section I to Schedule A of the Contract and finds that construction of ORs as enlisted at Serial Nos. 4, 5 SHARMA 18:48 and 14 therein, while barrack block numbers are specifically mentioned, there is no reference to Toilet Block. The interpretation to the scope of the Tender given by the Arbitrator holding that the non-mention of the Toilet Block in Section I to Schedule A of the Contract gives right to a legitimate understanding of the contractor that the Toilet Block was not included in the scope of the contractor, falls within the jurisdiction of the Arbitrator. The Arbitration himself is a Chief Engineer (QS&C) and his understanding of the necessity of mentioning the Toilet Block in Section I to Schedule A of the Contract, in the considered opinion of this Court does not require any interference as the interpretation of the scope of the tender falls within his jurisdiction and his interpretation is a plausible one.

48. Claim No. 4 pertains to award of costs of Rs. 13,200/- for construction of four [4] Alarm Posts near Guard House. The Arbitrator has recorded its findings at paragraph no. 21.4.12 of the award. The Arbitrator has relied upon the reasoning recorded for awarding Claim No. 3 and held that similarly the construction of the Alarm Posts, which is an independent structure should have been specifically enlisted in the description of Section I to Schedule A of the Contract since it is a lumpsum contract and on this basis allowed the claim. The Petitioner has contended in its written submission that the Alarm Posts were duly reflected in the drawings for construction of the Guard House and was therefore within the scope. The Petitioner does not dispute that it was not specifically enlisted in the description of this item at Section I to Schedule A of the Contract. As observed, for Claim No. 3, the interpretation of the scope of the Tender on the basis of items listed in Section I to Schedule A of the Contract falls SHARMA 18:48 within the jurisdiction of the Arbitrator and his interpretation is a plausible one, which does not require any interference.

49. Claim No. 9 pertains to payment of final bill together with interest for delayed payment as well as expenditure incurred in extending the bank guarantee for retention money. The Arbitrator has awarded a sum of Rs. 12,77,560/- towards this claim and the findings are recorded at paragraph no. 29.9.12 of the award. There are no grounds of challenge set out in the written submissions dated 31.07.2025 to this claim and therefore this Court is unable to appreciate the stand of the petitioner.

50. Accordingly, this Court finds no merit in the submissions of the Petitioner qua its challenge to Claim Nos. 2, 3, 4 and 9. Conclusion

51. In the facts of the present case, this Court is of the view that the findings returned by the Arbitrator vis-à-vis Claim Nos. 1, 2, 3, 4, 7 and 9 are in consonance with the terms of the Contract executed between the parties and in view of the discussion hereinabove, this Court finds no reason to interfere with the Arbitral Award dated 12.04.2019 passed by the Arbitrator for the said claims.

52. The present petition along with pending applications, if any, stands disposed of. Interim order dated 11.02.2021 stands vacated. Directions for release of funds

53. This Court vide order dated 12.09.2024 recorded the submission of the Petitioner that an amount of Rs. 1,63,67,319/- was transmitted to the account of the Registrar General on 10.03.2021. The registry was directed to verify the submission and thereafter as per the office noting dated SHARMA 18:48 25.11.2024, it was recorded that the said amount has been kept in a fixed deposit by the registry.

54. The registry is directed to release the entire amount along with accrued interest to the Respondent through NEFT/RTGS after verifying the particulars within two (2) weeks.

MANMEET PRITAM SINGH ARORA (JUDGE) JANUARY 14, 2026/msh/hp/MG SHARMA 18:48