Electropneumatics And Hydraulics India Pvt. Ltd. v. Appasaheb M. Todmal

15) Similarly, the relevant clause in Settlement dated 7 September 2013 reads thus: “1.1. It is agreed by and between the parties that this settlement shall apply to those permanent daily rated workmen who are on the muster rolls of the Company in its plant at Gat No. 254/255, Kharabe Wadi, Taluka Rajguru Nagar, Chakan Talegaon Road, Chakan – 410501 as on 01 September 2013 and who accept said settlement by signing letter of acceptance/undertaking referred to threin (Annexure – I) before 15 September 2013. Those who sign the letter of acceptance thereafter, will not be entitled for any Adhoc Payment, but will be entitled for the benefits of the settlement only with effect from the date of signing the letter of acceptance.

16) Thus, Clause 1.[1] in both the Settlements required the permanent daily rated workmen on the muster rolls of the Company to sign the Letter of Acceptance/Undertaking as per Annexure – I before 10 July 2010 / 15 September 2013. The format of Letter of Acceptance/Undertaking in Annexure – I for both the Settlements is as under: “To: The Head — HR & IR, Electropneumatics And Hydraulics (India) Pvt. Ltd., Gat No. 254/255, Kharabe Wadi, Chakan — Talegaon Road, Taluka: Rajgurunagar, Chakan, 410 501, District: Pune. Sub: Acceptance to the Settlement / Undertaking I -------------------- the undersigned, Employee No.--------------, a permanent workman of M/s. Electropneumatics And Hydraulics (India) Pvt. Ltd., Chakan, Pune410501, hereby submitting this declaration / undertaking on my own with free will that I am aware of the terms and conditions of the wages settlement dated 30/06/2010 between my representative Union, Electropneumatics Hydraulics Workers Union, Registration No.: PN 3663 and the Management of the Company M/s. Electropneumatics And Hydraulics (India) Pvt. Ltd., Chakan, Pune. I have read all the terms and conditions of the said wages settlement / all the terms,and conditions are read and explained to me in the language understood by me. The terms and conditions of the settlement including the revised and agreed set production norms and the settlement are agreed and accepted by me. I further declare that I will abide by the same in total during the tenure of this settlement. I also declare that I will not raise any issue / demand resulting in direct or indirect financial burden to the company, during the tenure of this settlement. Any deviation from my side in observing the terms and conditions of this settlement will disqualify me to receive the benefits extended to me by this settlement. In view of my accepting all the terms and conditions of this settlement, I hereby declare and agree that this settlement shall be in full arid final settlement of all the claims / demand and disputes, whatsoever, between me and the Company, whether in Court or otherwise. I have affixed my signature as hereuncler in token of my acceptance if this settlement. Signature/Thumb Impression of the Workman Name: Employee No: Date:

17) It is thus relying on Clause 1.[1] of the Settlement that the Petitioner has refused to grant wage rise to such workmen who failed to sign Letter of Acceptance/Undertaking on or before 10 July 2010 or 15 September 2013. Section 18 of the ID Act deals with the persons on whom settlement and awards are binding and reads thus:

18) Thus, as per Section 18 of the ID Act, when a Settlement is arrived by agreement between employer and the workmen otherwise than in course of conciliation proceedings becomes binding on all parties to the Settlement. However, in its application to the State of Maharashtra, following Proviso has been added to sub-section 1 of Section 18 of the ID Act and it reads thus: “Provided that, where there is a recognized union for any undertaking under any law for the time being in force, then such agreement (not being an agreement in respect of dismissal, discharge, removal, retrenchment, termination of service, or suspension of an employee) shall be arrived at between the employer, and the recognized union only; and such agreement shall be binding on all persons referred to in clause

(c) and clause (d) of sub-section (3) of this section.”

19) Thus in respect of the State of Maharashtra in every establishment where there is recognized union, the Agreement for Settlement must be arrived at between the employer and recognized Union only and such Agreement becomes binding on all persons referred to in clauses (c) and (d) of sub-section 3 of Section 18. The Agreement thus becomes binding on all workmen in an establishment.

20) Thus, there is no dispute and Mr. Cama has rightly not disputed the position that the settlement dated 30 June 2010 and 7 September 2013 applies to all the workmen in the establishment of Petitioner. Once the settlement becomes applicable to all workmen, the issue is whether the employer can defeat application of Settlement to any workman on the ground of refusal on the part of workman to sign the prescribed Letter of Acceptance/Undertaking.

21) Mr. Rao has relied upon judgment of Single Judge of this Court (R.J. Kochar, J.) in Bennett Coleman & Company Ltd. (supra) wherein this Court has held as in para-13 as under: “13. No recognized union can say that a workman will be allowed the benefits of the settlement only if he signs a declaration or that he is or becomes the member of such union as the law extends all the benefits to all the employees covered by such settlement between the employer and the recognized union. In these circumstances the Industrial Court was right in holding that the insistence of the union on the respondents J to 10 to sign a declaration was not legal and proper. It is, therefore, not necessary and not required under the law for either the employee or workman covered by the settlement between the employer and the recognized union to give or for the employer and the union to insist or seek any declaration that he was bound by such settlement before he is extended or given the benefits of the settlement. He is not only entitled to get all the benefits of the settlement but he is also bound by the obligations and responsibilities prescribed thereunder. If under the settlement he is required to pay any amount by way of levy or donation mentioned before he is given the advantage of such settlement he will have to comply with the same without demur as laid down by the Supreme Court in the case of Balmer Lawrie (supra). No separate undertaking or declaration from the workmen is required. The recognized union cannot and should not, however, compel any workmen to become its member as a condition to get the benefits of the settlement as such a condition would defeat the provisions of the settlement to be binding on all the workmen as a matter of law under section 18 of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947. Nor the recognized union can insist upon the employer to get a declaration, like in the present case, from the workmen that they are bound by the settlement to be eligible to get the benefits under the settlement. There can be no other condition, direct or indirect, except a condition of payment of reasonable amount of donation or levy payable to the recognized union, for the workmen to get the benefits of the settlement. The employer is per se bound to extend such settlement to all the workmen covered by the settlement unconditionally as per the law. Even if such conditions to the effect of depriving or threatening to deny the benefits of the settlement to the workmen unless they fulfill such conditions like the declarations by them are mentioned in the settlement they are to be treated as directory or optional and are to be ignored as otherwise it would violate section 18 of the Act. If the employer extends the benefits of such settlement without getting the declarations as prescribed in the settlement in the present case, he will not be guilty of the unfair labour practice under Item 9 of Schedule IV of the MRTU and PULP Acct. If he does so he would be violating the mandate of section 18 of the Industrial Disputes Act. To summarize the legal position: (a) A settlement between the employer and a recognized union is binding on all the workmen whether members or not of the union; and the employer and the union, both are bound by the settlement and are bound to give all the benefits of such settlement to all the workmen unconditionally; (b) The recognized union cannot put any preconditions on the workmen to become eligible to get the benefits of the settlement. viz. membership of the union or giving of a declaration directly or indirectly making it obligatory for workmen to become its members under compulsion to get the benefits of the settlement as has exactly happened in the present case.

(c) Such a settlement may provide for condition of payment of union’s levy or donation on some reasonable basis as laid down in the case of Balmer Lawrie (supra) and it is certainly obligatory for the workmen to pay such levy or donation to the recognized union to get the benefits or advantage of such settlement. A quid-pro-quo principle to be accepted by the workmen to get the fruits of the struggle of the Union.

(d) If the workmen do not give such declaration though demanded by the employer under the settlement neither the workmen nor the employer can be accused of violating the settlement. The employer cannot be held guilty of unfair labour practice under Item 9 of Schedule IV of the MRTU and PULP Act at the instance of the recognized union if the employer applies such settlement to such workmen who do not give the prescribed declarations as has been done in the present case.”

22) However, Mr. Cama has placed reliance on judgment of the Apex Court in ANZ Grindlays Bank (supra), which is delivered at a latter point of time. The issue before the Apex Court was about validity of Order of reference. In that case, the Appellant Bank had executed Settlement with the Association. The Settlement contained a stipulation that the benefits thereof would also be applicable to workmen who were not members of the association, subject to the condition of they signing a receipt in enclosed format. The Apex Court held that the Bank was entitled to require signing of a receipt to protect its interests. The Apex Court held in para 5, 9 and 11 of the judgment as under: “5. At the instance of All India Grindlays Bank Employees Federation (second respondent) the Central Government, by order dated 29.12.1997, made a reference under Section 10(1) of the Act for adjudication by the Industrial Tribunal. After issuance of a corrigendum on 17.12.1998, the reference reads as under: - "Whether the terms of bipartite settlement dated 18.8.1996, between the management of ANZ Grindlays Bank Limited, and All Indian Grindlays Bank Employees Association which bound withholding of benefits of settlement to workmen who are not members of All India Grindlays Bank Employees Association until the individual gives acceptance of the settlement in the given format is legal and justified? If not, to what relief are the workmen entitled to?" Feeling aggrieved by the aforesaid reference made by the Central Government the ANZ Grindlays Bank filed a writ petition under Article 226 of the Constitution before the Bombay High Court for quashing and setting aside the same. The writ petition was dismissed by a learned single Judge and the appeal preferred against the said decision before the Division Bench also failed. The present appeal has been filed by the Bank challenging the aforesaid orders.

9. Mr. S.N. Bhat, learned counsel for the Federation (second respondent), has submitted that under the settlement such employees of the bank, who were not members of the Association (third respondent), were required to give a receipt in writing in order to avail of the benefits of the settlement and this was clearly illegal. We are unable to accept the submission made. As already stated, the settlement was arrived at between the Bank and the Association (third respondent) and by virtue of sub-section (1) of Section 18 of the Act it bound only the members of the Association (third respondent). However, the Bank also extended the benefit of settlement to such other employees, who were not members of the Association. In order to avail of the benefit they had to give a receipt that they were accepting the settlement and the same shall be binding upon them and the format of the receipt, which has been reproduced earlier, does not contain any such term, which may be of detriment to them. To protect its interest the Bank was perfectly justified in asking for a receipt from those employees, who were not members of the Association (third respondent), but wanted to avail of the benefit of the settlement. Therefore, we do not find anything wrong in the Bank asking for a receipt from the aforesaid category of employees.

11. A plain reading of the reference made by the Central Government would show that it does not refer to any dispute or apprehended dispute between the Bank and the Federation (second respondent). It does not refer to any demand or claim made by the Federation or alleged refusal thereof by the Bank. In such circumstances, it is not possible to hold that on account of the settlement dated 18.8.1996 arrived at between the Bank and the Association (third respondent), any dispute or apprehended dispute has come into existence between the Bank and the Federation (second respondent). The action of the Bank in asking for a receipt from those employees, who are not members of the Association (third respondent) but wanted to avail of the benefit of the settlement, again does not give rise to any kind of dispute between the Bank and the Federation (second respondent). Thus, the reference made by the Central Government by the order dated 29.12.1997 for adjudication by the Industrial Tribunal is wholly redundant and uncalled for.”

23) I am thus faced with two judgments, one of single Judge of this Court and the other of the Apex Court taking divergent views about entitlement of employer to prescribe condition for extending the benefits flowing out of Settlement to a section of employees. In ordinary circumstances, this Court is bound to follow the view taken by the Apex Court over the one expressed by Single Judge of this Court. However careful scrutiny the judgment of Apex Court in ANZ Grindlays Bank would indicate that the same is rendered by taking into consideration provisions of Section 18 of the ID Act as applicable outside the State of Maharashtra. In para-7 of the Judgment, the Apex Court has considered provisions of Section 18 and its interpretation in the judgment in M/s. Tata Chemical Limited Vs. The Workmen under M/s. Tata Chemical Limited AIR 1978 SCC 828 and which reads thus: “7. It may be mentioned at the very outset that the appellant-Bank had entered into the settlement dated 18.8.1996 with the Association (third respondent) and members of the Grindlays Bank Employees Union, Calcutta, after holding discussions and negotiations. The settlement had not been entered into either before a conciliation officer or labour court or industrial tribunal. In view of Section 18(1) of the Act the settlement was binding only upon the parties thereto. Section 18 of the Act reads as under: - "18. Persons on whom settlements and awards are binding.- (1) A settlement arrived at by agreement between the employer and workman otherwise than in the course of conciliation proceeding shall be binding on the parties to the agreement. (2) Subject to the provisions of sub-section (3), an arbitration award which has become enforceable shall be binding on the parties to the agreement who referred the dispute to arbitration. (3) A settlement arrived at in the course of conciliation proceedings under this Act or an arbitration award in a case where a notification has been issued under sub-section (3-A) of Section 10-A or an award of a Labour Court, Tribunal or National Tribunal which has become enforceable shall be binding on-- (a) all parties to the industrial dispute; (b) all other parties summoned to appear in the proceedings as parties to the dispute, unless the Board arbitrator, Labour Court, Tribunal or National Tribunal, as the case may be, records the opinion that they were so summoned without proper cause;

(c) where a party referred to in clause (a) or clause (b) is an employer, his heirs, successors or assigns in respect of the establishment to which the dispute relates;

(d) where a party referred to in clause (a) or clause (b) is composed of workmen, all persons who were employed in the establishment or part of the establishment, as the case may be, to which the dispute relates on the date of the dispute and all persons who subsequently become employed in that establishment or part." A plain reading of the provisions of Section 18 would show that where a settlement is arrived at by agreement between the employer and the workman otherwise than in the course of conciliation proceeding shall be binding on the parties to the agreement in view of the clear language used in sub-section (1) thereof. Sub-sections (2) and (3) of Section 18 contemplate different situations where an arbitration award has been given or a settlement has been arrived at in the course of conciliation proceedings. In M/s. Tata Chemicals Ltd. vs. The Workmen employed under M/s. Tata Chemicals Ltd. AIR 1978 SC 828, it was held as under: - "Whereas a settlement arrived at by agreement between the employer and the workman otherwise than in the course of conciliation proceeding is binding only on the parties to the agreement, a settlement arrived at in the course of conciliation proceeding under the Act is binding not only on the parties to the industrial dispute but also on other persons specified in Cls. (b), (c) and (d) of sub-sec. (3) of S. 18 of the Act."

24) Thus on account of absence of Proviso to Section 18, as is applicable to the State of Maharashtra, the Apex Court held that settlement is arrived at by the agreement between employer and workman otherwise then in the course of conciliation proceedings, the same binds only the parties to the agreement. It is on account of its conclusion in para-7 that the Apex Court has held in para-9 of the Judgment that the Bank had extended the benefit of Settlement to other employees, who were not members of the Association and that in order to avail the benefit, they had to give a receipt of accepting the Settlement. Thus the validity of Bank’s action in insisting on submission of Receipt is determined by the Apex Court in the light of voluntary offer by Bank to extend the benefit of settlement to even non-members of Association. In absence of statutory mandate for uniform application of settlement to all workmen in ANZ Grindlays Bank, the Apex Court upheld conditional extension of benefits of settlement to those who were not signatories to it.

25) However, in the instant case, Proviso added to sub-section 1 of Section 18 of ID Act changes the picture altogether. Under Proviso to Section 18 (1), the Settlement executed with recognized Union becomes binding on all workmen. It thus does not lie in the discretion of the employer not to extend the benefit of settlement to non-members of recognized union. It is the statutory right in favour of every workman under the Proviso to Section 18 (1) to avail the benefit of the Settlement irrespective of whether he/she is member of recognized Union or not. Thus, the observation of the Apex Court in para-9 of Judgment in ANZ Grindlays Bank that “as already stated, the settlement was arrived at between the bank and the Association (third respondent) and by virtue of sub-section (1) of Section 18 of the Act it bound only the members of the Association (third respondent)” cannot be made applicable to the present case as Proviso added to sub-section (1) of Section 18 is attracted in the present case and therefore the Settlement applies and is binding on all workmen.

26) In my view therefore the judgment of the Apex Court in ANZ Grindlays Bank would not apply to facts and circumstances of the present case. On the contrary, the law expounded by Kochar, J. in Bennett Coleman & Company Ltd. after considering the Proviso to Section 18 (1) would apply to the instant case. Therefore Respondent cannot be denied the benefits flowing out of settlement on the ground of non-signing of Letter of Acceptance/Undertaking. No error can be traced in the Orders of the Industrial Court which has followed the dicta of judgment of Kochar, J. in Bennett Coleman & Company Ltd.

27) The next issue is about limitation. It is sought to be urged by Mr. Cama that Complaint (ULP) No. 210 of 2012 filed on 20 July 2010 for enforcement of Settlement dated 30 June 2010 was barred by limitation. Respondents are not members of the recognized Union which signed the Settlement. They were agitating before the Industrial Court by filing Compliant (ULP) No. 161 of 2010 on 28 June 2010 to restrain Petitioner and recognized Union from entering into any Settlement. During pendency of that complaint, the Settlement was signed on 30 June 2010, to which Respondents and their Union was not a party. It is Petitioner’s contention that in addition to the Settlement being displayed on notice board of the Company, the same was read out and explained to some of the Respondents on 6 August 2010. It appears that the Petitioner did not grant the benefits flowing out of the Settlement to workmen who failed to sign the Letter of Acceptance /Undertaking as per Annexure – I. It is therefore difficult to hold that the cause of action for filing the ULP Compliant arose for Respondents on 30 June 2010. The same arose much after August 2010 when some of the Respondents became aware of the terms and conditions of the settlement.

28) In M.R. Gupta[5] the Apex Court has that denial of pay fixation of an employee, while he is in service, not in accordance with the rules resulting in payment of a quantum of salary not computed in accordance with the rules can give rise to assertion of a continuing wrong against such act giving rise to the cause of action each time he is paid less than his entitlement and so long as such employee is in service, a fresh cause of action arises every month when he is paid his monthly salary on the basis of such wrong computation. It is held as under: “The claim to be paid the correct salary computed on the basis of proper pay fixation, is a right which subsists during the entire tenure of service and can be exercised at the time of each payment of the salary when the employee is entitled to salary computed correctly in accordance with the rules. This right of a Government servant to be paid the correct salary throughout his tenure according to computation made in accordance with rules, is akin to the right of redemption which is an incident of a subsisting mortgage and subsists so long as the mortgage itself subsists, unless the equity of redemption is extinguished. It is settled that the right of redemption is of this kind. (See Thota China Subba Rao and Others vs. Mattapalli Raju and Others, AIR 1950 Federal Court 1).” 29) In Tarsem Singh.[6] the Apex Court held in para-7 as under:

30) Thus as held by the Apex Court in M. R. Gupta and Tarsem Singh in cases of continuing wrong, relief can be granted even if there is delay in seeking remedy. In Tarsem Singh, the Apex Court held that the consequential relief relating to arrears can be restricted normally to a period of three years prior to the date of filing of Petition.

31) Mr. Cama has placed reliance on judgment of Single Judge of this Court (S.C. Gupte, J.) in Jaihind Sahakari Pani Purvatha Mandali Ltd. (supra), this Court took note of the ratio of the judgment of the Apex Court in M. R. Gupta and Tarsem Singh and held that arrears are required to be restricted in the complaint of unfair labour practices under MRTU and PULP Act to three months prior to the date of filing of complaint. This Court held in para 14, 15 and 16 are as under: “14. The Division Bench of our court in Warden & Co. (India) Ltd. vs. Akhil Maharashtra Kamgar Union 6 was concerned with a workmen's complaint of unfair labour practice of non-payment of wages from February 1992, and bonus, leave travel allowance, encashment of privilege and causal leave for the years 1990-91 and 1991-92. The complaint was filed on 29-3-1993 under MRTU & PULP Act. Though the main controversy before the court was whether an unrecognised union was entitled to appear and act on behalf of workmen of an industry governed by the Industrial Disputes Act in a complaint relating to unfair labour practice other than those specified by Items 2 and 6 of Schedule IV of the MRTU & PULP Act, the Division Bench did consider the other issue involved in the matter, namely, whether the complaint was barred employer's side, the same provision of limitation was pressed into service, namely, Section 28 of the Act, providing for three months' period. The Division Bench observed that the complaint was of an unfair labour practice under Item 9 of Schedule IV of the Act, namely, "failure to implement award, settlement or agreement"; Section 28 enabled a complainant to file a complaint where "any person has engaged in or is engaging in any unfair labour practice" and every time wages were not paid when due, it could be averred that the employer was engaging in an unfair labour practice under Item No.9 of Schedule IV. That was the basis on which the Division Bench did not find merit in the submission of the employer based on limitation of three months. The Division Bench, with respect, correctly held the complaint as not barred under Section 28, but that was on the basis of a recurring cause of action - every time wages were not paid, the employer could certainly be said to have engaged in an unfair labour practice. The Division Bench, however, does not appear to have considered the further question, namely, what should be the period for which arrears of wages should be ordered or in other words, which arrears, calculated on the basis of difference in pay, were recoverable as within time and which were time-barred. The decision of the Supreme Court in M. R. Gupta’s case (supra) was not brought to the notice of the Division Bench. The Supreme Court in M.R. Gupta, as we have noted above, made it clear that so long as an employee was in service, a fresh cause of action arose every month when he was paid his monthly salary on the basis of a wrong computation; if the employee's claim of computation was found to be correct on merits, he would be entitled to be paid according to the properly fixed pay scale "in the future" and "the question of limitation would arise for recovery of the arrears for the past period. In other words, the appellant's claim, if any, for recovery of arrears calculated sat wp 563-2017.doc on the basis of difference in the pay which has become time barred would not be recoverable". This has now been fully explained and reiterated by the Supreme Court, by making out a clear distinction between a continuing cause of action and recurring causes of action particularly from the stand- point of service jurisprudence in Tarsen Singh’s case (supra). After this latter decision, it is impermissible to argue that since each time wages are not paid when due there is a resultant unfair labour practice, arrears could be ordered to be paid for any length of time, that is to say, without reference to any time-bar. The judgments of two learned Single Judges of our court in Indian Smelting & Refining Co.Ltd. vs. Sarva Shramik Sangh 7, Maharashtra State Electricity Board Vs. Suresh Ramchandra Parchure 8 and Cipla Ltd. Vs. Anant Ganpat Patil 9, also, with utmost respect, do not state the law correctly to the extent they allow the claims of arrears of wages without reference to the bar of limitation for claiming past dues. The decisions could be said to be per incuriam for not considering the law laid down in M. R. Gupta’s case (supra) and, in any event, now impliedly overruled by the Supreme Court decision in Tarsen Singh’s case (supra). “15. Ms.Singh also relies on a Full Bench decision of our court in Maharashtra State Road Transport Corporation vs. Premlal Khatri Gajbhiye10 in support of her submission on limitation. The Full Bench in that case was considering whether a particular clause in an earlier settlement was replaced by another clause of a subsequent settlement, and particularly, whether the two concerned clauses operated in different fields or the same field. The clauses related to time scale of pay. The case of the complainants was that the original clause of the earlier settlement operated 7 2009 (121) FLR 310 8 2005 (1) Bom.C.R. 820 9 2008 (1) Bom.C.R. 78 10 2004(2) Bom.C.R. 338 sat wp 563-2017.doc in a different field and was not replaced by the new settlement. They claimed that the employer should continue to enforce it. One of the objections of the employer (respondent to the complaint) was based on the bar of limitation. It was submitted that admittedly ephemeral time scale was granted to the complainants, but that was prior to three years preceding filing of the complaints. The complainants' answer was based on Section 23 of the Limitation Act providing for a continuous cause of action. The Full Bench held that the obligation of the employer to honour the time scale was a recurring obligation. It held that in the context of such recurring obligation, the term 'making of an illegal change' could never have the same meaning as change made once for all so that what continued was only its effect in the context of recurring obligation to pay month to month the wages or value of such amenities. It held that an illegal change would be made afresh every month when the employer would refuse to carry out that continuous obligation. The Full Bench, accordingly, recognised the principle of recurring causes of action. It held that non- compliance of terms of settlement concerning service conditions of employees amounted to a recurring cause of action, rather than a continuous cause of action. The Full Bench merely decided the point in principle, holding a complaint for enforcement of a settlement as not barred. The question of actual relief, which would include actual grant of benefits under the settlement, was left to the Division Bench to decide. That question was not part of the reference. One does not know how this question was actually decided by the concerned Division Bench. As noted in Tarsen Singh’s case (supra), it is whilst considering actual relief of past arrears that the question of application of the principle of recurring cause of action would assume importance. The Full Bench decision, accordingly, does not support Ms. cause of action without considering its actual application. So far as actual application is concerned, it does not state the law otherwise that what we have discussed above.

16. Accordingly, for the reasons stated above, the impugned order of the Industrial Court cannot be sustained to the extent of past arrears beyond three months prior to the date of the complaint and will have to be set aside to that extent and the matter remanded to the Industrial Court for considering the claim of past arrears in the light of its discretion to order recovery beyond three months prior to the complaint for good and sufficient reasons.”

32) Relying on the judgment of this Court in Jaihind Sahakari Pani Purvatha Mandali Ltd, Mr. Cama has submitted that the Industrial Court could not have directed payment of arrears arising out of wage rise from 30 June 2010. In my view considering the peculiar facts and circumstance of the case, where the exact date of cause of injury cannot be ascertained coupled with the recurring cause of action on account of payment of lesser wages to the Respondents every month, the benefit of arrears cannot be restricted to three years prior to the date of filing of Petition. As matter of fact in Tarsem Singh, the Apex Court has held that normally the arrears can be restricted with three years before filing of complaint. Also of relevance is the fact that the action of Petitioners in imposing arbitrary condition of signing Letter of Acceptance/Undertaking is found to be invalid. In such circumstances, Respondents, who were always vigilant of about their rights, cannot be declined the benefit of arrears of wages in respect of their recurring cause of action. So far as Complaint (ULP) No. 249 of 2013 (Writ Petition (St) No. 16992 of 2023) is concerned, the issue of limitation does not apply as the Complaint was filed on 21 October 2013 immediately after signing of Settlement on 4 September 2013.

33) I therefore do not find any valid reason to interfere in the Orders passed by the Industrial Court in both the Petitions. The Writ Petitions are accordingly dismissed without any Order as to costs.

34) In view of the disposal of the Writ Petition (St) No. 16992 of 2023 and Interim Application No.18266 of 2023 do not survive and the same are also disposed of. [SANDEEP V. MARNE J.] After the Judgment is pronounced, Mr. Joshi the Learned counsel appearing for the Petitioner would pray for continuation of the interim Order passed by this Court on 1 August 2023. Considering the fact that the Order passed by the Industrial Court directs grant of wage rise only to small section of employees (Respondents) which is due from the year 2013, the request for continuation of interim Order is rejected. [SANDEEP V. MARNE J.]