Vitthal Rama Pawar v. Deputy Collector (Acquisition) Raigad-Alibag

SCHEDULE [See section 30(2)] COMPENSATION FOR LAND OWNERS The following components shall constitute the minimum compensation package to be given to those whose land is acquired and to tenants referred to in clause (c) of section 3 in a proportion to be decided by the appropriate Government. Serial Component of compensation Manner of determination of value Date of No. package in respect of land determination acquired under the Act of value (1) (2) (3) (4)

1. Market value of land To be determined as provided under section 26

2. Factor by which the market value 1.00 (One) to 2.00 (Two) based on the distance is to be multiplied in the case of of project from urban area, as may be notified rural areas. by the appropriate Government.

3. Factor by which the market value 1(One). is to be multiplied in the case of urban areas.

4. Value of assets attached to land To be determined as provided under section 29. or building.

5. Solatium Equivalent to one hundred per cent. of the market value of land mentioned against

┌─────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────┐
│                                            serial number 2 for rural areas or serial        │
│                                            number 3 for urban areas plus value of assets    │
│                                            attached to land or building against serial      │
│                                            number 4 under column (2).                       │
├─────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────┤
│ 6.    Final award in rural areas           Market value of land mentioned against serial    │
│                                            number 1 multiplied by the factor specified      │
│                                            against serial number 2 plus value of assets     │
│                                            attached to land or building mentioned against   │
│                                            serial number 4 under column (2) plus            │
│                                            solatium mentioned against serial number 5       │
│                                            under column (2).                                │
│ 7.        Final award in urban areas       Market value of land mentioned against serial    │
│                                            number 1 multiplied by the factor specified      │
│                                            against serial number 3 plus value of assets     │
│                                            attached to land or building mentioned against   │
│                                            serial number 4 under column (2) plus            │
│                                            solatium mentioned against serial number 5       │
│                                            under column (2).                                │
│ 8.      Other component, if any, to be                                                      │
│         Included.                                                                           │
└─────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────┘

12. As can be seen from this schedule, the same is divided into four columns. Column 2 deals with the component of compensation package in respect of land acquired under the Act and column 3 deals with the manner of determination of value. Entry 1 of the 1st Schedule talks about the market value of the land and stipulates that the same is to be determined as provided under Section 26. Entry 2 of the 1st Schedule, and which is relevant for our purpose, stipulates the factor by which the market value is to be multiplied in the case of rural areas. The manner of determination of value is that the multiplier factor has to be between 1.00 to 2.00, based on the distance of the project from the urban area, as notified by the Appropriate Government. In other words, whilst determining the compensation in case of the rural areas, the appropriate government has to notify the multiplier factor as contemplated under Entry 2 of the 1st Schedule of the 2013 Act. On a plain reading of Section 26 with Section 30 and the 1st Schedule, it is clear that before any Award is passed in relation to any land in rural areas, the aforesaid multiplier factor has to be applied. Passing an Award without applying the multiplier factor would be contrary to the provisions of Sections 26 to 30 of the 2013 Act.

13. Coming to the facts of the present case, as mentioned earlier, compensation has been calculated by applying the provisions of Section 26 to 30 of the 2013 Act. However, whilst determining the compensation, the authority [Respondent No.1] passing the impugned Award, has applied the multiplier factor as notified by the government vide its notification dated 13th August, 2014. The multiplier factor applied is 1.10. As mentioned earlier, this notification dated 13th August 2014 was set aside by this Court vide its order and judgment dated 9th March 2015. Once this is a case, no Award could have been passed by applying the multiplier factor in this notification. The only justification given by the learned AGP is that even though the Award was passed on 6th May 2015, and which is after the date when the High Court [in WP No.4274 of 2014] had set aside/struck down the said notification, the Award was passed when the Judgment of this Court in WP No.4274 of 2014 was stayed for a period of 2 months. In other words, the justification given was that all the Awards in all the above Writ Petitions were passed during the period when the stay was in operation. This would mean, according to the learned AGP, that the notification was very much in existence when the Awards were passed. Once this is the case, then, there was nothing wrong on the part of the State to calculate the compensation on the basis of the multiplier factor notified in the notification dated 13th August 2014, was the submission. We find this argument to be without any substance for the simple reason that on the date when the Awards were passed, the said notification was already set aside. It was only to give a liberty to the State to challenge its order that the Division Bench stayed its own order dated 9th March 2015 for a period of 2 months. This does not in any way revive the said notifications. Otherwise also, even if we were to assume that the notifications were in force because the Division Bench [in WP No.4274 of 2014] had stayed its own order dated 9th March 2015 for a period of 2 months, the said Division Bench, by its order dated 23rd September 2014 [whilst refusing to grant a stay of the notifications dated 13th August, 2014], clarified that any Award passed during the pendency of the WP No.4274 of 2014, would be subject to the outcome of the said Petition. Once this is the case, and the Writ Petition No.4274 of 2014 was allowed and the notification dated 13th August 2014 was set aside, and which has now attained finality, the State cannot justify its actions by contending that the Awards were passed during the period when the stay was in operation. Once the said notification dated 13th August 2014 was struck down/set aside, any Award passed on the basis of the said notification cannot stand. In other words, if the foundation of the Award itself goes, the Award cannot be permitted to be held as valid. We say this also because the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of Executive Engineer, Gosikhurd Project Ambadi, Bhandara, Maharashtra Vidarbha Irrigation Development Corporation VS Mahesh and others, [(2022) 2 SCC 772] has clearly held that until a notification stipulating the multiplier factor is issued by the "appropriate government" for rural areas, compensation in terms of sub-section (2) of Section 26 cannot be determined. Paragraph 26 of this decision reads thus:- "26. The determination of compensation is never simple. It is a complex factual and legal exercise. As per sub-section (2) to Section 26 of the 2013 Act, the market value calculated under sub-section (1) is to be multiplied by the factor to be specified in the First Schedule. Section 30(2) requires the Collector to issue individual awards detailing the particulars of compensation payable and details of payment as specified in the First Schedule. As per the First Schedule, the factor/multiplier in case of rural areas can be between one and two, based on the distance from the urban area, and this factor/multiplier is to be notified by the "appropriate Government". This aspect is of importance when we examine the second issue and would be adverted to later. Thus, it clearly delineates that until notification of the multiplier is issued by the "appropriate Government" for rural areas, compensation in terms of subsection (2) to Section 26 cannot be determined. When a multiplier of more than 1 applies, the compensation payable under Section 26 of the 2013 Act would be higher than the market value of the land."

14. In light of this authoritative pronouncement, we are of the view that since the impugned Award is based on a notification issued by the State Government dated 13th August 2014 and which is struck down by this Court, the Award cannot be sustained. On this ground alone the impugned awards in all the above Writ Petitions are liable to be set aside. At the risk of repetition, we may reiterate that we have come to this finding because in all the Writ Petitions, all the Awards are based on the notification dated 13th August, 2014, and all Awards have been passed after 9th March 2015, and on or before 9th May 2015 (the period during which the Division Bench had granted stay of its own order dated 9th March 2015).

15. There is yet another ground on which the awards and the proceedings have been challenged by the Petitioners, namely, that the impugned Awards are not passed within 1 year of 1st January 2014 i.e. the date when the 2013 Act came into force, and hence, the entire acquisition proceedings have lapsed. In other words, it was the submission of the Petitioners that once acquisition proceedings were initiated under the 1894 Act and no Award was made on the date when the 2013 Act came into force, then the Award had to be passed within 12 months from 1st January 2014 subject to any stay being granted by any Court. In other words, if there was any stay, the same has to be excluded for the purposes of calculating the period of 12 months within which the Award ought to be passed.

16. In this regard, Mr. Kulkarni, the learned counsel for the Petitioner, has once again heavily relied upon a judgment of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of Executive Engineer, Gosikhurd Project Ambadi, Bhandara, Maharashtra Vidarbha Irrigation Development Corporation (supra). Mr. Kulkarni submitted that in the facts of the present case, even as per the State there was a stay granted and which was for a period of 42 days. He submitted that this is also clearly reflected in the impugned Awards and not even disputed by the learned AGP. If the Award was to be passed within 1 year from 1st January 2014, excluding this period of 42 days, then all the Awards ought to have been passed on or before 11th February

2015. However, in the facts of the present case it is an admitted position that all the Awards in all the above Writ Petitions have been passed after 11th February 2015. In fact, they were all passed after the notification dated 13th August 2014 was set aside by the Division Bench of this Court on 9th March 2015 and only whilst a stay was operating of the said order for a period of 2 months, namely, till 9th May 2015. He submitted that once this is the case then entire acquisition proceedings itself are bad because the Awards were not passed within the statutory period of 12 months from 1st January 2014 (even after excluding the period of 42 days the stay was operating).

17. In answer to this argument, Ms. Bane, the learned AGP, submitted that in all the above Writ Petitions the Awards are passed by taking into consideration the provisions of Section 24 of the 2013 Act. She submitted that under Section 24(1)(a) where land acquisition proceedings are initiated under the 1894 Act but have not culminated in an Award on the date when the 2013 Act came into force [i.e. 1st January 2014], then, all the provisions of the 2013 Act relating to the determination of compensation shall apply. She submitted that when one reads Section 24(1)(a), it is clear that proceedings initiated under the 1894 Act have to be continued and it is only for determination of compensation that the provisions of the 2013 Act would come into play. In other words, it was the submission of Ms. Bane that once no Award is passed under the 1894 Act by 31st December 2013, then, only the provisions of Section 26 to 30 of the 2013 Act relating to determination of compensation would apply and not the other provisions, namely, Section 25, which stipulates that the Award is to be passed within a period of 1 year from the notification issued under Section 19 of the 2013 Act. To put it differently, it was the submission of Ms. Bane that the time for passing the Award was a period of 2 years as specified in Section 11A of the 1894 Act and if this be the case, then all the Awards were passed within time and hence there is no question of either the Awards, or the acquisition proceedings relating thereto, having lapsed and or being declared as invalid. In support of this submission Ms. Bane relied upon a decision of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of Haryana State Industrial & Infrastructure Development Corporation Ltd. VS Deepak Agarwal & Ors. [2022 SCC Online SC 932].

18. We have heard Mr. Kulkarni as well as Ms. Bane on this issue. To understand the question raised, it would be appropriate to once again briefly narrate the facts. In the present case, the notification under Section 4 of the 1894 Act was issued on 31st December 2011. Thereafter, the Section 6 declarations were issued on 19th December 2012, 25th January 2013, 26th January 2013 and 25th March 2013 respectively. Thereafter, before passing of any Award, the 2013 Act came into force on 1st January 2014. In the instant case, all the Awards have been passed after 9th March 2015, and on or before 9th May 2015. What is to be determined is whether the period to pass the Award is 12 months from 1st January, 2014 as contended by Mr. Kulkarni, or a period of 2 years from the Section 6 declarations (by applying the provisions of Section 11-A of the 1894 Act) as contended by the learned AGP. We find that this argument need not detain us any further because the same is squarely covered by the decision of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of Executive Engineer, Gosikhurd Project Ambadi, Bhandara, Maharashtra Vidarbha Irrigation Development Corporation (supra). The Hon'ble Supreme Court was examining the exact same question. After referring to the relevant provisions of both the Acts, in paragraphs 29, 30 and 31, the Hon’ble Supreme Court concluded that in cases covered under Section 24(1)(a) of the 2013 Act, the limitation period for passing of an Award would commence from 1st January 2014, i.e. the date when the 2013 Act came into force. The Hon'ble Supreme Court further held that Awards passed under clause (a) to Section 24(1) would be valid if made within 12 months from 1st January 2014. The Supreme Court clarified that this dictum is subject to the caveat that a declaration which has lapsed in terms of Section 11-A of the 1894 Act on or before 31st December 2013, would not get revived. The relevant portion of this decision reads thus:- "29. Given the object and purpose behind Sections 24 and 26 to 30 of the 2013 Act, we notice that practical absurdities and anomalies may arise if the two-year period for making of an award in terms of Section 11-A of the 1894 Act commencing from the date of issue of the declaration is applied to the awards to be made under Section 24(1)(a) of the 2013 Act. This would mitigate against the underlying legislative intent behind prescription of time for making of an award in respect of saved acquisition proceedings initiated under the repealed 1894 Act, which is twofold: (i) to give sufficient time to the authorities to determine compensation payable under the 2013 Act; and (ii) to ensure early and expedited payment to the landowners by reducing the period from two years under Section 11-A of the 1894 Act to twelve months under Section 25 of the 2013 Act. In case of declarations issued in January 2012, on application of Section 11-A of the 1894 Act, the time to determine compensation under the 2013 Act would vary from a day to a month, and while in cases where the declarations were issued within twelve months of the repeal of the 1894 Act, the landowners would be at a disadvantage as an award beyond the twelve-month period specified in Section 25 of the 2013 Act would be valid. In the first set of cases, given the onerous factual and legal exercise involved in determination of compensation and the need to issue notification under Section 26(2) of the 2013 Act, publication of the awards would be impractical. Hasty and incorrect awards would be deleterious for the landowners. If the awards are not pronounced, the acquisition proceedings would lapse defeating the legislative intent behind Section 24(1)(a) of the 2013 Act to save such proceedings. We would, therefore, exercise our choice to arrive at a just, fair and harmonious construction consistent with the legislative intent.

30. A rational approach so as to further the object and purpose of Sections 24 and 26 to 30 of the 2013 Act is required. We are conscious that Section 25 refers to publication of a notification under Section 19 as the starting point of limitation. In the context of clause (a) to Section 24(1) of the 2013 Act there would be no notification under Section 19, but declaration under Section 6 of the 1894 Act. When the declarations under Section 6 are valid as on 1-1-2014, it is necessary to give effect to the legislative intention and reckon the starting point. In the context of Section 24(1)(a) of the 2013 Act, declarations under Section 6 of the 1894 Act are no different and serve the same purpose as the declarations under Section 19 of the 2013 Act.

31. Consequently, we hold that in cases covered by clause (a) to Section 24(1) of the 2013 Act, the limitation period for passing/making of an award under Section 25 of the 2013 Act would commence from 1-1-2014, that is, the date when the 2013 Act came into force. Awards passed under clause (a) to Section 24(1) would be valid if made within twelve months from 1-1-

2014. This dictum is subject to the caveat stated in paras 20 to 23 (supra) that a declaration which has lapsed in terms of Section 11-A of the 1894 Act before or on 31-12-2013 would not get revived."

19. Faced with this decision, Ms. Bane, the learned AGP, submitted that this decision of the Supreme Court is impliedly overruled by 3 judge bench of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of Haryana State Industrial & Infrastructure Development Corporation Limited (supra). She submitted that in this decision the Supreme Court has held that in cases covered under Section 24(1)(a), it is only the provisions of Section 26 to 30 of the 2013 Act that would apply and not any other provision, namely, Section 25. We are unable to agree with the submissions made by the learned AGP for more than one reason. Firstly, we find that the issue raised before the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of Haryana State Industrial & Infrastructure Development Corporation Limited (supra) was the interpretation of the word "initiated" appearing in Section 24(1) of the 2013 Act with reference to land acquisition proceedings under the 1894 Act. It was the contention of some of the parties that for the purposes of Section 24(1)(a) of the 2013 Act, issuance and publication of notification under Section 4(1) of the 1894 Act alone amounted to initiation of acquisition proceedings thereunder. The contrary stand was that it is the declaration under Section 6(1) of the 1894 Act [that the land is required for a public purpose], which would mark the point of initiation of acquisition proceedings thereunder. It was this issue that was being decided by the Supreme Court. In fact, this is clear from paragraph 33 of this decision which states that taking note of the legislative intention it has no hesitation in holding that the point of initiation of land acquisition proceedings under the 1894 Act, for the purposes of Section 24(1) of the 2013 Act, is the issuance and publication of the Section 4(1) notification in the official gazette of the Appropriate Government. Thereafter, the Supreme Court also went on to consider whether the Section 4 notification issued under the 1894 Act prior to 1st January 2014 could continue or survive after 1st January 2014, and as to whether the Section 6 declaration [under 1894 Act] could be issued after 1st January

2014. It is whilst discussing this issue that the Hon'ble Supreme Court inter alia held that the combined effect of Section 24(1) and clause (a) thereof is that if land acquisition proceedings under the 1894 Act were initiated prior to 1st January, 2014 (the date of coming into force the 2013 Act), and it did not culminate into an Award under Section 11 [of the 1894 Act], then all provisions of the 2013 Act relating to the determination of compensation should apply to such acquisition proceedings. The Hon'ble Supreme Court thus held that in such circumstances, the land acquisition proceedings should continue but all the provisions relating to the determination of compensation under the 2013 Act alone will be applicable to such proceedings, meaning thereby, the 2013 Act would come into play only at that stage. When one reads the observations of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in Haryana State Industrial & Infrastructure Development Corporation Limited (supra) the same cannot be read de-hors the question that was being determined by the Supreme Court.

20. It is now too well settled a proposition that the ratio of any decision must be understood in the background of the facts of that case. It has been said a long time ago that a case is only an authority for what it actually decides and not what logically follows from it. If one must refer to any authority on this subject, the Supreme Court, in the case of Sarva Shramik Sanghatana (KV) v/s State of Maharashtra [(2008) 1 SCC 494] has very succinctly and eloquently reiterated the said proposition. The relevant portion of this decision reads thus:- "14. On the subject of precedents Lord Halsbury, L.C., said in Quinn v. Leathem [1901 AC 495: (1900-1903) All ER Rep 1 (HL)]: (All ER p. 7 G-I) “Before discussing Allen v. Flood [1898 AC 1: (1895- 1899) All ER Rep 52 (HL)] and what was decided therein, there are two observations of a general character which I wish to make; and one is to repeat what I have very often said before—that every judgment must be read as applicable to the particular facts proved or assumed to be proved, since the generality of the expressions which may be found there are not intended to be expositions of the whole law, but are governed and qualified by the particular facts of the case in which such expressions are to be found. The other is that a case is only an authority for what it actually decides. I entirely deny that it can be quoted for a proposition that may seem to follow logically from it. Such a mode of reasoning assumes that the law is necessarily a logical code, whereas every lawyer must acknowledge that the law is not always logical at all.” We entirely agree with the above observations.

15. In Ambica Quarry Works v. State of Gujarat [(1987) 1 SCC 213] (vide SCC p. 221, para 18) this Court observed:

16. In Bhavnagar University v. Palitana Sugar Mill (P) Ltd. [(2003) 2 SCC 111] (vide SCC p. 130, para 59) this Court observed: “59. … It is also well settled that a little difference in facts or additional facts may make a lot of difference in the precedential value of a decision.”

17. As held in Bharat Petroleum Corpn. Ltd. v. N.R. Vairamani [(2004) 8 SCC 579: AIR 2004 SC 4778] a decision cannot be relied on without disclosing the factual situation. In the same judgment this Court also observed: (SCC pp. 584-85, paras 9-12) “9. Courts should not place reliance on decisions without discussing as to how the factual situation fits in with the fact situation of the decision on which reliance is placed. Observations of courts are neither to be read as Euclid's theorems nor as provisions of a statute and that too taken out of their context. These observations must be read in the context in which they appear to have been stated. Judgments of courts are not to be construed as statutes. To interpret words, phrases and provisions of a statute, it may become necessary for judges to embark into lengthy discussions but the discussion is meant to explain and not to define. Judges interpret statutes, they do not interpret judgments. They interpret words of statutes; their words are not to be interpreted as statutes. In London Graving Dock Co. Ltd. v. Horton [1951 AC 737: (1951) 2 All ER 1 (HL)] (AC at p. 761), Lord MacDermott observed: (All ER p. 14 C-D) ‘The matter cannot, of course, be settled merely by treating the ipsissima verba of Willes, J. as though they were part of an Act of Parliament and applying the rules of interpretation appropriate thereto. This is not to detract from the great weight to be given to the language actually used by that most distinguished Judge, …’

10. In Home Office v. Dorset Yacht Co. Ltd. [1970 AC 1004: (1970) 2 WLR 1140: (1970) 2 All ER 294 (HL)] Lord Reid said, ‘Lord Atkin's speech … is not to be treated as if it were a statutory definition. It will require qualification in new circumstances.’ (All ER p. 297g) Megarry, J. in Shepherd Homes Ltd. v. Sandham (No. 2) [(1971) 1 WLR 1062: (1971) 2 All ER 1267], observed: (All ER p. 1274d) ‘One must not, of course, construe even a reserved judgment of even Russell, L.J. as if it were an Act of Parliament;’ And, in British Railways Board v. Herrington [1972 AC 877: (1972) 2 WLR 537: (1972) 1 All ER 749 (HL)] Lord Morris said: (All ER p. 761c) ‘There is always peril in treating the words of a speech or a judgment as though they were words in a legislative enactment, and it is to be remembered that judicial utterances are made in the setting of the facts of a particular case.’

11. Circumstantial flexibility, one additional or different fact may make a world of difference between conclusions in two cases. Disposal of cases by blindly placing reliance on a decision is not proper.

12. The following words of Hidayatullah, J. in the matter of applying precedents have become locus classicus: (Abdul Kayoom v. CIT [AIR 1962 SC 680], AIR p. 688, para 19) ‘19. … Each case depends on its own facts and a close similarity between one case and another is not enough because even a single significant detail may alter the entire aspect, in deciding such cases, one should avoid the temptation to decide cases (as said by Cardozo) by matching the colour of one case against the colour of another. To decide therefore, on which side of the line a case falls, the broad resemblance to another case is not at all decisive.’ *** ‘Precedent should be followed only so far as it marks the path of justice, but you must cut the dead wood and trim off the side branches else you will find yourself lost in thickets and branches. My plea is to keep the path to justice clear of obstructions which could impede it.’ ”

18. We have referred to the aforesaid decisions and the principles laid down therein, because often decisions are cited for a proposition without reading the entire decision and the reasoning contained therein. In our opinion, the decision of this Court in Sarguja Transport case [(1987) 1 SCC 5: 1987 SCC (Cri) 19: AIR 1987 SC 88] cannot be treated as a Euclid's formula."

21. Applying the aforesaid principles, we are unable to accept the submission of Ms. Bane that the decision rendered by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in Haryana State Industrial & Infrastructure Development Corporation Limited (supra) has impliedly overruled its decision in Executive Engineer, Gosikhurd Project Ambadi, Bhandara, Maharashtra Vidarbha Irrigation Development Corporation (supra). This is more so when one take into consideration that the said judgment in Executive Engineer, Gosikhurd Project Ambadi, Bhandara, Maharashtra Vidarbha Irrigation Development Corporation (supra) has been specifically referred to in Haryana State Industrial & Infrastructure Development Corporation Limited (in paragraph 9 thereof), and the same has not been overruled, either expressly or by necessary implication. Another factor that persuades us to take this view is that one of the Judges in both the matters was the same (A. M. Khanvilkar, J. as he then was). If the Supreme Court, in Haryana State Industrial & Infrastructure Development Corporation Limited wanted to overrule its judgment in Executive Engineer, Gosikhurd Project Ambadi, Bhandara, Maharashtra Vidarbha Irrigation Development Corporation (supra), it would have expressly done so. We therefore find that the argument of Ms. Bane is wholly misplaced and so is the reliance on the judgment of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of Haryana State Industrial & Infrastructure Development Corporation Limited (supra).

22. As mentioned earlier, this point is squarely covered by the decision of the Supreme Court in the case of Executive Engineer, Gosikhurd Project Ambadi, Bhandara, Maharashtra Vidarbha Irrigation Development Corporation (supra) which clearly stipulates that in cases falling under Section 24(1)(a) of the 2013 Act, the limitation period for passing an Award would commence from 1st January, 2014 and the same would have to be passed within a period of 12 months thereafter, subject to any stay being granted by any Court. In other words, the period during which the stay was operating would have to be excluded for the purposes of calculating the period of 12 months. This has admittedly not been done in the present case. Therefore, on this count also, the entire acquisition proceedings are bad and the Awards passed pursuant thereto, are also unsustainable.

23. In these circumstances, we hold that the acquisition proceedings in respect of the lands of all the Petitioners in all the above Writ Petitions have lapsed and the Awards passed pursuant thereto are quashed and set aside.

24. The State will now have to initiate fresh acquisition proceedings and acquire the lands of all the Petitioners by following the procedure under the 2013 Act.

25. Rule is made absolute in the aforesaid terms and all the Writ Petitions are disposed of in terms thereof. However, there shall be no order as to costs. In view of the disposal of all the Writ Petitions, nothing survives in any Interim Applications filed therein and the same are disposed of accordingly.

26. This order will be Personal Assistant of this Court. All concerned will act on production by [ M.M. SATHAYE, J.] [ B. P. COLABAWALLA, J.] Utkarsh